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Abstract
Flight control systems, railway interlocking systems, and nuclear reactor protection
systems are examples of safety critical systems from diﬀerent industrial domains. A
safety critical system within any of these domains requires some type of acceptance from
a safety authority prior to commissioning. The minimum prerequisite for achieving
acceptance is to comply with relevant normative requirements from regulations and
standards. Safety standards and guidelines typically deﬁne the safety objectives to be
met by a system and by the process of developing the system.
In this thesis we present a method and a pattern language called Safe Control
Systems (SaCS) for development of conceptual safety designs. By a conceptual safety
design we mean an early stage speciﬁcation of system requirements, system design,
and safety case for a safety critical system. The SaCS method consists of: (1) The
SaCS process – a process for the systematic application of patterns as development
support. (2) The library of SaCS patterns – a collection of patterns providing guidance
on eﬀective solutions to diﬀerent challenges relevant when developing conceptual safety
designs. The library is structured into patterns for requirements capture, system design
and safety assurance in the form of a safety case. (3) The SaCS pattern language – a
language for deﬁning patterns and for specifying the application of patterns for safety
design conceptualisation. The three artefacts are complementary and their integration
represents a combined approach to pattern-based development.
The patterns in the library represent safety engineering best practices inspired by
international safety standards and guidelines. Applying patterns according to the SaCS
process supports establishing the evidence that the conceptualisation of systems is
being performed according to a suitable process and according to accepted practices.
The pattern language supports the speciﬁcation of patterns and the documentation of
their use.
The SaCS method has been evaluated in three diﬀerent studies: (1) Study 1 – a
case study on safety design conceptualisation of a nuclear power plant control system;
(2) Study 2 – a case study on safety design conceptualisation of a railway interlocking
system; (3) Study 3 – an analytic evaluation of the suitability of the SaCS pattern
language for its intended task.
The experiences and results from the diﬀerent evaluations indicate that the SaCS
method facilitates the development of conceptual safety designs by systematically com-
bining and applying patterns as development support.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A safety critical system must not only be safe, it must also be demonstrated safe, and
typically be accepted as being suﬃciently safe for its intended purpose by a relevant
safety authority prior to commissioning [160]. By safe, we do not mean in an absolute
sense. No system is free from risk and thus absolutely safe [113], not even those systems
that are developed according to the highest standards.
The safety property of a programmable system is aﬀected by the diﬀerent develop-
ment practices applied during its life-cycle [28,93]. The principles for determining what
is suﬃciently safe and what engineering practices shall be applied in order to develop
systems that are inherently safe and that may be accepted as suitable diﬀer among
experts. International safety standards are developed by means of a consensus among
domain and safety experts and reﬂect the current best practices for development of
safety critical systems within an industrial domain [30,86,93] that may understood as
accepted. Even if a system has been developed in compliance with relevant standards,
this does not imply that the intended safety level of the system developed has been
achieved. Catastrophic accidents still occur as in the case of the 2011 Fukushima Dai-
ichi [45] nuclear disaster or the 2011 collision of two high-speed trains close to Wenzhou
in China [112]. Compliance to a standard only implies that a system has been devel-
oped according to the principles that are accepted as yielding safe systems within a
domain.
Acceptance for the commissioning of a safety critical system is based on a safety
authority having achieved conﬁdence in the the system being suﬃciently safe for its
intended purpose. In 2009, the Norwegian National Rail Administration discontinued
its project to deploy a computer-based interlocking system named Merkur, designed
by ABB, after spending 420 million NOK (Norwegian Krone) on the project and not
achieving safety acceptance [139]. The Norwegian Railway Inspectorate rejected the
request to put the Merkur system into operation due to substantial weaknesses in the
elementary documentation [139, 155], including the requirement speciﬁcation and the
safety demonstration documentation. Thus, failure to produce basic documentation
correctly can be costly, as in the case of the Merkur system.
A system failure can potentially endanger human life or the environment and render
a system unsafe. A system failure is the eﬀect of one or more errors propagating to
the system level [14]. An error is a manifestation of a latent fault [14]. Feiler [53]
indicates that 70% of the faults detected during development of software-based systems
are introduced in the early phases of the development life-cycle, during the phases
for specifying requirements, architecture and design. In general, a fault or an error
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becomes increasingly more costly to mitigate the later in the development process it is
detected [12,21,53]. Risks associated with the potential erroneous operation of a system
may be eﬀectively reduced in the early phases of development by avoiding the potential
causes of failure, the faults, to be introduced and by incorporating fault tolerance in
the system design to mitigate the eﬀects of a failure [14].
Developing systems in compliance with the requirements and recommendation given
in standards is costly. Amey [7] reports that developing software compliant to Level
A of DO-178B/ED-12B [47] is ﬁve times as costly as developing non-critical software.
Wong et al. [175] compares software safety standards from diﬀerent domains with re-
spect to cost-eﬀectiveness and identiﬁes that there is no consensus across domains
on how to achieve safety in a cost-eﬀective fashion. The authors also reviewed sev-
eral large development projects with respect to the cost-eﬀectiveness of the practices
applied in order meet safety objectives. They conclude that safety objectives and cost-
eﬀectiveness objectives are best met by applying company-speciﬁc safety engineering
best practices throughout the development life cycle.
Regulations [50] and standards [28–30] commonly give detailed requirements on
the objectives to be fulﬁlled during system development, and to a lesser degree pro-
vide guidance on how to apply methods and techniques in order to fulﬁl objectives.
Guidelines [52, 144] on the other hand may bridge this gap and oﬀer guidance on the
application of diﬀerent methods and techniques in order to satisfy objectives. A chal-
lenge with providing guidance on diﬀerent topics within the format of a traditional
guideline is completeness; it is not possible to cover all topics. Guidelines are typically
documented in the form of a report. They are therefore expanded with new knowledge
through revisions.
Based on the challenges introduced above we see the need for a new type of develop-
ment guidance, a guidance that describes safety engineering best practices and eﬀective
solutions in a manner that may be eﬃciently applied. The guidance should support
the early phases of system development and provide assurance that safety objectives
are met. The guidance should also be easy to expand with new knowledge as this is
gained. In addition, it should be possible to tailor the guidance to domain-speciﬁc
and company-speciﬁc needs. We envision a body of knowledge represented as guidance
on safety engineering best practices and solutions on every aspect of system develop-
ment in a library such that guidance on individual topics can be eﬃciently combined,
applied, and tailored to accommodate speciﬁc needs.
The notion of patterns [5,26,55] has been used for decades as a means to describe the
essence of a recurring problem and to deﬁne the very core of a solution to that problem.
Pattern collections and languages deﬁne a body of knowledge on eﬀective solutions
within a particular domain. Patterns generalise known solutions to commonly recurring
problems and are usually presented in an format that is easy to understand and apply.
The use of patterns for communicating engineering best practices and design concepts
is widespread. The pattern format is ﬂexible in the sense that pattern collections and
languages are found in a wide range of diﬀerent domains and for diﬀerent purposes.
A pattern deﬁnition is usually scoped to deﬁne one concept only. Thus, the pattern
format supports a separation of concerns. A number of concerns may be addressed by
a collection of complementing patterns. The problem of combining patterns in order
to solve an overall problem is addressed by pattern languages. A pattern language
deﬁnes the systematic application of several patterns. The many attractive features of
patterns and pattern languages as presented above led us to pursue a pattern-based
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solution.
In the following sections we state the overall objective of our work and give an
overview of the main contributions. Then, the structure of the thesis is presented.
1.1 Objective
As stated in the introduction, the notion of patterns [5,26,55] has been used for decades
as a means to describe the essence of a recurring problem and the very core of a solution
to that problem. Pattern languages [5] can serve as a tool for expressing a combination
of patterns. Each individual pattern speciﬁed in the language describes a solution
to an isolated problem and the combination of results from the application of several
patterns solves the overall problem.
The literature on patterns deﬁnes solutions to problems on a variety of topics rel-
evant to safety critical systems development, e.g., fault tolerant software design [68],
or safety argumentation [102]. In the pattern literature there is a lack of eﬀective ap-
proaches for precisely specifying the combined use of several patterns for addressing a
development challenge [79]. In order for a pattern-based development approach to be
useful within development of safety critical systems, it should be possible to integrate
patterns on product-oriented development challenges and solutions, e.g., patterns for
hardware design and software design, with patterns on process-oriented challenges and
solutions, e.g., patterns for hazard identiﬁcation or risk assessment. It is not neces-
sarily suﬃcient to present the system design alone in order to provide conﬁdence that
the system in question is suitable for its intended use. Safety is a property of a system
achieved through a systematic development process where the system design is one
of several results. The system design is a result from the design phase and is very
important as it deﬁnes the components, interfaces and other main characteristics of a
system. With the intention of addressing the early stages of development, the focus of
this thesis is to support the stages leading to the deﬁnition of conceptual safety designs
by providing guidance to the deﬁnition of system solutions that are suitable for their
intended use. Guidance in the form of patterns represents the core of our approach.
The overall objective of this thesis is to develop a method and a pattern language
that is:
1. Well-suited for developing conceptual safety designs.
2. Applicable within an industrial context within acceptable eﬀort.
3. Comprehensible for its intended users.
The intended target users are system engineers, safety engineers, hardware and software
engineers.
1.2 Contribution
The main contributions of this thesis is the Safe Control Systems (SaCS) method and
its supporting pattern language that has been developed to meet the overall objec-
tive stated above. The SaCS method facilitates the development of conceptual safety
designs for safety critical systems.
5
Introduction
The SaCS method consists of the SaCS process, the library of SaCS patterns, and
the SaCS pattern language. In the following three subsections we give a brief overview
of each of these artefacts.
1.2.1 The SaCS process
The SaCS method oﬀers a process for systematically selecting and instantiating pat-
terns as well as documenting how patterns are applied to support development.
The most important documents established during the development of a safety
critical system design are the requirement speciﬁcation and the design speciﬁcation.
The requirement speciﬁcation should deﬁne the required properties of the system. The
design speciﬁcation describes how the requirements shall be fulﬁlled technically.
In order to provide conﬁdence that the design of the system under development
actually deﬁnes a safe system, another important document is the safety case. The
purpose of a safety case is to explicitly deﬁne why a system under consideration is
suﬃciently safe for its intended purpose, e.g., by demonstrating that the safety re-
quirements are correct and suﬃcient and that the safety requirements are satisﬁed by
design. Further, the speciﬁcation of the safety demonstration should be initiated at
the very beginning of system development and systematically maintained during the
life-cycle of the system.
The SaCS process deﬁnes a sequence of activities for systematic selection and ap-
plication of patterns. The selection process ensures that the patterns are applied in a
suitable order. In addition, activities are deﬁned for documenting the composition and
application of patterns.
1.2.2 The library of SaCS patterns
The library of SaCS patterns consists of so-called basic SaCS patterns. Basic patterns
are categorised into six diﬀerent kinds. There are basic patterns for, e.g., eliciting
requirements, assessing risk, deriving system design, and establishing the safety argu-
mentation.
Although basic SaCS patterns are of diﬀerent kinds, they are all described as vari-
ations over a common and simple format. Each pattern is uniquely identiﬁed, clearly
deﬁnes the problem that is addressed, and provides a description of a solution to the
problem. The patterns in the library provide guidance on a number of topics. De-
pending on the problem in being addressed, guidance is given in diﬀerent forms, e.g.,
a solution to a design challenge is described by an abstract deﬁnition of a design, a
solution to an assessment challenge may be described as a process.
The eﬀective use of patterns depends on the ability of the user to match problems
occurring in the real world with, if available, a pattern that describes a solution to the
problem. Secondly, the eﬀective use of patterns depends on the ability of the user to
correctly apply the pattern.
The patterns in the library are deﬁned at diﬀerent levels of abstraction; some are
very speciﬁc and some generic. Every pattern includes an instantiation rule that char-
acterises guidance on its instantiation. The patterns in the SaCS library are also
deﬁned in a manner that allows them to be applied as stand-alone entities. However,
the intention is that basic patterns are applied in a speciﬁc sequence decided by the
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user. In order to select patterns in a proper sequence, the related patterns sections of
the basic patterns may be consulted.
1.2.3 The SaCS pattern language
A pattern expressed in the SaCS pattern language may be a basic pattern, as repre-
sented by the patterns in the library, or a composite pattern. A composite pattern is
a structure of patterns where patterns are combined by operators. The SaCS pattern
language includes a notation for deﬁning how patterns are combined into composite
patterns. The rules for combining patterns forms the basis for deﬁning new patterns as
compositions of predeﬁned patterns. The notation of the SaCS pattern language may
also be used to deﬁne how patterns are applied during development and thus oﬀers the
ability to document the application of SaCS.
The notation for deﬁning composite patterns is graphical and serves several pur-
poses. It is graphical to facilitate communication and discussion among users on the
proper application of patterns for problem solving. The notation allows the docu-
mentation of the application of patterns in a development context. The notation also
facilitates the documentation of the reusable pattern compositions that may be applied
in diﬀerent contexts.
A composite pattern deﬁnes a structure of patterns where each pattern in the struc-
ture is represented abstractly by an icon and a unique identiﬁer. The full deﬁnition of
a referenced pattern can be found using the identiﬁer as a key. A composite pattern
is parametrised in terms of inputs and outputs. Each pattern in a composite is also
parametrised. The notation supports deﬁning reusable pattern structures. The pat-
terns in a composite are connected by relations. The relations models the expected data
ﬂow and dependencies between patterns when they are applied in a context. Relations
operate on the parameters of the patterns that are combined. A speciﬁc application
of a pattern may be captured by connecting its formal parameters with the actual
documents these represent in a given context. A composite pattern can deﬁne the
instantiation order of patterns and in this sense guide and document the process of
developing conceptual safety designs.
A composite pattern can be instantiated according to the instantiation rules associ-
ated with each basic pattern it is composed of and according to the rules of composition.
1.3 Structure of the thesis
This thesis is based on a collection of 4 research papers and split into two parts. Part I
provides the context and an overall summary of the work, while Part II contains the
research papers. Each paper is self-contained and can therefore be read separately.
Part I is organized into the following chapters:
Chapter 1 - Introduction presents the main objective of this thesis, the research
domain, the contribution, and the structure of this thesis.
Chapter 2 - Problem characterisation provides background material and argues
why our main objective is worth pursuing. In addition, success criteria for our
main artefacts are formulated.
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Chapter 3 - Research method discusses a method for technology research and how
this method has been applied in this thesis.
Chapter 4 - State of the art presents the state of the art literature of relevance
for our main artefacts. In Section 7.2 of Chapter 7 we conduct a more detailed
discussion of our results with respect to this state of the art. This more detailed
discussion has been postponed to Chapter 7 because it depends on the detailed
description of our artefacts.
Chapter 5 - Achievements: the overall picture provides an overview of the SaCS
method and its main ingredients.
Chapter 6 - Overview of research papers provides publication details of each re-
search paper.
Chapter 7 - Discussion argues to what extent artefacts satisfy the success criteria
stated in Chapter 2. In addition, important design decisions are discussed, and
it compares our approach to other approaches from the literature.
Chapter 8 - Conclusion presents conclusions and possible areas of future work.
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Problem characterisation
In this chapter, we present some background material and motivate in more detail why
the overall objective deﬁned in Section 1.1 is desirable. Furthermore, we decompose
and reﬁne the overall objective into a set of success criteria that we would like our
artefacts to fulﬁl.
Section 2.1 clariﬁes the terminology and main concepts that are used throughout
this thesis. Section 2.2 details success criteria for each of the three artefacts.
2.1 Conceptual clariﬁcation
To avoid ambiguity, and consequently misinterpretation, we deﬁne the diﬀerent terms
that are used throughout the thesis. The terms that we apply or deﬁne are emphasised
in a bold font.
2.1.1 Safety
This thesis addresses the development of systems that are required to be dependable.
We address especially the safety property of dependable systems. Dependability is
by Avizˇienis et al. [14] deﬁned as “the ability to deliver service that can justiﬁably be
trusted”. The authors further deﬁne dependability to be be composed of [14]: avail-
ability: deﬁned as the “readiness for correct service”; reliability: deﬁned as “conti-
nuity of correct service”; safety: deﬁned as “absence of catastrophic consequences on
the user(s) and the environment”; integrity: deﬁned as “absence of improper system
alterations”; and maintainability: deﬁned as the “ability to undergo modiﬁcations
and repairs”.
Leveson [113] points out that no system is free from risk and thus absolutely safe.
Thus, safety is commonly associated with the notion of risk. In the generic safety stan-
dard IEC61508 [93], the notion of risk is deﬁned as “combination of the probability of
occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm”. A harm [93] is deﬁned as “physical
injury or damage to the health of people or damage to property or the environment”, a
hazard is deﬁned as “potential source of harm”.
Safety is considered in relation to a speciﬁc system. This thesis addresses pro-
grammable electronic systems [93], deﬁned as systems “for control, protection or
monitoring based on one or more programmable electronic devices, including all el-
ements of the system such as power supplies, sensors and other input devices, data
highways and other communication paths, and actuators and other output devices”.
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Some sources diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent kinds of what we broadly term as a
safety critical system and operate with the terms safety system and safety related
system as in the nuclear standard IEC61226 [91]. The former term is restricted to
systems important to safety and that can be classiﬁed as a safety system; the latter
term denotes applications that are important to safety but not part of a safety system.
In IEC61508 [93], the term safety related system is used to denote a system that
implements the required safety functions in order to achieve or maintain a safe state.
In order to avoid misunderstandings, we avoid using terms that are deﬁned diﬀer-
ently in diﬀerent domains and use the term safety critical system to denote any system,
independent of the nature of the function it provides, that by failing might negatively
impact safety. More precisely, we apply the deﬁnition given by Knight [106] that de-
ﬁnes a safety critical system as “those systems whose failure could result in loss
of life, signiﬁcant property damage, or damage to the environment”. Thus, we make
the distinction between those systems that may negatively aﬀect safety in the event of
failure, independent of their function, and those systems that may not aﬀect safety.
The criticality of diﬀerent types of systems is classiﬁed diﬀerently within diﬀerent
industrial domains. Within railway [30], it is a classiﬁed in terms of required safety
integrity level (SIL) of a system function. Within aviation [49], it is classiﬁed into
an associated development assurance level (DAL), while the nuclear power production
domain [91] applies a categorisation where category A denotes safety functions and
where category B and C denote safety related functions. Common to the diﬀerent
classiﬁcation schemes is that all reﬂect upon the concept of risk, either by classifying
a system or a system function with respect to the potential severity of failure or by its
importance in assuring safety. The classiﬁcation provides guidance on how risk should
be reduced.
Given that the risks associated with a safety critical system are properly reduced
to a tolerable level, we generally accept the residual risk as a trade-oﬀ of the utility
provided by the system. Tolerable risk [93] is deﬁned as “risk which is accepted in a
given context based on the current values of society”. Residual risk [93] is deﬁned as
“risk remaining after protective measures have been taken”.
A system provides its service as long as no failures are experienced. A failure
is deﬁned by Avizˇienis et al. [14] as “an event that occurs when the delivered service
deviates from correct service”. The authors term the “deviation” (from correct service)
an error and the “adjudged or hypothesized cause of an error” as a fault.
2.1.2 Pattern
Patterns are deﬁned for diﬀerent purposes and within diverse application domains, e.g.,
for supporting software design [55], or buildings design [5]. According to Buschmann,
Henney, and Schmidt [25] a pattern for software architecture “describes a particular
recurring design problem that arises in speciﬁc design contexts, and presents a well-
proven generic scheme for its solution. The solution scheme is speciﬁed by describing its
constituent components, their responsibilities and relationships, and the way in which
they collaborate”.
According to Alexander et al. [5] a pattern for buildings architecture “describes a
problem which occurs over and over again in our environment, and then describes the
core of the solution to that problem, in such a way that you can use this solution a
million times over, without ever doing the same twice”.
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In this thesis, we use the format of a pattern for describing solutions to recurring
problems on a number of diﬀerent issues, e.g., system design, requirements elicitation,
development processes, assessment methods, and safety case argumentation. The main
purpose of a pattern is to describe the core elements in a recurring problem and,
respectively, the core elements of its solution in a comprehensible and easy to use
format. The deﬁnition of design pattern as given in ISO 24765 [95] captures our
interpretation pattern in the broader sense, thus, we apply the following deﬁnition
stating that a pattern is “a description of the problem and the essence of its solution
to enable the solution to be reused in diﬀerent settings”.
2.1.3 Pattern language
A pattern language is a language for specifying patterns making use of patterns from
a vocabulary of existing patterns and deﬁned rules for combining these.
In the pattern language of Alexander et al. [5] for buildings construction, patterns
are organised and applied in a sequence based on deﬁned connections between already
existing patterns. Patterns presented early in the sequence are at a high level of
abstraction and are complemented by the patterns presented later in the sequence. The
organisation of the patterns and the connections deﬁned between these are essential.
2.1.4 Safety assurance
Within the context of developing safety critical systems, safety assurance refers to the
process of providing conﬁdence that a system is suﬃciently safe for its intended purpose.
In the standards literature there are fundamental diﬀerences in how safety assurance
is achieved [6, 103, 119]. One diﬀerence is between the so-called process assurance
based approach and the product assurance based approach [6]. Safety standards with a
strong process focus, e.g., the CENELEC standards [28–30], emphasise safety assurance
by applying prescribed development processes and tasks. Safety standards with a
strong product focus, e.g., the Defence Standard 00-56 [123], emphasise safety assurance
on the basis of well-structured and reasoned safety arguments targeting the product
speciﬁcally [6].
Safety assurance from a process assurance perspective may involve the application
of a particular development process (e.g., the process indicated in Fig. 2.1) as well as the
application of speciﬁc methods, techniques (e.g., selected techniques from Table 2.1)
and tools. Furthermore, safety assurance is achieved on the basis of justiﬁable evidence
for a system under consideration being suitable and developed according to acceptable
safety engineering principles. The evidence accumulated during the system life-cycle
provides the required conﬁdence that safety is assured.
The EN50126 standard [28] addresses the speciﬁcation and safety demonstration
of railway signalling systems and deﬁnes a process, based on the system life-cycle, to
achieve safe systems. Safety assurance of railway applications within the European
Union involves showing compliance to the development process and the recommenda-
tions deﬁned within EN50126 [28] and associated standards. Fig. 2.1 describes the
typical life-cycle of a railway system as it is deﬁned in EN50126 [28]. The life-cycle
depicted in Fig. 2.1 is comparable to the life-cycle described in the generic standard
IEC61508 [93] that is used as a foundation for standards within diﬀerent domains. The
life-cycle is deﬁned as a sequence of phases where each phase deﬁnes tasks that shall
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Figure 2.1: System life-cycle from EN50126 [28]
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SWSIL SWSIL SWSIL SWSIL SWSIL
Assessment Technique 0 1 2 3 4
1. Checklists HR HR HR HR HR
2. Static software analysis R HR HR HR HR
3. Dynamic software analysis – R R HR HR
4. Cause consequence diagrams R R R R R
5. Event tree analysis – R R R R
6. Fault tree analysis R R R HR HR
7. Software error eﬀect analysis – R R HR HR
8. Common cause failure analysis – R R HR HR
9. Markov models – R R R R
10. Reliability block diagram – R R R R
11. Field trial before commissioning R HR HR HR HR
Requirement
1. One or more techniques shall be selected to satisfy the software safety
integrity level being used.
Table 2.1: Modiﬁed version of “Table A.9 – Software assessment (clause 14), assessment
techniques” in Appendix A of EN50128 [29]
be performed. EN50126 [28] details the associated tasks for each phase indicated in
Fig. 2.1. The joint set of phases and tasks covers the life of the system from initial
concept to disposal.
The EN50128 [29] standard speciﬁes the process and requirements for develop-
ment of software for railway control and protection systems. EN50128 complements
EN50126. Table 2.1 exempliﬁes the recommendations given on techniques for software
assessment as given in Appendix A of EN50128 [29]. Diﬀerent techniques for assessing
the software are given a recommendation for use depending on a target software safety
integrity level (SWSIL). In Table 2.1, the symbol “HR” means that the technique is
highly recommended, “R” means recommended, and “–” means that the technique or
measure has no recommendation for or against being used.
Habli [65] argues that there is no consensus on a universal approach to the de-
velopment and assessment of safety-critical systems in the standards from diﬀerent
industries, domains, and regions but identify nonetheless some important similarities
and states “it is common for a safety standard to cover basic safety activities such as
hazard and risk analysis, safety requirements allocation, and safety evidence provision”.
We apply the deﬁnition given by the European Commission [51] deﬁning safety
assurance as “all planned and systematic actions necessary to provide adequate con-
ﬁdence that a product, a service, an organisation or a functional system achieves ac-
ceptable or tolerable safety”.
2.1.5 Safety case
The notion of a safety case is used in this thesis interchangeably with the term safety
demonstration. A safety case according to Defence Standard 00-56 issue 4 [123] is
“a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that provides a compelling,
comprehensible and valid case that a system is safe for a given application in a given
operating environment”.
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A safety case according to the railway standard EN 50129 [30] is a structured
justiﬁcation document that provides a convincing and valid argument that a system
is adequately safe for a given application in a given environment. The documentation
representing the safety case shall according to [30] be structured into the following
parts: deﬁnition of the system; evidence on quality management; evidence on safety
management; evidence of functional and technical safety; evidences in the form of
references to dependent safety cases; a summary of all the evidences into a conclusion.
Independent of how a safety case is structured, it presents the body of evidences
in a documentation form with the intention of providing conﬁdence that the system is
suﬃciently safe for its intended purpose.
A safety case should ideally be created and maintained in parallel with the activities
on system development and assessment, rather than postponed to the end of the devel-
opment life-cycle [102]. Delaying the creation of the safety case to the later phases may
result in inability to justify safety and give proper rationale for choices that potentially
require costly design and implementation changes [34], or not achieving acceptance to
put the system into operation [139].
2.1.6 Conceptual safety design
Design is deﬁned by IEEE in [94] as “(1) The process of deﬁning the architecture,
components, interfaces, and other characteristics of a system or a component. (2) The
results of the process in (1)”. Inspired by this, in this thesis we deﬁne system design
as the architecture, components, interfaces, and other characteristics of a system.
A system design matures during the development process and may be represented
as a concept in the early phases of development (see Fig. 2.1). The system design is
mature and should deﬁne the main characteristics of a system when the implementation
phase is reached. It is essential to capture the relevant requirements for the system
to be developed. By relevant requirements we mean requirements that deﬁne the
intended system functions and constraints, its intended use, how it shall be operated,
how it shall be maintained, etc. Thus, in addition to the technical speciﬁcation of the
system design, we argue that it should be complemented with a speciﬁcation of the
requirements that motivated its deﬁnition and that describes the required properties
of the system in question.
Unless it can be demonstrated that a safety critical system is suﬃciently safe for
application within its intended context, it will not be accepted for operation. In order
to avoid re-engineering in the later stages, demonstration of safety should be a major
concern from the very beginning of development. The importance of arguing that safety
objectives are met is highlighted by the 2006 Nimrod XC230 aircraft accident review
report [66]. Haddon-Cave concludes in the report [66] that a main contributor to the
accident was a series of crucial design ﬂaws that resulted in mid-air ﬁre. The report
also concludes that the safety case for the aircraft represented the best opportunity to
identify these serious design ﬂaws, but it was riddled with errors: ‘‘If the Nimrod Safety
Case had been properly carried out, the loss of XV230 would have been avoided”. To
reﬂect this, we deﬁne a conceptual safety design to mean an early stage speciﬁcation
of system requirements, system design, and safety case for a safety critical system. In
the following, we elaborate on this deﬁnition based on the UML class diagram in
Fig. 2.2.
As illustrated by Fig. 2.2, a conceptual safety design is basically a triplet consisting
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of a speciﬁcation of requirements R, a speciﬁcation of system design D, and a speciﬁ-
cation of a safety case S. An implementation I satisﬁes a conceptual safety design (R,
D, S) if there exists a safety case SC in accordance with S that demonstrates that I
is safe with respect to the speciﬁcations of R and D.
Although the objective of a safety case is to argue that the implementation is
suﬃciently safe to apply in its intended context, this thesis only addresses the activities
leading to the speciﬁcation of a conceptual safety design. In the same way that a system
design is reﬁned into its implementation, the safety case speciﬁcation is reﬁned into a
safety case.
Requirements
(R)
System Design
(D)
Safety Case
(SC)
Safety 
Requirements
(SR)
Implementation
(I)
Safety Case
Specification
(S)
satisfies Specification
(R & D)
according to
Figure 2.2: Relationships between an implementation (I) and elements of a conceptual
safety design (R,D,S)
2.2 Success criteria
In Chapter 1 we outlined some of the challenges of developing safety critical systems
and argued that there is a need for a new kind of guidance on eﬀective solutions to
these challenges. Further, we justiﬁed the suitability of a pattern-based solution to
satisfy this need. The overall objective of the thesis, as stated in Section 1.1, is to
develop a method and a pattern language that is:
1. Well-suited for developing conceptual safety designs.
2. Applicable within an industrial context within acceptable eﬀort.
15
Problem characterisation
3. Comprehensible for its intended users.
To meet the overall objective, we have developed the SaCS method consisting of
three main artefacts, namely:
1. The SaCS process.
2. The library of SaCS patterns.
3. The SaCS pattern language.
The process (1) guides the user in systematically selecting, applying, and docu-
menting the use of patterns; the library (2) contains knowledge on eﬀective solutions
to recurring development challenges that may be used as development support; and
the language (3) facilitates pattern speciﬁcation and documentation of how patterns
are applied in a given context. Further, the combined use of (1), (2), and (3) facilitates
the development of conceptual safety designs.
In the following sections, we characterise more precisely the expectations for the
three artefacts in terms of a set of success criteria.
2.2.1 The SaCS process
The purpose of the SaCS process is to facilitate development of conceptual safety
designs of safety critical systems by a systematic application of patterns. The process
should describe how the method should be applied, hence the criterion:
Success criterion 1 The SaCS process provides satisfactory guidance for its intended
users, which are system engineers, safety engineers, hardware and software engineers.
The intended result of the process is a conceptual safety design according to the
deﬁnition given in Section 2.1.6. The deﬁnition describes the main characteristics of
a conceptual safety design but not what qualiﬁes it as useful. A conceptual safety
design is useful if it speciﬁes the characteristics of a system in accordance with safety
objectives at a suﬃcient level of detail, and is easy to use. On the basis of this we
deﬁne the following success criterion:
Success criterion 2 The application of the SaCS process results in conceptual safety
designs that are: a) in accordance with safety objectives; b) at a suﬃcient level of detail;
and c) easy to use.
With respect to the overall objective of providing a pattern-based method that is
applicable within industrial contexts to an acceptable eﬀort, we formulate the following
success criterion:
Success criterion 3 The SaCS process is cost eﬃcient.
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2.2.2 The library of SaCS patterns
The purpose of the library of SaCS patterns is to oﬀer guidance on eﬀective solutions
to known challenges commonly recurring in the context of conceptual safety designs of
safety critical systems. In order to oﬀer a library of patterns that is well-suited to this
purpose, the available patterns must deﬁne relevant solutions to relevant challenges.
Thus, we deﬁne the following criterion:
Success criterion 4 The library of SaCS patterns consists of patterns that describe
eﬀective solutions to recurring challenges within conceptual safety design.
Each pattern in the library should be described in a format that facilitates eﬃcient
application of the guidance oﬀered by the patterns. Once a user of SaCS has identiﬁed
the essence of a problem and a suitable pattern for addressing the problem, it must be
easy to apply. In addition, it should be easy to combine patterns. Hence, we deﬁne
the following success criterion:
Success criterion 5 The library of SaCS patterns consists of patterns that may be
eﬃciently and eﬀectively applied individually or in combination.
Potential users of the method may want to formalise their company speciﬁc best
practices as patterns by extending the the SaCS library, hence the criterion:
Success criterion 6 The library of SaCS patterns is easy to extend.
2.2.3 The SaCS pattern language
As stated in Section 2.1.3, a pattern language is a language for specifying patterns from
a vocabulary of existing patterns and deﬁned rules for combining these. The existing
patterns in SaCS reside in the library. The expectations to the vocabulary of existing
patterns are covered by the success criteria presented in Section 2.2.2.
Another expectation of the SaCS pattern language is that it shall facilitate the
speciﬁcation of composite patterns for conceptual safety design. Hence, the criterion:
Success criterion 7 The SaCS pattern language is suﬃciently expressive to specify
composite patterns that may be easily instantiated into conceptual safety designs.
An important part of providing safety assurance in many industrial domains where
safety is a concern, e.g., within nuclear, railway and aviation, is to provide evidence
that a suitable development process has been followed. In a pattern-based method for
conceptualisation of safety critical systems, there should be support for documenting
how patterns are applied. In order to fulﬁl the overall objective of providing a method
that is applicable within an industrial context, we want the SaCS pattern language
to support an easy way of documenting the application of patterns in a development
context. The SaCS pattern language should facilitate specifying the combined use of
patterns from the library in a manner that allows composite patterns to be used in
diﬀerent contexts. Hence, the criterion:
Success criterion 8 The SaCS pattern language facilitates the speciﬁcation of com-
posite patterns in a context.
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A composition of patterns speciﬁed by the SaCS pattern language may include a
large number of relationships between patterns from the library and in this sense poten-
tially represent a complex speciﬁcation. The complexity of a speciﬁcation may be more
manageable if it is modularised into a combination of several less complex speciﬁca-
tions. By less complex, in this context, we mean a combination of several speciﬁcations
where each speciﬁcation has fewer patterns and fewer relationships than the original
non-modularised speciﬁcation. Modularisation may also facilitate separation of con-
cerns, interchangeability of speciﬁcation items, as well as reuse. This motivates the
following success criterion:
Success criterion 9 The SaCS pattern language facilitates modularity and reuse.
In order to facilitate a common understanding of a composition of patterns from
the library, each pattern in the library, as well as the rules for composition, must be
easy to understand. Hence, the criterion:
Success criterion 10 The SaCS pattern language is well-suited to express patterns
that are easily understandable for its intended users, which are system engineers, safety
engineers, hardware and software engineers.
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Research method
In this chapter, we brieﬂy present a method for technology research and describe how
we have applied this method in our research. This chapter is inﬂuenced by similar
discussions presented in the thesis of Hogganvik [83], Ligaarden [116], Omerovic [135],
and Refsdal [141].
This thesis is rooted within the ﬁeld of computer science, and there are diﬀerent
opinions on whether computer science may rightfully be called science [23,38,39,69,161].
Brooks [23] argues that computer science is not a science but rather an engineering
discipline concerned with making things. Brooks further argues that the discovery of a
new fact or a new law within the research ﬁelds that classify as sciences is itself an end
that are worthy of publication, whereas the development of novel designs in computer
science is not a proper end but merely tools to reach an end.
Abelson and Sussman [1] support the view of computer science not being a science.
A deﬁnition of what is science and what disqualiﬁes computer science as science is
however not given. They relate computer science to mathematics and argue that
mathematics provides a framework for precisely describing what is, while computation
represents a framework for precisely describing how to.
Authors in support of computer science representing a science are in majority in
the literature. Denning et al. [39] deﬁne computer science as “the systematic study
of algorithmic processes – their theory, analysis, design, eﬃciency, implementation
and application – that describe and transform information”. Denning claims [38] that
computing research is ﬁlled with examples of scientiﬁc research where hypothesis are
formed and experimentally tested according to scientiﬁc principles. Denning dismisses
the viewpoint of computer science not being science merely due to its study of man-
made artefacts and states that “computer science studies information processes both
artiﬁcial and natural”.
Tichy [161] considers computer science to be the study of information processes and
therefore a science. Tichy argues that computer scientists should put more emphasis
on experiments to test their theories. He claims that the traditional scientiﬁc method
for observing phenomena, formulating explanations, and testing is also applicable to
the ﬁeld of computer science although the entity that is investigated is information
rather than energy or matter.
Hartmanis [69] argues that advances in computer science often results from demon-
stration rather than from experimentation as is common within physical science and
states “It is the role of the demo to show the possibility or feasibility to do what was
thought to be impossible or not feasible”.
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3.1 A technology research method
The research described in this thesis may be classiﬁed as technology research. Technol-
ogy research concerns creating new artefacts or artefacts that are better, faster, safer
or in some way improve on existing artefacts [81, 118, 153]. Classical research aims
to gain new knowledge about the world in the form of new or reﬁned principles and
laws [153].
Within technology research focusing on information systems, Hevner [81] identiﬁes
two research paradigms, termed design-science and behavioural-science research, which
are deﬁned and motivated along the following lines. The behavioural-science paradigm
is concerned with development and evaluation of theories to explain and predict human
or organisational behaviour and has its roots in natural science research methods, or
classical research methods to use the term in [153]. The design-science paradigm seeks
to extend the boundaries of human and organizational capabilities by creating new and
innovative artefacts. The design-science paradigm has its roots in engineering and the
sciences of the artiﬁcial and is fundamentally a problem solving paradigm.
Fig. 3.1 is adopted from Solheim and Stølen [153] and illustrates the main steps
in performing technological research as well as the associated question that is sought
answered at each step.
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Figure 3.1: Main steps in technological research (adopted from Solheim and Stølen [153]
and modiﬁed)
As described in [153] and illustrated in Fig. 3.1, technological research is performed
by iterating over the following main steps:
• Problem analysis – concerned with identifying the (potential) need for a new or
improved artefact. The need may be characterised in the form of a set of success
criteria.
• Innovation – concerned with invention, creation or establishment of an artefact
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that satisﬁes the identiﬁed needs. The overall hypothesis is that the new artefact
satisﬁes the needs.
• Evaluation – concerned with the evaluation of the new artefact with the intention
of ﬁnding out whether the need is satisﬁed by the artefact as hypothesised. The
researcher formulates predictions on the basis of hypothesis to test the hypothesis.
If the predictions are not falsiﬁed the conﬁdence in the validity of the hypothesis
increases.
If the hypothesis is falsiﬁed, the previous steps may be reconsidered.
3.2 Strategies for evaluation
According to McGrath [120], there are eight common strategies for evaluation of pre-
dictions. There is however no single evaluation method according to McGrath that
provides results that are valid across populations (strong on generality), provides very
precise measurements (strong on precision), and at the same time is performed in en-
vironments that are very similar to reality (strong on realism). The researcher has to
choose, based on the strengths and weaknesses of the diﬀerent evaluation methods and
the questions that are required answered, how the diﬀerent kinds of methods should
be combined.
The eight diﬀerent strategies are presented in Fig. 3.2. The evaluation strategies
fall into four groups, corresponding to the inner circle of Fig. 3.2, depending on the
diﬀerences in the environment in which the evaluations are performed. The three single
letters with a bold font in Fig. 3.2 denote the point of maximum concern with respect
to providing results strong on either precision, generality, or realism.
The most common evaluation strategies according to McGrath are:
• Field experiment – an experiment carried out in a natural environment, but in
which the researcher intervenes and manipulates a certain factor.
• Field study – a direct observation of natural systems, with little or no interface
from the researcher.
• Experimental simulation – a laboratory test simulating a relevant part of the real
world.
• Laboratory experiment – gives the researcher a large degree of control and the
possibility to isolate the variables to be examined.
• Qualitative interview – a collection of information from a few selected individuals.
The answers are more precise than those of a survey, but cannot be generalized
to the same degree.
• Survey – a collection of information from a broad and carefully selected group of
informants.
• Non-empirical evidence – argumentation based on logical argumentation and
common sense.
• Computer simulation – operating on a model of a given system.
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Figure 3.2: Evaluation strategies (adopted from McGrath [120])
It is desirable to maximise precision, realism and generality simultaneously but, as
argued by McGrath, this is not possible with one single research strategy. For exam-
ple, the ﬁeld study is strong on realism but not necessarily on precision; a laboratory
experiment is strong on precision but not necessarily on realism. Diﬀerent and com-
plementing evaluation strategies can be applied in order to compensate for any lack of
precision, generality or realism of one strategy.
In the following sections, we describe how we have applied the technology research
method outlined in Section 3.1, including an outline of the diﬀerent and complementing
evaluation strategies that have been applied.
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3.3 How we have applied the research method
Fig. 3.3 is adopted from Refsdal [141] and modiﬁed to illustrate our research method.
An iterative process was applied, in which the artefacts were continuously developed
and improved based on the experiences gained. Our research method is similar to the
method outlined in Section 3.1 where Fig 3.1 depicts a process that iterates over the
problem analysis, innovation, and evaluation activities.
In this thesis, the ﬁnal results from the problem analysis are summarised in Chap-
ter 1 and Chapter 2. Chapter 1 presents the challenges that motivated the research
and deﬁnes the overall objective. Chapter 2 deﬁnes success criteria characterising what
is required to satisfy the need. The ﬁnal results from the innovation activity are sum-
marised in Chapter 5. The ﬁnal results from the overall evaluation are summarised in
Chapter 7. Chapter 8 concludes on the basis of the evaluation results.
Innovation
Success criteria fulfilled?
Identify success criteria for artefact
Problem
analysis
Propose artefact
Evaluation
Adopt artefact
Yes
No
No
YesNew insight w.r.t. 
success criteria?
Study 2:
Case study on safety 
design conceptualisation 
of a railway interlocking 
system
Study 3:
Analytic evaluation of 
the suitability of the 
SaCS pattern  language 
for its intended task
Study 1:
Case study on safety 
design conceptualisation 
of a nuclear power plant 
control system
Figure 3.3: Applied research method (adopted from Refsdal [141] and modiﬁed)
Fig. 3.3 distinguishes between three studies. They are brieﬂy described below:
• Study 1: Case study on safety design conceptualisation of a nuclear power plant
control system. The case study concerns the suitability of SaCS within the nuclear
domain. It addresses a control system for operating a power producing reactor in
load following mode. A reactor operating in a load following mode is controlled
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such that the production of its outputs, electricity, is scaled to accommodate
ﬂuctuations in power demand during the day. Experiences from this case study
are detailed in Paper 2 [74].
• Study 2: Case study on safety design conceptualisation of a railway interlocking
system. The case study concerns the suitability of SaCS within the railway do-
main. It addresses an interlocking system for safely controlling train movements
through a train station with two tracks and a level crossing that are connected
to neighbouring trains stations with a single track. Experiences from this case
study are detailed in Paper 3 [75].
• Study 3: Analytic evaluation of the suitability of the SaCS pattern language for
its intended task. The evaluation was performed by adopting SEQUAL [108,134]
to assess the quality of the SaCS pattern language. Results of the evaluation are
detailed in Paper 4 [76].
The case studies referred to as Study 1 and Study 2 may be seen as a variant of the
ﬁeld experiment in the McGrath classiﬁcation, a strategy that scores high on realism.
According to Eisenhardt [43], the case study approach is “especially appropriate in
new topic areas” and describes how to build theories from case study research. Yin
[176] states: “A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.”. Study 3 is most closely
related to non-empirical evidence in the McGrath classiﬁcation.
The three artefacts presented in this thesis have also been evaluated against the
literature, the results of which are presented in Chapter 4 and the discussion in Sec-
tion 7.2.
Fig. 3.4 details the relationship between the three diﬀerent studies and the artefacts
proposed. The two case studies, Study 1 and Study 2, address all three artefacts. Study
3 primarily addresses Artefact 3.
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Artefact 1:
The SaCS process
Artefact 2:
The library of 
SaCS patterns
Artefact 3:
The SaCS pattern 
language
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Figure 3.4: Relationship between evaluation studies and research artefacts
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Chapter 4
State-of-the-art
In this chapter, we give a general overview of state-of-the-art literature of relevance
for the three artefacts developed in this thesis. The relevant literature is classiﬁed
with respect to topics instead of per artefact. For a more detailed discussion on the
relationship of our artefacts to the state-of-the-art, the reader is referred to Section 7.2.
We have structured this chapter into four sections:
• Section 4.1 Pattern-based development – SaCS is a method that makes use of a
pattern language, and this section addresses the relevant literature on patterns.
Section 4.1.1 addresses notable pattern collections of relevance to SaCS. Sec-
tion 4.1.2 addresses the literature on pattern languages. Section 4.1.3 addresses
formats for deﬁning patterns.
• Section 4.2 Standards and guidelines – SaCS is intended to be used for conceptu-
alisation of safety critical systems, and this section addresses relevant literature
deﬁning acceptable and recommended practices for achieving safe systems within
diﬀerent domains. International safety standards and guidelines are commonly
established by a consensus between experts from diﬀerent countries and thus de-
scribe practices that may be seen as being widely accepted within an industrial
domain. Section 4.2.1 addresses generic safety standards that may be applied in-
dependent of domain. Section 4.2.2 addresses the railway domain. Section 4.2.3
addresses the nuclear domain. Section 4.2.4 addresses the aviation domain.
• Section 4.3 Safety engineering – SaCS facilitates conceptualisation of safety crit-
ical systems, and this section addresses safety engineering literature on eﬀective
solutions within the ﬁeld of safety engineering. Section 4.3.1 addresses relevant
literature on system design. Section 4.3.2 addresses approaches for safety demon-
stration. Section 4.3.3 addresses methods and techniques for safety assurance.
• Section 4.4 Modelling – SaCS oﬀers a graphical notation for specifying compo-
sition of patterns and their application. SaCS also oﬀers a library of patterns
where each pattern expresses a solution graphically. Section 4.4.1 addresses rel-
evant literature on modelling. Section 4.4.2 addresses the literature on generic
principles of visualisation.
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4.1 Pattern-based development
The initial work on pattern languages is described by Alexander et al. [3–5] as an ap-
proach to buildings architecture and construction. The notion of patterns was later
introduced to the software engineering community by the work of Beck and Cunning-
ham [17] and after that by Gamma et al. [55] with their popular book “Design Patterns:
Elements of Reusable Object-Oriented Software”. The patterns presented in [17,55] are
organised more in the form of pattern collections rather than pattern languages. The
notion of patterns is currently adopted by several disciplines within system engineering.
Here we will report on the pattern approaches relevant with respect to the development
of SaCS.
4.1.1 Pattern collections
The engineering methods, techniques, and tools applied at diﬀerent stages of develop-
ment vary with the development challenges that are addressed. Thousands of patterns
for development of software based systems exists [79] on diverse topics in diﬀerent pat-
tern collections and pattern languages. Of special relevance to SaCS are pattern ap-
proaches that support requirement elicitation, systems design, and establishing safety
cases, as these are constituents of a conceptual safety design according to the deﬁnition
in Section 2.1.6.
Jackson [98] presents the problem frames approach that supports requirements anal-
ysis and elicitation. A generic set of problem diagrams are adapted to model the main
problem domains appearing in a development context and their interactions with a
system under development. Jackson identiﬁes ﬁve diﬀerent problem frames that rep-
resents classes of problems, and describes a solution for each class of problem. Once a
user has identiﬁed diﬀerent problem domains, interactions, and classes of problems in
the context of the analysis, the user systematically elicits requirements for the system.
Although the problem frames approach is useful for detailing and analysing a problem
and thereby detailing requirements, the problem classes presented in [98] are deﬁned
at a very high level of abstraction.
The use of boilerplates [84, 150] for requirement speciﬁcation is a form of require-
ment templates but nonetheless touches upon the concept of patterns. The boilerplate
approach helps the user phrase requirements in a uniform manner and to detail these
suﬃciently. Although boilerplates may be useful for requirement speciﬁcation, the
focus of this thesis is more towards supporting requirement elicitation.
Withall [174] describes 37 requirements patterns for assisting the speciﬁcation of
diﬀerent types of requirements. The patterns are deﬁned at a low level; the level of a
single requirement. Each pattern describes how a particular type of requirement shall
be deﬁned. The patterns of Withall may be useful, but as with the boilerplates ap-
proach, the patterns are intended primarily to support the speciﬁcation of requirements
rather than their elicitation.
Patterns on design and architecture of software-based systems are presented in sev-
eral pattern collections. One of the well-known pattern collections is described by
Gamma et al. [55] on recurring patterns in the design of software based systems. Han-
mer [68] presents a collection of patterns for the development of fault tolerant systems.
Buschmann et al. presents in [24–26,105,146] a ﬁve volume series on Pattern-Oriented
Software Architecture (POSA). In addition, there are diﬀerent online collections, such
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as the Portland Pattern Repository [35] or the repository provided by the Hillside
Group [82]. The Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS) series on Transactions on
Pattern Languages of Programming (TPLOP) [130–132] give insight into notable re-
cent developments within the community of pattern developers. Without a doubt, the
diﬀerent pattern collections and languages for system design and architecture repre-
sent a deep insight into eﬀective solutions on diﬀerent aspects of software based systems
development. However, there are two major challenges to the eﬀective application of
existing patterns for the development of safety critical systems: a) The need to justify
the application of one design/architecture/technique pattern over another; and b) The
need to provide evidence of the correct application and combination of the knowledge
contained in the diﬀerent patterns. Design choices should be founded on the needs for
assuring and arguing safety, and otherwise follow well-established principles for good
design. The choice of applying one design pattern over another should be based on a
systematic process to establish the need in order to ensure that design choices are not
left unmotivated.
The motivations for a speciﬁc design choice are founded on the knowledge gained
during the development activities applied prior to design speciﬁcation. Gnatz et al. [57]
outline the concept of process patterns as a means to address the recurring problems
and known solutions to challenges arising during the development process. The patterns
of Gnatz et al. are not tailored for development of safety critical systems. Thus,
their patterns do not necessarily reﬂect development practices relevant to our domain.
Fowler [54] presents a catalogue of 63 analysis patterns. The patterns do not follow a
strict format but represent a body of knowledge on analysis described textually and
supplemented by sketches.
While process patterns and analysis patterns may be relevant for assuring that the
development process applied is suitable and leads to well-informed design choices, Kelly
[102] describes patterns for arguing that safety is suﬃciently addressed. Kelly presents
patterns that support the safety demonstration in the form of safety-case patterns. The
safety-case patterns express how safety may be argued and are represented textually
and by the use of the Goal Structured Notation (GSN) [61]. GSN is a notation for
explicitly representing the elements of a safety argument in a graphical model. The
safety-case patterns presented by Kelly [102] are representative for how we want to
address the safety demonstration concern in our approach.
From the literature study on diﬀerent pattern approaches, it is obvious that a great
body of knowledge is captured in the form of patterns or similarly easy to use formats.
A challenge is to eﬀectively combine and apply the knowledge captured in these diverse
pattern collections. Furthermore, pattern collections tend to contain patterns on dif-
ferent concepts deﬁned in a manner where it is unclear how the knowledge contained
in patterns may be combined. In a survey on software pattern practices, Henninger
and Correˆa [79] states “software patterns and collections tend to be written to solve
speciﬁc problems with little to no regard about how the pattern could or should be used
with other patterns”.
The intention of pattern languages is to facilitate the integration of patterns as sup-
port for solving problems. We now go on to address pattern languages in Section 4.1.2.
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4.1.2 Pattern languages
The pattern language of Alexander et al. [5] consists of 253 patterns on the architecture
of buildings. The connections between patterns are deﬁned by a sequential arrangement
of the patterns. The sequential arrangement also represents the intended order for
applying the patterns as well as how a grammar is approached in the pattern language.
The patterns are deﬁned from large scale solutions (organising towns and buildings)
towards smaller scale pattern solutions (rooms and walls).
Aguiar and David [2] present a pattern language as guidance to developers in doc-
umenting object-oriented frameworks. The pattern language is more a process than
a language in the sense that patterns have interdependencies and the set of patterns
deﬁnes a sequence in the style ﬁrst proposed by Alexander et al. [5].
Guerra et al. [62] present a pattern language for metadata-based frameworks. The
interconnectivity of the patterns is presented in a simple sketch providing guidance to
the user on the relationship between patterns in terms of arrows and short sentences
explaining how patterns can be used in a sequence. Although some guidance is given
on the expected sequence of patterns, it is not clear how patterns should be integrated.
Vainsencher and Black [166] present a pattern language supporting a single code
model for the program analyses and tools that might be applied to the code. An
illustration shows the relationship between challenges occurring in the intended context
of the language and the patterns that may be applied to solve the challenges. A
development is approached by a sequence of generally deﬁned challenges and choices
for how challenges may be solved by patterns. The approach represents a process with
solution choices more than a language.
Hentrich and Zdun [80] present a pattern language as support for designing Service-
Oriented Architectures (SOA). The patterns in the language address conceptual and
architectural design issues. The approach is similar in style to [2,62,166]. The intercon-
nections between patterns are indicated as loosely deﬁned dependencies and expected
sequences.
Siddle [148] presents an interactive approach to pattern selection. The approach is
deﬁned as a means to support software design education and learning. The author ex-
empliﬁes the approach through a sequence of steps that might guide a user in exploring
and selecting patterns that are appropriate for application in a given context.
Henninger and Correˆa [79] identify in their survey a lack of inter-pattern depen-
dencies in software pattern collections and that little to no regard has been taken to
specify how patterns should and could be used in pattern combinations. One exception
identiﬁed by the authors is the pattern relations of Noble [129].
Zimmer [178] describes the need to deﬁne relationships between design patterns in
order to eﬃciently combine them. Noble [129] builds upon the ideas of Zimmer and
deﬁnes a number of relationships such as uses, reﬁnes, used by, combine, and sequence
of as means to deﬁne relationships between design patterns. A challenge with the
relations deﬁned by Noble is that these may only specify relations on a very high level.
The relations are not able to detail what part of a pattern is used, reﬁned, or combined
and relate that with a part described in a combined pattern. Thus, the approach does
not facilitate a precise modelling of relationships.
Bayley and Zhu [16] deﬁne a formal language for pattern composition. The authors
argue that design patterns are almost always to be found composed with each other
and that the correct application of patterns thus relies on precise deﬁnition of the
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compositions. A set of six operators is deﬁned for the purpose of specifying pattern
compositions. Formalised relationships expressed between design patterns described
by Gamma et al. [55] are used to provide examples of the language in use.
Smith [151] presents a catalogue of elementary software design patterns in the tra-
dition of Gamma et al. [55] and proposes the Pattern Instance Notation (PIN) for
expressing compositions of patterns visually. The PIN notation can be seen as a vi-
sual language for expressing patterns. The notation uses simple rounded rectangles to
abstractly represent a pattern and its associated roles. Connectors deﬁne the relation-
ships between patterns. The notation is comparable to the UML [137] collaboration
notation.
4.1.3 Pattern formats
Table 4.1 indicates the format of patterns in diﬀerent pattern collections and languages.
The intent of a pattern as presented in the work Alexander et al. [5] is to disseminate
and document design knowledge and represent a vocabulary for expressing ideas on
design. Each pattern in the language described in [5] is deﬁned according to a common
format that is easy to understand for a human user, through a sequence of sections
containing textual descriptions and sketches.
Patterns are commonly described by a sequence of descriptive sections, named or
unnamed, adopted from the initial pattern format deﬁned by Alexander et al. [5].
Henninger and Correˆa [79] identify that although there are similarities, almost every
pattern collection they surveyed used diﬀerent pattern formats. The authors further
identify that attempts at standardising pattern formats have not been successful as
diﬀerent types of patterns serves diﬀerent needs.
Table 4.1 compares the formats of patterns in some of the commonly cited pattern
collections [5,26,55] and some more recent pattern collections [2,62,68,102,140,143,151,
179]. The diﬀerent pattern formats are clearly rooted in the tradition of the patterns
described by Alexander et al. [5] where each pattern has a name, describes a problem,
presents a solution to the described problem, and further indicates related patterns.
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[5] (1977) Alexander et al. – Buildings architecture
[55] (1995) Gamma et al. – Software design
[26] (1996) Buschmann et al. – Software architecture
[68] (2007) Hanmer – Software fault tolerance
[102] (2008) Kelly – Safety argumentation
[2] (2011) Aguiar and Gabriel – Frameworks documentation
[179] (2011) Zimmermann et al. – Process description
[151] (2012) Smith – Software design
[143] (2013) Ru¨ping – Data migration
[62] (2013) Guerra et al. – Metadata-based frameworks
[140] (2013) Ratzka – User interface interactions
[5] [55] [26] [68] [102] [2] [179] [151] [143] [62] [140]
Name           
Also known as    
Intent    
Motivation   
Context      
Applicability   
Problem        
Forces     
Solution        
Process steps 
Structure     
Participants    
Collaborations   
Dynamics  
Consequences       
Beneﬁts 
Liabilities 
Rationale 
Implementation    
Sample code  
Example      
Example resolved 
Variants 
Known uses      
Related patterns        
See also 
Table 4.1: The format of patterns as found in the literature
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4.2 Safety standards and guidelines
International safety standards and guidelines have been important sources for consol-
idating our pattern-based approach with accepted development practices. The stan-
dards and guidelines presented in this section have been developed on the basis of
consensus among domain and safety experts from diﬀerent countries. Thus, the stan-
dards and guidelines presented reﬂect broadly accepted practices for development of
safety critical systems. The intention of a pattern is to express a generalised solution
of well-proven practices for solving commonly recurring problems.
A commonality between the safety standards and guidelines addressed in the fol-
lowing is the focus on the need to assure functional safety. Functional safety is the
part of the overall safety of a system or equipment that depends on the system or
equipment operating correctly in response to its inputs. Further, functional safety is
achieved when every speciﬁed safety function is carried out and the level of performance
required of each safety function is met. A diﬀerence between the safety standards and
guidelines addressed in the following is the categorisation scheme applied to functions
as a measure of their relative importance to safety. Although diﬀerent categorisation
schemes are applied in diﬀerent domains, their use is very similar as it provides a basis
for imposing requirements for risk reduction.
4.2.1 Generic
The standard IEC 61508 [93] is an international and generic safety standard titled
Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-related Sys-
tems that is applicable to development of safety critical systems in all kinds of industry.
The IEC 61508 standard has been adopted into domain speciﬁc variants in diﬀerent
industrial domains, e.g., automotive [96], railway [29] and for development of nuclear
power plant systems [86], and as such is inﬂuential on how safety critical systems are
developed within several domains.
The viewpoint of the IEC 61508 [93] standard, as of its domain speciﬁc variants,
is that an absolutely safe system is not possible to achieve; there will always be risks
associated with the operation of a system. A key concept is the notion of functional
safety; achieved when every speciﬁed safety function is carried out and the level of
performance required of each safety function is met.
The standard describes the process of steps, known as the safety life-cycle, to be
performed in order achieve functional safety. The safety life-cycle includes activities
that shall be performed in the diﬀerent phases of the system development, such as
deﬁning the initial concept, hazard and risk analysis, overall safety requirements, etc.
until the last phase that addresses decommissioning and disposal.
The standard requires an assessment of the risks associated with the operation of the
system under development in its context and a classiﬁcation of the system with respect
to the required safety integrity level (SIL) of the functions performed by the system.
Based on the allocation of SIL there are deﬁned requirements on the application of
means for risk reduction.
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4.2.2 Railway
The CENELEC standards EN 50126 [28], EN 50128 [29], and EN 50129 [30] repre-
sent a railway implementation of IEC 61508 [93]. EN 50126 [28] deﬁnes the general
approach to speciﬁcation and demonstration of reliability, availability, maintainability,
and safety (RAMS) of the total railway system. EN 50129 [30] addresses system safety
in signalling systems while EN 50128 [29] addresses the methods and techniques that
provide software that satisﬁes requirements to safety integrity.
The standards are highly-process oriented, meaning that they deﬁne requirements
for applying certain processes, performing speciﬁc activities, and documenting results
associated with diﬀerent phases of the safety life-cycle of systems. The SIL concept
is adopted from IEC 61508 and represents a measure, in the form of a categorisation
of the criticality of the functions provided by systems on safety, used for specifying
safety integrity requirements for the safety functions performed by systems. The cat-
egorisation of SIL is performed on the basis of hazard and risk analysis. Depending
on SIL there are imposed constraints and given recommendations on the methods and
techniques to be applied during system development as well as how to document safety
objectives being met.
Fig. 2.1 in Section 2.1.4 illustrates the system life-cycle as it is presented in EN 50126
[28]. The system life-cycle in EN 50126 is relatively similar to the life-cycle described
in other safety standards presented in Section 4.2.
Another inﬂuence from the railway domain is the framework known as Common
Safety Methods (CSM) described in the European Union (EU) regulation presented
in [50]. A guidance to the application of CSM regulation is provided in [52]. CSM
addresses the harmonisation of the practices for operation and approval of railway
products within the borders of the EU. The framework describes the process to be used
across all EU member states when assessing signiﬁcant changes to railway systems that
aﬀect safety. The CSM framework and associated guideline is particularly strong on
describing the general practices for achieving safe systems and the acceptable strategies
for arguing that safety objectives are met.
4.2.3 Nuclear
The standard IEC 61513 [86] represents a nuclear domain application of IEC 61508
and describes the general requirements for nuclear Instrumentation and Control (I&C)
systems. IEC 61513 is a system level document covering all categories of nuclear
safety I&C functions. The functions to be performed by I&C systems are assigned
to categories according to their importance to safety. The importance of a function
to plant safety is identiﬁed on the basis of the anticipated consequences in the event
of its failure to perform required operation when needed and the consequences in the
event of a spurious actuation. Diﬀerent requirements are imposed on I&C systems
based on their importance in assuring nuclear power plant safety such that, e.g., more
demanding requirements are put on systems that are required to provide reactor shut-
down when needed than those systems that are responsible for controlling the reactor
within operational bounds.
IEC 61226 [91] describes a classiﬁcation of I&C functions into category A, B, C,
and otherwise not classiﬁed functions. Category A functions either play a principal role
in the achievement or maintenance of plant safety or are functions whose failure could
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directly lead to accident conditions which may cause unacceptable consequences if not
mitigated by other category A functions. Category B functions play a complementary
role to the category A functions in the achievement or maintenance of plant safety.
Category C functions play an auxiliary or indirect role in the achievement or main-
tenance of plant safety. IEC 60880 [90] deﬁnes requirements for category A software.
IEC 62138 [87] deﬁnes requirements for category B and C software.
The purpose of the classiﬁcation described in IEC 61226 [91] is to provide a mecha-
nism for imposing graded requirements for the development of I&C systems depending
on the importance of their functions to achieve or maintain plant safety. As in the
other industrial domains, diﬀerent safety objectives are required to be met depending
on the classiﬁcation of functions and thus the systems performing the functions.
4.2.4 Aviation
The ARP4754 [49] is a guideline to the process of developing aircraft systems. ARP4754
is supported by the standards ED-12B [47] and ED-80 [48] on the process of developing
the software and hardware parts of systems, respectively.
ARP4754 [49], ED-12B [47], and ED-80 [48] are highly process-oriented standards.
ARP4754 [49] deﬁnes a Development Assurance Level (DAL) classiﬁcation scheme
consisting of ﬁve categories, A-E, for classifying aircraft functions with respect to the
criticality of the functions on safety. The allocation of DAL dictates the required devel-
opment process rigour that shall be applied in order to assure a proper risk reduction.
The ARP4761 [144] is a guideline for conducting the safety assessment process and
for the application of diﬀerent methods for assessing aircraft systems with respect to
safety.
The classiﬁcation of a DAL for a function leads to the application of graded require-
ments for the software and hardware parts of a system implementing the function. ED-
12B [47] describes software requirements. ED-80 [48] describes hardware requirements.
The concept of DAL may be seen as similar to the concepts of SIL within railway and
the categorisation applied for nuclear power plant I&C systems. The diﬀerent concepts
are similar in the sense that diﬀerent kinds of requirements are imposed on systems
depending on a classiﬁcation of the importance of the functions performed by systems
on safety. Contrary to the railway industry, the nuclear industry and the aviation
industry have so far not adopted the SIL concept from IEC 61508 [93] directly.
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4.3.1 Designing for safety
To design a system that is fault free is generally accepted as being impossible [113].
Common strategies within safety engineering for reducing the risk of system failure
are to avoid faults being introduced in the ﬁrst place or remove them once detected,
if that is possible; secondly to mitigate the potential negative eﬀects of faults by fault
tolerance techniques.
Avizˇienis et al. [14] describe the relationship between fault and failure and the
fundamental relationship between threats, mitigations, and their eﬀect on achieving
dependable systems. Dependable systems are, according to the authors [14], the result
of the combined utilisation of the following techniques: fault prevention; fault removal;
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fault forecasting; and fault tolerance. None of these techniques are suﬃcient alone, but
a mix of these is required to attain dependable systems.
Fault prevention may be supported by diﬀerent methods and techniques for assuring
high quality of the end product. One means for avoiding faults related to out-of-range
values is to choose a strongly typed programming language. Faulty data type casting
was one of the causes that led to the Ariane 5 accident [117]. Another means may
be to apply formal methods in order to mathematically specify and reason about the
software [22]. Fault detection and removal may be supported by, e.g., dynamic and
static testing techniques [109]. Diﬀerent types of predictive techniques and safety
monitoring may support fault forecasting. Fault tolerance may be supported by design
such that errors occurring at a component or subsystem level are mitigated before
propagating to the system level.
Redundant hardware modules are commonly applied in safety critical systems.
Diﬀerent traditional and well-established design principles are descried by Storey in
[156,157]. The Dual Modular Redundant (DMR) [156] design contains replicated mod-
ules that operate in parallel on the same input in order to provide protection against
random hardware failure. A voting mechanism compares the outputs of the diﬀerent
modules and takes appropriate action upon disagreement. The replication of modules
provides protection against random hardware failure based on the assumption that it
is unlikely that two identical modules will experience random failure at the same time.
In order to reduce the likelihood of common cause failure, a higher degree of dissimilar-
ity between redundant hardware modules may be achieved by, e.g., choosing hardware
modules from diﬀerent suppliers in redundant channels. In order to provide further
protection against random hardware failure, the number of redundant modules may
be increased. The Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) [156] design and the M-out-of-
N [156] design is comparable to the DMR arrangement in that there is a replication of
modules and a mechanism for voting that allows continued safe operation of a system
despite module failure. The diﬀerence is the increased number of redundant modules,
which is more costly. The beneﬁt is an increased protection against random faults and
the ability to continue operation in the event of module failure as the voter may detect
which module failed. The standby-spare arrangement [156] is comparable to DMR
but where the voting mechanism is replaced with a module for switching operational
control between a primary and a secondary control module on the basis of information
from a fault detection unit.
Contrary to the hardware parts of a system, the software always fails systematically
and not randomly due to wear and tear. A software module will fail each time the con-
ditions for executing its faulty code are satisﬁed. Given two identical software modules
operating in parallel, both modules will fail provided that the operating conditions are
similar as both modules will continue to execute their identical faulty code. In order
to achieve protection against software faults in redundant channels software diversity
may be introduced.
Avizˇienis [13] describes the N-version technique that involves using several diﬀerent
implementations of a program as a means to achieve tolerance to failure in any of
the individual versions. The assumption is that software errors will be experienced as
statistically-uncorrelated random events in independently-implemented programs. The
diﬀerent versions all attempt to implement the same speciﬁcation and therefore should
produce the same result for the same input. In the absence of a disagreement between
the software modules, the unanimous answer is passed to its destination. The action
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taken given a disagreement between modules depend on the number of versions/variants
used. For a two-version system, the disagreement between the versions represents
a fault condition where the system cannot tell which version is incorrect. Given a
transient, the problem may be resolved by repeating the calculation. If a system
contains three or more versions, the eﬀect of an error in one version may be masked by
some form of voting mechanism. The main disadvantages of N-version programming
is its cost of implementation. Knight and Leveson [107] question the independence
claim of diﬀerent versions of the same speciﬁcation on the basis of an experiment with
N-version programming. In the experiment, 27 independently developed versions of a
program was subjected to one million tests. The tests revealed that the programs were
individually extremely reliable but also that the number of tests in which more than
one program failed was substantially more than expected.
The Recovery Block (RB) [8] technique uses some form of error detection to validate
the operation of a software module. If an error is detected in a primary module then a
secondary software module is used. The RB scheme is based on the use of acceptance
tests. These tests may have several components and may, for example, include checks
for runtime errors; excessive execution time; and calculation errors. The overall system
can execute a redundant module in one of two ways given the failure of an acceptance
test, which are by backward recovery or by forward recovery. By backward recovery
it is meant that the state of the system is reset to a recovery point from which the
redundant module starts executing. By forward recovery it is meant that the redun-
dant module must continue execution from the current execution point. The eﬀective
implementation of the error detection mechanism and acceptance tests are essential for
the successful implementation of the RB technique.
A way to achieve safety is to utilise adaptable systems [11]. Adaptable systems
are able to evolve during operation, thereby providing resilience against unforeseen
changes that may occur while executing. The ability to adapt introduces an additional
uncertainty aspect with respect to the correctness of the function provided compared
to conventional software-based systems that do not evolve by themselves. Adaptable
systems are proposed or explored in many diﬀerent domains, e.g., health, nuclear power
production, space exploration, and military applications, for diﬀerent kinds of safety
and mission critical control tasks as indicated in the papers [18, 110, 127, 149, 152, 158,
159]. The motivation is to increase performance by applying techniques for adapting
the behaviour of some control function to handle unforeseen or otherwise uncertain
factors. Evidently there are challenges with respect to determinism and predictability
of adaptable systems since the behaviour of these types of systems will change over time
as adaptations are eﬀectuated. In critical applications where there may be unacceptable
consequences of certain failures, potential negative eﬀects due to erroneous adaptations
must be controlled in order to facilitate utilisation. There are open questions with
respect to how to assess the safety of such systems as indicated in [152] and [158].
Tallant [158] identiﬁes the non-determinism of intelligent and reasoning systems as a
challenge to current practices on veriﬁcation and validation that further slows down
the utilisation of these types of systems for performing safety critical control.
From a safety perspective, the main challenge with utilising adaptable systems is
to demonstrate that the system is still safe after each change. The service oﬀered by
an adaptable system may vary over time as an eﬀect of the adaptations that may be
experienced at runtime. This reduces the ability to predict the behaviour of the system.
The variability of an adaptable system and its service is governed by the adaptation
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loop mechanism [145] consisting of processes for monitoring, detecting, deciding and
acting upon change. The challenges associated with the variability of the service and
the system as an eﬀect of adaptations are discussed in [126] and [172].
In order to provide assurance before commissioning that system adaptations will
not negatively aﬀect safety, there are basically two choices: (i) assure that the system
is not able to adapt into a hazardous conﬁguration, or (ii) assure that that no change is
eﬀectuated during operation unless it may be conﬁrmed there that are no adverse eﬀects
of the change. The two choices are basically diﬀerent in that choice (i) establishes the
safety argument once and for all before commissioning, while choice (ii) necessitates
on-job assessment of change as an integral part of the safety argument. Kurd [110]
describes the SCANN (Safety Critical Artiﬁcial Neural Network) model and how it can
be applied in order to satisfy performance goals as well as safety goals. The SCANN
incorporates constraints as part of the network model in order to constrain adaptation
in the manner of choice (i) above. Kurd [110] and also Taylor [159] discuss several
methods found in the literature addressing diﬀerent aspects of the life-cycle important
for veriﬁcation and validation of neural networks. Both authors identify rule extraction
techniques as a promising approach for demonstrating that the knowledge inherently
contained in a neural network is consistent with requirements.
A survey of rule extraction techniques is provided by Darbari in [37]. Darbari [37]
identiﬁes that many of the approaches to rule extraction is in the form of a search
problem where a space of candidate rules are explored and conﬁrmed by testing of
individual candidates against the network in order to establish valid rules.
Although rule extraction techniques may oﬀer a promising approach for assessing
what a neural network has learnt and to establish safety tests, this thesis pursues strat-
egy (ii) above in the ﬁrst case study documented in Paper 2 (described in Chapter 10)
by an adaptation of the ideas of Sha [147] on dissimilar redundant systems for con-
trolling the uncertainty related to adaptable systems learning. A DMR fault tolerant
design solution is described in our second case study documented in Paper 3 (described
in Chapter 11) founded in traditional design principles to achieve fault tolerance.
4.3.2 Safety demonstration
The two basic concerns that must be addressed in order to achieve conﬁdence that
a safety critical system is suﬃciently safe for its intended purpose are: (1) that the
deﬁned safety objectives are correct and adequate; and (2) that the safety objectives are
satisfactory satisﬁed. A safety demonstration should in order to successfully convince
someone assessing that a system is suﬃciently safe for operating in its intended context
provide the claims, arguments and evidences required such that the concerns (1) and
(2) are convincingly demonstrated met.
A safety demonstration can be structured in diﬀerent styles and by diﬀerent means,
e.g., by graphical approaches like Goal-Structure Notation (GSN) [6] or Claims-Arguments
Evidence (CAE) notation [20], by Bayesian approaches [60], by natural language struc-
tured according to a template as in [30], or simply presented as a coherent body of
documents stemming from the system life-cycle whose combination acts as demonstra-
tion of safety being suﬃciently addressed, to name a few. The intent, however, is to
structure claims, arguments and evidences in such a manner that it convinces some
actor reviewing the collection of evidences that the system is suﬃciently safe for its
intended use.
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Approaches for demonstrating that safety objectives are satisfactory met may be
divided into: implicit approaches and explicit approaches. Bishop et al. [20] argue
that safety justiﬁcations in the past tended to be implicit and rule-based when argu-
ing compliance to standards. The authors ﬁnd implicit approaches suitable in stable
environments where best practice is supported by extensive experience but not being
ﬂexible in accommodating technology advances. Due to the inherent lack of ﬂexibil-
ity in the rule-based approaches, a more explicit and goal- based safety justiﬁcation
approach has emerged according to the authors.
Leveson [114] divides safety assurance methods into two general types: (1) pre-
scriptive approaches; and (2) goal-setting approaches. Leveson [114] view is in line
with Bishop et al. [20] on goal-setting approaches emerging within diﬀerent domains.
Prescriptive approaches (called rule-based in [20]) typically represented in standards
and guidelines have a long lasting tradition within domains developing safety critical
systems and may be divided [64,114] into process-based approaches and product-based
approaches. In standards and guidelines with a strong process focus, safety assurance
is to a large degree required to be evidenced in the application of recommended or
mandatory development practices. In standards and guidelines with a strong product
focus, safety assurance is to a large degree based on product speciﬁc evidences.
The result of showing compliance to a standard, e.g., IEC 61513 [86], may be seen
as a way of performing an implicit safety demonstration where a system is developed
according to practices prescribed by a consensus of an international community of
experts on what yields safe systems. Thus, a demonstration of compliance also implies
that the procured system is developed according to acceptable practices and thus may
be seen as suﬃciently safe for operating in its intended context. The position of seven
nuclear regulators presented in [160] gives a warning to this view and states “standards
and national rules reﬂect the knowledge and consensus of experts; the fulﬁlment of these
requirements may not be suﬃcient to assure safety in all cases. They usefully describe
what is recommended in ﬁelds such as requirements speciﬁcation, design, veriﬁcation,
validation, maintenance, operation, etc. and contribute to the improvement of safety
demonstration practices”. The authors further argue [160] that any combination of
approaches for the demonstration of safety may be used and may also be conditioned
on the provision of evidence for compliance to laws, regulations, and standards as well
as conditioned on certain speciﬁc residual risks are acceptable and that certain safety
properties are achieved.
Fig. 4.1 illustrates the three main approaches that may be integrated to form an
overall safety justiﬁcation strategy as identiﬁed in [160] and [20].
The three main approaches for arguing safety as indicated in Fig. 4.1 diﬀer in focus
as follows:
1. Goal-based approach: justiﬁcations based on evidences of certain safety properties
being achieved [160].
2. Rule-Based approach: justiﬁcations based on evidences of compliance with a set
of agreed rules, laws, and standards [160] .
3. Risk-informed approach: justiﬁcations based on evidences of certain speciﬁc resid-
ual risks are acceptable [160].
In the railway domain, EN 50129 [30] insists on a structured safety justiﬁcation
document known as a safety case. The role of the safety case [30] is: “The safety case
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Figure 4.1: Main safety justiﬁcation approaches (adopted from Bishop, Bloomﬁeld,
and Guerra [20] and modiﬁed)
forms part of the overall documentary evidence to be submitted to the relevant safety
authority in order to obtain safety approval for a generic product, a class of application
or a speciﬁc application”.
In the nuclear domain on the other hand, IEC 61513 [86] does not require a safety
case to communicate a safety demonstration. The view on how a safety demonstration
should be used is also somewhat diﬀerent compared to the railway. The position of
seven nuclear regulators as given in [160] is that “A safety demonstration addresses the
properties of a particular system operating in a speciﬁc environment. It is therefore
speciﬁc and carried out on a case-by-case basis, and not once and for all”. Thus,
to obtain safety approval for a generic product is not generally accepted within the
nuclear domain as safety approval of some product is given on its speciﬁc use in a
speciﬁc context.
Habli [65] argues that the traditional free text representation of safety argumen-
tation in the safety domain is problematic when communicating complex safety argu-
ments involving stakeholders with diﬀerent concerns. Habli identiﬁes the Goal Struc-
tured Notation (GSN) [61,101,102,154] as a means to improve expressiveness and deal
with the complexity of safety arguments. GSN is a graphical notation for deﬁning a
safety argumentation that is inspired by Toulmins theory of argumentation [162].
The main elements of GSN are presented in Fig. 4.2 where an overall claim is decom-
posed via sub-claims into evidences. Goal elements are used to express claims. Context
elements are used to describe the context of terms expressed in a claim. Strategy ele-
ments are used to express a speciﬁc strategy for the decomposition of a claim. Solution
elements are used to reference documentation that shall be perceived as evidences.
4.3.3 Safety assurance
Independent of the means applied for structuring and presenting a safety demonstra-
tion, as addressed in Section 4.3.2, there is a need to establish evidence that provides
the necessary safety assurance. What is necessary depends on what is needed to con-
vince some safety authority that safety is assured. A ﬁrst test is to convince oneself.
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Figure 4.2: Main graphical elements in GSN (adopted from [61] and modiﬁed)
Safety assurance may be achieved on the basis of evidence on the appropriate use of
processes, methods, techniques and tools for developing and assessing a system under
consideration according to acceptable safety engineering principles. What is acceptable
depends on the task or the problem that is addressed and the context of application.
Fig. 2.1 presents the system life-cycle as it is presented in the railway standard
EN50129 [30]. The system life-cycle is described as a process of phases. EN50129
also provides guidance to the appropriate selection of techniques to support the dif-
ferent phases of the process. Annex E of EN50129 provides recommendations for the
application of methods and techniques relevant to the phase identiﬁed as risk anal-
ysis, namely phase 3 in Fig. 2.1. A prerequisite for achieving safety assurance is to
establish the safety objectives associated with the system under development. Some
safety objectives may be deﬁned on the basis of the results from hazard and risk
analysis. The following techniques are highly recommended within EN50129 as sup-
port for failure and hazard analysis of SIL 4 systems: Preliminary Hazard Analysis
(PHA); Fault Tree Analysis (FTA); Markov analysis; Failure Modes Eﬀects (Criti-
cality) Analysis (FMEA/FMECA); HAZard and OPerability studies (HAZOP); and
Common Cause Failure (CCF) analysis. Another recommended technique is Event
Tree Analysis (ETA). In the following, each of these techniques will be brieﬂy pre-
sented.
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) [46] is a hazard identiﬁcation technique. PHA
is typically applied in the early stages of development when detailed technical informa-
tion about the system under consideration is not available, e.g., prior to the speciﬁca-
tion of the design. The objective is to identify the hazards that are relevant with respect
to the system under development, determine the potential causes of the hazards, the
eﬀects of hazards, their probability of occurring, and establish initial requirements to
avoid or control hazards. The identiﬁcation step may be supported by a list of known
hazards. The results of the PHA are usually reported by using a worksheet.
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [89] is a deductive analysis technique that starts from
the deﬁnition of a hazard and investigates deductively what can cause this hazard.
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Each of the identiﬁed potential causes are further investigated in order to deduce their
causes. This procedure continues until every derived cause is related to some initial
basic event for which there is no reason to perform further investigation. The causal
relationships between basic events, intermediate causal events, and the hazard are
typically presented in a tree-like structure called a fault tree. The hazard investigated
represents the top-node in the tree, the basic events represent the leaf-nodes in the
three, and the intermediate events are represented as the other nodes in the tree.
Diﬀerent types of logical gates between the nodes describe the relationships between
hazards, causes and basic events.
Markov analysis [9] is a stochastic mathematical method for analysing the reliability
and availability of systems whose components exhibit dependencies. In Markov analy-
sis, a system is modelled as a number of states with transitions between the states. It
can be challenging to apply Markov analysis as the number of discrete system states
gets large due to the rapid growth of the workload for analysing the system.
Failure Modes Eﬀects (Criticality) Analysis (FMEA/FMECA) [88] is a stepwise
procedure for systematically assessing the potential failure modes of a system and
their eﬀects. Once a system is deﬁned in a manner such that its function and structure
may be understood, each part is assessed with respect to it potential failure modes and
their resulting eﬀects on the rest of the system. For each failure mode investigated, it
is typically assumed that it is the only failure mode that exists at a given time. Thus,
the FMEA approach is eﬀective for identifying single failure points but not failure
combinations.
HAZard and OPerability studies (HAZOP) [165] is a qualitative technique for iden-
tifying hazards based on discussions carried out by a multi-disciplinary team during
meetings. The meetings are facilitated by applying guide-words as support for inves-
tigating the system eﬀect of deviations from intended operation of diﬀerent system
parts.
Common Cause Failure (CCF) analysis [46] is a technique for assessing in what way
a system may experience failure as an eﬀect of multiple components failing due to a
single common cause within a speciﬁed time.
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) [92] is a technique for modelling the consequences of
initiating events by an inductive investigatory process. A set of event chains is modelled
starting from an initiating event with logical branches describing potential subsequent
events. The result is a tree-like structure modelling the causal relationships between
an initiating event and risks by causal chains of events.
The techniques presented above are widely applied in diﬀerent industrial domains
as support for hazard and risk analysis. The result of applying these techniques does
not provide safety assurance alone. The result may be used to identify where eﬀorts
for risk reduction should be allocated, e.g., by providing a basis for deﬁning safety
objectives. Thus, depending on the result of the risk analysis, the development team
chooses the appropriate techniques, methods, and tools in order to reduce identiﬁed
risk to an acceptable level. What is an acceptable level depends on the criticality of
the functions that will be performed by the system and what is deﬁned as acceptable
within a particular domain. At some point during development, the risks are analysed
and understood to such a degree that means for risk reduction may be proposed. Safety
assurance is achieved when the proper set of risk reductions is applied such that safety
objectives may be argued to be satisfactorily met.
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4.4 Modelling
4.4.1 Modelling dependencies and ﬂows
Krogstie [108] discusses diﬀerent general abstraction mechanisms and perspectives used
in conceptual modelling. Krogstie divides modelling languages according to the core
phenomena or concepts that are represented and focused on in a language, termed
the perspective of the language. A survey of state-of-the-art approaches for conceptual
modelling is presented and divided into eight diﬀerent perspectives. The modelling
perspectives can be brieﬂy summarised as:
1. Behavioural : The main phenomena are states and transitions between states
[108].
2. Functional : The main phenomena is the transformation, e.g., an activity trans-
forms inputs to outputs. The terms typically used are function, process, activity,
and task [108].
3. Structural : The main phenomena support the description of the static structure
of a system. The constructs of structural languages are often termed entity, or
otherwise termed object, concept, thing and phenomena with some diﬀerences in
the associated semantics [108].
4. Goal and Rule: The main phenomena are goals and rules where rules inﬂuence
the actions of a set of actors [108].
5. Object : The main phenomena of object-oriented languages are similar to those
found in most object-oriented programming languages. The terms typically used
are class, object, type, instance, inheritance, event, interface, etc. [108].
6. Communication: The main phenomena in this category of languages support
the modelling of how persons cooperate within work processes through their
conversations and through mutual commitments taken within them [108].
7. Actor and Role: The main phenomena in this category of languages support
the modelling of relationships between actors, otherwise called agents, and their
role [108].
8. Topological : The main phenomena in this category of languages support the mod-
elling of the topological ordering between diﬀerent concepts, e.g., the modelling
of where diﬀerent tasks shall be performed [108].
Krogstie [108] states that in many cases it can be diﬃcult to classify a speciﬁc
modelling approach to one perspective as the perspectives are somewhat related, and
follows up with a discussion on other classiﬁcation schemes and their drawbacks. More
importantly, no language supports every perspective. Thus, the language for expressing
concepts within a particular domain should be selected on the basis of the modelling
need. We present below a short summary of a few modelling languages supporting one
or more of the modelling perspectives 1-8 presented above.
The Uniﬁed Modeling Language (UML) [137] is a general-purpose modelling lan-
guage that is well known and commonly used within the ﬁeld of software engineering.
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UML has a rich set of language constructs and consists of diﬀerent kinds of diagrams
that supports the speciﬁcation of the behaviour and structure of a system. UML pro-
ﬁles may be deﬁned in order to adapt UML to particular needs, e.g., the need to express
patterns that may be combined.
Jackson [98] describes the Problem Frames (PF) approach as support for require-
ments analysis and elicitation. Jackson oﬀers a notation for scoping the main concerns
relevant to a system under consideration for performing its intended task. The notation
oﬀers constructs for identifying the diﬀerent problem areas and the entities that occur
in a speciﬁc system context as well as the interfaces between problem areas and enti-
ties. When the problem is framed, the user continues with an analysis of the problem
through a sequence of steps. The analysis results in the deﬁnition of the requirements
that must be satisﬁed in order for the system under consideration to satisfy its goals.
Gane and Sarson [56] present the Data Flow Diagram (DFD) approach for express-
ing the data ﬂow through an information system. The notation includes symbols for
expressing processes, stores (data and material), ﬂows, and external entities. An exter-
nal entity interacts with a system and may represent an individual, an organisational
actor, or a technical actor. A system is represented as a network of processes, stores
and external entities connected by ﬂows.
The Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) [136] is a notation for busi-
ness process modelling that supports diﬀerent kinds of users from business analysts,
technical developers, to those managing and monitoring business processes. The basic
elements in BPMN are diﬀerent kinds of ﬂow objects, connecting objects, swimlanes,
and artefacts. The conceptual modelling of the application of patterns could take the
form of a BPMN-like diagram in which ﬂow objects may represent patterns, connec-
tors may represent relations between patterns, and artefacts may represents pattern
instances or the outcome of applying a pattern.
Chen [31] describes the Entity-Relationship (ER) model for describing database
design. The basic elements in a model are: entity, relationship, and attribute. The
model constructs are used to describe the relationships between data.
Hull and King [85] present the Generic Semantic Modelling (GSM) language. GSM
supports the semantic modelling of data in the sense that it models the primitive data
types, the constructed data types (e.g., generalisations and aggregations of other data
types), and attributes. GSM also supports the speciﬁcation of derived classes and the
modelling of the relationships between diﬀerent types of data.
Halpin [67] presents the Object Role Modelling (ORM) language for designing
database models and the procedures for creating, transforming, mapping, and querying
the models.
Gulla [63] presents the Phenomena, Process, and Programs (PPP) environment
where PPP models are created by four sub-languages for expressing: process model
(PrM), phenomenon model (PhM), process life description (PLD), and user interface
description (UID).
Rumbaugh et al. [142] present the Object-Modeling Technique (OMT), a predeces-
sor to UML, for software modelling and design. There are three main types of models
in OMT: object model; dynamic model; and functional model. Object models are
comparable to UML class diagrams. Dynamic models are comparable to UML state
machine diagrams and activity diagrams. Functional models describe ﬂow in terms of
processes, data store, data ﬂow and actors.
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Winograd and Flores [173] present a graph structure for the modelling of a con-
versation for action. A state transition diagram in the form of a graph describes the
speech act between parties attempting to coordinate actions with one another. The
approach could be relevant for describing a connected set of patterns where each ver-
tex in the graph represent a pattern and the edges between could represent diﬀerent
relationships or interactions.
Yu and Mylopoulos [177] present an integrated set of languages known as i* as
support for the early phases of system modelling, in the understanding of the problem
domain. The i* is developed for modelling and reasoning about organizational envi-
ronments and their information systems with respect to capturing the actors, tasks,
goals, resources, and dependencies that occurs in these environments.
Gordijn and van der Raadt [59] present the e3value modelling language for inter-
organisational modelling. The purpose of the language is to model how objects of value
are created, exchanged, and consumed by actors.
Gopalakrishnan et al. [58] present simple annotations to UML activity diagrams
for diﬀerentiating between the places where activities are performed. The activities in
an activity diagram are given diﬀerent colours. A legend provides a mapping between
each of the colours used in a diagram and the associated geographical places in which
activities are performed.
4.4.2 Principles of visualisation
The key activities performed by a reader in order to draw conclusion about a diagram
are, according to Larkin and Simon [111]: searching; and recognising relevant informa-
tion. In order to aid the user in these activities there exists a solid basis of knowledge
represented in the literature. Visualisation of qualitative information for eﬀective hu-
man information processing is addressed by Ellis [44], Healay and Enns [77], Katz [100],
Lidwell et al. [115], Norman [133], Tufte [163, 164], Ware [170], and Wertheimer [171],
to name a few.
Ellis [44] provides an extensive overview of the Gestalt principles of perception which
build upon classic work from Wertheimer [171] and others. Gestalt principles build
upon theory of human perception and the tendency of the human mind to naturally
perceive whole objects on the basis of object groups and parts1.
Katz [100] presents patterns on designing information and exempliﬁes their use on
hundreds of examples of how to facilitate ease of perception and clarity in visualisations.
Lidwell, Holden, and Butler [115] present 125 patterns of good design evidenced
within theory and empirical research on visualisation. The patterns describe principles
of designing visual information for eﬀective human perception. The patterns are deﬁned
on the basis of extensive research on human cognitive processes.
Norman [133] presents principles in the design of everyday objects. Some of the
principles are generally applicable within design, such as the principle of natural map-
ping and the principle of achieving high visibility. The natural mapping principle con-
cerns the arranging of objects controlled and the objects used for controlling. Given
a natural mapping order of controllers and controlled objects, the eﬀect is a reduced
need for memorising the relationship between objects. The principle of high visibility
1In Fig. 4.1, the arrangement of shapes makes the mind perceive a triangle encapsulating the words
“safety justiﬁcation” although there is no triangle. The phenomena is within Gestalt known as the
principle of closure [44, 171].
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concerns designing items such that those features of the designed item that should
get immediate attention receive it, e.g., one look at an item reveals its state and the
alternatives for action.
Healey and Enns [77] survey theories and empiric research on visual attention and
visual memory. The authors discuss the limited ability of humans to remember im-
age details and to deploy attention. Further, they argue that the limitations to the
capabilities of humans for attention and memory have signiﬁcant consequences for vi-
sualisation and should be mitigated by producing images that are salient, memorable,
and that guide attention to important locations within the data.
Tufte addresses [164] the display of quantitative information in charts and diagrams.
Although the work mainly covers the display of quantitative data, some generally
applicable principles to the use of lines, symbols, words, shading and colour for reducing
visual complexity and highlighting the data of interest are addressed. In [163], Tufte
presents general principles of graphical presentation of quantitative data as well as
qualitative data thoroughly evidenced in the literature.
Ware [170] gives a detailed analysis of the current theory of the mechanics of human
visual cognitive processes and provides guidance on the use of graphic design as a tool
to enhance perception.
A principle of good design addressed by several authors [15, 115, 128] is to balance
the need for performance by the importance of preference in designing solutions. Lidwel
et al. [115] give the example of the Dvorak keyboard layout, estimated to provide 30%
better performance and fewer errors in typing than the QWERTY keyboard layout.
Although the Dvorak layout was introduced more than 50 years ago, people prefer
the familiar QWERTY layout. Thus, solutions showing higher performance than well-
established solutions are not necessarily accepted due to preference.
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Chapter 5
Achievements: the overall picture
In this chapter, we give an overview of the three main artefacts resulting from our work
and how they are integrated into the SaCS method.
The SaCS method consists of the following three artefacts:
1. The SaCS process : deﬁnes the process for systematically applying SaCS patterns
to support the development of conceptual safety designs.
2. The library of SaCS patterns : deﬁnes 26 basic SaCS patterns on best practices
for conceptual safety design categorised into six diﬀerent kinds. A user deﬁnes
composite SaCS patterns on the basis of patterns in the library. The user can
extend the library by deﬁning additional basic and composite SaCS patterns.
3. The SaCS pattern language: deﬁnes how to express basic SaCS patterns and
includes a graphical notation for specifying composite SaCS patterns.
In Section 5.1, we start by presenting the SaCS method. Thereafter, Section 5.2
presents the SaCS process, Section 5.3 presents the SaCS pattern language, while
Section 5.4 presents the library of SaCS patterns. Lastly, Section 5.5 exempliﬁes the
SaCS method.
5.1 The SaCS method
Fig. 5.1 presents how the SaCS method integrates the three artefacts of this thesis,
resulting in the SaCS method for conceptual safety design. In Fig. 5.1, the associations
denote in what way the three artefacts are integrated. In this integration, an assumed
user of the SaCS process makes use of the patterns within the library as guidance
to problem solving. Furthermore, the user of the process makes use of the language
for expressing a solution to a problem in the form of a pattern in order to extend
the library. The formal syntax of the language is used to support the speciﬁcation of
patterns. The structured semantics is used to support understanding what is expressed
by a pattern.
Depending on the complexity of the problem that needs to be solved in a given
context, and to the extent available patterns can be used to solve the problem, the
user chooses whether to address the problem with a single basic pattern or rather by a
combination of several patterns. The classiﬁcation structure for the patterns denotes
the diﬀerent kinds of patterns oﬀered by the library. As a basic pattern provides
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Figure 5.1: UML class diagram showing the integration of the artefacts into the SaCS
method
guidance on a speciﬁc problem-solution concept with a limited scope, the use of several
and complementary kinds of basic patterns is necessary for conceptual safety design.
The combination of several basic patterns for problem solving facilitates separation of
concerns.
A composite pattern is expressed graphically and speciﬁes how several patterns are
combined. The visual presentation facilitates the discussion between diﬀerent kinds of
users on how conceptual safety design is intended to be approached with patterns as
guidance. The instantiation of a composite that combines suitable patterns supporting
the speciﬁcation of requirements, system design, and safety case in a given context, is
used to produce the conceptual safety design.
5.2 The SaCS process
Fig. 5.2 presents the SaCS process. The SaCS process interleaves the three main
activities, pattern selection, pattern composition, and pattern instantiation, each of
which is described in the following subsections.
The intention of the interleaving is to allow ﬂexible use. A user can choose to strictly
follow the sub-activities of pattern selection before performing pattern composition, and
ﬁnally, pattern instantiation, if that is found suitable. Another approach is to iterate
over pattern selection, pattern instantiation, and pattern composition, one pattern at
a time, until every relevant pattern has been applied.
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Figure 5.2: The main activities of the SaCS process
5.2.1 Pattern selection
Fig. 5.3 presents a speciﬁc kind of relationship between a few of the basic patterns in the
library and is a fragment of a larger visualisation. The visualisation is used to support
pattern selection and is referred to as a pattern selection map. The kind of relationship
that is visualised is the order in which a user is expected to consider the relevancy of
a pattern for application in a given context. Patterns are ordered in the map, partly
as a sequence and partly grouped into choices between alternatives. The ordering of
patterns in the map supports the process for pattern selection as presented in Fig. 5.2
where a user ﬁrstly selects patterns supporting requirements elicitation, secondly se-
lects patterns supporting system design, and thirdly selects patterns supporting the
construction of a safety case.
In Fig. 5.3, the round icons classify patterns. The identiﬁers adjacent to the round
icons are names of patterns in the library. The arrows suggest the order in which
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patterns should be considered for application. A user traverses the pattern selection
map in the order indicated by the arrows and considers whether a pattern is relevant or
not for application by inspecting its deﬁnition. The diamonds represent choices. The
patterns below a diamond represent the alternatives associated with a choice where
more than one pattern can be selected.
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Figure 5.3: A fragment of a larger map of available patterns in the library supporting
pattern selection
Six diﬀerent kinds of basic patterns may be selected from two main groups: process
assurance and product assurance patterns. In Fig. 5.3, icons enclosed by an arrow are
process assurance patterns. Icons enclosed by a circle are product assurance patterns.
Product assurance as well as process assurance patterns are further classiﬁed into re-
quirement patterns, solution patterns, and safety case patterns. The process assurance
patterns deﬁne, e.g., processes for performing certain safety engineering activities and
documenting results, eﬀective methods for addressing speciﬁc development challenges,
and how to argue safety on the basis of applying acceptable development processes.
The product assurance patterns deﬁne very speciﬁc system properties, e.g., the re-
quirements for a system that shall perform a speciﬁc function, various eﬀective system
designs, and safety arguments from a product oriented development perspective.
5.2.2 Pattern composition
A composite pattern is expressed graphically and is used to specify how the patterns
selected as guidance for conceptual safety design are combined and applied. Further-
more, the visual presentation facilitates the discussion between participants involved in
conceptualisation on whether the patterns selected and their combination is appropri-
ate as support for solving the diﬀerent kinds of challenges that arise in a given context.
Once the users agree on the speciﬁc combination of patterns that shall be applied to
support conceptualisation, and have documented this plan within a composite pattern,
relevant users perform stepwise instantiation of the patterns within the composite to
produce results. A composite is instantiated according to the rules for composition.
The patterns within a composite are instantiated according to their associated rules.
In order to document more precisely how patterns are applied, the user can annotate a
composite to indicate the documents that were used as input to pattern instantiation
as well the documents produced as a result of pattern instantiation.
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5.2.3 Pattern instantiation
The user must interpret a pattern in order to correctly apply it in a relevant context.
Each basic pattern deﬁnes its instantiation rule that guides the user on how to trans-
form input to output by the use of the pattern deﬁnition. Furthermore, each pattern
explicitly deﬁnes its input and output parameters. A description of how a pattern is
expected to be applied in a sequence with other patterns can be found in the deﬁnitions
of those basic patterns where this is relevant.
Guidance on the proper instantiation of composite patterns is represented by the
rules for composition as deﬁned within Paper 1. In short, patterns in SaCS are com-
bined with others through operators, otherwise called relations, which act on the pa-
rameters of patterns. As the output of a pattern cannot be produced before the input
required for pattern instantiation is available, and relations deﬁne the expected work
ﬂows or dependencies between related patterns, the instantiation order can to a large
degree be deduced from the deﬁned relations. In cases where it is unclear which pat-
tern should be prioritised or patterns are expected to be instantiated in parallel, the
user can provide additional guidance by using annotations to indicate the expected
instantiation order of the patterns within a composite.
5.3 The SaCS pattern language
The SaCS pattern language is used to specify SaCS patterns and their use. While a
basic pattern is intended to describe a concept for how to solve an elementary problem
within conceptual safety design with a limited scope, a composite pattern is intended
to describe a solution to a more complex problem as a combination of simpler patterns.
We present the syntax for basic and composite patterns separately as the formats
are diﬀerent. The structured semantics is approached similarly for both basic and
composite patterns.
In Section 5.3.1, the syntax of basic SaCS patterns is presented. Thereafter, we
present in Section 5.3.2 the syntax of composite patterns. In Section 5.3.3, we describe
our approach to structured semantics for SaCS patterns.
5.3.1 Syntax of basic SaCS patterns
Table 5.1 presents the overall format of basic SaCS patterns in terms of identifying
the named sections of a pattern description and their expected content. The format
is deﬁned in accordance with the practice for documenting patterns as addressed in
Section 4.1.3 and can be seen as a variant of the format of Alexander et al. [5].
Fig. 5.4 presents the illustration given in the “Pattern Signature” section of the
pattern named Hazard Identiﬁcation [74]. Within the deﬁnition of a composite pattern,

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Figure 5.4: The signature of the Hazard Identiﬁcation pattern (from Paper 2 [74])
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Section Content
Name A unique name identifying the pattern.
Pattern Signature A short description of the basic information associated with
a pattern, such as its categorisation, the name and type of
every input and output parameter, and a presentation of how
the pattern shall be referred to graphically within a composite
SaCS pattern.
Intent A short overview of the problem that is addressed together
with a description of how the pattern provides a beneﬁcial
solution for solving the problem.
Applicability A short description of the typical situations in which the pat-
tern may be applied.
Problem Identiﬁes and describes the core of problem that is addressed
by the pattern.
Solution * Describes the essence of a solution that addresses the deﬁned
problem. The solution description identiﬁes how the inputs
to the pattern are used as part of the solution to produce
the expected outputs of the pattern when it is applied in a
context.
* There are variants of the heading depending on the pattern
category. The headings are: Problem Frame Analysis Solution
for product assurance requirement patterns, Design Solution
for product assurance solution patterns, Process Solution for
process assurance requirement patterns, Method Solution for
product assurance solution patterns, Argument Structure So-
lution for process assurance safety case patterns and product
assurance safety case patterns.
Instantiation Rule Deﬁnes a rule for the correct instantiation of the pattern in
terms of deﬁning what the expected output is.
Related Patterns Describes the relationships to other SaCS patterns.
Known Uses Describes examples of the pattern in use.
Table 5.1: The format of basic SaCS patterns
the pattern Hazard Identiﬁcation can be referenced graphically as presented in Fig. 5.4.
The illustration identiﬁes the name of the pattern, its categorisation, as well as the
name and categorisation of each of its input and output parameters according to the
syntax of SaCS [73]. The remainder of the pattern deﬁnition describes how the inputs,
i.e., ToA (short for Target of Assessment), Src (short for Source), IdHz (short for
Identiﬁed Hazards) are used in order to derive some result, i.e., HzLg (short for Hazard
Log). Speciﬁcally, the “Solution” section within a basic pattern deﬁnition expresses a
generic solution that facilitates the transformation of inputs to outputs.
Fig. 5.5 presents a UML activity diagram with the addition of SaCS speciﬁc anno-
tations that represents the process solution proposed within Hazard Identiﬁcation for
identifying hazards.
The SaCS speciﬁc annotations are represented by: the dotted drawn frame that
encapsulates the activity diagram; the dotted drawn boxes that appears on the dotted
drawn frame; and the arrows that are connected to the dotted drawn boxes. The
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Figure 5.5: Process solution described in the Hazard Identiﬁcation pattern (from Paper
2 [74])
dotted drawn boxes represent either an input or an output. The identiﬁer within
a box names a parameter. An arrow pointing away from a box indicates that the
identiﬁed parameter is an input. An arrow pointing towards a box indicates that
the identiﬁed parameter is an output. The remaining diagram elements in Fig. 5.5
represent the process solution in terms of a UML activity diagram. The SaCS speciﬁc
annotations in Fig. 5.5 indicate in what way inputs are related to the diﬀerent activities
for performing hazard identiﬁcation and how the result of one of the activities in this
process represents an output of applying the pattern. Each activity in the diagram
is further deﬁned textually in the pattern deﬁnition. The textual description deﬁnes
how the diﬀerent inputs are used to perform the activities they are associated with.
The textual description also details how the output is intended to be produced. The
parameters that can be identiﬁed from Fig. 5.5 correspond to the parameters of the
pattern signature presented in Fig. 5.4.
The SaCS speciﬁc annotations in Fig. 5.5 deﬁne a relationship between the param-
eters of the pattern and elements of the pattern solution that should be interpreted as
follows:
• ToA is an input to the activity Identify Scope of Analysis.
• Src is an input to the activity Identify Relevant Data Sources.
• IdHz is an input to the activity Identify System Applicable Hazard.
• HzLg is an output of the activity Document Hazards.
The syntax for describing basic patterns in SaCS facilitates precise models of pattern
compositions by demanding input and output parameters to be explicitly deﬁned and
thereby oﬀering the possibility to easily connect patterns through their parameters.
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5.3.2 Syntax of composite SaCS patterns
Fig. 5.6 exempliﬁes the use of a subset of the diﬀerent graphical elements that may be
applied for specifying a composite pattern. In Fig. 5.6, coloured arrows and text are
added in order to identify the diﬀerent kinds of SaCS speciﬁc graphical elements that
are entirely visualised in diﬀerent shades of grey. A composite consists of a declaration,
which may be thought of as a signature of the composite, and its content. A horizontal
line separates the declaration from the content. In the declaration, the composite
pattern is given its name and the input and output parameters of the composite pattern
are declared. In the content part of the composite, each pattern that is involved in
the combination of patterns is identiﬁed as well as the relations between patterns.
Relations connect patterns.
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Figure 5.6: The main elements of a composite pattern explained
The input to Risk Identiﬁcation and Analysis is listed inside square brackets, i.e.,
ToA (short for Target of Assessment). The arrow pointing towards the brackets sym-
bolises input. The output of the pattern is also listed inside square brackets, i.e.,
Risks. The arrow pointing away from the brackets symbolises output. An icon placed
adjacent to a parameter identiﬁer denotes its type. The parameters ToA, Risks, HzLg
(short for Hazard Log), and Haz (short for Hazards) in Fig. 5.6 are denoted as docu-
mentation parameters. Parameters are deﬁned with either local or public accessibility.
The inputs and outputs of a composite are always deﬁned with public accessibility;
symbolised with a thick black arrow.
The composite in Fig. 5.6 is annotated to indicate a particular instantiation of
parameters by connecting them with references to development artefacts. An identiﬁer
provides a reference to a unique development artefact; an icon placed adjacent to the
identiﬁer classiﬁes what kind of artefact that is referenced. We have assumed the
existence of four development artefacts in Fig. 5.6. The belonging documentation of a
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referenced development artefact may be found using the identiﬁer as a key. A dotted
drawn line represents an instantiates relation and connects an artefact to the parameter
it gives value or represent. The following relationships are deﬁned between development
artefacts and parameters in Fig. 5.6:
• The document System context description instantiates ToA.
• The document Hazard log version 3 instantiates Risks.
• The document Hazard log version 1 instantiates HzLg (the output parameter of
Hazard Identiﬁcation).
• The document Hazard log version 2 instantiates HzLg (the output parameter of
Hazard Analysis).
The content part of Risk Identiﬁcation and Analysis contains references to patterns
and relations combining patterns. Patterns are referenced by their identiﬁers; icons
placed adjacent to the identiﬁers for patterns classiﬁes what kind of pattern that is
referenced. Inputs and outputs of referenced patterns are denoted similarly in the con-
tent part of a composite as in the declaration. A parameter of a contained pattern is,
if not otherwise speciﬁed, deﬁned with local accessibility. A one-to-many relationship
exists between inputs in the declaration part of a composite and similarly named inputs
with public accessibility in the content part. The relationship is such that when ToA of
Risk Identiﬁcation and Analysis is instantiated (i.e., given its value by the deﬁned rela-
tion to System context description) then every correspondingly named input parameter
with public accessibility contained in the composite is also similarly instantiated. A
one-to-one relationship exists between an output parameter in the declaration part of a
composite and a correspondingly named output parameter with public accessibility in
the content part. The relationship is such that when Risk of Risk Analysis is produced
then Risk of Risk Identiﬁcation and Analysis is similarly produced.
The arrows connecting patterns in the content part of Risk Identiﬁcation and Anal-
ysis represent two instances of the assigns relation. Relations may be used to deﬁne a
speciﬁc combination of patterns and then operates on the parameters of the respective
patterns that are combined. The assigns relations also indicate the instantiation order
as an output from the instantiation of a pattern must be available before it can be used
as an input to the instantiation of a connected pattern. The assigns relations deﬁned
within Risk Identiﬁcation and Analysis express that:
• The output HzLg of the pattern Hazard Identiﬁcation is assigned to the input
Haz of the pattern Hazard Analysis.
• The output HzLg of the pattern Hazard Analysis is assigned to the input Haz of
the pattern Risk Analysis.
A serial order for instantiating patterns is indicated by the grey wide arrow in
Fig. 5.6 where patterns close to the start of the arrow shall be instantiated prior to
patterns close to the tip. However, the instantiation order visualisation is redundant
and may be removed as the expected order may be deduced from the assigns relations.
Fig. 5.7 exempliﬁes a modularised speciﬁcation where the composite Deﬁne Safety
Requirements models a relationship between the composite Risk Identiﬁcation and
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Analysis deﬁned in Fig. 5.6 and the basic pattern named Establish System Safety Re-
quirements. It is easy to modularise a pattern speciﬁcation by deﬁning within separate
composite a subset of the total number of combined patterns, and further combine
speciﬁcation fragments into a complete pattern structure.
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Figure 5.7: Example on referencing a composite pattern within the deﬁnition of a
composite pattern
The notation for expressing composite patterns consists of the following main mod-
elling elements:
• Pattern reference: Fig. 5.8 presents the icons for the diﬀerent kinds of patterns
deﬁned in SaCS. A pattern reference consists of a unique identiﬁer in a bold font
and an icon classifying the pattern referenced.
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Figure 5.8: The icons for the diﬀerent kinds of pattern references in SaCS
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• Parameter : Fig. 5.9 presents the icons for the diﬀerent kinds of parameters de-
ﬁned in SaCS. A parameter consists of an identiﬁer and an icon classifying the
parameter. Within a composite, the parameters of a pattern are listed inside
square brackets and placed adjacent to the icon that classiﬁes the pattern. The
documentation parameter is a general classiﬁcation and represent a parameter
that cannot be classiﬁed as a requirement parameter, design parameter or safety
case parameter.
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Figure 5.9: The icons for diﬀerent kinds of parameters in SaCS
• Relation: Fig. 5.10 presents the symbols for diﬀerent kinds of relations deﬁned in
SaCS. A relation denotes a relationship between elements in a composite pattern.
The instantiates relation is used to associate an artefact with a parameter indi-
cating that the artefact instantiates the parameter. The assigns relation models
a data ﬂow between patterns where the output of one pattern is used as an input
to a second pattern. The combines relation is used to denote that the outputs
of the patterns that are related are combined into a set consisting of the union
of all outputs. The details relation is used to denote that an output of a pattern
is detailed by the output of a related pattern. The satisﬁes relation is used to
denote that an output of a pattern (typically represented by a requirement pa-
rameter) is satisﬁed by the output of a related pattern (typically represented by
a design parameter). The demonstrates relation is used to denote that an output
(typically represented by a safety case parameter) demonstrates safe the output
of a related pattern (typically represented by a design parameter).
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Figure 5.10: The symbols for the diﬀerent kinds of relations in SaCS
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• Artefact reference: Fig. 5.11 presents the diﬀerent kinds of artefact references
deﬁned in SaCS. An artefact reference consists of an unique identiﬁer and an
icon classifying what kind of artefact that is referenced. Artefact references are
used for denoting a speciﬁc representation of parameters.
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Figure 5.11: The icons for diﬀerent kinds of artefact references in SaCS
• Instantiation order : A composite pattern may include symbols as guidance to
the user on the proper instantiation order of patterns. In the serial instantiation
case of Fig. 5.12 there are two composite patterns A and B where A shall be
instantiated before B. A general rule is that patterns placed closer to the starting
point of the arrow are instantiated prior to patterns placed close to the tip of
the arrow. In the parallel instantiation case of Fig. 5.12, no speciﬁc ordering of
the patterns A and B is assumed and thus the respective pattern references are
placed on two separate arrows.





	

	

Figure 5.12: The symbols for the diﬀerent kinds of instantiation orders in SaCS
5.3.3 Structured semantics
A structured semantics is deﬁned in order to facilitate a common understanding of the
meaning of patterns on the basis of their deﬁnition and rules for translation.
A detailed description of the syntax and semantics of the SaCS pattern language is
presented in Paper 1 (described in Chapter 9). We outline the procedure here.
The method for providing the semantics of SaCS patterns is adapted from [36] and
is performed in two steps:
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1. the translation of a SaCS pattern into its textual syntax; and
2. the translation of the textual syntax into a meaningful text in English.
The textual syntax of SaCS patterns is deﬁned by the use of Extended Backus-Naur
Form (EBNF) [97]. The semantics as a sentence or paragraph in English is provided
by functions that take fragments of a pattern deﬁned by its textual syntax as input
and provides the meaning in English as output.
The textual syntax for pattern references of the same type as the one named Es-
tablish System Safety Requirements in Fig. 5.7 is expressed in Fig. 5.13.
In Fig. 5.13, a term representing a name of the graphical element is given to the left
followed by the associated graphical syntax of the named element. The right pointing
arrow should be interpreted “translates to” and separates the graphical syntax from
the textual syntax (described in the Extended Backus-Naur Form). The term identiﬁer
is not deﬁned but can be assumed to be an alphanumeric string. A terminal symbol
(written in a bold font to increase readability) is used to deﬁne a syntactical element.
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Figure 5.13: Example on the correspondence between graphical and textual syntax of
a pattern reference in SaCS
The symbols 〚 〛 below denote a semantic rule and represents a function that takes
a fragment of a pattern deﬁned according to its textual syntax as input and provides
a sentence or a paragraph in English as output. A semantic rule for the syntactical
element presented in Fig. 5.13 is:
〚 procreqpatternreference(identifier) 〛 = the process pattern identifier
Fig. 5.14 presents a fragment of the composite pattern in Fig. 5.6 and the corre-
sponding translation of this fragment in terms of a textual syntax expressing the rela-
tionship modelled between the two patterns Hazard Identiﬁcation and Hazard Analysis.
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Figure 5.14: A fragment of the composite in Fig. 5.6 and associated textual syntax
Below there is given a semantic rule for translating an assigns relation as exempliﬁed
in Fig. 5.14 into a paragraph in English. In the semantics, the term pr represents a
pattern reference (note that the process assurance pattern reference presented above is
one speciﬁc kind of pattern reference), p represents a parameter, and id( ) represents
a function that takes parameters of diﬀerent kinds as input and provides as output the
associated identiﬁer. A semantic rule for the assigns relation is deﬁned as:
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〚 assigns(pr1, p1, pr2, p2) 〛 = id(p1) is assigned to id(pr2) where:
id(p1) is the output of 〚 pr1 〛.
id(p2) is input to 〚 pr2 〛.
By applying the semantic rules provided for translating the assigns relation and
the process assurance requirement pattern reference on the textual syntax presented
in Fig. 5.14 we get the following English paragraph (slightly formatted to increase
readability):
HzLg is assigned to Haz where:
– HzLg is the output of the process pattern Hazard Identiﬁcation.
– Haz is input to the process pattern Hazard Analysis.
The semantics of a complete SaCS pattern is translated into its meaning as un-
derstandable paragraphs in English in a similar manner as exempliﬁed above on the
assigns relation by translating diﬀerent syntactical elements systematically.
5.4 The library of SaCS patterns
We introduce the library by presenting in Section 5.4.1 the deﬁnition of a basic pattern
as an example of its content. Thereafter, Section 5.4.2 discusses the content of the
library more generally.
5.4.1 An example deﬁnition of a pattern from the library
In the following, a slightly formatted version of the pattern Establish System Safety
Requirements documented in [74] is reproduced. The pattern is described as a sequence
of named sections according to the format outlined in Table 5.1. The section names
are presented in a bold font. The section ”Known Uses” (see Table 5.1) is optional
according to the detailed syntax of basic SaCS patterns (see Paper 1). In the following
pattern deﬁnition, known uses is not deﬁned.
Name: Establish System Safety Requirements
Pattern Signature: Establish System Safety Requirements is deﬁned with the sig-
nature illustrated in Fig. 5.15. In Fig. 5.15, the following abbreviations are used for
denoting the parameters of the pattern:
• ToA is short for Target of Assessment.
• Reg is short for Regulations.
• Risks is not abbreviated; represents the documentation of the risks associated
with the application of ToA in its intended context.
• Req is short for Requirements.
Intent: Support the speciﬁcation of system safety requirements Req on the basis of
a risk-based approach. The safety requirements describe the required measures to
be satisﬁed by the system ToA to assure the necessary safety integrity. The general
approach for deﬁning safety requirements is to deﬁne them on the basis of the result
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Figure 5.15: Establish System Safety Requirements – Pattern Signature
of a risk assessment Risks, especially the mitigations identiﬁed as means to reduce
risk to an acceptable level. The pattern describes the general process of capturing the
requirements that must be satisﬁed in order to assure safety.
Applicability: The Establish System Safety Requirements pattern is intended for the
following situations:
• When the system under construction may negatively aﬀect the overall system
safety.
• When there are identiﬁed measures that can mitigate identiﬁed risks and can be
used as input to the speciﬁcation of safety requirements.
Problem: The main aspects relevant to address when establishing the safety require-
ments are:
• Characteristics : To deﬁne the system characteristics to be satisﬁed such that the
occurrence of unwanted events are minimised or avoided.
• Functions : To deﬁne the safety functions that assures safe operations.
• Constraints : To deﬁne the functional constrains that suﬃciently delimit poten-
tially hazardous operations.
• Environment : To deﬁne the operational environment that ensures safe opera-
tions.
• Compliance: To deﬁne the requirements that are required to be satisﬁed in order
to comply with laws, regulation and standards, as a minimum the mandatory
requirements related to assurance of safety. These requirements include require-
ments on applying some speciﬁc development process, perform certain activities,
or make use of speciﬁc techniques.
Process Solution: Fig. 5.16 illustrates the Establish System Safety Requirements
process speciﬁed using a UML activity diagram.
The input parameters associated with the activity diagram may be interpreted as
follows:
• ToA (Target of Assessment): represents the target system for which safety re-
quirements should be established.
• Reg (Regulations): represents any source of information describing mandatory
or recommended practices (e.g. as provided in laws, regulations or standards)
valuable for identifying risk reducing measures.
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Document safety 
requirements
Reg
Risks
Establish safety 
requirements qualitatively
Establish safety 
requirements quantitatively
qualitative safety requirements
quantitative safety requirements
Confer laws, regulations, 
and standards
Confer risk analysis 
regulatory specific
risk reducing measures
risk reducing measures
system specific 
risk reducing measures Req
ToA Identify target
Figure 5.16: Establish System Safety Requirements – Process Flow
• Risks : represents risks associated with the target system.
The main activities serve the following purpose:
• Identify target : the intent of the activity is to identify ToA. The description
of the target should as a minimum include a deﬁnition of the system and its
boundaries, its operational proﬁle, functional requirements, and safety integrity
requirements.
• Confer laws, regulations, and standards : the intent of the activity is to capture
all relevant data (requirements for risk reducing measures) from relevant sources
(normative references) in order to outline the set of risk reducing measures that
shall be met by compliance. Each source is inspected in order to identify, as a
minimum, the mandatory risk reducing measures that shall be met in order to
be compliant.
• Confer risk analysis : the intent of the activity is to capture all the relevant data
on risk analysis of the system that is under construction in order to outline the
system speciﬁc risk reducing measures that shall be met.
• Establish safety requirements qualitatively : the intent of the activity is to de-
ﬁne safety requirements on the basis of those identiﬁed risk reducing measures
required applied, and which can be demonstrated fulﬁlled with qualitative rea-
soning.
• Establish safety requirements quantitatively : the intent of the activity is to de-
ﬁne safety requirements on the basis of those identiﬁed risk reducing measures
required applied, and which can be demonstrated fulﬁlled with quantitative rea-
soning.
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• Document safety requirements : the intent of the activity is to detail all relevant
information with respect to the requirements in a system safety requirements
speciﬁcation. For each requirement deﬁned in the requirement speciﬁcation, in-
formation detailing what inﬂuenced its deﬁnition should be provided, e.g., the
associated risks, assumptions, calculations, and justiﬁcations.
Instantiation Rule: An artefact Req (see Fig. 5.15 and Fig. 5.16) is the result of a
process that instantiates the Establish System Safety Requirements pattern if:
• Req is a set of requirements.
• Req is a result of applying a process illustrated in Fig. 5.16 and described in
Section “Process Solution”. The process is initiated by an activity on describing
the target ToA. Once a description of the target system and its operational
context is provided, the next activities shall identify the risk reducing measures
to be applied to the target by conferring relevant laws, regulations and standards
as well as the result of target speciﬁc risk analysis for guidance. Once all the
relevant risk-reducing measures are identiﬁed, these shall be used as a basis to
deﬁne the requirements to be met by the target system or by the process to be
followed while developing the target. The requirements are deﬁned quantitatively
or qualitatively depending on the nature of the risk reducing measure that is
addressed. The requirements are documented in a requirement speciﬁcation Req.
• Every requirement of Req is traceable to relevant risks (identiﬁed by the instan-
tiation of Risks), and/or regulatory requirements (identiﬁed by the instantiation
of Reg).
• Every requirement of Req is justiﬁed such that any assumptions, calculations,
and assessments that support the speciﬁcation of the requirement as a safety
requirement are provided.
Related Patterns: The Establish System Safety Requirements pattern is related to
other patterns in the following manner:
• May succeed the Risk Analysis pattern that supports identifying risks. The
Establish System Safety Requirements may be applied as support for deﬁning the
requirements to be fulﬁlled in order to reduce risk to an acceptable risk level.
• May be used in order to detail requirements for the design that is a result of an
instantiation of a design pattern.
5.4.2 General description of the content in the library
The library consists of 26 predeﬁned patterns, known as basic pattern, providing guid-
ance on diﬀerent aspects of conceptual safety design. The library also consists of any
composite pattern that a user includes in the library. In the following, we give a short
presentation of a few of the basic patterns in the library and explain how they can be
combined.
Establish Concept is a pattern that describes the process of establishing an initial
speciﬁcation of the purpose of a system under construction and its intended use. Al-
though Establish Concept can be suitable to apply as guidance for deﬁning an initial
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system concept description containing an overview of the intended operating context,
main functionality, and intended use of a given system, a more detailed assessment
must be performed in order identify whether there are some safety constraints that
needs to be addressed. While Hazard Identiﬁcation provides guidance on the process
of identifying hazards associated with the use of a system in its intended context, Haz-
ard Analysis provides guidance on the process of ﬁnding the potential causes of hazards.
Hazard identiﬁcation and analysis can be supported by several diﬀerent methods, the
essence of two well known methods within safety engineering are captured in the pat-
terns FMEA (short for Failure Modes and Eﬀect Analysis) and FTA (short for Fault
Tree Analysis). The result from hazard analysis forms a basis for identifying risks.
While Risk Analysis deﬁnes the process of deﬁning the risks associated with the use
of a system in a given context, Establish System Safety Requirements (fully described
in Section 5.4.1) deﬁnes the process of specifying safety requirements on the basis of
the results from risk analysis and other sources such as laws, regulations, and stan-
dards. The system requirements drive the system design. An important subset of the
system requirements is the safety requirements. The safety requirements are especially
important as they specify what needs to be met in order to achieve a suﬃciently safe
system. The choice of design pattern to use as a design basis should be motivated
by the needs as deﬁned by the requirements. Furthermore, once a system design is
derived, it must be assured as a minimum that the designed system satisﬁes relevant
safety requirements. Regarding guidance on system design, two patterns are oﬀered
named Dual Modular Redundant and Trusted Backup, but more are easily found in
the pattern literature. Several kinds of strategies can be applied for arguing that the
system under construction is suﬃciently safe for its intended purpose. Safety Require-
ments Satisﬁed facilitates the speciﬁcation of the structure for a safety case arguing
that every safety requirement is suﬃciently addressed.
The patterns outlined above provide guidance on diﬀerent and complementing con-
cepts relevant for developing safety critical systems. Although each pattern can be
used standalone, the patterns in the library are deﬁned with the intention of being
used together.
5.5 SaCS exempliﬁed
Fig. 5.17 presents an example of the integration of the three artefacts of this thesis into
the SaCS method. In Fig. 5.17, arrows are used to indicate the ﬂow between the use of
the SaCS process, Artefact 1, and the use of Artefact 2 and 3 as support in performing
the activities of the process. Filled arrows indicate the inputs and outputs from the
application of the SaCS method. The dotted drawn arrow indicates that a user may
choose to feed the composite pattern provided as a result of applying SaCS back into
the library of patterns.
The SaCS method is in the following explained by exemplifying the steps (1) to
(17) from Fig. 5.17.
64
5.5 SaCS exempliﬁed
Artefact 1: The SaCS process
Artefact 2:
The library of SaCS patterns
Artefact 3:
The SaCS pattern language
Activity S – Pattern Selection
   a) Select SaCS Patterns for Requirement Elicitation
   b) Select SaCS Patterns for Establishing Design Basis
   c) Select SaCS Patterns for Establishing Safety Case
Activity I – Pattern Instantiation
   a) Select Pattern Instantiation Order
   b) Conduct Stepwise Instantiation
Activity C – Pattern Composition
   a) Specify Compositions of Patterns
   b) Specify Instantiations of Patterns
Input
Objective(s) for a system performing 
potentially safety critical operations
Output
Conceptual safety design
Output
Composite SaCS pattern(s)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(4)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
Figure 5.17: Example integration of the three artefacts into the SaCS method
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Fig. 5.18 presents references to development documents that are available to an
assumed user in the following example. Level crossing concept description is a docu-
ment assumed to deﬁne the main functionality of an interlocking system for separating
train movements from road traﬃc movements at a railway level crossing. Furthermore,
Hazard log is a document assumed to describe the result from an initial hazard anal-
ysis of the level crossing concept. There are patterns in the library that facilitates
the deﬁnition of an initial concept as well as hazard identiﬁcation and analysis, but
we nevertheless assume the presence of these documents as a starting point in the
exempliﬁcation of the use of the SaCS method. The end result is expected to be a
conceptual safety design of a railway level crossing interlocking system.
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Figure 5.18: Representation of references to development documentation
Step (1): Fig. 5.19 illustrates the fragment of a map for pattern selection presented
earlier with the addition of annotations to indicate in which steps of this example we
use the map. A user traverses the pattern selection map in the order as indicated by
the arrows and considers whether a pattern is relevant for application by considering
its deﬁnition.
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Figure 5.19: Pattern selection map – revisited
By the use of Fig. 5.19, the user starts the pattern selection activity from the left
and identify Risk Analysis as the ﬁrst pattern that should be considered as support. By
inspecting the deﬁnition of Risk Analysis, the user identiﬁes that the pattern describes
the process of performing risk analysis on the basis of the results from hazard analysis.
As a hazard log is already present, the user selects the pattern as support for the
classiﬁcation of risks. In choice D, two patterns are identiﬁed that oﬀer guidance on
alternative methods for the classiﬁcation of functions, named SIL Classiﬁcation (SIL
is short for Safety Integrity Level) and I&C Function Classiﬁcation (I&C is short
for Instrumentation and Control), respectively. The user selects SIL Classiﬁcation as
support as it deﬁnes an approach to the classiﬁcation of functions commonly applied
within the railway domain whereas I&C Function Classiﬁcation is applicable within the
nuclear power production domain. The pattern Establish System Safety Requirements
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was presented in details earlier. The pattern uses the result from risk analysis as input
to the speciﬁcation of safety requirements. The user selects these three patterns as
support for the elicitation of requirements in Step (1), but will return to the selection
map in Step (7) and Step (13) related to the selection of patterns for establishing design
and safety case.
Step (2)-(3): Fig. 5.20 presents how an assumed user combines the three patterns
selected in the previous step according to the syntax of the SaCS pattern language.
The order in which these patterns should be instantiated is indicated in the pattern
selection map presented in Fig. 5.3. The order can also be found by inspecting the
“Related Patterns” sections of the pattern deﬁnitions. In Fig. 5.20, the order is in-
dicated by the wide grey arrow in the background indicating that Risk Analysis and
SIL Classiﬁcation can be instantiated in parallel and prior to Establish System Safety
Requirements. As described earlier, the symbols [ ] indicate a parameter list. The
identiﬁers within these symbols identify parameters. The parameters are abbreviated
as follows: ToA is short for Target of Assessment, Haz is short for Hazards, Req is
short for Requirements, FncCat is short for Function Categorisation, ClsCr is short
for Classiﬁcation of Criticality, and Risks is not abbreviated. The small icons adjacent
to parameters classify the parameters. The thin arrows represents three instances of an
assigns relation. The semantics of an assigns relation was explained in Section 5.3.2.
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Figure 5.20: Composite that can be instantiated into a speciﬁcation of requirements
Step (4)-(5): Fig. 5.21 is identical to Fig. 5.20 with the addition of annotations
indicating the instantiation of patterns. In Fig. 5.21, the instantiation of the composite
is documented such that Level crossing concept description represents the documenta-
tion associated with the input parameter ToA and Hazard log is associated with the
input Haz. We have assumed that the user has instantiated the composite to produce
three diﬀerent documents. The outcome of instantiating the composite is deﬁned as
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being represented by a requirements speciﬁcation known as Safety requirements spec-
iﬁcation. Furthermore, two intermediate documents to the requirements speciﬁcation
is produced where Classiﬁcation of functions is associated with the output parameter
FncCat of SIL Classiﬁcation and Risk analysis results is a document associated with
the output Risks of Risk Analysis.
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Figure 5.21: Composite specifying its instantiation into a speciﬁcation of requirements
Step (6)-(8): Once the user has speciﬁed the requirements for the system under
construction, enough information should be available for selecting an appropriate design
pattern to use as a basis for establishing the system design. Thus, in Step (7) the
user continues the pattern selection activity from where it was temporarily stopped
in Step (1). In the pattern selection map presented in Fig. 5.19, a choice E follows
Establish System Safety Requirements. In choice E, the design patterns Dual Modular
Redundant and Trusted Backup are indicated as alternatives. We assume that the user
ﬁnd Dual Modular Redundant to oﬀer the most beneﬁcial design after an evaluation
of the ability of the respective design solutions described within these two patterns to
satisfy requirements. The user selects Dual Modular Redundant as support for system
design.
Step (9)-(11): We postpone Step (9) and Step (11) for later in order to avoid
unnecessary repetitions of similar pattern compositions. In Step (10), we assume that
the user makes use of the requirements derived earlier as input for detailing a system
design supported by Dual Modular Redundant selected in the previous step. We further
assume that the user instantiate Dual Modular Redundant according to its instantia-
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tion rule to produce a speciﬁcation that can be referenced graphically as presented in
Fig. 5.22.
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Figure 5.22: Representation of a reference to a design speciﬁcation
Step (12)-(14): Once the system design is established, enough information should
be available for the user to start the detailing of how safety will be argued. Thus, in
Step (13) the user continues the pattern selection activity from where it was temporarily
stopped in Step (7), leading to choice F in Fig. 5.19. In choice F, the user inspects the
pattern deﬁnitions of the diﬀerent proposed patterns. We assume that the user ﬁnds
Overall Safety as a suitable starting point. The pattern provides guidance on arguing
safety from a quality management, safety management, as well as a technical safety
perspective. The railway standard EN 50129 [30] requires that the three perspectives
are explicitly addressed in a safety case for railway signalling systems.
Step (15)-(16): While we postpone Step (15) for later in order to avoid unneces-
sary repetitions, we assume in Step (16) that the user makes use of the system design
derived earlier as a deﬁnition of the target for which a safety case shall be deﬁned.
We further assume that the user instantiate Overall Safety selected in the previous
step according to its instantiation rule to produces a safety case that can be referenced
graphically as presented in Fig. 5.23.
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Figure 5.23: Representation of a reference to a safety case
Step (17): Fig. 5.24 extends Fig. 5.21 to also specify the use of the patterns
Dual Modular Redundant and Overall Safety. In Fig. 5.24, the parameters of the
patterns introduced are abbreviated as follows: S is short System, ToD is short for
Target of Demonstration, and Case is short for Safety Case. The satisﬁes relation (see
Fig. 5.10) expresses that a design S (represented by the System design speciﬁcation)
shall satisfy the requirements in Req (represented by Safety requirements speciﬁcation).
Furthermore, S of Dual Modular Redundant represents the target of demonstration as
deﬁned by the assigns relation connecting S with ToD of Overall Safety. The outcome
Case (represented by Safety case speciﬁcation) of Overall Safety is related to S of Dual
Modular Redundant with a demonstrates relation. The demonstrates relation expresses
that Case is a safety demonstration for S.
In the example, the SaCS method is assumed applied for developing a railway level
crossing system concept where the composite pattern expressed in Fig. 5.24 represent
one of the results. A second result is the conceptual safety design. The conceptual
safety design is the result of instantiating the composite pattern. In the example,
the triple that represents the conceptual safety design is assumed represented by the
documentations referred to within Fig. 5.24 as Safety requirements speciﬁcation, System
design speciﬁcation, and Safety case speciﬁcation.
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Figure 5.24: Composite specifying its instantiation into a conceptual safety design
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Chapter 6
Overview of research papers
The main results of our work are documented in the papers presented in Part II. This
chapter provides publication details for each of these papers.
6.1 Paper 1: Syntax & Semantics of the SaCS Pat-
tern Language
Authors: Andre´ Alexandersen Hauge and Ketil Stølen.
Publication status: Technical report HWR-1052, OECD Halden Reactor Project,
Institute for energy technology, Halden Norway, 2013. The report represents an ex-
tension and consolidation of the paper titled “SACS: A Pattern Language for Safe
Adaptive Control Software” published in Proceedings of the 18th Conference of Pattern
Languages of Propgrams (PloP’11) [70].
My contribution: Andre´ Alexandersen Hauge was the main author, responsible for
about 90% of the work.
Main topics: The report provides a detailed description of the syntax and semantics
of the SaCS pattern language. The syntax of SaCS patterns is described by the use
of Extended Backus Naur Form (EBNF). The semantics is described as a systematic
translation of the textual syntax of SaCS patterns into paragraphs in English. The
translation of SaCS patterns into their meaning in English is exempliﬁed on a number
of patterns where each step of the translation process is detailed.
6.2 Paper 2: A Pattern-based Method for Safe Con-
trol Conceptualisation Exempliﬁed Within Nu-
clear Power Production
Authors: Andre´ Alexandersen Hauge and Ketil Stølen.
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Publication status: A short version of the paper with the same title is published
in the Proceedings of 31st International Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability
and Security (SAFECOMP’12) [71]. The full version, which is included in this thesis,
is published as a technical report, namely HWR-1029 rev 2, OECD Halden Reactor
Project, Institute for energy technology, Halden, Norway, 2014.
My contribution: Andre´ Alexandersen Hauge was the main author, responsible for
about 90% of the work.
Main topics: The paper demonstrates and presents experiences from the use of the
SaCS method and pattern language in a case on the conceptualisation of a safety
design for a load following reactor control system. In countries where a large share of
the consumed electricity comes from nuclear power plants, there is a need for controlling
the electricity production in accordance with demand that is varying with time, referred
to as operating in a load following mode. An adaptable system is conceptualised in
the report. Adaptability is here introduced as a means to automatically calibrate the
controller performing control rod control during operation in order to accommodate
fuel burn up. The result is described as a set of requirements for the load following
controller, a technical design of the load following controller system and an outline of
a safety case for demonstrating that a system based on the conceptual safety design is
suﬃciently safe for its purpose.
6.3 Paper 3: Developing Safe Control Systems Us-
ing Patterns for Assurance
Authors: Andre´ Alexandersen Hauge and Ketil Stølen.
Publication status: A short version of the paper with the same title is published
in the Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Performance, Safety and
Robustness in Complex Systems and Applications (PESARO’13) [72]. The full version
of the paper, which is included in this thesis, is available as HWR-1037 rev 2, OECD
Halden Reactor Project, Institute for energy technology, Halden, Norway, 2014.
My contribution: Andre´ Alexandersen Hauge was the main author, responsible for
about 90% of the work.
Main topics: The paper demonstrates and presents experiences from the application
of the SaCS method and pattern language in a case on the conceptualisation of a
safety design for a railway interlocking system. A railway interlocking system is a
typical safety critical system. A failure in a railway interlocking system may lead to
unacceptable consequences. The conceptual safety design is built systematically in
manageable steps by the application of SaCS. Each step is exempliﬁed. The resulting
conceptual safety design is described as a speciﬁcation of a set of requirements for the
interlocking system, a system design deﬁned in accordance with requirements, as well
as an outline of a safety case for demonstrating that a system based on the conceptual
safety design is suﬃciently safe for its purpose.
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6.4 Paper 4: An Analytic Evaluation of the SaCS Pattern Language – Including
Explanations of Major Design Choices
6.4 Paper 4: An Analytic Evaluation of the SaCS
Pattern Language – Including Explanations of
Major Design Choices
Authors: Andre´ Alexandersen Hauge and Ketil Stølen.
Publication status: The paper is published in the Proceedings of the 6th Interna-
tional Conference on Pervasive Patterns and Applications (PATTERNS’14) [76].
My contribution: Andre´ Alexandersen Hauge was the main author, responsible for
about 90% of the work.
Main topics: The paper presents an analytic evaluation of the SaCS pattern lan-
guage for the development of conceptual safety designs. A framework for evaluating
modelling languages is used to conduct the evaluation. The quality of a language is
within the framework expressed by six appropriateness factors. A set of requirements
is associated with each appropriateness factor. The extent to which these requirements
are fulﬁlled are used to judge the quality. The fulﬁlment of the requirements formu-
lated for the SaCS language is discussed on the basis of the theoretical, technical, and
practical considerations that were taken into account and shaped the SaCS language.
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Chapter 7
Discussion
This chapter is divided into two sections. In Section 2.2, we deﬁned the success criteria
that should be fulﬁlled by each invented artefact in order for our overall objective to
be met. In Section 7.1, we discuss to what extent the invented artefacts satisfy each
success criterion. In Chapter 4, we gave an overview of state-of-the-art of relevance for
this thesis. In Section 7.2, we characterise in more detail how our work extends and
improves this state-of-the-art.
7.1 Fulﬁllment of the success criteria
The overall objective of this thesis as stated in Section 1.1 is to develop a method and
a pattern language that is:
1. Well-suited for developing conceptual safety designs.
2. Applicable within an industrial context within acceptable eﬀort.
3. Comprehensible for its intended users.
Section 2.2 presents the expectations in terms of success criteria for each of the three
artefacts developed in this thesis in order to meet the overall objective. In the following
subsections, the fulﬁlment of each success criteria presented in Section 2.2 is discussed.
7.1.1 The SaCS process
Success criterion 1 The SaCS process provides satisfactory guidance for its intended
users, which are system engineers, safety engineers, hardware and software engineers.
Fig. 5.17 presents the SaCS process and how it can be applied together with the
library of SaCS patterns and the SaCS pattern language as support for conceptual
safety design. Fig. 5.17 shows that the process deﬁnes three main activities with sub-
activities. As explained in Section 5.1, the SaCS process interleaves these three main
activities; hence, many correct sequences for applying the process exist.
The application of the process has been thoroughly exempliﬁed in two case studies
within diﬀerent domains. Paper 2 (described in Chapter 10) describes the application
of the SaCS process in a case study on the conceptualisation of a nuclear power plant
control system. Paper 3 (described in Chapter 11) describes the application of the SaCS
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process for conceptualisation of a railway interlocking system. Each paper describes
the application of each step of the SaCS process and its result in terms of a conceptual
safety design according to deﬁnition.
We believe that the steps of the SaCS process as presented in Section 5.1 should
be easily understood by the intended users of the SaCS process due to their expected
formal background and experience within engineering disciplines, as well as due to the
simplicity of the process itself. Moreover, both Paper 2 and Paper 3 provide extensive
guidance on the application of each of the activities of the SaCS process and describe
how pattern selection is supported by a pattern selection map, how pattern composition
is supported by the pattern language, and how pattern instantiation is supported by
instantiation rules. Paper 1 (described in Chapter 9) details the syntax and semantics
of the SaCS pattern language and also provides guidance on the pattern composition
step.
Fig. 5.3 presents a fragment of a larger pattern selection map supporting the sys-
tematic selection of patterns from the library. The patterns referenced in the pattern
selection map are ordered in a sequence. The sequence of patterns also includes choices.
In the sequence, a choice follows a pattern for which there exists several patterns that
are natural to consider to support development. In a choice, more than one pattern
can be selected as support. The diﬀerent patterns in SaCS, as well as their sequence
as presented in the pattern selection maps in Paper 2 and Paper 3, are inﬂuenced by
the safety literature. One of the inﬂuences is the railway standard EN 50126 [28],
and another is the generic safety standard IEC 61508 [93]. The system life-cycle of
EN 50126 is presented in Fig. 2.1 as a sequence of phases. The ﬁrst six phases in the
life-cycle presented in Fig. 2.1 are to a large degree represented in the sequence of SaCS
patterns in Fig. 4 of Paper 2. The ﬁrst pattern in the sequence presented in Fig. 4 of
Paper 2 is named Establish Concept and supports the speciﬁcation of an initial system
concept for a system under development. This pattern should be instantiated prior to
patterns supporting a detailed elicitation of requirements, safety assessment, system
design, and safety argumentation. This practice is inline with safety literature such
as the standards EN 50126 and IEC 61508. The instantiation of Establish Concept in
a context should provide a result that guides the user in selecting the most suitable
pattern at the next selection point in Fig. 4 of Paper 2. The user needs to inspect
the deﬁnitions of candidate patterns in order decide whether a pattern is applicable
for solving the challenges of the user. The patterns are organised in a sequence in
the selection map that to a large degree mirrors the early stages of the development
processes promoted by highly regarded safety standards and guidelines.
Although we argue that the SaCS process is comprehensible for a user unfamiliar
with SaCS on the basis of the guidance provided in Paper 1, Paper 2 and Paper 3, this
has not been evaluated. Empirical evaluation is needed in order to validate if the SaCS
process is comprehensible for its intended users in general.
Based on the above discussion, we believe that the simplicity of the SaCS process
and the extensive documentation demonstrating its practical use provide suﬃcient
guidance for its intended users, but further suggest that this should be empirically
evaluated.
Success criterion 2 The application of the SaCS process results in conceptual safety
designs that are: a) in accordance with safety objectives; b) at a suﬃcient level of detail;
and c) easy to use.
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As previously mentioned, the SaCS process has been applied to two diﬀerent cases
documented in Paper 2 (described in Chapter 10) and Paper 3 (described in Chap-
ter 11).
Regarding a): Section 10 of Paper 2 and Section 10 of Paper 3 describe the three
diﬀerent speciﬁcations that represent the conceptual safety design in each case. In both
cases:
• Section 10.1 contains a description of the safety objectives in the form of safety
requirements. The safety requirements are established by the application of a
similarly named composite identiﬁed as Safety Requirements. The composite de-
scribes the systematic application of selected patterns from the library as support
for the elicitation and speciﬁcation of safety requirements.
• Section 10.2 contains the description of a system design that accommodates the
safety requirements. Although the system design is deﬁned in accordance with
the safety requirements, it is mainly the safety case presented in Section 10.3 that
expresses to which extent the safety requirements are satisﬁed.
• Section 10.3 contains a description of a safety case that outlines the main argu-
ments for claiming that the safety requirements are met.
The three speciﬁcations serve diﬀerent purposes. The system requirements speci-
ﬁcation captures the objectives of the system under construction. The system design
speciﬁcation represents an early stage technical description of a system that fulﬁls
objectives. The safety case expresses how the safety objectives are fulﬁlled.
Regarding b): A conceptual safety design is an early stage speciﬁcation according
to the deﬁnition in Section 2.1.6. The conceptual safety designs presented in Paper 2
and Paper 3 are triplets where each part is described in easy to understand formats.
The requirements speciﬁcation part is expressed textually. The system design part
is expressed textually and with UML [137] models. The safety case part is expressed
with the GSN [61] notation. Although textual speciﬁcations of requirements, GSN, and
UML models in general should be understandable for the intended users of SaCS, our
speciﬁcations can, of course, lack understandability and be deﬁned with an insuﬃcient
level of detail. We have not tested the speciﬁcations on potential users of SaCS in
order to investigate if the speciﬁcations are easy to understand and at a suﬃcient level
of detail, but rather provide the speciﬁcations themselves in the reports.
Regarding c): We recognise that it may be diﬃcult at an early stage to evaluate if
the design is easy to use in the sense of being easy to implement or reﬁne. However, we
believe that the speciﬁcations are informative enough for experts to judge whether the
concepts described within Paper 2 and Paper 3 are feasible and detailed enough to use
as a starting point for further reﬁnement. The conceptual designs presented in Paper 2
and Paper 3 can be reﬁned by repeating the SaCS process and iterating over pattern
selection, pattern instantiation, and pattern composition until each system design is in
an implementable state.
The requirements speciﬁcation part consists of requirements that are uniquely iden-
tiﬁed. Any requirement may be detailed or rephrased to deﬁne another version of the
requirement. Requirements may be added to the speciﬁcation easily by adding a unique
requirement reference and the associated requirement text.
UML class diagrams, component diagrams, sequence diagrams, and state machine
diagrams (with composite states), as well as textual descriptions, are used for expressing
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the system design parts of the conceptual safety designs. Some suggestions for a further
detailing of the system designs using UML are given within the papers. However, the
main features of the proposed system designs should be easy to understand from the
speciﬁcations that are provided. Dzidek et al. [42] present a controlled experiment
investigating the beneﬁts and costs of using UML during the maintenance and evolution
of a real non-trivial system. Professional developers were used as subjects. The control
group had no UML documentation. The experiment showed that the subjects in the
UML group had, on average, a 54 percent increase in the functional correctness of
changes and 7 percent overall improvement in design quality. Cruz-Lemus et al. [33]
present the result of ﬁve empirical studies of the understandability of UML statechart
diagrams with composite states. Although the results are not completely conclusive,
composite states seem to be helpful for acquiring knowledge from a diagram. The eﬀect
of the use of composite states for memorisation and understanding is not clear.
The safety case speciﬁcation is described by GSN [61]. The GSN community stan-
dard [61] has been developed, and has matured, over several years by a consensus
approach between a large group of experts from academia and industry. GSN oﬀers
constructs for modularising a safety argument such that existing argument structures
can be easily reused. The scope of the safety cases presented in the reports can be
easily extended, e.g., by adding nodes to the existing tree structure that represents
the safety case, adding sub-trees to the structure, or making the existing safety case a
sub-tree in a larger argument structure. We have limited the scope of the safety cases
to only provide details on selected issues. The undeveloped parts of each safety case are
explicitly denoted within the argument structure as undeveloped goals. The undevel-
oped goals of a safety case facilitate further reﬁnement. The initial safety case indicates
how safety is intended argued and should be maintained throughout the life-cycle of
the system. In this sense, the safety case is a living document and needs a continuous
reﬁnement. As far as evidence for the suitability of a system under construction for its
intended use can be provided in the early stages, the safety cases presented in Paper 2
and Paper 3 at least provide traceability between the safety objectives and the features
of the design as far as these are speciﬁed to show that the objectives are met.
Textual descriptions, UML models, and GSN models are widely used notational
forms for the kind of early stage speciﬁcations that constitute a conceptual safety
design. In this sense, the notations used for expressing the conceptual safety designs
presented in Paper 2 and Paper 3 should be easy to use. The satisfaction of a), b),
and c) are also discussed within Paper 2 and Paper 3. The discussions in Paper 2 and
Paper 3 represent self-evaluations as the method has been applied in both cases by
the main author and the designer of SaCS. However, each step in the application of
the SaCS process is documented in a manner we believe is suﬃcient to allow others to
perform an independent evaluation of the feasibility of the SaCS approach.
Success criterion 3 The SaCS process is cost eﬃcient.
We will discuss cost eﬃciency of the SaCS process in terms of estimates of the eﬀort
required in order to conduct each step of the process. We ﬁnd it fair to argue that the
SaCS process is cost eﬃcient if it provides intended results when applied in a relevant
context without wasted resources, e.g., time or money.
Table 7.1 presents the expected time in hours for an experienced user to conduct
the diﬀerent steps of the SaCS process in collaboration with a stakeholder on a repre-
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sentative case. The estimates represent our experience from applying the SaCS process
in Study 1 (described in Chapter 10) and Study 2 (described in Chapter 11).
Activities and sub-activities User St.h.
P M P M
Preparation: Deﬁne overall objective and system context 15 5 10 5
Activity S: Pattern Selection 3 3 0 3
Activity S.a Select SaCS Patterns for Requirements 1 1 0 1
Elicitation
Activity S.b: Select SaCS Patterns for Establishing 1 1 0 1
Design Basis
Activity S.c: Select SaCS Patterns for Establishing 1 1 0 1
Safety Case
Activity C: Pattern Composition 4 4 0 4
Activity C.a: Specify Compositions of Patterns 3 2 0 2
Activity C.b: Specify the Instantiations of Patterns 1 2 0 2
Activity I: Pattern Instantiation 49 5 0 5
Activity I.a: Select Pattern Instantiation Order 1 0 0 0
Activity I.b: Conduct Stepwise Instantiation 48 5 0 5
After-work: Document the conceptual safety design 40 0 0 0
Total (the process) 56 12 0 12
68 12
80
Total (the process. preparations and after-work) 111 17 10 17
128 27
155
Table 7.1: The expected eﬀort in hours for applying the SaCS process
In Table 7.1, estimates of the expected eﬀort required to conduct activities are given
in the columns named “User” and “St.h”, representing the eﬀort required of a user and
a stakeholder, respectively. We distinguish in our estimates between the time spent in
meetings “M” and the time spent preparing “P” for meetings or conducting work tasks.
We do not distinguish between the diﬀerent user roles (e.g., modeller or domain expert)
or kinds of users (e.g., system engineer or safety engineer) in the estimates nor do we
distinguish between the eﬀorts required if there are one or more users. The process
does not require several users with complementing competences, although this would
be beneﬁcial as a development problem could be addressed from multiple perspectives
by users with in-depth expertise from diﬀerent ﬁelds of engineering. We recognise that
if there are multiple users collaborating to produce a conceptual safety design, some
overhead hours are required to reach a mutual agreement on which patterns should
be applied and how. In this sense, some additional hours can be expected for each of
the activities related to the eﬀort required to reach a consensus within a group. The
stakeholder is more likely to represent a development project stakeholder or responsible
rather than a customer, at least a person who is familiar with the SaCS method as
well as concepts for developing safety critical systems. We have separated the eﬀort
required for preparation and after-work from the eﬀort required conducting the process.
In Fig. 5.17, it is indicated that the SaCS process takes as a starting point one or
more deﬁned objectives for a system performing potentially safety critical operations.
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In the initial stage (Preparation) prior to the application of the SaCS process, we
believe that 10 hours is a reasonable estimate of the eﬀort required by the stakeholder
for compiling the necessary information relevant to the conceptualisation work. The
user and stakeholder should be able to agree on the overall objective, scope, and context
of the system under construction within 5 hours of meetings. We estimate that the user
needs 15 additional hours to deﬁne more precisely the overall objective and the intended
context of the system under construction as well as the scope of the conceptualisation
work.
The user conducts pattern selection (Activity S) starting with the deﬁned objective
for the conceptualisation work as the initial input. An experienced user is expected to
identify quickly the applicability of the patterns oﬀered as support for conceptualisation
on the basis of the pattern deﬁnitions; the pattern selection map that supports eﬃcient
selection; and the low number of patterns that can be selected. We estimate that each
of the sub-activities (S.a, S.b, and S.c) of pattern selection can be performed in less
than an hour, but, as we only provide estimates in whole hours, a 1 hour estimate is
given for preparation in each of the sub-activities of pattern selection. The selection
of patterns proposed by the user should be discussed with the stakeholder in order to
conﬁrm that the selection is viable. We estimate that the user and stakeholder can
reach an agreement on the selection of patterns within meetings of 1 hour for each of
the sub-activities (S.a, S.b, and S.c) of pattern selection.
Some eﬀort is required for specifying the composition of patterns (Activity C). A
composite pattern can be seen as a model of the interconnection of patterns. Each
pattern within a composite has a predeﬁned signature; thus, guidance to the represen-
tation of a pattern within a composite is available from the deﬁnitions of the patterns
that are used. We estimate that 3 hours is enough for specifying the combination of
patterns (Sub-activity C.a) as support for conceptual safety design. When the user
annotates the composite patterns used for conceptual safety design with symbols indi-
cating how each pattern is instantiated (Sub-activity C.b), the composites are already
deﬁned and a small amount of time is needed to add the additional information. We
estimate that less than an hour is needed to update the composites with identiﬁers and
a classiﬁcation for each documentation used or produced during development, in addi-
tion to symbols relating these documents to the respective parameters they represent.
The application and documentation of patterns for problem solving should be commu-
nicated to the stakeholder. We estimate that both the user and the stakeholder need
2 hours for discussing the composition of patterns for problem solving (Sub-activity
C.a) and 2 hours for discussing the documentation of the instantiation of patterns
(Sub-activity C.b).
The eﬀort required to perform pattern instantiation (Activity I) in a speciﬁc context
depends on the number of patterns applied; to which level of rigour the guidance within
the patterns are applied; and the level of detail that is expected from the results from
pattern instantiation. The eﬀort required for selecting the pattern instantiation order
(Sub-activity I.a) is expected to be less than 1 hour and is insigniﬁcant compared to the
eﬀort required to perform instantiation (Sub-activity I.b). Each basic pattern contains
a section deﬁning related patterns that can be used to identify the expected order
among several patterns. An order for patterns is also indicated in the pattern selection
map used in the pattern selection activity as well as in the composites resulting from
the pattern composition activity. The expected eﬀort associated with the activity
on stepwise instantiation of patterns (Sub-activity I.b) on the other hand signiﬁcantly
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inﬂuences the eﬀort required for patterns instantiation (Activity I). While some pattern
may be rather quick to perform due to their limited scope, others require more eﬀort. 12
basic patterns were applied as support for conceptual safety design in both Study 1 and
Study 2. We estimate that a user needs 4 hours on average for instantiating a pattern.
Thus, we estimate a user needs 48 hours for conducting the stepwise instantiation of
patterns in the cases described in Study 1 and Study 2. We estimate that both the
user and stakeholder need 5 hours for discussing the assumptions and simpliﬁcations
that are reasonable to apply when instantiating patterns, as well as the interpretation
of diﬀerent concepts (Sub-activity I.b).
After all the steps of the SaCS process have been conducted, the user combines the
results in a document that describes the conceptual safety design. We estimate that 40
hours is suﬃcient for preparing the documentation that explains the conceptual safety
design. An experienced user is expected to use a total of 68 hours for applying the
SaCS process for conceptual safety design as presented in Paper 2 and Paper 3, and a
total of 128 hours if preparations and after-work are also included. The stakeholder is
estimated to use a total of 12 hours in meetings with the user during the SaCS process,
and a total of 27 hours if preparations and after-work are also included. The total
eﬀort, including the eﬀort of the user as well as the stakeholder, is estimated to 155
hours.
7.1.2 The library of SaCS patterns
Success criterion 4 The library of SaCS patterns consists of patterns that describe
eﬀective solutions to recurring challenges within conceptual safety design.
The full deﬁnition of the patterns in the library can be found in the appendices of
Paper 2 (described in Chapter 10) and Paper 3 (described in Chapter 11). Each pattern
in the library is deﬁned according to a sequence of named sections containing textual
descriptions and illustrations. In Section 2.1.2, a pattern is deﬁned as a description of
a problem and the essence of its solution to enable the solution to be reused in diﬀerent
settings. The common format of the patterns in the library includes a section named
“Problem” that contains a description of the problem or challenge that is addressed
by the pattern. A section named “Solution” contains a description of the associated
pattern solution. The “Known Uses” section provides examples of known instantiations
or otherwise details the source that inspired its deﬁnition. The pattern deﬁnitions
clearly describe a relationship between a problem and its solution. Thus, we ﬁnd
it reasonable to delimit the discussion to whether the patterns address challenges or
problems that recur within conceptual safety design as well as whether the solutions
described can be accepted as eﬀective. That the overall format of basic patterns is
suitable is argued in the discussion related to fulﬁlment of Success criterion 5.
The knowledge conﬁned within SaCS patterns is extracted from many sources, but
is also, to a large extent, traceable to a few important and inﬂuential sources within the
ﬁeld of development of safety critical systems. The international safety standards and
guidelines presented in Section 4.2 as well as the safety engineering literature presented
in Section 4.3, represent some of the most important sources of inspiration in designing
the library of patterns. We regard international safety standards and guidelines as
particularly suitable sources of inspiration as these are:
• developed and matured over many years;
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• deﬁned on the basis of a consensus between an international group of domain
and safety experts;
• deﬁned according to established processes for quality assurance within highly
regarded organisations;
• deﬁned with the intention of addressing recurring challenges within development
of safety critical systems;
• deﬁned with the intention of describing acceptable solutions for developing safety
critical systems.
We ﬁnd it fair to argue that a pattern that expresses a concept in accordance with
highly regarded international safety standards and guidelines or otherwise authoritative
documents within a domain, expresses a practice that is commonly accepted. Each
pattern has undergone a review by at least 2 experts with extensive knowledge and
experience within research on the development of safety critical systems, one of which
has also been actively involved in safety standardisation work for many years. The
knowledge captured within the patterns in the library reﬂects the knowledge within
the safety literature in the following manner:
1) Establish Concept : The pattern captures the essence of the ﬁrst phase in the
system life-cycle presented in EN 50126 [28] and in IEC 61508 [93] that is simply
named “Concept”. The phase is in the standards concerned with how to establish
the purpose and constraints associated with a system under development.
2) Hazard Identiﬁcation: The pattern describes a process for identifying hazards
in accordance with the practise deﬁned in EN 50129 [30]. The pattern captures
the hazard identiﬁcation part of the phase named “Hazard and risk analysis” of
the safety life-cycle presented in IEC 61508 [93]. The identiﬁcation of hazards is
essential for later steps concerned with the deﬁnition of safety requirements.
3) Hazard Analysis : The pattern describes a process for identifying the potential
causes of hazards in accordance with the practise deﬁned in EN 50129 [30]. The
patterns in 2), 3), and 4) captures the intent expressed in the life-cycle phase
named “Hazard and risk analysis” in IEC 61508 [93].
4) Risk Analysis : The pattern describes a process for assessing risk in accordance
with the practises deﬁned in EN 50129 [30] and IEC 61508 [93].
5) Establish System Safety Requirements : The pattern describes a process for spec-
ifying safety requirements inspired by the fourth phase in the system life-cycle
presented in EN 50126 [28] named “System Requirements”. In EN 50129 [30],
the safety requirements are deﬁned on the basis of results from hazard identiﬁ-
cation and analysis, risk assessment, and the classiﬁcation of functions. Thus,
the patterns in 2), 3), 4), 5), and 9) may be used as a set of complementing
patterns supporting the elicitation of safety requirements in a manner compa-
rable to the practice described in EN 50129. In a similar manner, the fourth
phase of the safety life-cycle presented in IEC 61508 [93] is named ‘Overall safety
requirements” and represents a phase that is concerned with the speciﬁcation of
requirements on the basis of hazard and risk analysis.
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6) FMEA: The pattern captures the essence of the Failure Modes and Eﬀects Anal-
ysis (FMEA) method. The FMEA method is widely used within domains devel-
oping safety critical systems and is thoroughly described in IEC 60812 [88].
7) FTA: The pattern captures the essence of the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) method
as it is described in IEC 61025 [89].
8) I&C Functions Categorisation: The pattern captures the method for classify-
ing nuclear Instrumentation and Control (I&C) functions as it is deﬁned within
IEC 61226 [91].
9) SIL Classiﬁcation: The pattern captures the railway approach to the classiﬁca-
tion of functions as it is deﬁned in EN 50128 [29], applicable for software, and
EN 50129 [30], applicable for system functions.
10) Variable Demand for Service: The pattern is highly specialised to support re-
quirements elicitation in development scenarios as addressed in the ﬁrst case
study presented in Paper 2. The case study describes a very speciﬁc develop-
ment challenge; the pattern describes a solution to that challenge. The pattern is
not deﬁned on the basis of the knowledge conﬁned within the safety standards and
guidelines literature. It describes, however, a systematic approach for require-
ments elicitation according to principles for eﬀective requirements engineering.
We cannot argue that the pattern describes an eﬀective solution to a recurring
challenge within conceptual safety design although it was eﬀectively applied in
the case described in Paper 2.
11) Station Interlocking Requirements : The pattern captures the essential require-
ments for building interlocking systems in Norway as deﬁned by the Norwegian
Rail Authority in the technical rules JD 550 [99].
12) Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements : The pattern captures the essential
requirements for building level crossing systems in Norway as deﬁned by the
Norwegian Rail Authority in the technical rules JD 550 [99].
13) Trusted Backup: The pattern describes a system design concept enabling the
utilisation of adaptable control systems for safety critical control tasks by the use
of a variant of the Simplex architecture proposed by Sha [147]. Sha refers to the
Boeing 777 ﬂight control system as an example of a system that uses the Simplex
architecture in practise.
14) Dual Modular Redundant : The pattern deﬁnes a variant of a generic design so-
lution [156] consisting of two redundant controllers and a voting unit that is
implemented in numerous kinds of systems for diﬀerent kinds of task. The NSB-
94 interlocking system used by the Norwegian Railway Authority for many years
at diﬀerent railway stations in Norway uses a conﬁguration of PLC systems ac-
cording to the concepts described by the pattern.
15) Overall Safety : The pattern deﬁnes a structure for providing an overall system
safety demonstration in a manner that is comparable to the overall structure
required for safety cases as presented in EN 50129 [30].
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16) Technical Safety : The pattern describes a structure for arguing safety with a
focus on technical aspects and represents a variant of Part 4 of the safety case
required by EN 50129 [30] addressing issues related to technical safety.
17) Code of Practice: The pattern deﬁnes a structure for arguing that safety ob-
jectives are met on the basis of the application of well-proven practices. The
strategy of arguing safety on the basis of the application of a code of practice
is a strategy expressed in the European Regulation on common safety methods
within the railway industry [50] and its associated application guideline [52].
18) Cross Reference [74]: The pattern describes a structure for arguing that a system
satisﬁes safety objectives on the basis of a comparison between the system in
question with a similar and already accepted system. The strategy is expressed in
the European Regulation on common safety methods within the railway industry
[50] and its associated application guideline [52].
19) Explicit Risk Evaluation: The pattern describes a structure for arguing that a
target system is suﬃciently safe on the basis of risk being suﬃciently addressed.
The strategy is expressed in the European Regulation on common safety methods
within the railway industry [50] and its associated application guideline [52].
20) Safety Requirements Satisﬁed : The pattern describes a structure for arguing that
a target system is suﬃciently safe on the basis of evidence for safety requirements
being satisﬁed. The practice of demonstrating system safety on the basis of
demonstrating that safety requirements are satisﬁed is one of the core principles
of EN 50129 [30] and IEC 61508 [93].
21) Deterministic Evidence: The pattern describes an argument structure where a
claim is supported by evidence that demonstrates the claim is fully predictable.
One example of the need for relying on deterministic evidence is related to the
recommendation expressed in Table A.12 within Appendix A of EN 50128 [29]
where it is expressed that the software code of SIL 4 systems is expected to
contain no dynamic objects, no dynamic variables, and no conditional jumps.
22) Assessment Evidence: The pattern describes an argument structure where a
claim is supported by evidence derived on the basis of the application of a suitable
assessment method. One example of the need to argue that a suitable assessment
techniques has been applied may be seen in Appendix A of EN 50128 [29]. Table
A.9 within Appendix A provides recommendations on the application of speciﬁc
techniques for assessing software depending on their software safety integrity level
(SWSIL) classiﬁcation.
23) Process Quality Evidence: The pattern describes an argument structure where
the evidence of compliance to a particular process, as well as evidences of the
quality of the process, assures a claim being met.
24) Process Compliance Evidence: The pattern describes an argument structure
where the evidence of compliance to a process that is argued widely known as
providing eﬀective results assures a claim being met. A typical use of this strategy
may be to claim that, e.g., the software in a given system is developed according
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to the practices described in a relevant software standard [29, 90] and thus is
developed according to acceptable practices.
25) Probabilistic Evidence: The pattern describes an argument structure where the
evidence supporting a claim is derived on the basis of probabilistic methods. Ta-
ble 2.1 in Section 2.1.4 is from Appendix A of EN 50128 [29]. Table 2.1 identiﬁes
some of the recommended techniques that may be used to derive probabilistic
results such as reliability block diagram, fault tree analysis, and Markov models.
26) Basic Assumption Evidence: The pattern describes an argument structure where
a claim is supported by a form of rationale or a justiﬁed assumption such that
no further evidence is required. In any kind of argumentation there are some
axioms that are used as base facts. The assumptions used as a basis in assuring
and justifying that safety objectives are met should be justiﬁed [28–30,93, 160].
Based on the above, we conclude that the patterns in the library describe eﬀective
solutions to recurring challenges within conceptual safety design.
Success criterion 5 The library of SaCS patterns consists of patterns that may be
eﬃciently and eﬀectively applied individually or in combination.
The basic patterns in the library are deﬁned with the intent of describing the core
of a problem and its solution in a format that is simple, easy to understand, and
that makes the solutions described easy to apply. We argued earlier that the patterns
may be seen as expressing solutions commonly accepted as eﬀective, as the patterns
mirror the knowledge contained in highly regarded safety standards and guidelines.
However, a format that facilitates human interpretation is required in order for a user
to eﬃciently and eﬀectively apply the patterns.
The library consists of basic SaCS patterns that are deﬁned in a format comparable
to the format of patterns in the literature. In the literature, patterns are commonly
described as a sequence of named sections containing textual and graphical descriptions.
The overall format of basic SaCS patterns is represented by a sequence of named
sections with headings as outlined in the left column of Table 5.1, in the right column
a short description of the expected content given beneath each heading is given. A
comparison of the formats for expressing patterns in some recent, as well as commonly
cited, pattern approaches is given in Section 4.1.3. Many diﬀerent pattern formats exist,
however, the comparison shows that the recent pattern formats, to a large extent, are
variations of the pattern formats presented by Alexander et al. [5] in the 70’s or Gamma
et al. [55] in the 90’s. A popular format is that provided by Gamma et al. [55], made
known through their book on software design patterns. The format is simple, easy to
understand, and most certainly easy to apply as evidenced through their widespread
use within software development and within the literature. However, the format [55]
is tailored speciﬁcally for capturing patterns for software design.
Although the sections in the format of Alexander et al. [5] are unnamed, we have
chosen a similar sectioning in basic patterns, but have named each section. The format
for basic patterns extends the format in [5] with the addition of the sections “Pattern
Signature”, “Intent”, “Applicability”, and “Instantiation Rule”. The additional sec-
tions are added for eﬃciency reasons especially. The format in [5] is a suitable basis
as it is simple, well-known, and generally applicable for specifying patterns of diﬀerent
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kinds. The pattern signature, intent, and applicability sections of basic patterns are
documented in such a manner that the context section part of the format of Alexander
et al. is not needed. Within the section named “Pattern Signature”, the pattern is
shortly summarised in terms of a listing of the expected inputs and outputs of the
pattern and its classiﬁcation. An illustration is also included. The illustration presents
how the pattern can be referenced graphically within a composite pattern. The pa-
rameters of a pattern represent its interfaces that allow it to be easily connected with
other patterns within a composite. The inputs identify the information required from
the context in order to apply the pattern. The outputs identify what is the expected
outcome of applying the pattern in a context. The “Intent” section contains a short
description of what is the intent of the pattern and in what way the solution described
is beneﬁcial. A set of rules expressed under the heading “Instantiation Rule” provides
guidance to the user on what classiﬁes an instantiation of the pattern. The remaining
sections contain textual descriptions and illustrations as in [5]. The input and output
parameters of a pattern are explicitly deﬁned in the beginning of a pattern description
and are consistently used throughout. The inputs required in order to apply a basic
pattern do not have to be provided as a result of the application of another pattern. As
long as the required input is provided, a pattern can be applied standalone according
to its instantiation rule in order to produce the deﬁned output.
Paper 2 and Paper 3 demonstrate the practical use of the SaCS pattern language in
two diﬀerent case studies. Each paper thoroughly describes how each pattern selected
from the library is applied in order to derive results. The papers also describe how
several patterns can be applied in combination.
Success criterion 6 The library of SaCS patterns is easy to extend.
Although the library currently only consists of basic patterns, it can be easily extended
by deﬁning and including in the library new basic patterns or new composite patterns.
Paper 1 (described in Chapter 9) details the syntax and semantics for SaCS pat-
terns. The syntax is deﬁned in Extended Backus-Naur Form (EBNF) [97]. EBNF is
a meta-syntax that is widely used for describing context-free grammars. Besides the
syntactical description of the diﬀerent kinds of patterns, Paper 1 also provides several
examples in which patterns from the library are translated into their textual syntax in
EBNF as well as their semantics. That a newly deﬁned pattern is understandable for
a user can be checked by translating it into its semantics, which is presented as a set of
paragraphs in English. The translation procedure is shortly outlined in Section 5.3.3
and should be simple to perform.
Paper 2 (described in Chapter 10) and Paper 3 (described in Chapter 11) demon-
strate the practical use of the SaCS pattern language for deﬁning composite patterns
based on the basic patterns in the library. Papers 1, 2, and 3 provide an extensive
guidance on how to deﬁne SaCS patterns. Each of the patterns presented in Paper 2
and Paper 3 are deﬁned according to the syntax presented in Paper 1.
7.1.3 The SaCS pattern language
Success criterion 7 The SaCS pattern language is suﬃciently expressive to specify
composite patterns that may be easily instantiated into conceptual safety designs.
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A conceptual safety design is an early stage speciﬁcation of system requirements,
system design, and safety case for a safety critical system. What is meant by a con-
ceptual safety design being an instantiation of a composite pattern is deﬁned in both
Paper 2 and Paper 3 as follows: “A conceptual safety design instantiates a SaCS com-
posite pattern if each element of the triple can be instantiated from the SaCS composite
pattern according to the instantiation rules of the individual patterns within the com-
posite and according to the rule for composition”. Paper 1 deﬁnes the syntax and
semantics of the SaCS pattern language that includes the rules for composition. Each
basic pattern deﬁnes its instantiation rule. The basic patterns are deﬁned in the ap-
pendices of Paper 2 and Paper 3. Furthermore, both Paper 2 and Paper 3 describe the
application of the SaCS method in two cases, including the use of the SaCS pattern
language as support for pattern composition and instantiation. Study 1 is documented
in Paper 2 and is concerned with the conceptualisation of a nuclear power plant con-
trol system. In Paper 2, the sections 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 present the composite patterns
deﬁned for the case and their instantiation into a conceptual safety design of a nuclear
power plant control system. Study 2 is documented in Paper 3 and is concerned with
the conceptualisation of a railway interlocking system. In Paper 3, the sections 5, 6,
7, 8, and 9 present the composite patterns for the case and their instantiation into a
conceptual safety design of a railway interlocking system. In both cases, it was possible
to model the application of patterns and derive a conceptual safety design using the
SaCS language. We refer to the demonstration of the applicability of the SaCS pattern
language, and the respective discussions on the fulﬁlment of success criteria for each
case as presented in Paper 2 and Paper 3, as support for claiming that the language
at least was suﬃciently expressive for conceptual safety design in the two case studies.
As mentioned earlier, the SaCS method was tested out in the two cases by the authors.
Thus, the discussions on the successfulness of SaCS method and the pattern language
in the cases presented in Paper 2 and Paper 3 represent self-evaluations. However,
each step in specifying the composite patterns and instantiating these into conceptual
safety designs is documented. We believe this is suﬃcient to allow others to perform an
independent evaluation of the feasibility of the SaCS method and the pattern language.
Paper 4 (described in Chapter 12) presents an analytical evaluation of the quality
of the SaCS pattern language for conceptual safety design as a complement to the
experience based evaluations described by Paper 2 and Paper 3. A framework for
analysing languages known as the SEmiotic QUALity (SEQUAL) framework [108] is
used as a basis for the evaluation. The quality of a language is within the framework
evaluated with respect to six diﬀerent appropriateness factors. A set of requirements is
associated with each appropriateness factor. The extent to which these requirements
are fulﬁlled is used to judge the quality.
The SEQUAL framework is based on semiotic theory (the theory of signs) and was
chosen as support for the analytic evaluation as it is a general framework applicable to
diﬀerent kinds of languages [108] whose usefulness has been conﬁrmed in experiments
[125]. Mendling et al. [121] describe two dominant approaches in the literature for
evaluating the quality of modelling approaches: (1) top-down quality frameworks; (2)
bottom-up metrics that relate to quality aspects. SEQUAL is the most prominent of
the top-down quality frameworks according to the authors. Mendling et al. [121] also
discuss a number of bottom-up metrics approaches. According to the authors, several
of these contributions are theoretic without empirical validation.
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The appropriateness factors used to judge the quality of the SaCS pattern language
for conceptual safety design are:
a) Domain appropriateness : by domain appropriateness it is meant that the lan-
guage should be able to represent all concepts in the domain [108].
b) Modeller appropriateness : by modeller appropriateness it is meant that there
should be no statements in the explicit knowledge of the modeller that cannot
be expressed in the language [108].
c) Participant appropriateness : by participant appropriateness it is meant that the
conceptual basis should correspond as much as possible to the way individuals
who partake in modelling perceive reality [108].
d) Comprehensibility appropriateness : by comprehensibility appropriateness it is
meant that the participants in the modelling should be able to understand all
the possible statements of the language [108].
e) Tool appropriateness : by tool appropriateness it is meant that the language
should have a syntax and semantics that a computerised tool can understand
[108].
f) Organisational appropriateness : by organisational appropriateness it is meant
that the language should be usable within the organisation it targets such that
it ﬁts with the work processes and the modelling required to be performed [108].
In the following, we brieﬂy explain the associated evaluation criteria for each of the
appropriateness factors a) to f) above and summarise the discussion on their fulﬁlment.
We refer to Paper 4 for the detailed discussion.
Regarding a), the criteria associated with the domain appropriateness factor con-
cerns whether the language: includes the concepts representing best practices within
conceptual safety design; and supports the application of best practices for conceptual
safety design.
In the design of the SaCS language, we have as much as possible selected keywords
and graphical symbols in the spirit of leading literature within the area. Section 2.1
deﬁnes some of the main terms from the safety literature used throughout this thesis.
In Section 7.1.2, each of the currently available basic patterns is identiﬁed and brieﬂy
presented with traceability to some of the sources within the safety literature that
inspired their deﬁnition. That the language supports the application of best practices
is represented by the available patterns in the library as well as the language constructs
for combining these into composite patterns. This indicates that we are at least able
to represent a signiﬁcant part of the concepts of relevance for conceptual safety design.
Regarding b), the criteria associated with the modeller appropriateness factor con-
cerns whether the language: facilitates tacit knowledge externalisation; and supports
the modelling needs within conceptual safety design.
Although we believe that the available patterns in the library represent a signiﬁcant
part of the concepts of relevance for conceptual safety design, only 26 patterns are
currently deﬁned. The limited number of basic patterns currently available limits what
can be modelled in a composite pattern. Deﬁning additional basic patterns will provide
a better coverage of the tacit knowledge that can be externalised. A comparison of
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classic and recent formats in the literature is provided in Section 4.1.3. The format of
basic patterns is based on the well-known format of Alexander et al. [5] and is presented
in Section 5.3.1. The format of basic patterns diﬀers from the format presented in [5]
by having the additional sections “Pattern Signature”, “Intent”, “Applicability”, and
“Instantiation Rule”. The signature, intent, and applicability sections of basic patterns
are documented in such a manner that the context section provided in [5] is not needed.
The format in [5] is a suitable basis as it is simple, well-known, and generally applicable
for specifying patterns of diﬀerent kinds.
We admit that there can be relevant tacit knowledge that is not easily externalised
in the SaCS language. However, the opportunity for increasing the number of basic
patterns makes it possible to at least reduce the gap.
Regarding c), the criteria associated with the participant appropriateness factor
concerns whether: the terms used for concepts in the language are the same terms used
within safety engineering; the symbols used to illustrate the meaning of concepts in
the language reﬂect these meanings; the language is understandable for people familiar
with safety engineering without speciﬁc training.
In Section 7.1.2, the diﬀerent concepts expressed in the form of basic patterns were
shortly outlined and traced to the safety literature. Activities such as hazard identiﬁca-
tion and hazard analysis [52], methods such as fault tree analysis [89] and failure mode
eﬀects analysis [88], system design solutions including redundant modules and voting
mechanisms [156], and practices like arguing safety on the basis of arguing that safety
requirements are satisﬁed [160], are all well known safety engineering practices that
may be found in diﬀerent standards and guidelines [30, 86, 93]. Moreover, as already
pointed out, keywords and terms have all been selected based on leading terminology
within safety engineering. In this sense, the SaCS language facilitates representing
the application of best practices within safety design and mirrors leading international
standards and guidelines on development of safety critical systems.
Regarding d), the criteria associated with the comprehensibility appropriateness
factor concerns whether: the concepts and symbols of the language diﬀer to the extent
they are diﬀerent; it is possible to group related statements in the language in a natural
manner; it is possible to reduce model complexity with the language; the symbols of
the language are as simple as possible with appropriate use of colour and emphasis.
Principles supporting eﬀective human interpretation of visualisations as presented
in Section 4.4.2 have shaped how composite patterns are expressed in the language,
especially the Gestalt principles of perception [115,171]. Paper 4 explains how several
of the classic Gestalt principles has been applied in the language such as Similarity for
expressing a degree of relatedness between concepts, Figure-Ground for separating the
objects of focus from the background, Proximity for indicating relatedness by placing
related objects close to each other, and Uniform Connectedness for indicating close
relationships by connecting objects. An example of the application of the visualisation
principle of categorisation [115] is also exempliﬁed in that the SaCS pattern language
facilitates reducing the number of relations drawn between patterns when these are
similar, thus reducing model complexity. The philosophy behind the use of grey-scale
symbols and how simple symbolism is achieved is also explained. As already pointed
out, the comprehension of individual patterns and pattern compositions is supported
by the use of terms commonly applied within the relevant industrial domains. We
ﬁnd the use of commonly applied safety terms and visualisation principles for eﬀective
human interpretation suﬃcient to facilitate comprehension.
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Regarding e), the criteria associated with the tool appropriateness factor concerns
whether the language has: a precise syntax; and a precise semantics.
The syntax and semantics of the SaCS pattern language are deﬁned in Paper 1
(described in Chapter 9) and developed in order to facilitate human interpretation and
use. The syntax is deﬁned in the Extended BackusNaur Form (EBNF) [97] notation,
a meta-syntax that is widely used for describing context-free grammars. Although
a computerised tool has not been developed that supports pattern speciﬁcation and
translating patterns deﬁned according to its syntax into its semantics, this should be
possible to deﬁne on the basis of the syntax and semantics presented in Paper 1.
Regarding f), the criteria associated with the organisational appropriateness fac-
tor concerns whether the language: is able to express the desired conceptual safety
design when applied in a safety context; ease the comprehensibility of best practices
within conceptual safety design for relevant target groups like system engineers, safety
engineers, hardware and software engineers; and is usable without the need for costly
tools.
Organisations developing safety critical systems are assumed to follow a develop-
ment process in accordance with the requirements deﬁned in relevant standards. Wong
et al. [175] reviewed several large development projects and software safety standards
from diﬀerent domains with respect to cost-eﬀectiveness and concludes that although
standards provide useful and eﬀective guidance, safety and cost-eﬀectiveness objectives
are successfully met by eﬀective planning and by applying company best practices that
are deﬁned in accordance with safety engineering best practices throughout the devel-
opment life-cycle. SaCS patterns may be deﬁned, applied, and combined in a ﬂexible
manner to support company best practices and domain-speciﬁc best practices.
Success criterion 8 The SaCS pattern language facilitates the speciﬁcation of com-
posite patterns in a context.
Fig. 5.23 is identical to Fig. 5.21 with the addition of annotations indicating the
instantiation of parameters. The annotations for specifying the instantiation of pa-
rameters as presented in Fig. 5.23 exempliﬁes how a composite pattern is speciﬁed in
a context by the SaCS pattern language. The input parameters identify what kind of
information is expected from the context in order for a user to apply the pattern. The
output parameters identify the expected outcome of applying a pattern in a context.
The user applies the pattern deﬁnition in its context according to its instantiation rule
in order to provide the output. A symbol and an identiﬁer representing a development
artefact used or produced during pattern instantiation is within a composite pattern
speciﬁcation connected with the parameter of the respective pattern it represent.
Paper 1 describes the syntax of composite patterns, which clearly shows how to
explicitly deﬁne the parameters of a pattern. The syntax also clearly deﬁnes the rules
for specifying the instantiation of parameters. The structured semantics describes the
rules for interpreting parameterised patterns with or without annotations indicating
the instantiation of parameters.
Fig. 5, Fig. 10, Fig. 11, Fig. 13, Fig. 20, and Fig. 21 of Paper 2 are all composite
patterns annotated with indications of their instantiation in the context represented
by Study 1. Fig. 19 and Fig. 21 of Paper 3 specify a composite pattern and the
instantiation of this composite, respectively, for addressing the challenges that occur
in the context represented by Study 2.
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Success criterion 9 The SaCS pattern language facilitates modularity and reuse.
Modularity is deﬁned by ISO/IEC/IEEE [95] as “the degree to which a system or
computer program is composed of discrete components such that a change to one compo-
nent has minimal impact on other components”. The SaCS pattern language facilitates
the speciﬁcation of composite patterns that can be instantiated into conceptual safety
designs. It seems fair to argue that the SaCS pattern language facilitates modularity
and reuse if:
a) changes to a pattern within a composite have minimal impact on the other pat-
terns within the composite as well those parts of the conceptual safety design
that are not produced on the basis of the changed pattern; and
b) a composite pattern or the conceptual safety design that instantiates the com-
posite can at least partly be reused in another context.
Regarding a), we argue that the parameterisation of SaCS patterns and the com-
position of patterns by the diﬀerent kinds of relations minimise the impact of change.
The input and output parameters of a SaCS pattern deﬁne the interface that al-
lows it to be easily connected with other patterns. Relations connect patterns and
operate on the parameters of the connected patterns. An input parameter identiﬁes
the expected information to be provided when instantiating a pattern in its context.
An output parameter identiﬁes the expected outcome of pattern instantiation. The
pattern deﬁnition provides the user with guidance on how to produce the outputs. A
change to a pattern will not aﬀect other patterns within a pattern composite unless
the change aﬀects the interface or how the user produces the outputs upon pattern
instantiation.
The patterns in the library represent the predeﬁned “components” that the user
combines to build composite patterns. The composites deﬁned by a user can be used
as a basis for specifying new composite patterns. Fig. 5.7 exempliﬁes a modularised
speciﬁcation where the composite Deﬁne Safety Requirements uses the composite Risk
Identiﬁcation and Analysis deﬁned in Fig. 5.6 as part of its speciﬁcation. The language
facilitates modularity by oﬀering patterns and operators for combining patterns into
structures that are reusable. Paper 1 (described in Chapter 9) describes the syntax
and semantics of the SaCS patterns language and provides several examples on pattern
composition. Paper 2 (described in Chapter 10) and Paper 3 (described in Chapter 11)
demonstrates the application of the SaCS pattern language in two diﬀerent cases re-
sulting in modularised composite patterns as well as modularised conceptual safety
designs.
Regarding b), we argue that the parameterisation of SaCS patterns and the com-
position of patterns by the use of relations facilitate pattern interchangeability and
reuse. Furthermore, we argue that the result of pattern instantiation can be reused
to the extent the diﬀerent contexts for which a composite pattern are instantiated are
similar.
Fig. 13 of Paper 2 deﬁnes a composite pattern named Safety Requirements as well as
how it was instantiated to support eliciting safety requirements in Study 1. Fig. 10 of
Paper 3 deﬁnes a composite pattern to support eliciting safety requirements in Study 2.
The two composites deﬁne approaches to the process of eliciting safety requirements
that are to a great extent similar. The similarly speciﬁed pattern compositions facilitate
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a partial reuse, e.g, by reusing parts of Fig. 13 of Paper 2 for specifying Fig. 10 of
Paper 3. Another option is to deﬁne a generally applicable composite. A part of
the process for eliciting safety requirements as represented in Fig. 13 of Paper 2 and
Fig 10. of Paper 3 is risk identiﬁcation and analysis. In Fig. 5.21, a sequential use
of the patterns Hazard Identiﬁcation, Hazard Analysis, and Risk Analysis is deﬁned.
In Section 7.1.2, we argued on the basis of the literature that these patterns represent
safety engineering best practices and also that this sequence is promoted within the
literature.
Although the composites used to derive safety requirements used in Study 1 and
Study 2 are to a large extent similar, the result of pattern instantiation cannot be
expected to be reused from one context to another when the contexts are diﬀerent.
However, it is expected that the conceptual safety design presented in Study 2 can be
reused to a large extent given a context similar to the one presented, e.g., development
of a railway interlocking system at a railway station with a similar: overall system;
track conﬁguration; objects to be controlled, and operational proﬁle.
Success criterion 10 The SaCS pattern language is well-suited to express patterns
that are easily understandable for its intended users, which are system engineers, safety
engineers, hardware and software engineers.
We ﬁnd it fair to argue the language expresses patterns that are easily understand-
able for its users if:
a) the pattens have a precise syntax and semantics; and
b) the meaning of patterns can be derived by a user in a short time and without the
need of a costly tool; and
c) the patterns are deﬁned with notations optimised for human information pro-
cessing and otherwise follow established principles of human cognition.
Regarding a): Paper 1 (described in Chapter 9) details the syntax and semantics
of the SaCS pattern langauge. The syntax of the SaCS language is deﬁned in the
EBNF [97] notation. A structured semantics for SaCS patterns is oﬀered in the form
of a schematic mapping from pattern deﬁnitions, via its textual syntax in EBNF [97],
to English. The non-formal representation of the semantics supports human inter-
pretation. The presentation of the semantics of patterns as a text in English was
chosen in order to aid communication between users, possibly with diﬀerent technical
backgrounds, on how to interpret patterns.
Regarding b): Paper 1 (described in Chapter 9) oﬀers a procedure for translat-
ing patterns into their semantics in English. The procedure is exempliﬁed on several
patterns in Paper 1 by the systematic application of translation rules. Although the
procedure for the translation of a pattern into its semantics may be automated, it is
currently represented as a set of translation rules. The translation of a pattern into its
semantics requires no tool beyond the rules deﬁned in Paper 1 and should require only
a few minutes to perform, even without training.
Regarding c): Moody [124] deﬁnes 9 principles for designing cognitive eﬀective
visual notations optimised for human understanding. The principles are synthesised
from theory and empirical research from a wide range of ﬁelds. We ﬁrstly introduce
the set of principles. Secondly, we exemplify and discuss the implementation of the
principles in the SaCS pattern language. The principles are:
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1) Semiotic clarity : concerns to which extent there is a correspondence between
semantic constructs and graphical symbols [124].
2) Perceptual discriminability : concerns to which extent diﬀerent symbols are dis-
tinguishable [124].
3) Semantic transparency : concerns to which extent the meaning of a symbol can
be inferred from its appearance [124].
4) Complexity management : concerns to which extent the visual notation is able to
represent information without overloading the human mind [124].
5) Cognitive integration: concerns to which extent there are explicit mechanisms
supporting the integration of information from diﬀerent diagrams [124].
6) Visual expressiveness : concerns to which extent the full range of and capacities
of visual variables are used [124].
7) Dual coding : concerns to which extent text is used to complement graphics [124].
8) Graphic economy : concerns to which extent the number of diﬀerent graphical
elements are cognitively manageable [124].
9) Cognitive ﬁt : concerns to which extent visual dialects are used to support diﬀerent
tasks and audiences [124].
Fig. 7.1 presents how the principles 1-9 outlined above, as well as three of the
Gestalt [44, 115, 171] principles of visual perception, are implemented in a slightly
revised version of the composite explained in Section 5.3.2. In Fig. 7.1, the coloured
elements represent the annotations used for explaining the implementation of principles,
while the remaining elements are SaCS notation. Below we give a further description
of the implementation of the 9 principles.
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Figure 7.1: Example composite pattern with annotations showing the implementation
of principles for cognitive eﬀective visual notations
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7.1 Fulﬁllment of the success criteria
Regarding 1): We have deliberately applied a symbol deﬁcit approach, which inﬂu-
ences semiotic clarity [124]. Several concepts are expressed in natural language rather
than by symbols, e.g., names of patterns and parameters. Hence, there is not a one-
to-one mapping between concepts and symbols. We believe an approach where all
concepts are symbolised with dedicated symbols is counter-productive. A one-to-one
mapping between concepts and symbols would likely lead to symbol overload as well as
violate the Gestalt principle of simplicity [115]. There is also a limit of human capacity
to process information that motivates a small number of symbols. The limit, according
to Miller [122], is seven plus or minus two elements. When the number of elements in-
creases past seven, the mind may be confused in correctly interpreting the information.
Thus, the number of symbols should be kept low in order to facilitate eﬀective human
information processing. We have deﬁned a small set of symbols. The diﬀerent icons
are used as classiﬁers instead of being associated with one speciﬁc concept. However,
any lack of clarity with our symbol deﬁcit approach is compensated by the use of other
principles such as dual coding explained later.
Regarding 2): We have approached perceptual discriminability [124] by using the
Gestalt principle of similarity to balance the need for similarity with the need for
dissimilarity. According to Lidwell et al. [115], the principle of similarity is such that
similar elements are perceived to be more related than elements that are dissimilar.
The use of the similarity principle can be seen applied to the icons for the diﬀerent
contained patterns in Fig. 7.1. Although each referenced pattern has a unique name,
their identical icons indicate relatedness. Diﬀerent kinds of patterns are symbolised by
the icons in Fig. 5.8. The icons are of the same size with some aspects of similarity
and some aspects of dissimilarity such that a degree of relatedness may be perceived.
An icon for a pattern reference is diﬀerent in shape and shading compared to an icon
used for artefact reference (see Fig. 5.8 and Fig. 5.11). Thus, an artefact and a pattern
should be perceived as representing quite diﬀerent concepts. Textual diﬀerentiation is
approached with diﬀerent typefaces and font size.
Regarding 3): Lidwell et al. [115] describe iconic representation as “the use of
pictorial images to make actions, objects, and concepts in a display easier to ﬁnd,
recognize, learn, and remember”. The authors describe four forms for representation of
information with icons: similar, example, symbolic, and arbitrary. We have primarily
applied the symbolic form to identify a concept at a higher level of abstraction than
can be achieved with the similar and example forms. We have also tried to avoid
the arbitrary form where there is little or no relationship between a concept and its
associated icon. Section 5.3.2 presents the main icons in SaCS and identiﬁes the result
of our eﬀorts to achieve semantic transparency [124].
Regarding 4): Several diﬀerent mechanism are used for complexity management
[124] in SaCS. According to Lidwell et al. [115], hierarchical organisation is the sim-
plest structure for visualising and understanding complexity. The SaCS language of-
fers diﬀerent kinds of hierarchical organisation, e.g., the details relation may be used
to specify that one pattern is detailed by another, and a composite pattern can use
other composites as part of its speciﬁcation. The latter provides a mechanism for
modularisation.
Regarding 5): Diﬀerent kinds of basic patterns are integrated as support for con-
ceptual safety design in SaCS. We have applied UML [137], GSN [61], and Problem
Frames [98] to support modelling diﬀerent kinds of concepts within basic patterns.
These three languages are widely known, and no single language exists that serves
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the diﬀerent modelling needs these notations oﬀer. In addition, a principle of good de-
sign [15,115,128] is to balance the need for performance by the importance of preference
in designing solutions. However, the choice of several languages challenges cognitive
integration [124]. Kim et. al [104] argue within their theory on cognitive integration
of diagrams that in order for a multi-diagram representation to be cognitively eﬀec-
tive, a mechanism that supports conceptual, as well as perceptual, integration must be
explicitly included. The SaCS-speciﬁc mechanism that allows cognitive integration is
explained in Section 5.3 and is represented by the notation that maps parameters to
diagram elements of diﬀerent kinds.
Regarding 6): The degree of visual expressiveness [124] is deﬁned by the number
of visual variables used in a language. Bertin [19] identiﬁes 8 visual variables divided
into 2 planar variables and 6 retinal variables. The planar variables are horizontal and
vertical position. The retinal variables are shape, size, brightness, orientation, texture,
and colour. Every visual variable besides colour is used either to encode information
or attract the visual attention of the user to what is important. A general principle
within visualisation according to Lidwell et al. [115] is to use colour with care as it may
lead to misconceptions if used inappropriately. The authors points out that there is
no universal symbolism for diﬀerent colours. As colour blindness is common we have
applied diﬀerent shades of grey in visualisations. Moody [124] points out that although
color is one of the most eﬀective visual variables it should not be used as the sole basis
for distinguishing between symbols, but rather for redundant coding. In this sense,
colour coding can be added to our models for redundant coding and for emphasising
particularly interesting information that requires immediate attention.
Regarding 7): Paivio [138] argues within the dual coding theory that text and
graphics together is a more eﬀective carrier of information than using them separately.
In SaCS, text is solely used for identiﬁers, e.g., identiﬁers for parameters, patterns,
and development artefacts. Icons provide visual cues to what an entity represent. We
believe this is a suitable strategy as identiﬁers are used in the verbal communication
between users to name the entities that are discussed.
Regarding 8): As mentioned earlier we have deliberately applied a symbol deﬁcit
approach in composite patterns, which reduces the number of graphical symbols and
positively eﬀect graphic economy [124]. We have used the dual coding principle to bal-
ance text with symbols where symbols classify entities and text provides supplementing
information. Information is primarily textual in basic patterns. Basic patterns provide
detailed guidance on diﬀerent concepts that is diﬃcult to fully capture graphically;
thus, diagrams are used in basic patterns to provide supplementing information.
Regarding 9): The intended users of SaCS represent diﬀerent engineering disciplines
and roles. Depending on task and audience, diﬀerent kinds of information represen-
tation should be used according the cognitive ﬁt theory [124]. In order to achieve an
overall eﬀective visual representation, visual dialects suited to the individual tasks and
audiences should be integrated rather than providing one representation for all pur-
poses. A requirements engineer is expected to be aware of the Problem Frames [98]
notation. A system engineer, hardware engineer, or a software engineer is expected to
be aware of the UML [137] notation. A safety engineer is expected to be aware of the
the GSN [61] notation. The SaCS pattern language integrates these visual dialects and
facilitates the communication between users on the development of conceptual safety
design.
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7.2 How our contributions relate to and extends
state-of-the-art
In this section we will discuss how our artefacts relate to and extend the state-of-
the-art presented in Chapter 4. The reason for having this additional discussion on
state-of-the-art is that our artefacts is ﬁrst presented in Chapter 5.
In the following sections, the inﬂuence of our artefacts on state-of-the-art is dis-
cussed separately for each artefact.
7.2.1 The SaCS process
The process of applying patterns as support for buildings architecture is found in the
work of Alexander et al. [3–5] from the 70’s. A wide audience of software developers
adopted the concept of design patterns, especially from the mid 90’s with the intro-
duction of the inﬂuential book by Gamma et al. [55] on patterns for software design.
The patterns in [55] are organised more like a collection rather than as a sequence of
patterns as is the case in [5]. Although a number of diﬀerent formats for presenting
patterns and pattern languages [2, 62, 68, 102, 140, 143, 179] exist, current practices for
expressing patterns may be traced to the early works represented in [5] or in [55]. Typ-
ically, a pattern expresses knowledge on a proven design concept (or some other kind of
solution concept) to a recurring design problem (or some other kind of problem). More-
over, the inter-dependencies between patterns are typically expressed informally or are
deﬁned by the sequence in which the patterns are presented. Henninger and Correˆa
identify in their survey [79] a lack of pattern approaches supporting the speciﬁcation of
inter-dependencies between patterns and how patterns are combined. The process of
the SaCS method improves the state-of-the-art by bridging the activities on selecting
patterns, instantiating patterns, and specifying the application of patterns systemati-
cally. The SaCS pattern language supports the process of specifying reusable pattern
compositions as well as specifying how patterns can be applied in a given context for
documentation purposes.
7.2.2 The library of SaCS patterns
There is a lack of pattern approaches targeting the development of safety critical sys-
tems speciﬁcally, with some notable expeditions [10, 32, 68, 102]. A problem with the
mentioned approaches is that these only provide patterns addressing one development
perspective/discipline, e.g., embedded design solutions [10], systems architecture [32],
software fault tolerance [68], or safety argumentation [102]. In order to consolidate our
patterns with best practices for the development of safety critical systems we have used
international safety standards and guidelines as inspiration, e.g., [30,86,93]. When do-
ing so, we identiﬁed and expressed patterns that are not represented in the literature
as patterns, but nevertheless represent patterns of safety engineering. The patterns of
SaCS represent diﬀerent branches of knowledge that combined supports development
of conceptual safety designs.
A challenge to the eﬀective combined use of patterns in pattern collections is that
these are not necessarily deﬁned in a manner that makes it easy to use several together
[79]. It is common to detail the relations to other patterns within the deﬁnition of a
pattern as indicated in Table 4.1. In the literature, the relationships to other patterns
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is often detailed in a section named “‘Related Patterns”. The format of basic SaCS
patterns is presented in Table 5.1 and includes a related patterns section. The related
patterns sections of patterns in the literature does not normally present indications on
how to combine patterns, but more typically provides suggestions for further reading.
Thus, its content typically supports pattern selection more than pattern composition,
as is also the case with SaCS patterns.
Each pattern in the library is deﬁned to address one concept only. Thus, the library
of patterns provides development guidance that facilitates separation of concerns. Ev-
ery pattern in the library explicitly deﬁnes its input and output parameters in order to
facilitate precise modelling of a connected structure of patterns using the SaCS pattern
language. A ﬂexible solution for connecting patterns is sought by using relations that
operate on the parameters of patterns. The relations may be used for expressing ﬂows
and dependencies between patterns where the parameters represent the connection
points.
7.2.3 The SaCS pattern language
The approach to pattern-based development by the SaCS pattern language involves
more than applying patterns merely as support for specifying the technical aspects
of a system design. Six diﬀerent kinds of basic patterns are oﬀered. The patterns
address diverse topics, e.g., requirements elicitation, safety assessment, design, and
safety demonstration. While some basic patterns provide a description within their
deﬁnition of an expected sequence in the manner of the pattern language of Alexander
et al. [5], other patterns are organised more as in the catalogue of Gamma et al. [55]
where diﬀerent patterns represent alternative solutions to a common problem or address
problems not directly related.
The language facilitates the speciﬁcation of workﬂows, dataﬂows, and dependencies
in a structure of patterns by the use of relations. A relation in the language operates on
the parameters of patterns and thus provides a more precise modelling of relationships
than the relations deﬁned by Noble [129], which operates on patterns and not pattern
parts. Smith [151] presents a catalogue of elementary software design patterns in the
tradition of Gamma et al. [55] and the Pattern Instance Notation (PIN) for express-
ing compositions of patterns graphically. Connectors deﬁne the relationships between
patterns. The connectors operate on the deﬁned roles of patterns. The notation of
Smith [151] and several other notations [27,40,169] for expressing patterns graphically
use UML as its basis. The notations are simple, but target the speciﬁcation of software.
In SaCS, patterns for diﬀerent kinds of aspects are combined.
With respect to the modelling of workﬂows, Dumas and Hofstede [41] discuss the
use of UML [137] activity diagrams for the purpose. Aalst et al. [167] describe workﬂow
patterns and also how Petri nets [168] may be use to model these patterns. UML activ-
ity diagrams and Petri nets could be candidate methods for expressing a composition
of patterns graphically. A challenge is, of course, that UML activity diagrams, Petri
nets, and other kinds of established notational forms mentioned in Section 4.4.1 have
a speciﬁc purpose and semantics that do not fully accommodate what is intended to
be expressed when specifying a structure of patterns in SaCS.
UML collaboration diagrams can be used to graphically present patterns of system
structure in the form of objects and interaction by the use of associations or messages
[78]. Collaborations can be suitable for modelling some concepts expressed in basic
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SaCS patterns that address the structure of systems. A basic pattern can address
concepts other than structural concepts. Hence, there is challenge to give reasonable
semantics for a structure of patterns modelled as a network of collaborations when the
collaboration environment is not applicable to all concepts that are modelled.
In our literature search on patterns, pattern languages, and modelling approaches,
we have identiﬁed a lack of languages or notational forms that serve our purpose fully.
Thus, we have chosen to develop our own language that is not a variant of an established
language but speciﬁc for our purpose inspired by established languages for modelling
and principles for good visualisation.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
This chapter concludes Part I. In Section 8.1, we summarise what has been achieved
in terms of new artefacts. Thereafter, Section 8.2 summarises the evaluation of the
artefacts. Finally, Section 8.3 describes some possible directions for future work.
8.1 Developed artefacts
In order to develop a safety critical system that can be accepted as being suﬃciently
safe for its intended use, the system needs to be designed for safety. This entails that
safety thinking is part of the development process from the very beginning. To embed
safety thinking into each step of the conceptualisation process, starting from the idea
stage until a mature system design that can be argued to satisfy safety objectives
is reached, requires informed choices. Furthermore, eﬀective guidance is needed on
acceptable safety engineering approaches that can be eﬃciently applied in order to
make informed choices and eﬀectuate them in a cost-eﬃcient manner. There is also a
need for a common language in order to reach a common understanding and consensus
within a development team, likely consisting of people with diverse responsibilities
and competences, on what should be the guiding safety principles for safety design
conceptualisation.
By using a pattern language as support, diﬀerent kinds of experts can more easily
communicate on how they want to resolve diverse challenges using well-proven patterns
as guidance. The applicability of the patterns expressed within the language, and
the expressiveness of the language, as well as its ease of use for combining patterns,
are essential for success. As diﬀerent kinds of users, such as system engineers, safety
engineers, hardware engineers, and software engineers, need to combine their knowledge
on well-proven concepts within their respective ﬁeld of expertise to reach the end
goal, their common language must be able to express these diverse concepts. For
this reason, the pattern language must be able to express diverse concepts, such as,
processes, techniques, and solutions for requirements elicitation, system and software
design, safety demonstration, veriﬁcation and validation. A language that can express
individual patterns on highly specialised topics and still be able to combine these in a
ﬂexible manner that also can be easily implemented would contribute to the eﬃcient
and eﬀective conceptualisation of systems.
This thesis contributes to the development of conceptual safety design of safety
critical systems by providing a pattern-based approach. The overall objective of this
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thesis as presented in Section 1.1 is to develop a method and a pattern language that
is:
1. Well-suited for developing conceptual safety designs.
2. Applicable within an industrial context within acceptable eﬀort.
3. Comprehensible for its intended users.
To this end, we have developed the SaCS method, which is supported by the SaCS
pattern language. More speciﬁcally, the artefacts developed in this thesis facilitate the
conceptualisation of safe system designs by integrating the following main contributions
into the SaCS method:
1. The SaCS process : deﬁnes the process for systematically applying SaCS patterns
to support the development of conceptual safety designs.
2. The library of SaCS patterns : deﬁnes 26 patterns categorised into six diﬀerent
kinds describing best practices for conceptual safety design.
3. The SaCS pattern language: deﬁnes how to express basic SaCS patterns and
includes a graphical notation for specifying pattern compositions.
8.2 Evaluation of artefacts
We have conducted two large case studies (presented in Paper 2 and in Paper 3)
within diﬀerent domains as part of the evaluation of each artefact of this thesis, as
well as its integration into the SaCS method. We have also conducted an analytical
evaluation (presented in Paper 4) of the quality of the SaCS pattern language (presented
in Paper 1) as support for conceptual safety design as a complement to the two case
studies.
While Section 2.2 characterises more precisely the success criteria for each invented
artefact in order for the overall objective of this thesis to be met, Section 3.3 describes
our strategy for evaluating whether the artefacts satisfy the success criteria. In the
McGrath [120] classiﬁcation of evaluation approaches, our case studies can be viewed
as variants of what is termed a ﬁeld experiment. The analytical evaluation can be seen
as a variant of what is termed non-empirical evidence [120] although it partly builds
on the case studies. The ﬁeld experiment and the non-empirical evidence represent
approaches that score highly on realism and generality, respectively. We recognise that
further empirical evidence is needed in order to validate whether the SaCS method is
feasible as support for its intended users in general.
The demonstrations of the applicability of the SaCS method in the two case studies
provide indications on its feasibility for conceptual safety design. Each pattern applied
in the cases is deﬁned according to a formal syntax. Each step in the process of
selecting, modelling the use of, and instantiating patterns in the cases, is thoroughly
documented. As argued in Section 7, the method can also be expected to provide useful
results with reasonable eﬀort.
The analytical evaluation of the SaCS pattern language is supported by a framework
for evaluating the quality of languages for conceptual modelling. The result indicates
that a signiﬁcant part of the concepts of relevance for conceptual safety design is
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represented by the carefully selected terms, concepts, and terminology. Furthermore,
the result indicates that principles of good design for visualisation, to support human
comprehension, are applied in the deﬁnition of the graphical language. It is also argued
that tool support can be provided, to support pattern speciﬁcation and comprehension,
on the basis of the deﬁned syntax and the structured semantics of the language. The
result also indicates that some relevant tacit knowledge may not be easily externalised
as the SaCS language is today; however, the opportunity to increase the number of
basic patterns makes it at least possible to reduce the gap.
8.3 Directions for future work
There are a number of interesting possibilities for further work. We present some
of these in this section. Most importantly, empirical evaluations of SaCS are needed
in industrial development projects in order to assess its practical application further.
Another direction is to develop tool support.
A tool could support pattern selection by oﬀering an interactive process that presents
the set of available patterns and provides a mechanism for eﬃciently ﬁltering the set
to only account for those relevant to the context. Given a tool that captures the inter-
action and prompt for a rationale for the diﬀerent choices of the user, the process for
pattern selection and rationale for choices can be automatically documented by logging
interactions. This would provide a thorough documentation of the motivations for the
diﬀerent choices taken during development.
A tool could support pattern speciﬁcation by, for example, performing automatic
checks on the consistency of composite pattern speciﬁcations on the basis of the syn-
tax presented in Paper 1. Furthermore, a mechanism for automatically generating
the meaning of composite patterns could be provided on the basis of the structured
semantics also presented in Paper 1.
A tool could support pattern instantiation by providing templates for the speciﬁ-
cation of requirements, system design, and safety case, as well as other development
artefacts. Traceability could be supported by generating trace links when a template
is applied between a pattern and the artefact produced upon pattern instantiation.
The library should be increased with more patterns on relevant topics within concep-
tual safety design in order to provide better coverage of the concepts that are commonly
applied within the development of safety critical systems. The number of patterns in
the library can be increased by importing patterns expressed in the literature, such as,
patterns on requirement speciﬁcation provided by Whithall [174], patterns on software
fault tolerant software as described by Hanmer [68], or patterns on safety case devel-
opment provided by Kelly [102]. The main challenge is not to deﬁne best practices
on diﬀerent aspects of development in the form of patterns, but rather to combine the
knowledge scattered in diﬀerent pattern approaches eﬃciently and eﬀectively.
In addition to extending the library with patterns on the core concepts of safety
critical systems development, the library could also include a collection of predeﬁned
composite patterns. The library of composite patterns should include those pattern
structures that are recurring in the intended application domains of SaCS, e.g., compos-
ite patterns supporting the implementation of IEC 61508 [93], such that instantiation
as speciﬁed ensures compliance.
There is a need for eﬀective mechanisms for indexing, ﬁltering, searching and cross-
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referencing patterns given a large number of patterns in a library. A solution could
be in the form of a dedicated search engine. The search engine could base its search
on a rigid categorisation of patterns and interact with the user through questions and
answers, or by an interactive graphical model. Another solution could be to deﬁne the
“Related Patterns” section of basic patterns according to a strict syntax. The user of
the language could search for relevant patterns in a manner like searching a word list to
ﬁnd synonyms and antonyms. A WordNet (wordnet.princeton.edu/) like semantic
network of patterns could increase the utilisation of patterns by providing a platform
for sharing knowledge and present this knowledge in a consistent format.
The language deﬁnes a limited number of operators to model relations between
patterns. There is likely to be a need for additional relations if the library is extended
with more patterns as well as new categories of patterns. Furthermore, the development
of additional relations should include a categorisation such that the fundamental kinds
of pattern relations are represented.
A composite pattern can be seen as a network where the patterns represent nodes
and relations represent the vertices. The network of patterns can be extended with
information on cost estimates. The vertices and edges could be annotated with knowl-
edge on the expected eﬀort required in order to instantiate patterns. An algorithm
could perform calculation on the network. If there are optional elements or alternative
paths in a network, the algorithm could calculate all possibilities and provide a com-
parison such that a user could make informed decisions on what to include and what
to exclude in the planning of activities within an acceptable cost limit.
The language could be extended with additional annotations for indicating who is
responsible for what, as well as the intended role of diﬀerent actors involved in pattern
instantiation. The symbols used for indicating the instantiation order of patterns
provide a very rough model of time. Additional information could be introduced for
denoting the expected start and duration for applying the diﬀerent patterns within a
composite, as support for detailed planning of diﬀerent development activities. Some
kind of visualisation could also be introduced for indicating the location of an activity,
if this information is relevant, e.g., that a certain test procedure shall be performed at
the customer site contrary to the vendor site.
As more information is added to a composite pattern, there is a danger that the
model will become more diﬃcult to interpret rather than more informative. Introducing
layering, where a base model is supplemented with additional visual information as
selected by a user, could be used to mitigate information overload.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The SaCS pattern language consists of a set of predefined patterns and different kinds of operators for 
combining patterns. The intention is to offer guidance on development of conceptual safety designs in a 
format that is easy to comprehend and apply. By a conceptual safety design we mean an early stage 
specification of system requirements, system design, and safety case for a safety critical system. The 
intended users of the SaCS pattern language are system developers, safety engineers, and HW/SW 
engineers.  
A specification of a conceptual safety design is the accumulated result of combining a number of 
intermediate development results, e.g., a specification of functional requirements and a result of risk 
assessment. In order to provide confidence that a specific system design is suitable for a given 
application, it is not necessarily sufficient to present the system design itself – the process of developing 
the system design should also be presented. If the applied process for developing a system design is 
adequate, it provides additional assurance for the result being based on a proper set of activities and 
increases confidence in the result being correct and sufficient.  
The SaCS pattern language provides, in addition to development guidance, a means to visualise and 
document the sequential application of patterns. The visualisation intends to capture the development 
process in a manner that is easy to comprehend. Composite patterns are user defined and describes 
how a set of patterns are combined and applied as support for conceptual safety design. A composite 
pattern may identify every pattern applied during safety design conceptualisation, the order in which the 
different patterns shall be applied, the input and output parameters of each pattern, the relationships 
between patterns, and optionally how patterns are instantiated. Thus, a composite pattern may serve as 
a means to model a reusable combination of patterns that may be applied in different contexts, or 
document the process of applying patterns as development support. 
We distinguish between two main groups of patterns, basic patterns and composite patterns, the former 
presented as a combination of text and illustrations in a defined sequence of named sections and the 
latter represented graphically as a combination of the former. The basic patterns provide guidance on 
different aspects of development, e.g., requirement elicitation, safety assessment, system design, and 
safety demonstration challenges.  
In order to ease the comprehension of SaCS patterns, this report offers a structured semantics. The 
structured semantics enables the user to extract the meaning of a SaCS pattern, which is expressed with 
graphics and text, and translate it into readable paragraphs in English prose based on a systematic 
translation of the elements that defines the pattern.  
The remainder of this report is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the approach to our structured 
semantics. Section 3 describes the syntax of basic SaCS patterns. Section 4 describes the structured 
semantics of basic SaCS patterns. Section 5 describes the graphical syntax of composite SaCS patterns. 
Section 6 describes the textual syntax of composite SaCS patterns. Section 7 describes a structured 
semantics of composite SaCS patterns. Section 8 exemplifies the translation of basic SaCS patterns. 
Section 9 exemplifies the translation of composite SaCS patterns. Section 10 concludes.  
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2. THE APPROACH TO A STRUCTURED SEMANTICS 
The main intention of a pattern in SaCS is to provide guidance on a solution to a recurring challenge and 
aid the communication between different users on how a certain challenge should be approached. The 
semantics for a given language may be approached in different ways depending on considerations such 
as who are the intended users, what is the purpose, and what are the needs for precision in terms of 
providing mathematical and logical definitions versus a more informal natural language definition [10] of 
the semantics. The semantics of SaCS patterns as presented here is primarily intended to aid 
communication between users on the interpretation of defined patterns without requiring any specific 
training. Our structured semantics is based on a systematic translation of pattern fragments into 
sentences or paragraphs in English. 
The method for providing the structured semantics of SaCS patterns is adapted from [1] and performed 
in two steps: 
• The translation of a SaCS pattern into its textual syntax, and 
• The translation of the textual syntax of a pattern into a meaningful text in English. 
The textual syntax of SaCS patterns is defined by the use of Extended Backus-Naur Form (EBNF) [7]. 
The vertical bar “|” represents options, braces “{ }” means an ordered sequence of zero or more 
repetitions of the enclosed element, “{ }−” means and ordered sequence of one or more repetitions of the 
enclosed element, square brackets “[ ]” denotes optional features, comma “,” represents the 
concatenation symbol, and semicolon “;” marks the termination of a rule. In EBNF, parentheses cannot 
be placed next to identifiers but must be concatenated with them. We take advantage of the constricted 
use of parentheses in EBNF and extend the syntax description with terminals (denoted in a PT Sans bold 
font for better readability) placed adjacent to a parenthesis to symbolise a syntactic fragment for which 
there is associated a semantic rule.  
The following exemplifies a fragment of a textual syntax described with the use of EBNF: 
                                                    name = name( identifier ); 
The following exemplifies a semantic rule for the above textual syntax that may be used to translate a 
textual syntax into English.  
                              name( identifier )  = identifier is a pattern. 
The symbols   denote a function that takes a syntactical element defined according to a specific textual 
syntax as input and provides its translation as a sentence or a paragraph in English as output. 
In the following sections, the syntax and semantics of SaCS patterns are defined. We do not provide a 
very strict syntax of basic SaCS patterns, although some elements of a basic pattern are associated with 
a strict syntax, and consequently the semantics of basic patterns is detailed at a high level. The reason is 
to allow pattern authors a high degree of freedom in defining basic patterns. In addition, a basic pattern 
should be self-explanatory. The syntax and semantics of composite SaCS patterns are given at a 
detailed level.  
Examples on the translation of basic patterns and composite patterns are given in Section 8 and 9, 
respectively.  
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3. SYNTAX OF BASIC SACS PATTERNS 
This section defines the textual syntax of basic SaCS patterns. There are six different kinds of basic 
patterns in SaCS, three kinds for patterns reflecting on issues associated with the development process 
(process assurance patterns) and three kinds for patterns reflecting upon issues of the product that is 
under development (product assurance patterns).  
                    basic pattern  = process assurance requirement pattern | 
                                              process assurance solution pattern |  
                                              process assurance safety case pattern | 
                                              product assurance requirement pattern | 
                                              product assurance solution pattern | 
                                              product assurance safety case pattern; 
The syntax for the different kinds of basic patterns is as follows: 
      process assurance requirement pattern = 
                        name, process requirement pattern signature, intent,  
                        applicability, problem, process solution, instantiation rule,  
                        [ related patterns ], [ known uses ]; 
     process assurance solution pattern = 
                         name, process solution pattern signature, intent,  
                         applicability, problem, method solution, instantiation rule,  
                         [ related patterns ], [ known uses ]; 
     process assurance safety case pattern = 
                          name, process safety case pattern signature, intent,  
                          applicability, problem, argument structure solution, instantiation rule,  
                          [ related patterns ], [ known uses ]; 
     product assurance requirement pattern = 
                        name, product requirement pattern signature, intent,  
                        applicability, problem, problem frame solution, instantiation rule,  
                        [ related patterns ], [ known uses ];  
      product assurance solution pattern = 
                         name, product solution pattern signature, intent,  
                         applicability, problem, design solution, instantiation rule, 
                         [ related patterns ], [ known uses ]; 
     product assurance safety case pattern = 
                         name, product safety case pattern signature, intent,  
                         applicability, problem, argument structure solution, instantiation rule,  
                         [ related patterns ], [ known uses ]; 
In the following definitions, the terms identifier, prose, and documentation are not defined. The term 
identifier is assumed to be an alphanumeric string. The term prose is assumed to represent a sequence 
of words in English that is complete in itself. The term documentation is not defined but is assumed to be 
a combination of prose and some drawing, table or diagram. As mentioned, a terminal symbol (written in 
PT Sans bold font to increase readability) is used to define different syntactical elements. 
                                        name = name( identifier ); 
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Immediately following the section on the naming of a pattern there is section containing an illustration of 
the signature of the pattern. Each basic pattern has a section that defines how the pattern may be 
referenced graphically in a composite pattern. The pattern signatures are defined slightly differently 
depending the kind of pattern defined. 
                     pattern signature = process requirement pattern signature |  
                                                    process solution pattern signature | 
                                                    process safety case pattern signature | 
                                                    product requirement pattern signature | 
                                                    product solution pattern signature | 
                                                    product safety case pattern signature; 
                     process requirement pattern signature =  
      procreqpatternsignature( identifier, [ input ], output );  
                     process solution pattern signature =  
      procsolpatternsignature( identifier, [ input ], output ); 
                     process safety case pattern signature =  
      procsafcasepatternsignature( identifier, [ input ], output ); 
                     product requirement pattern signature =  
      prodreqpatternsignature( identifier, [ input ], output ); 
                     product solution pattern signature =  
      prodsolpatternsignature( identifier, [ input ], output ); 
                     product safety case pattern signature =  
      prodsafcasepatternsignature( identifier, [ input ], output ); 
Each pattern signature identifies the respective input and output parameters of the pattern that is 
defined. 
                                       input = input( { parameter }– ); 
                                     output = output( { parameter }– ); 
A parameter may be one of four different kinds. 
                               parameter = requirement parameter | design parameter | 
                                                   safety case parameter | documentation parameter; 
          requirement parameter = requirementparameter( identifier );  
                   design parameter = designparameter( identifier ); 
           safety case parameter = safetycaseparameter( identifier ); 
      documentation parameter = documentationparameter( identifier ); 
Figure 1 illustrates the translation of the different kinds of pattern signatures as defined by their graphical 
syntax into their corresponding textual syntax. In Figure 1, a term is given to the left followed by an 
example of the graphical syntax of the named element. The right pointing white arrow with a black stroke 
should be interpreted “translates to” and separates the graphical syntax (or example of a graphical 
element) from its textual syntax (described in EBNF).  
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 Figure 1 Pattern Signatures 
The input and output terms in Figure 1 represents parameters separated by comma.  
Figure 2 illustrates the graphical syntax and the corresponding textual syntax of the different kinds of 
parameters.  
 
Figure 2 Different kinds of parameters 
After the definition of the pattern signature, the following sections are presented in a pattern definition: 
                                        intent = intent( documentation ); 
                              applicability = applicability( prose ); 
                                   problem = problem( documentation ); 
Once the problem addressed by a pattern is described, a solution to that problem is defined. Depending 
on the kind of basic pattern defined, the respective solutions are described according to slightly different 
formats. 
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                     process solution = processolution( uml activity diagram, documentation ); 
                      design solution = designsolution( uml diagram, documentation ); 
                     method solution = methodsolution( arbitrary diagram, documentation ); 
   argument structure solution = argstructuresolution( gsn diagram, documentation ); 
          problem frame solution = problemframesolution( problem frames diagram, documentation ); 
In the following, we loosely define the syntax for the different kinds of diagrams that may be used to 
detail the solution part of a pattern. Annotations are added to, e.g., a UML [11] diagram or a GSN [2][9] 
diagram in order to denote how the input and output parameters of a pattern relate to entities in the 
diagrams that illustrate a solution in a pattern.  
                                 diagram = uml activity diagram | uml diagram | arbitrary diagram | 
                                                  gsn diagram | problem frames diagram; 
In the following, the terms uml, gsn, pfd, and illustration are only defined by a reference that may be 
assumed to represent an alphanumeric string that identifies the diagram. The referenced diagram 
however is defined according to the syntax of UML [11], GSN [2], PFD (Problem Frames Diagram) [3][8], 
or some arbitrary format, respectively.  
                               uml activity diagram = umlactivitydiagram( uml, 
                                                                   { input to activity }, { output from activity }– ); 
                                                         uml = uml( reference ); 
                                       input to activity = inputtoactivity( inputparameter, activity ); 
                                output from activity = outputfromactivity( outputparameter, activity ); 
                                       inputparameter = inputparameter( identifier ); 
                                     outputparameter = outputparameter( identifier ); 
                                                    activity = activity( identifier ); 
                                           uml diagram = umldiagram( uml, 
                                                                   { input to entity }, { output from entity } ); 
                                          input to entity = inputtoentity( inputparameter, [ entity ] ); 
                                    output from entity = outputfromentity( outputparameter, [ entity ] ); 
                                                       entity = entity( identifier ); 
                                     arbitrary diagram = arbitrarydiagram( illustration 
                                                                   { input to entity }, { output from entity } ); 
                                                illustration = illustration( reference ); 
                                          gsn diagram = gsndiagram( gsn, 
                                                                   { goal }–, { context }, {undeveloped goal }, { solution } ); 
                                                         gsn = gsn( reference ); 
                                                        goal = goal( identifier ); 
                                                   context = context( identifier ); 
                                  undeveloped goal = undevelopedgoal( identifier ); 
                                                  solution = solution( identifier ); 
                        problem frames diagram = problemframesdiagram( pfd, 
                                                                   { input to machine }–, { input to problem domain },  
                                                                   { input to description }, { input to requirement },  
                                                                   { output from requirement }– ); 
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                                                          pfd = pfd( reference ); 
                                    input to machine = inputtomachine( inputparameter, machine ); 
                        input to problem domain = inputtoproblemdomain( inputparameter, problem domain ); 
                                 input to description = inputtodescription( inputparameter, description ); 
                               input to requirement = inputtorequirement( inputparameter, requirement ); 
                         output from requirement = outputfromrequirement( outputparameter, requirement ); 
                                                  machine = machine( identifier ); 
                                       problemdomain = problemdomain( identifier ); 
                                               description = description( identifier ); 
                                             requirement = requirement( identifier ); 
The diagrams used for illustrating the different concepts presented in SaCS patterns are annotated 
versions of diagrams defined in languages like UML [11], GSN [2], and PFD [8]. We do not define the 
syntax and semantics of every kind of diagram or illustration that may be part of a composite SaCS 
pattern but assume the following: 
• uml activity diagram is a UML [11] activity diagram with the addition of SaCS specific 
annotations. The annotations identify how each input and output parameter of a pattern is 
represented as either an input or an output to the different activities identified in an activity 
diagram. 
• uml diagram is a UML diagram with the addition of SaCS specific annotations. The annotations 
identify how the input and output parameters of a pattern relate to items in a UML diagram, e.g., 
a component, a lifeline, or a class. 
• arbitrary diagram is a diagram in a format that either requires no explanation in order to be 
comprehended, or that is accompanied with a legend or a description, or that is defined in a 
notation that has a defined syntax and semantics. An example of a type of illustration that has its 
own syntax and semantics but addressed by the generic semantic rules of an arbitrary diagram 
is the fault tree diagram [6] used in the pattern named FTA presented in Section 8.3. The SaCS 
specific annotations indicate a relationship between the input and output parameters of a pattern 
and entities illustrated in the diagram. 
• gsn diagram is a diagram defined according to the Goal Structured Notation [2] with the addition 
of SaCS specific annotations. The annotations identify how the input and output parameters of a 
pattern relate to elements in a GSN diagram, e.g., goal, undeveloped goal, solution, and context. 
• problem frames diagram is a diagram described according to the syntax of the problem frames 
notation [8] with the addition of SaCS specific annotations. The annotations identify how the 
input and output parameters of a pattern relate to elements in a problem frames diagram, e.g., 
machine, problem domain, description, and requirement. 
In Figure 3, only the SaCS specific annotations that are used to indicate the relationship between 
parameters and entities in a specific diagram type are exemplified. Input and output parameters of a 
pattern are identified by their name inside a dotted drawn rectangle that are superimposed on a dotted 
drawn frame that surrounds the original illustration. An arrow pointing from a parameter and inwards 
indicates an input parameter; an arrow pointing from within the dotted frame and towards the box placed 
on the frame indicates an output parameter.  
In the case of the uml diagram, and the arbitrary diagram in Figure 3, a diamond is used to represent any 
shape of the original illustration that may be connected to either an input parameter or an output 
parameter and thus does not represent any specific shape.  
In the case of the gsn diagram in Figure 3, inputs and outputs are symbolised by placing GSN specific 
graphical elements on the dotted frame.  
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In order to assure consistency between the specification of a pattern signature and the specification of 
the solution part of a pattern, we define the following constraints with respect to the definition of the 
annotations of diagrams: 
• An input parameter that is indicated in a diagram shall be explicitly denoted as an input 
parameter in the respective pattern signature of a pattern. 
• An output parameter that is indicated in a diagram shall be explicitly denoted as an output 
parameter in the respective pattern signature of a pattern. 
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Figure 3 Annotations to diagrams for indicating relationships to input and output parameters 
There is a relationship between the definitions of input and output parameters in a pattern signature and 
the definitions of input and output parameters in the respective diagrams used to define a solution in a 
pattern. As an example there is a relationship between the definition of a process requirement pattern 
signature and the process solution in the definition of a process assurance requirement pattern. This 
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relationship is not defined in the syntax but captured in the following constraints on the definition of basic 
patterns: 
• The identifier of an input parameter given in the pattern signature section of a pattern should be 
explicitly denoted with the same identifier and an indication on what part of the solution it is 
associated with in the diagram given in the respective solution part of a pattern. 
• The identifier of an output parameter given in the pattern signature section of a pattern should be 
explicitly denoted with the same identifier and an indication on what part of the solution it is 
associated with in the diagram given in the respective solution part of a pattern. 
Once the solution part of a pattern is described, the pattern definition contains a section defining its 
instantiation rule followed by the definition of related patterns and known uses. The related patterns and 
known uses sections are optional. The term pattern identifier is assumed to represent an alphanumeric 
string. 
                     instantiation rule = instantiationrule( { parameter, pattern identifier, { rule }– }– ); 
                                         rule = rule( prose ); 
                      related patterns = relatedpatterns( pattern identifier, prose ); 
                            known uses = knownuses( prose ); 
4. SEMANTICS OF BASIC SACS PATTERNS 
This section describes the semantics of basic SaCS patterns. A basic pattern should be expressed in 
such a way that its semantics is understood from its definition. A pattern definition consists of prose and 
illustrations structured and grouped under a sequence of headings. The names given to headings 
indicate the content of the subsequent part of the pattern definition and it should be possible for a user to 
derive the semantics of the pattern from its different parts. Nevertheless, we provide semantic rules that 
may be systematically applied in order to generate a further explanation in English of the meaning of the 
different elements of a pattern definition. 
A basic pattern is translated into a set of paragraphs in English where each fragment within the pattern 
definition is translated into either a sentence within a paragraph or a paragraph. The semantics is defined 
by a function   that takes fragments of a pattern definition as its input and returns as output its 
translation in English. The semantics of a basic pattern is the semantics of each of the elements that 
defines the patterns.  
         name( identifier )  =  
                  identifier is a generalised solution to the challenges described in the following.  
In the following we define the semantics for the different kinds of pattern signatures. In the definitions, let 
in and out range over parameter. The semantics of the different types of parameters is defined 
immediately below the semantics for the different pattern signatures.  
         procreqpatternsignature( identifier, in1,, inn, out1,, outn )  =  
                  identifier belongs to a category of patterns that addresses challenges appearing in a  
                  development context by defining its solution as a process and by defining requirements for  
                  documenting the results of the process. The pattern requires the input: in1 ,, inn   
                  The pattern delivers the output: out1 ,, outn  
         procsolpatternsignature( identifier, in1,, inn, out1,, outn )  =  
                  identifier belongs to a category of patterns that defines solutions to recurring development  
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                  challenges in the form of a method. The pattern requires the input: in1 ,, inn   
                  The pattern delivers the output: out1 ,, outn  
         procsafcasepatternsignature( identifier, in1,, inn, out1,, outn)  =  
                  identifier belongs to a category of patterns that addresses challenges of demonstrating that  
                  safety objectives are met and defines its solution as a structure of arguments. The 
                  pattern requires the input: in1 ,, inn  The pattern delivers the output: out1 ,, outn  
         prodreqpatternsignature( identifier, in1,, inn, out1,, outn)  =  
                  identifier belongs to a category of patterns that defines a set of abstract requirements and a  
                  problem frames analysis solution as a means to address the challenges of eliciting  
                  requirements for a particular context. The pattern requires the input: in1 ,, inn   
                  The pattern delivers the output: out1 ,, outn  
         prodsolpatternsignature( identifier, out1,, outn)  =  
                  identifier belongs to a category of patterns that defines a design solution as a means to  
                  handle a commonly occurring development challenge. The pattern delivers the output:  
                  out1 ,, outn . 
         prodsafcasepatternsignature( identifier, in1,, inn, out1,, outn )  =  
                  identifier belongs to a category of patterns that addresses challenges of demonstrating that  
                  safety objectives are met and defines its solution as a structure of arguments. The 
                  pattern requires the input: in1 ,, inn  The pattern delivers the output: out1 ,, outn  
The following defines the semantics for the different kinds of parameters: 
            requirementparameter( identifier )  = A set of requirements identifier. 
                     designparameter( identifier )  = A specification of the design of identifier. 
                safetycaseparameter(identifier )  = A safety case element identifier. 
        documentationparameter( identifier )  = A description identifier. 
The following defines the semantics of the intent, applicability, and problem sections of a pattern.  
                   intent( documentation )  = The intent of the pattern is to: documentation 
                        applicability( prose )  = The scenarios for which the pattern typically may be applied are  
                                                                  as follows: prose 
                 problem( documentation)  = The main challenges addressed by the pattern are described in  
                                                                  the following: documentation  
The solution sections of basic patterns are defined slightly different depending on the kind of basic 
pattern that is expressed. The following defines the semantics of the different kinds of solution 
descriptions: 
         processolution( uml activity diagram, documentation )  =  
                                        The process solution is defined by  uml activity diagram  documentation 
         designsolution( uml diagram, documentation )  =  
                                        The solution, defined by  uml diagram  documentation 
         methodsolution( arbitrary diagram, documentation )  =  
                                        The method solution is exemplified by  arbitrary diagram  documentation 
         argstructuresolution( gsn diagram, documentation )  =  
                                        The safety case solution is defined by  gsn diagram  documentation 
         problemframesolution( problem frames diagram, documentation )  =  
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                                         The solution is described as a requirement analysis, defined by  
                                          problem frames diagram  documentation  
The following defines the semantics of the different kinds of annotated diagrams. In the semantics, we do 
not define every mapping rule but the most important ones. In addition, we do not translate the terms 
referred to as uml, gsn, pdf, and illustration as these represent parts of an annotated diagram in SaCS 
that are defined with a syntax and semantics defined elsewhere, e.g., as presented in UML [11], GSN [2], 
and PFD [8]. As an example, a translation of a diagram as in “diagram a” in Figure 3, only the SaCS 
specific annotations will be translated. The remaining UML specific parts of the diagram will only be 
referred in the translation as uml( diagram a) , indicating that the meaning of the referred diagram 
parts that are not translated should be interpreted according the semantics of UML. In the semantics, let 
id( _ ) be a function that takes a uml, gsn, pfd, or illustration element as input and returns the associated 
identifier. 
         umlactivitydiagram( uml, input to activity, output from activity )  =  
                   uml   In id(uml), the following relationships between parameters of the pattern and 
                  activities are defined:  input to activity   output from activity   
         inputtoactivity( input parameter, activity )  =  
                  The instantiation of input parameter  is used for performing the activity . 
         outputfromactivity( output parameter, activity )  =  
                   Performing the activity  produces the output parameter . 
         inputparameter( identifier )  = input identifier 
         outputparameter( identifier )  = output identifier  
         activity( identifier )  = activity identifier 
         umldiagram( uml, input to entity, entity to output )  =  
                  uml  In id(uml), the following relationships between parameters of the pattern and 
                  UML entities are defined: input to entity  entity to output  
         inputtoentity( input parameter, entity )  =  
                  The instantiation of input parameter  is associated with entity . 
         inputtoentity( input parameter )  = input parameter  represents a required input. 
         outputfromentity( outputparameter, entity )  = entity  is associated with output parameter   
         outputfromentity( outputparameter )  = output parameter  represents an instantiation result. 
         entity( identifier )  = identifier 
         arbitrarydiagram( illustration, input to entity, entity to output )  =  
                  illustration . In id(illustration), the following relationship between parameters of the pattern 
                  and the elements in the illustration are defined: input to entity   entity to output  
         gsndiagram( gsn, goal, context, undeveloped goal, solution )  =  
                  gsn . In id(gsn), the following elements represent the parameters of the pattern: 
                  goal  context undeveloped goal  solution  
         goal( identifier )  =  
                  identifier represents an output of the pattern once instantiated. 
         context( identifier )  =  
                  identifier represents an input that describes the context of  
                  the associated element in the diagram. 
         undevelopedgoal( identifier )  =  
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                  identifier represents an output that needs to be instantiated and further  
                  developed. 
         solution( identifier )  =  
                  identifier represents an input required to be provided for supporting the claim described by the  
                  associated element in the diagram. 
         problemframesdiagram( pfd, input to machine, input to problem domain, input to description,  
                                                                 input to requirement, output to requirement )  =  
                  pfd  In id(pfd), the following relationships between parameters of the pattern and 
                   entities in the diagram are defined:  input to machine  input to problem domain   
                  input to description  input to requirement  output from requirement  
         inputtomachine( input parameter, machine )  = 
                  The instantiation of input parameter  is associated with the machine . 
         inputtoproblemdomain( input parameter, problem domain )  = 
                  The instantiation of input parameter  is associated with the problem domain . 
         inputtodescription( input parameter, description )  =  
                  The instantiation of input parameter  is associated with the description . 
         inputtorequirement( input parameter, requirement )  =  
                  The instantiation of input parameter  is associated with the requirement . 
         outputfromrequirement( output parameter, requirement )  = 
                  The instantiation of the requirement  is associated with output parameter . 
         machine( identifier )  = machine named identifier 
         problemdomain( identifier )  = problem domain named identifier 
         description( identifier )  = description named identifier 
         requirement( identifier )  = requirement named identifier 
The following describes the semantics for instantiation rule, related patterns, and known uses. 
         instantiationrule( parameter, pattern identifier, rule1,, rulen )  =  
                                         The pattern pattern identifier is instantiated by instantiating the  
                                         output parameter according to the following rules: rule1,, rulen 
         relatedpatterns( pattern identifier, prose )  =  
                                         The following describes patterns that are closely related to  
                                         pattern identifier: prose 
         knownuses( prose )  =  
                                         The following describes known uses of the pattern: prose 
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5. GRAPHICAL SYNTAX OF COMPOSITE SACS PATTERNS 
Figure 4 exemplifies a composite SaCS pattern; the filled arrows and associated text in the figure are 
added for highlighting the different kinds of graphical elements in SaCS. The original composite pattern 
without the added annotations is presented in Section 9.1 along with its semantics.  In the following we 
will explain the different graphical elements that appears in Figure 4 and more for specifying composite 
patterns. 
 
Figure 4 Example Composite Pattern with explanations 
Figure 5 gives an example of how the different graphical elements in SaCS are described in the coming 
sections. In Figure 5, a term representing a naming of a graphical element or a group of elements is 
given to the left followed by an example of the graphical syntax of the named element. The right pointing 
arrow should be interpreted “translates to” and separates the graphical syntax (or example of a graphical 
element) from the textual syntax (described in Extended Backus-Naur Form). In the definitions, the term 
identifier is not defined but is assumed to be an alphanumeric string. A terminal symbol (written in PT 
Sans bold font to increase readability) is used to define different types of syntactical elements. 
 
Figure 5 Example – Detailing the syntax of elements 
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5.1 Artefact references 
Figure 6 illustrates the different artefact references that are available in SaCS. When a SaCS pattern is 
instantiated some artefacts may be required as inputs in order to instantiate the pattern, artefacts may 
also be provided as a result of pattern instantiation. The parameters of a pattern indicate what kinds of 
artefacts are required or what artefacts that are provided upon pattern instantiation.  
The following icons are used to identify the different types of artefacts that may be referred to within a 
composite SaCS pattern.  
 
Figure 6 Icons identifying different types of artefacts 
5.2 Parameters 
Figure 7 illustrates the different kinds of parameters that are available in SaCS. In a composite pattern it 
is optional to include an icon symbolising the type of a parameter. The icons are simply smaller versions 
of the icons for symbolising artefact references but in white and placed inside a black circle. An icon is 
placed adjacent to an identifier for a parameter in order to symbolise its type.  
 
Figure 7 Icons for identifying different types of parameters 
Figure 8 illustrates the different annotations that may be added to a parameter when defining a 
composite pattern.  
 
Figure 8 Alias and set annotations 
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The parameter set annotation in Figure 8 is used to denote that the parameters listed inside the curly 
brackets are elements of a set; curly brackets may be omitted when the set contains only one element.  
The parameter set alias operator in Figure 8 is right associative; an identifier given to the left of the 
operator represents an alias for any parameter indicated to the right of the operator.  
Figure 9 illustrates the different annotations that may be added to a parameter in order to define whether 
a parameter is either a local parameter or a public parameter and if the parameter is an input or an 
output. In Figure 9 we have assumed that the parameter that is annotated is a documentation parameter.   
 
Figure 9 Input and output annotations 
A parameter that is defined as local is only available within the definition of the composite pattern. A 
parameter that is defined as public is available within the definition of the composite pattern and also 
available externally to a user of the pattern. 
Every parameter associated with a referenced pattern within a definition of a composite pattern is 
assumed to be local unless otherwise specified, thus the use of the white arrow with black stroke pointing 
either from or toward a parameter as illustrated in Figure 9 may be omitted. 
5.3 Pattern references 
Figure 10, Figure 11, and Figure 12 illustrate the different kinds of pattern references available in SaCS. 
There are seven different kinds of pattern references, six for referencing basic SaCS patterns (Figure 10 
and Figure 11) and the seventh for referencing composite patterns (Figure 12).  
Figure 10 illustrates the three different types of process assurance patterns references that may be used 
within a composite SaCS pattern. 
	

	

		

		


	
	

	






	
	

	


	
	

	


	
	

	


HWR-1052 
- 17 - 
 
 
Figure 10 Icons for referencing different process assurance patterns 
Figure 11 illustrates the three different types of product assurance patterns references that may be used 
within a composite SaCS pattern. 
 
Figure 11 Icons for referencing different product assurance patterns 
Figure 12 illustrates a composite pattern reference.  
   
Figure 12 Icon for referencing composite patterns 
Figure 13 exemplifies the use of the pattern group reference where a group of patterns is identified by 
the individual identifiers of each member of the group. 
 
Figure 13 A pattern group reference 
5.4 Relations 
Figure 14 illustrates the different relations that are defined in SaCS. The instantiates relation is used to 
model a relationship between an artefact and a parameter, the remaining relations model a relationship 
between patterns in the form of a relationship between the respective parameters of the related patterns.  
In Figure 14 we have assumed the existence of two composite patterns, named A and B, respectively, 
that are combined with a relation operator. We have assumed in each scenario that pattern A has a 
parameter a, and that pattern B has a parameter b. 
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Input and output parameters are always listed inside square brackets and placed adjacent to the 
belonging pattern. A comma is used as a separator when there is more than one parameter. The 
parameters of a pattern are always assumed to be local (local input parameter or local output parameter) 
in a relation unless otherwise specified. In a relation, there is no need to visualise whether a parameter is 
an input or an output as this is implied by the different relation types (see Section 6.4).  
 
Figure 14 Graphical elements for symbolising relations 
In a relation between patterns as illustrated in Figure 14, the relation operates on the parameters of the 
respective patterns. A relation between patterns may operate on multiple parameters; by a list matching 
of the respective parameter lists belonging to the patterns that are related.  
Figure 15 exemplifies the translation of a relation where patterns have multiple parameters. In the 
relation illustrated topmost in Figure 15, a shall be assigned to b, and aa shall be assigned to bb. In the 
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relation illustrated at the bottom of Figure 15, a shall be assigned to b, aa shall be assigned to bb, and 
aaa shall be assigned to bbb. In addition, the icons for symbolising the type of a parameter are omitted in 
the illustration at the bottom of Figure 15 in order to simplify the illustration. 
 
Figure 15 Parameter matching in relations 
The instantiates relation is used to associate an artefact and a parameter and indicates that the artefact 
instantiates the parameter.  
The assigns relation is used to denote that an output parameter of a pattern is assigned to an input 
parameter of a related pattern. The arrow always points towards the input parameter. 
The combines relation is used to denote that the outputs of two or more patterns are combined in a 
union, the result is a set that comprises all outputs. A list (indicated by [ _ ]) placed adjacent to the icon 
symbolising the relation denotes the result of combining. 
The details relation is used to denote that an output of a pattern is detailed by the output of a related 
pattern. The black box is associated with the output that is detailed; the set of smaller icons is associated 
with the output that details. 
The satisfies relation is used to denote that an output of type requirement parameter of a pattern is 
satisfied by the output of type design parameter of a related pattern. The bullet is associated with the 
output of type requirement parameter that describes what shall be satisfied; the checkmark is associated 
with the output of type design parameter. The relation indicates that the delivered design shall satisfy the 
requirements. 
The demonstrates relation is used to denote that an output of type safety case parameter demonstrates 
safety of the output of type design parameter of a related pattern. The stamp icon is associated with the 
output that provides a safety demonstration; the arrow points towards the design output that is 
demonstrated safe. 
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5.5 Instantiation order 
Figure 16 illustrates the additional guidance that may be given in a composite pattern on visualising the 
intended instantiation order of patterns. The intended instantiation order of patterns is visualised by 
superimposing pattern references on top of a grey arrow. The direction of the arrow indicates the pattern 
instantiation order, patterns placed closer to the starting point of the arrow are instantiated prior to 
patterns placed close to the tip of the arrow. Patterns may have no specific order; this is visualised as a 
parallel instantiation. 
 
Figure 16 Illustrating the pattern instantiation order 
In the example of the serial instantiation, two composite pattern references named A and B are 
superimposed in a sequence on a grey arrow indicating that A should be instantiated before B. 
In the example of the parallel instantiation, each of the two composite pattern references A and B are 
superimposed on top of a grey arrow where the two arrows are separate, indicating that A and B may be 
instantiated in parallel. 
5.6 Composite SaCS patterns 
Figure 17 illustrates the declaration of a composite SaCS pattern. A composite pattern consists of a 
declaration followed by a specification of its content (see Figure 4). The declaration is recognised by an 
icon similar (but larger) to the one in a composite pattern reference. A line at the bottom of the 
declaration denotes the end of the declaration, the content of the composite is visualised below the line. 
 
Figure 17 Example of a composite pattern declaration 
The content of a composite pattern consists of a description of a combination of patterns by the use of 
the different graphical elements described in this section as well as the preceding sections (e.g., pattern 
references, parameters, artefacts references, and relations).  
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Figure 18 exemplifies how patterns that act within a composite pattern may be declared. In Figure 18 we 
have assumed the existence of a composite pattern named P in different scenarios where P is 
associated with different kinds of parameters (that are either input or output, and either local or public) 
named x and y.  
The parameters of a pattern are visualised by enclosing parameter identifiers within square brackets that 
are placed adjacent to the respective pattern. The square brackets symbolise a list of parameters. The 
parameters are separated by comma.  
In Figure 18 we use a short hand notation (see Figure 9) for illustrating that the parameters of a pattern 
are defined as local or public and if the parameters are defined as input or output. An arrow without a 
bend points either towards (indicating inputs) or from (indicating output) a list of parameters (the square 
brackets indicate a list, the identifiers inside the square brackets represent names of parameters).  
 
Figure 18 Contained pattern declaration examples 
A black arrow symbolises that the parameters in the list are public and thus available as parameters of 
the composite that is defined. The white arrow with black stroke symbolises that the parameters in the list 
are only locally available within the composite that is defined. 
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6. TEXTUAL SYNTAX OF COMPOSITE SACS PATTERNS 
This section defines the general textual syntax of composite SaCS patterns. The syntax is described by 
the use of EBNF (Extended Backus-Naur Form). In the definitions, the term identifier is not defined but is 
assumed to be an alphanumeric string. A terminal symbol (written in PT Sans bold font to increase 
readability) is used to define different types of syntactical elements.  
6.1 Artefact references 
A pattern in SaCS has parameters of different types, representing either the input to be provided when 
instantiating a pattern or an output provided upon pattern instantiation. An instantiation of a parameter is 
represented as an artefact. It is assumed that an identifier may uniquely identify a specific artefact, the 
concrete artefact may then be found by using the identifier given in a diagram as a key. A reference to 
different types of development artefacts may be given as follows:  
      requirement artefact reference = requirementartefactreference( identifier ); 
               design artefact reference = designartefactreference( identifier ); 
       safety case artefact reference = safetycaseartefactreference( identifier ); 
 documentation artefact reference = documentationartefactreference( identifier ); 
The following term is used to denote a classifier for the different types of artefact references and is 
defined as follows: 
          artefact reference = requirement artefact reference | design artefact reference 
                                                            safety case artefact reference | documentation artefact reference; 
6.2 Parameters 
A pattern in SaCS has parameters of different types. The identifier and type of a parameter is found in 
each pattern definition. The syntax for referring to the different types of parameters of a pattern are as 
follows: 
                         requirement parameter = requirementparameter( identifier ); 
                                  design parameter = designparameter( identifier ); 
                          safety case parameter = safetycaseparameter( identifier ); 
                     documentation parameter = documentationparameter( identifier );  
The following term is used to denote a classifier for the different basic types of parameters that are used 
in the definitions of SaCS patterns. 
               basic parameter = design parameter | requirement parameter |  
                                             safety case parameter | documentation parameter; 
When defining a composite SaCS pattern, additional annotations may be used to denote, e.g., an alias 
for a parameter or define a set of parameters. In addition, a parameter may be referred to by its alias. 
                        parameter set alias = parametersetalias( alias, [ parameter set ] ); 
                                parameter set = parameterset( { basic parameter | alias }– );  
                                            alias = alias( identifier ); 
 
                    annotated parameter = parameter set | parameter set alias | alias; 
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A parameter is either an input or an output parameter. However, an input parameter may also act as 
either a local parameter or as a public parameter. A local parameter is only used within the definition of a 
composite pattern and is not externally accessible while a public parameter is externally accessible. 
                   public input parameter = publicinputparameter( basic parameter | annotated parameter ) ; 
                     local input parameter = localinputparameter( basic parameter | annotated parameter ); 
                 public output parameter = publicoutputparameter( basic parameter | annotated parameter  ); 
                   local output parameter = localoutputparameter( basic parameter | annotated parameter ); 
                             input parameter = public input parameter | local input parameter; 
                           output parameter = public output parameter | local output parameter; 
                          parameter = input parameter | output parameter; 
6.3 Pattern references 
The definitions of the syntax for the different types of patterns in SaCS are as follows: 
process assurance requirement pattern reference = procreqpatternreference( identifier ); 
      process assurance solution pattern reference = procsolpatternreference( identifier ); 
process assurance safety case pattern reference = procsafcasepatternreference( identifier ); 
 
product assurance requirement pattern reference = prodreqpatternreference( identifier );  
       product assurance solution pattern reference = prodsolpatternreference( identifier ); 
 product assurance safety case pattern reference = prodsafcasepatternreference( identifier ); 
                                 composite pattern reference = compositepatternreference( identifier ); 
In some cases it is necessary to reference several patterns. In these cases, the group itself is unnamed 
and instead each individual pattern in the group is referenced by its identifier. A pattern group reference 
is defined as: 
      pattern group reference = patterngroupreference( identifier, { indentifier }– ); 
The following restrictions apply to the specification of a group pattern reference: 
• A group pattern reference may only be used in a pattern relation when referencing the 
associated patterns of an output parameter provided from applying the combines relation. A 
combines relation denotes that parameters from two or more patterns are combined, the output 
parameter provided as a result of combining does not have a single pattern reference associated 
with it. Thus, each pattern reference in the combines relation is referenced. 
The following term defines a classifier for the different types of pattern references: 
                                      pattern reference = process assurance requirement pattern reference |  
                                                                     process assurance solution pattern reference |  
                                                                     process assurance safety case pattern reference |  
                                                                     product assurance requirement pattern reference | 
                                                                     product assurance solution pattern reference | 
                                                                     product assurance safety case pattern reference | 
                                                                     composite pattern reference | 
                                                                     pattern group reference; 
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6.4 Relations 
In SaCS a relation may be defined between an artefact and a parameter associated with a pattern, or 
between patterns (more specifically between the parameters of the respective patterns that are related). 
The following defines the syntax of the instantiates relation that is used to express that an artefact is an 
instantiation of a parameter: 
                  instantiates = instantiates( artefact reference, parameter ); 
The following restrictions apply to the specification of an instantiates relation: 
• The type of the artefact and the type of the parameter that the artefact is said to instantiate shall 
be the same. 
A relation between two patterns operates on the parameters of the respective referenced patterns that 
are related. A pattern input is defined as a pattern reference followed by one or more input parameters. A 
pattern output is defined as a pattern reference followed by one or more output parameters. 
                    pattern input  = pattern reference, { input parameter }–; 
                   pattern output = pattern reference ,{ output parameter }–; 
In a relation between patterns, the parameters of the pattern that represents a source in the relation are 
matched (by list matching) with the parameters of the pattern that represents a target in the relation.  
      source = pattern output; 
       target = pattern input | pattern output; 
The syntax of the different relations in SaCS are defined as: 
                  assigns = assigns( source, target );  
               combines = combines( source, { source }–, output parameter ); 
                    details = details( source, target ); 
                 satisfies = satisfies( source, target ); 
        demonstrates = demonstrates( source, target ); 
The following term defines a classifier for the different types of pattern relations: 
                           pattern relation = assigns | combines | details | satisfies | demonstrates; 
The following restrictions apply to the specification of an assigns, satisfies, demonstrates, details and a 
combines relation: 
• The source and target of a relation cannot be the same element. 
• A target in an assigns relation is a pattern input; in the remaining relations both source and target 
are pattern output. 
• The parameters of a source that are matched to the parameters of a target in a details relation 
must be of the same type. 
• Each parameter of a source in a satisfies relation is a design parameter; each parameter of a 
target in a satisfies relation is a requirement parameter. 
• Each parameter of a source in a demonstrates relation is a safety case parameter; each 
parameter of a target in a demonstrates relation is a design parameter. 
• Every parameter within every source in a combines relation must be of the same type and are 
combined into a parameter set that represents the result of combining.  
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• The output parameter in a combines relation represents a parameter set or a parameter set alias 
that is defined with either local or public accessibility (defined as either a local output parameter 
or a public output parameter).  
6.5 Instantiation order 
A composite pattern may define the intended instantiation order of contained patterns. The instantiation 
order of patterns in a set of patterns is described by partial orders among the patterns. The following 
gives the syntax for describing a serial and parallel instantiation order between a pair of patterns.  
               instantiation order = serial instantiation | parallel instantiation; 
                          serial instantiation = serialinstantiation( pattern reference, pattern reference ); 
                       parallel instantiation = parallelinstantiation( pattern reference, pattern reference ); 
The following constraints are associated with the definition of an instantiation order: 
• A serial instantiation order indicates a serial sequence of instantiating patterns, the first pattern 
that is listed in the syntax is assumed to precede the second pattern that is listed.  
• A parallel instantiation order indicates that patterns is not required to be performed in any 
sequence thus it does not matter in which order patterns are listed in the syntax. 
6.6 Composite SaCS patterns 
A composite pattern diagram may be said to be composed of a declaration and its content. In the 
declaration, an identifier gives the name of the pattern that is defined in addition to a list of the inputs and 
outputs of the composite and information on its instantiation. The content part of the pattern consists of a 
set of pattern references, relations, as well as the intended instantiation order of the contained patterns. 
 composite pattern = declaration, content; 
            declaration = declaration( identifier, { input parameter }, 
                                   { output parameter }, { instantiates } ); 
                 content = content( identifier, { contained pattern declaration }–,  
                                   { pattern relation }, { pattern instantiation order } ); 
 contained pattern declaration = containedpatterndeclaration( 
                                                     pattern reference, { input parameter },  
                                                     { output parameter }, { instantiates }  ); 
The following restrictions apply to the definition of input parameter and output parameter in the 
declaration part of a composite: 
• Every input parameter to a composite is a public input parameter and is uniquely defined in the 
declaration. 
• Every output parameter of a composite is a public output parameter and is uniquely defined in 
the declaration. 
• A one-to-many relationship exists between a parameter defined as input parameter in the 
declaration of a composite and any similarly named public input parameter in the content part of 
the composite. The modelling of the instantiation of an input parameter in the declaration of a 
composite implies that every similarly named public input parameter contained in the composite 
is similarly instantiated.  
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• A one-to-one relationship is implied between a parameter defined as output parameter in the 
declaration of a composite and a similarly named public output parameter in the content part of 
the composite. 
7. SEMANTICS OF COMPOSITE SACS PATTERNS 
This section describes the semantics of composite SaCS patterns. The semantics is a systematic 
translation of a SaCS composite pattern diagram into English. A composite pattern diagram is translated 
into a paragraph in English where each fragment within the diagram is translated into a sentence or a 
paragraph. 
The semantics is defined by functions  _   that takes diagrams and fragments of diagrams expressed 
by their textual syntax as inputs and return the associated English translation. 
7.1 Artefact reference 
In the definitions of the semantics of the different types of artefacts, let id range over identifier. 
                 requirementartefactreference( id )  = the requirements id 
                          designartefactreference( id )  = the design id 
                    safetycaseartefactreference( id )  = the safety case id 
             documentationartefactreference( id )  = the description id 
7.2 Parameters 
In the semantics of the different kinds of basic parameters in SaCS, let id range over identifier. 
                      requirementparameter( id )  = a set of requirements id  
                               designparameter( id )  = a design specification id 
                         safetycaseparameter( id )  = a safety case specification id  
                  documentationparameter( id )  = a description id 
In the semantics of parameter set alias let al range over alias, ps range over parameter set, and id range 
over identifier. 
                               parametersetalias( al )  = the set named al  
                         parametersetalias( al, ps )  = al  (alias for ps ) 
                                                   alias( id )  = id 
In the semantics of parameter set, let prm range over basic parameter and alias, let id( _ ) be a function 
that takes a basic parameter or an alias as input and deliver the associated identifier as output.  
                           parameterset( prm )  = id( prm ) 
            parameterset( prm1,, prmn )  = the set consisting of id( prm1 ),, and id( prmn ) 
In the semantics for input and output parameters, let p range over basic parameter and annotated 
parameter.  Let id( _ ) be a function that takes a basic parameter or an annotated parameter as input and 
returns its associated identifier. In the case where an input is defined as a parameter set alias, the 
function id( _ ) returns the semantics of the parameter set alias. 
                          publicinputparameter( p )  = id(p) (public) 
                            localinputparameter( p )  = id(p) (local) 
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                        publicoutputparameter( p )  = id(p) (public) 
                          localoutputparameter( p )  = id(p) (local) 
7.3 Pattern references 
In the definitions of the semantics of the different types of pattern references, let id range over identifier. 
                       procreqpatternreference( id )  = the process pattern id 
                        procsolpatternreference( id )  = the method pattern id 
                 procsafcasepatternreference( id )  = the safety case pattern id 
 
                     prodreqpatternreference( id )  = the requirements pattern id  
                      prodsolpatternreference( id )  = the design pattern id 
              prodssafcasepatternreference( id )  = the safety case pattern id 
 
                  compositepatternreference( id )  = the composite pattern id 
             patterngroupreference( id1,, idn )  = the patterns id1,, and idn 
7.4 Relations 
In the definition of the semantics for the instantiates relations let ar range over artefact reference 
(semantics of artefact references described in Section 7.1) and p range over parameter (semantics of 
parameters described in Section 7.2).  
                instantiates( ar, p)  = ar  represents id( p ) 
In the definition of the semantics for the assigns relation let pr range over pattern reference and p range 
over parameter. 
                 assigns ( pr1, p1, pr2, p2 )  =  
                             idp1 ) is assigned to id( p2 ) where:  
                             idp1 ) is the output of pr1 .  
                             idp2 ) is input to pr2 . 
                 assigns ( pr1, p11, , p1n, pr2, p21,, p2n )  =   
                             idp11 ) is assigned to id( p21 ),,  
                             idp1n ) is assigned to id( p2n ) where:  
                             idp11 ),, idp1n ) are outputs from pr1 .  
                             idp21 ),, idp2n ) are inputs to pr2 . 
In the semantics of the combines relation let pr range over pattern reference, p and op range over output 
parameter. 
                 combines(pr1, p1, pr2, p2,,  prn, pn, op )  =  
                             idp1 ),, and id( pn ) are combined in a union where:  
                             idp1 ) is the output from pr1 .  
                             idp2 ) is the output from pr2 . 
                                                  
                             idpn ) is the output from prn .  
                             The result of combining is represented by op . 
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                 combines( pr1, p11,, p1n, pr2, p21,, p2n,, prm, pm1,, pmn, op )  =  
                             idp11 ),, idp1n ), idp21 ) ,, idp2n ),, and id( pmn ) are  
                             combined in a union where:  
                             idp11 ),, idp1n ) are the outputs from pr1 .  
                             idp21 ),, idp2n ) are the outputs from pr2 . 
                                                  
                             idpm1 ),, idpmn ) are the outputs from prm .  
                             The result of combining is represented by op . 
In the semantics of the details relation let pr range over pattern reference and p range over parameter. 
                details( pr1, p1, pr2, p2 )  =  
                             idp1 ) is required to detail id( pr2 ) where:  
                             idp1 ) is the output from pr1 .  
                             idp2 ) is the output from pr2 . 
                details( pr1, p11,, p1n, pr2, p21,, p2n )  =  
                             idp11 ) is required to detail id( p21 ),, idp1n ) is required to satisfy id( p2n ) where:  
                             idp11 ),, idp1n ) are the outputs from pr1 .  
                             idp21 ),, idp2n ) are the outputs from pr2 . 
In the semantics of the satisfies relation let pr range over pattern reference and p range over parameter. 
                satisfies( pr1, p1, pr2, p2 )  =   
                             idp1 ) is required to satisfy the requirements defined by id( pr2 ) where:  
                             idp1 ) is the output from pr1 . idp2 ) is the output from pr2 . 
                satisfies( pr1, p11,, p1n, pr2, p21,, p2n )  =  
                             idp11 ) is required to satisfy the requirements defined by id( p21 ),,  
                             idp1n ) is required to satisfy the requirements defined by id( p2n ) where:  
                             idp11 ),, idp1n ) are the outputs from pr1 .  
                             idp21 ),, idp2n ) are the outputs from pr2 . 
In the semantics of the demonstrates relation let pr range over pattern reference and p range over 
parameter. 
                demonstrates( pr1, p1, pr2, p2 )  =   
                             idp1 ) is required to demonstrate safety of id( pr2 ) where:  
                             idp1 ) is the output from pr1 . idp2 ) is the output from pr2 . 
                 demonstrates( pr1, p11,, p1n, pr2, p21,, p2n )  = 
                             idp11 ) is required to demonstrate safety of id( p21 ),,  
                             idp1n ) is required to demonstrate safety of id( p2n ) where:  
                             idp11 ),, idp1n ) are the outputs from pr1 .  
                             idp21 ),, idp2n ) are the outputs from pr2 . 
7.5 Instantiation order 
In the semantics of instantiation orders let pr range over pattern reference and let id( _ ) be a function 
that takes a pattern reference as input and returns the identifier of the pattern.  
    serialinstantiation( pr1, pr2 )  = The pattern id( pr1 ) should be instantiated before the pattern id( pr2 ). 
 parallelinstantiation( pr1, pr2 )  = The patterns id( pr1 ) and id( pr2 ) may be instantiated in parallel. 
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7.6 Composite SaCS patterns 
The semantics of a composite pattern is defined by the semantic rules associated with the definition of 
the declaration and the content part of the composite. In the semantics, let ip range over input parameter, 
let op range over output parameter, and let inst range over the relation instantiates. Let param( _ ) be a 
function that takes an input parameter or an output parameter as input and returns the associated basic 
parameter or annotated parameter as output. 
             declaration( identifier, ip1,.., ipn, op1,.., opn, inst1,.., instn ) =  
                       identifier requires the input: param(ip1) , ,  param(ipn)   
                       An assignment of an input of identifier is assigned to every correspondingly named 
                       input with public accessibility of contained patterns. An input with public accessibility 
                       is when introduced in the following demarked “(public)”, otherwise demarked “(local)”. 
                       identifier delivers the output: param(op1) , ,  param(opn)  
                       An output of identifier is delivered when the correspondingly named output, with 
                       public accessibility, is delivered from a contained pattern. An output with public 
                       accessibility is when introduced in the following demarked “(public)”, otherwise demarked  
                       “(local)”. 
                       identifier is instantiated such that: inst1 , , instn  
In the semantics of the content part of a composite pattern, let cpd range over contained pattern 
declaration, r range over pattern relation, and io range over instantiation order. 
             content( identifier, cpd1,, cpdn, r1,, rn, io1,, ion )  =  
                       identifier contains the patterns id(cpd1),, and id(cpdn). cpd1 , , cpdn . 
                       r1 , , rn . identifier defines the following order for instantiating patterns:  
                       io1 , , ion . 
In the semantics of contained pattern declaration, let pr range over pattern reference, ip range over input 
parameter, op range over output parameter, and inst range over the relation instantiates.  
             containedpatterndeclaration( pr, op )  =  
                        op  is the output of pr . 
             containedpatterndeclaration( pr, op1,.., opn )  =  
                        op1 ,, opn  are the outputs of pr . 
             containedpatterndeclaration( pr, ip, op )  =  
                        op  is the output of pr  when applied to ip . 
             containedpatterndeclaration( pr, ip1,.., ipn, , op )  =  
                        op  is the output of pr  when applied to ip1 ,.., and ipn . 
             containedpatterndeclaration( pr, ip1,.., ipn, op1,.., opn )  =  
                        op1 ,, opn  are the outputs of pr  when applied to ip1 ,, and ipn  
             containedpatterndeclaration( pr, ip1,.., ipn, , op1,.., opn, inst1,.., instn)  =  
                        containedpatterndeclaration( pr, ip1,.., ipn, , op1,.., opn )  
                        id(pr) is instantiated such that: inst1   instn . 
  
HWR-1052 
- 30 - 
 
8. EXAMPLE TRANSLATIONS OF BASIC PATTERNS 
In this section we exemplify the translation of basic SaCS patterns, one from each of the six different 
kinds of basic patterns according to the categorisation described in [4] and [5]. Similar kinds of basic 
patterns are expressed according to the same format. As the rules for translating patterns are generic 
with minor differences between patterns from different categories we find it sufficient to exemplify the 
translation on six of the twenty-six basic SaCS patterns that is defined such that a pattern from each of 
the six categories is represented.  
In each example translation we detail in separate sub-sections:  
• the original pattern definition;  
• the pattern expressed by its textual syntax;  
• the semantics of the pattern as provided by the semantic rules given in Section 4. 
A pattern definition is translated into its textual syntax and further into its semantics section by section 
from start to end.  
We have formatted the presentation of the textual syntax slightly in order to increase readability. The 
sentences and paragraphs found in a pattern definition are written in italics. Whenever the symbols “” 
are found in the specification of a pattern by its textual syntax or in the translation, the text is shortened in 
order to avoid unnecessary repetition of text. The full text is provided in the original pattern definition. 
In the translations, text in italics is extractions from the pattern definition and non-italics text is generated 
from the semantic rules. The translated text is slightly formatted for increased readability. 
8.1 Example 1: Establish System Safety Requirements 
8.1.1 Pattern definition 
Name: Establish System Safety Requirements 
Pattern Signature: Establish System Safety Requirements is defined with the signature illustrated in 
Figure 19. 
In Figure 19, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the pattern: 
• ToA is short for Target of Assessment. 
• Reg is short for Regulations. 
• Risks is not abbreviated but represents the documentation of the risks associated with the 
application of ToA in its intended context. 
• Req is short for Requirements. 
 
Figure 19 Establish System Safety Requirements Pattern Signature 
Intent: Support the specification of system safety requirements Req on the basis of a risk-based 
approach. The safety requirements describe the required measures to be satisfied by the system ToA 
such that if satisfied assure the necessary safety integrity. The general approach for defining safety 
requirements is to define these on the basis of the result of a risk assessment Risks, especially the 
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mitigations identified as means to reduce risk to an acceptable level. The pattern describes the general 
process of addressing relevant aspects of the system that must be resolved in order to assure safety and 
how to capture this in the form of requirements. 
Applicability: The Establish System Safety Requirements pattern is intended for the following situations: 
• When the system under construction may negatively affect the overall system safety. 
• When there are identified measures that suitably mitigate identified risks and thus provide input 
to the specification of safety requirements. 
Problem: The main aspects relevant to establishing the safety requirements are: 
• Characteristics: To define requirements that require certain system characteristics to be satisfied 
such that the occurrence of unwanted events are minimised or avoided. 
• Functions: To define requirements that require certain safety functions to be satisfied in order 
assure safe operations. 
• Constraints: To define requirements that require certain functional constrains to be satisfied in 
order to delimit potentially hazardous operations. 
• Environment: To define requirements that require certain operational environment aspects to be 
fulfilled in order to assure conditions for safe operations. 
• Compliance: To define the requirements that are required to be satisfied in order to comply with 
laws, regulation and standards, as a minimum the mandatory requirements related to assurance 
of safety. These requirements may involve requirements for e.g. applying some specific 
development process, perform certain activities, or make use of specific technique. 
Process Solution: Figure 20 illustrates the Establish System Safety Requirements process annotated in 
a UML activity diagram. 
 
 
Figure 20 Establish System Safety Requirements – Process Flow 
The input parameters associated with the activity diagram may be interpreted as follows: 
• ToA (Target of Assessment): represents the target system for which safety requirements should 
be established. 
Document safety 
requirements
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Risks
Establish safety 
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Establish safety 
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quantitative safety requirements
Confer laws, regulations, 
and standards
Confer risk analysis 
regulatory specific
risk reducing measures
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• Reg (Regulations): represents any source of information describing mandatory or recommended 
practices (e.g. as provided in laws, regulations or standards) valuable for identifying risk reducing 
measures. 
• Risks: represents risks associated with the target system. 
The main activities serve the following purpose: 
• Identify target: the intent of the activity is to identify ToA. The description of the target should as a 
minimum include a definition of the system and its boundaries, its operational profile, functional 
requirements, and safety integrity requirements. 
• Confer laws, regulations, and standards: the intent of the activity is to capture all relevant data 
(data on requirements for risk reducing measures) from relevant sources (normative references) 
in order to outline the set of risk reducing measures that shall be met by compliance. Each 
source is inspected in order to identify, as a minimum, the mandatory risk reducing measures 
that shall be met in order to be compliant. 
• Confer risk analysis: the intent of the activity is to capture all relevant data on risk analysis of the 
system that is under construction in order to outline the system specific risk reducing measure 
that shall be met. 
• Establish safety requirements qualitatively: the intent of the activity is to define safety 
requirements on the basis of those identified risk-reducing measures required applied, and which 
may be demonstrated fulfilled qualitatively. 
• Establish safety requirements quantitatively: the intent of the activity is to define safety 
requirements on the basis of those identified risk-reducing measures required applied, and which 
may be demonstrated fulfilled quantitatively. 
• Document safety requirements: the intent of the activity is to detail all relevant information with 
respect to the specification of requirements in a system safety requirements specification. For 
each requirement defined in the requirement specification, information detailing what influenced 
its definition should be provided, e.g., the associated risks that are addressed, assumptions, 
calculations, and justifications.  
Instantiation Rule: An artefact Req (see Figure 20 and Figure 19) is the result of a process that 
instantiates the Establish System Safety Requirements pattern if: 
• Req is a set of requirements. 
• Req is defined as a result of applying a process as illustrated in Figure 20 and described by the 
guidance provided in Section “Process Solution”. The process is initiated by an activity on 
describing the target ToA. Once a description of the target system and its operational context is 
provided, the next activities shall identify the risk reducing measures to be applied to the target 
by conferring relevant laws, regulations and standards as well as the result of target specific risk 
analysis for guidance. Once all relevant risk-reducing measures are identified, these shall be 
used as a basis to define the requirements to be met by the target system or by the process 
applied for developing the target. The requirements are defined quantitatively or qualitatively 
depending on the nature of the risk reducing measure that is addressed. The requirements are 
documented in a requirement specification Req.  
• Every requirement of Req is traceable to the risks (identified by the instantiation of Risks), and/or 
regulatory requirements (identified by the instantiation of Reg) it addresses. 
• Every requirement of Req is justified such that any assumptions, calculations, and assessments 
that support the specification of the requirement as a safety requirement are provided. 
Related Patterns: The Establish System Safety Requirements pattern is related to other patterns in the 
following manner: 
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• May succeed the Risk Analysis pattern that supports identifying risks. The Establish System 
Safety Requirements may be successively applied as support for defining the requirements to be 
fulfilled in order to reduce risk to an acceptable risk level. 
• May be used in order to detail requirements for the design provided upon instantiation of a 
design pattern. 
8.1.2 Textual syntax 
name( Establish System Safety Requirements ) 
procreqpatternsignature( 
  Establish System Safety Requirements 
  input(  
   documentationparameter( ToA ) 
  documentationparameter( Reg ) 
  documentationparameter( Risks ) 
  ) 
 output( requirementparameter( Req ) ) 
 ) 
intent( Support the specification of system safety requirements on the basis of a ) 
applicability( The Establish System Safety Requirements pattern is intended for ) 
problem( The main aspects relevant to establishing the safety requirements are: ) 
processolution( 
  umlactivitydiagram(  
   uml( Establish System Safety Requirements – Process Flow ) 
   inputtoactivity( 
    inputparameter( ToA ) 
    activity( Identify target ) 
   ) 
   inputtoactivity( 
    inputparameter( Reg ) 
    activity( Confer laws, regulations, and standards ) 
   ) 
   inputtoactivity( 
    inputparameter( Risks ) 
    activity( Confer risk analysis ) 
   ) 
   outputfromactivity( 
    outputparameter( Req ) 
    activity( Document safety requirements ) 
   ) 
  )  
  The input parameters associated with the activity 
  The main activities serve the following purpose 
) 
instantiationrule(  
  requirementparameter( Req )  
  Establish System Safety Requirements 
  rule( Req is a set of requirements ) 
 rule( Req is defined as a result of applying a process as illustrated in Figure 20 and ) 
  rule( Every requirement of Req is traceable to ) 
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 rule( Every requirement of Req is justified... ) 
) 
relatedpatterns(  
  Establish System Safety Requirements  
  The Establish System Safety Requirements pattern is related to  
) 
8.1.3 Translation 
Establish System Safety Requirements is a generalised solution to the challenges described in the 
following. Establish System Safety Requirements belongs to a category of patterns that addresses 
challenges appearing in a development context by defining its solution as a process and by defining 
requirements for documenting the results of the process.  
The pattern requires the input: 
• A description ToA. 
• A description Req. 
• A description Risks. 
The pattern delivers the output: 
• A set of requirements Req. 
The intent of the pattern is to: Support the specification of system safety requirements on the basis of a 
The scenarios for which the pattern typically may be applied are as follows: The Establish System Safety 
Requirements pattern is intended for 
The main challenges addressed by the pattern are described in the following: 
The main aspects relevant to establishing the safety requirements are: 
The process solution is defined by uml( Establish System Safety Requirements – Process Flow ) . In 
Establish System Safety Requirements – Process Flow, the following relationships between parameters 
of the pattern and activities are defined: 
• The instantiation of input ToA is used for performing the activity Identify target. 
• The instantiation of input Reg is used for performing the activity Confer laws, regulations, and 
standards. 
• The instantiation of input Risks is used for performing the activity Confer risk analysis. 
• Performing the activity Document safety requirements produces the output Req. 
The input parameters associated with the activity 
The main activities serve the following purpose 
The pattern Establish System Safety Requirements is instantiated by generating the output Req in 
accordance with the following rules: 
• Req is a set of requirements. 
• Req is defined as a result of applying a process as illustrated in Figure 20 and 
• Every requirement of Req is traceable to... 
• Every requirement of Req is justified 
The following describes patterns that are closely related to Establish System Safety Requirements: 
• The Establish System Safety Requirements pattern is related to 
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8.2 Example 2: Station Interlocking Requirements 
8.2.1 Pattern definition 
Name: Station Interlocking Requirements 
Pattern Signature: Station Interlocking Requirements is defined with the signature illustrated in Figure 
21. 
In Figure 21, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the pattern: 
• Mch is short for Machine. 
• Req is short for Requirements. 
 
Figure 21 Station Interlocking – Pattern Signature  
Intent: Support eliciting functional requirements Req for an interlock system Mch that shall control the 
appliances of a train station with two or more tracks at the station area. A typical example of a station 
with two tracks is given as an example in Figure 22.
 
Figure 22 Example – Signal layout at a two track station 
Figure 23 illustrates a typical sectioning of the railway tracks of a two-track station. 
 
Figure 23 Example – Track sections and train routes at a two track station 
Applicability: The Station Interlocking Requirements pattern is intended for the following situations: 
	
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• When building or upgrading an interlocking system that shall control the appliances of a station 
with two or more tracks in order to derive the functional requirements for the system. 
Problem: The main aspects relevant for establishing functional requirements for the interlock system 
are: 
• States of appliances: What are the possible states of the different appliances like distant signals, 
main signals and points. 
• System states: What are the possible system states. 
• Transitions: What are the expected transitions between system states. 
• Safety: Is there some system states or transitions that shall never be allowed and that may be 
hazardous (e.g. simultaneous incoming or outgoing traffic or drive through). 
Problem Frame Analysis Solution: Figure 24 illustrates the Station Interlocking Requirements problem 
frames diagram. 
 
Figure 24 Station Interlocking Requirements – Problem Frame Diagram 
The input parameters associated with the problem frame diagram shall be interpreted as: 
• Mch: represents the machine to be constructed or an existing system that is modernised and that 
is responsible for controlling train movements in a safe manner. 
The output expected by instantiation of the pattern is identified as: 
• Req: represents the set of requirements derived on the basis instantiating the pattern according 
to the defined instantiation rule. 
The problem domains that are represented in the problem frame diagram shall be interpreted as: 
• Points: represents any point part of the track layout (e.g. the two points exemplified in Figure 22). 
• Track Sections: represents the different sections of the tracks (e.g. as exemplified in Figure 23). 
• Lights: represents the distant signals and the main signals (e.g. as exemplified in Figure 22).
The Interlock Machine shall assure safe allocation of train routes for trains. There are eight possible train 
routes in the configuration exemplified in Figure 24. A train route may be in two states, we name these 
states Locked (allocated to a train) and Not Locked. The Interlock Machine interacts with the appliances 
represented as problem domains in Figure 24 through the following interfaces in order to secure train 
routes: 
• A: represents the interaction between the Interlock Machine and the Points. The points may be in 
two positions; we name these positions Aligned and Diverging. 
• B: represents the interaction between the Interlock Machine and the Track Sections. A track 
section may be in two states, we name these states Vacant and Occupied. 
• C: represents the interaction between the Interlock Machine and the Lights. We assume here 
that the lights may be in the following states depending on type of signal: 
Interlock
Machine  
Interlock
Regime
Req
Mch

Track 
Sections
A
B
Points
C
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o A distant signal may be in the states: Expect Proceed, Expect Proceed Slow, or Expect 
Stop. 
o A main signal may be in the states: Proceed, Proceed Slow, or Stop. An outbound main 
signal on a diverging track (e.g. mO or mN in Figure 22) may only be in the states Proceed 
Slow and Stop because the train when moving shall only proceed with a limited speed (thus 
the Proceed signal is not provided). 
Requirements for the Interlock Machine may be elicited by instantiating the abstract requirements given 
in Table 1. 
Table 1 Station Interlocking Requirements – Abstract Requirements 
ID Requirement Note on instantiation 
R.1 Mch shall manage train movements along 
the following train routes: train routes 
Identify every train route that is required to be controlled (e.g. AX, 
AY,M, as in Figure 23) and that is part of all train routes 
R.2 Mch may set train route as locked when: 
conditions 
For each train route (e.g. AX in Figure 23): define each condition (e.g. A 
in state Not Locked, X in state Not Locled), part of conditions, which must 
be satisfied in order to lock a train route (assign a train route to a train). 
R.3 Mch shall when train route becomes 
locked signal: signalling 
For each train route define the signalling to be performed once the train 
route is locked 
R.4 Mch shall detect train route as 
commenced when: conditions  
For each train route (e.g. AX in Figure 23): define each condition (e.g. A 
goes to state Occupied), part of conditions which must be satisfied in 
order to detect train route as commenced 
R.5 Mch shall when train route is detected as 
commenced signal: signals 
For each train route (e.g. AX in Figure 23): define the signalling to be 
performed once the train route is detected as commenced (e.g. mA goes 
to state Stop) 
R.6 Mch may only unlock train route when: 
conditions 
For each train route (e.g. AX in Figure 23): define each condition (e.g. A 
goes to state Vacant), part of conditions, which must be satisfied in order 
to unlock a locked train route 
 
Instantiation Rule: An artefact Req (see Figure 24 and Figure 21) is the result of instantiating the 
Station Interlocking Requirements pattern if: 
• Req is a set of requirements. 
• Req is the a result of an analysis, e.g., by the use the problem frames analysis approach as 
outlined in Figure 24 and the guidance provided in Section “Process Solution”, of how a system 
Mch shall operate in order to assure safe train movements at train station. In order to perform the 
analysis, the system Mch must be identified and described, relevant problem domains that 
interact with Mch or in other ways are important for the interlocking scenario addressed must be 
identified and their possible states defined. The objective of the analysis is to define an 
interlocking regime that provides the rules, in the form of requirements Req for Mch, that assures 
the required functionality is provided and such that safety is assured.  
• Every requirement of Req is an instance of an abstract requirement. Abstract requirements are 
defined in column “Requirement” of Table 1. 
• An abstract requirement is instantiated by applying the guidance provided in column “Notes on 
instantiation” described in Table 1. 
• Every requirement of Req is traceable to a unique abstract requirement. 
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• Every requirement of Req describes a property, behaviour or a constraint of the system 
(identified by the instantiation of Mch). 
8.2.2 Textual syntax 
name( Station Interlocking Requirements) 
prodreqpatternsignature( 
  Station Interlocking Requirements 
  input( documentationparameter( Mch ) ) 
 output( requirementparameter( Req ) ) 
 ) 
intent( Support eliciting functional requirements for an interlock system that shall ) 
applicability( The Station Interlocking pattern is intended for the following situations  ) 
problem( The main aspects relevant for establishing functional requirements ) 
problemframesolution( 
  problemframesdiagram(  
   pfd( Station Interlocking Requirements – Problem Frame Diagram ) 
   inputtomachine( 
    inputparameter( Mch ) 
    machine( Interlock Machine ) 
   ) 
   outputfromrequirement( 
    outputparameter( Req ) 
    requirement( Interlock Regime ) 
   ) 
  )  
  The input parameters associated with the problem frame 
) 
instantiationrule(  
  requirementparameter( Req )  
  Station Interlocking Requirements 
  rule( Req is a set of requirements ) 
 rule( Req is the a result of an analysis, e.g., by the use the problem frames analysis approach) 
 rule( Every requirement of Req is an instance of an abstract requirement... ) 
  rule( An abstract requirement is instantiated by applying the guidance ) 
 rule( Every requirement of Req is traceable to a unique abstract requirement. ) 
 rule( Every requirement of Req describes a property, behaviour or a constraint... ) 
) 
8.2.3 Translation 
Station Interlocking Requirements is a generalised solution to the challenges described in the following. 
Station Interlocking Requirements belongs to a category of patterns that defines a set of abstract 
requirements and a problem frames analysis solution as a means to address the challenges of eliciting 
requirements for a particular context.  
The pattern requires the input: 
• A description Mch. 
The pattern delivers the output: 
• A set of requirements Req. 
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The intent of the pattern is to: Support eliciting functional requirements for an interlock system that 
shall 
The scenarios for which the pattern typically may be applied are as follows: The Station Interlocking 
Requirements pattern is intended for the following situations  
The main challenges addressed by the pattern are described in the following: The main aspects relevant 
for establishing functional requirements 
The solution is described as a requirement analysis, defined by pfd( Station Interlocking Requirements 
– Problem Frame Diagram) . In Station Interlocking Requirements – Problem Frame Diagram, the 
following relationships between parameters of the pattern and entities in the diagram are defined: 
• The instantiation of input Mch is associated with the machine named Interlock Machine 
• The instantiation of the requirement named Interlock Regime is associated with output Req 
The input parameters associated with the problem frame 
The pattern Station Interlocking is instantiated by instantiating the output Req according to the following 
rules: 
• Req is a set of requirements. 
• Req is the a result of an analysis, e.g., by the use the problem frames analysis approach 
• Every requirement of Req is an instance of an abstract requirement...  
• An abstract requirement is instantiated by applying the guidance 
• Every requirement of Req is traceable to a unique abstract requirement. 
• Every requirement of Req describes a property, behaviour or a constraint... 
8.3 Example 3: FTA 
8.3.1 Pattern definition 
Name: FTA (Fault Tree Analysis) 
Pattern Signature: FTA is defined with the signature illustrated in Figure 25. 
In Figure 25, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the pattern: 
• ToA is short for Target of Assessment. 
• UE is short for Unwanted Event. 
• FT is short for Fault Tree 
 
Figure 25 Pattern Signature – FTA 
Intent: Support a systematic and deductive assessment of the potential causes of identified unwanted 
events UE of a target ToA. The pattern describes the fault tree analysis method and provides guidance 
on its application. A fault tree FT is expressed as a tree where the root of the tree denotes the unwanted 
event UE (e.g. representing a system hazard) that is analysed and leaf nodes denotes basic events (e.g. 
system component failure modes) that may lead to the unwanted event. The primary goal is to identify 
minimal cut sets by the use of the tree structure. A cut set expresses a set of basic events such that if 
these are present at the same time, the unwanted event will occur. A minimal cut set expresses the 
minimal set of basic events that may lead to an unwanted event. 
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Applicability: The FTA pattern is intended for the following situations: 
• As a means to deduce potential causes of unwanted events. 
• As a means to identify combinations of faults that may lead to unwanted events. 
• As a means to analyse system concepts, simple systems or complex systems. 
Problem: The main challenges associated with methods for assessment of the potential causes of an 
unwanted event are: 
• Efficiency: To support efficient application with minimal use of resources. 
• Logical: To support a logical specification of the dependencies between an unwanted event that 
is investigated and the potential causes that is identified through the assessment. 
• Communication: To support communication of results on a form that allows different actors to 
understand findings with minimal effort. 
Method Solution: Figure 26 exemplifies a fault tree and outlines the relationships between a fault tree 
and the inputs and outputs of the FTA pattern.  
 
 
Figure 26 FTA example diagram 
The following steps may apply the FTA method systematically: 
• Step 1 – Define the top event: The intent is to define the top event that represent the root of a 
fault tree and the event that is analysed (UE.Top in Figure 26). 
• Step 2 – Construct fault tree: The intent is to construct the fault tree by deductively constructing 
the tree in a top-down manner by the use of graphical elements symbolising events and gates. 
An unwanted event should state what is the fault/failure under consideration. Gates (e.g. the or 
gate in Figure 26) are used to define the combination of antecedents (e.g. basic event E.1, 
UE.Sub1, or UE.Sub2) that imply the consequent (e.g. UE.Top). Decomposition of an unwanted 
event (e.g. UE.Top) should not be described by connecting a series of gates down to basic 
events, intermediate unwanted events should be defined (e.g. UE.Sub1, and UE.Sub2). Basic 
events answer the how questions by defining how a system component or element may 
experience a fault/failure.  
• Step 3 – Find minimal cut sets: The intent is to deduce from the tree structure the combination of 
basic events that may lead to the top event and arrange these in order. The set with lowest order 
UE
FT
UE.Top
E.1 E.2 E.3 E.4 E.5
UE.Sub2UE.Sub1
Legend
Unwanted Event
Basic Event
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OR gate
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(contains least number of basic events) is most significant. In Figure 26, the event UE.Top 
occurs if event E.1 occurs (minimal cut set of order 1). The top event also occurs if events E.2 
and E.3 occur or if events E.4 and E.5 occur (cut sets of order 2). There are many cut sets of 
order 3, 4, and 5 but these are less significant. 
• Step 4 – Qualitative Analysis: The intent is to analyse the fault tree qualitatively in order identify 
week points of the system with respect to the top event. This may be performed on the basis of 
cut sets. If there exists cut-sets of order 1 then the system is vulnerable to single point of failure. 
If there exists none cut sets of order 1 but the events in the cut sets of order 2 have identical 
characteristics, then the system may be susceptible to common cause failures. 
• Step 5 – Quantitative Analysis: The intent is to calculate the probability of a top event by 
combining probabilities of basic events (given that probabilities of basic events may be 
provided). The probability of UE.Top in Figure 26 may be calculated by a combination of the 
following general rules: 
o The probability of an event A ‘’and’’ an event B is expressed: P(A*B) = P(A) * P(B) 
o The probability of an event A ‘’or’’ an event B is expressed: P(A+B) = P(A) + P(B) – (P(A) * 
P(B)) 
Instantiation Rule: A documentation artefact FT (see Figure 26 and Figure 25) instantiates the FTA 
pattern if: 
• FT is a set of fault trees. 
• Every fault tree of FT is instantiated by applying the guidance provided in Section “Method 
Solution” for all unwanted events (identified by the instantiation of UE). For a specific target ToA, 
this means that every unwanted event UE that represents a suitable top event in the analysis is 
systemically assessed according to the process outlined through Steps 1 to Step 5. 
• Every fault tree of FT is traceable to a unique unwanted event (identified by the instantiation of 
UE). 
• Every fault tree of FT describes the relation between an unwanted event, represented as a top 
node in the tree structure, and potential initiating events (e.g. HW/SW failures) associated with a 
target system (identified by the instantiation of ToA). 
Related Patterns: The FTA pattern is related to other patterns in the following manner: 
• May support Hazard Analysis pattern by providing a method for performing identification of 
potential causes of hazards. 
• May support Risk Analysis pattern by providing a method for performing qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of hazards.  
Known Uses: Fault tree analysis is a commonly applied method within safety critical domains and is 
described in several standards and guidelines, e.g. nuclear domain [NUREG–0492], aerospace 
[ARP4761], and the more general applicable standard [IEC61025]. 
[NUREG–0492] NRC, Fault Tree Handbook, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1981) 
[ARP4761] SAE, Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil 
Airborne Systems and Equipment, Society of Automotive Engineers (1996) 
[IEC61025] IEC, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Edition 2.0, International Electrotechnical Commission 
(2006) 
8.3.2 Textual syntax 
name( FTA ) 
procsolpatternsignature( 
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  FTA 
  input(  
   documentationparameter( ToA ) 
  documentationparameter( UE ) 
  ) 
 output( documentationparameter( FT ) ) 
 ) 
intent( Support a systematic and deductive assessment of the potential causes ) 
applicability( The FTA pattern is intended for the following situations) 
problem( The main challenges associated with methods for assessment of ) 
methodsolution( 
  arbitrarydiagram(  
   illustration( FTA example diagram ) 
   inputtoentity( 
    inputparameter( ToA ) 
    entity( UE.Top ) 
   )  
   inputtoentity( 
    inputparameter( UE ) 
    entity( UE.Top ) 
   ) 
   outputfromentity( 
    outputparameter( FT ) 
   ) 
  )  
  The following steps may apply the FTA method systematically 
) 
instantiationrule(  
  documentationparameter( FT )  
  FTA 
  rule( FT is a set of fault trees. ) 
  rule( Every fault tree of FT is instantiated by applying the guidance...) 
 rule( Every fault tree of FT is traceable to a unique ) 
 rule( Every fault tree of FT describes the relation between ) 
) 
relatedpatterns(  
  FTA 
  The FTA pattern is related to  
) 
knownuses( Fault tree analysis is a commonly applied method within ) 
8.3.3 Translation 
FTA is a generalised solution to the challenges described in the following. FTA belongs to a category of 
patterns that defines solutions to recurring development challenges in the form of a method.  
The pattern requires the input: 
• A description ToA. 
• A description UE. 
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The pattern delivers the output: 
• A description FT. 
The intent of the pattern is to: Support a systematic and deductive assessment of the potential causes  
The scenarios for which the pattern typically may be applied are as follows: The FTA pattern is intended 
for the following situations 
The main challenges addressed by the pattern are described in the following: The main challenges 
associated with methods for assessment of 
The method solution is exemplified by FTA example diagram . In FTA example diagram, the following 
relationship between parameters of the pattern and the elements in the illustration are defined: 
• The instantiation of input ToA is associated with UE.Top 
• The instantiation of input UE is associated with UE.Top 
• Output FT represents an instantiation result. 
The following steps may apply the FTA method systematically 
The pattern FTA is instantiated by instantiating the output FT according to the following rules: 
• FT is a set of fault trees 
• Every fault tree of FT is instantiated by applying the guidance 
• Every fault tree of FT is traceable to a unique 
• Every fault tree of FT describes the relation between 
The following describes patterns that are closely related to name: The FTA pattern is related to 
The following describes known uses of the pattern: Fault tree analysis is a commonly applied method 
within  
8.4 Example 4: Dual Modular Redundant 
8.4.1 Pattern definition 
Name: Dual Modular Redundant 
Pattern Signature: The Dual Modular Redundantis defined with the signature illustrated in Figure 27. 
In Figure 27, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the pattern: 
• Cmd is short for Command. 
• C1 is short for Controller 1. 
• C2 is short for Controller 2. 
• V is short for Voter. 
• S is short for System. 
 
Figure 27 Dual Modular Redundant – Pattern Signature 

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Intent: Describe the design of a system S that offers a simple and cost effective protection against 
random hardware failure by the use of two redundant controllers, C1 and C2, which operate in parallel. 
Command signals to the two controllers and status indications from these are handled by a component 
Cmd that also provides the interface between the components performing control operations and the 
overall system. A voter V is used to implement functionality for reacting upon discrepancies between the 
parallel operating controllers. 
Applicability:The Dual Modular Redundant pattern is intended for the following situations: 
• When the reliability of the individual controllers in the dual controller setup and supporting system 
parts is high enough, and there is satisfactory protection against common cause failure, to 
provide within bound system reliability and a safe application. 
• When the safety management and quality management are performed at a level protecting 
against systematic errors at a satisfactory level. 
Problem: The main aspects to be considered when providing protection against failure are: 
• Random hardware failure: hardware is susceptible to wear and tear and failure may manifest at 
random, protection should be incorporated against random hardware failure. 
• Separation of functions: it must be ensured that the potential failure of non-critical functions do 
not negatively affect critical functions thus there should be a clear separation between functional 
parts of different safety integrity.  
• Reliability of components: it must be ensured that reliability of individual components is 
satisfactory in order to meet reliability targets. 
• Common cause failure: it must be ensured that the system is adequately protected against 
common cause failure threats. 
• Fail-safe behaviour: it should be ensured that any potential failure of the system should not 
negatively affect safety. 
Design Solution:Figure 28 illustrates the main structure of components and their interfaces, annotated 
in UML notation, which play a part in obtaining a Dual Modular Redundantdesign.
 
Figure 28 Dual Modular Redundant Design 
The component Cmd is responsible for communicating with an overall system and the parts performing 
critical operations, C1 and C2. C1 and C2 are two identical systems that operate in parallel and perform 
critical operations (e.g. interlocking operations). A voter interacts with the plant/EUC (Equipment Under 
Control) and carry out the control operations from C1 and C2. The voter will implement mechanisms for 
1-out-of-2 or 2-out-of-2 voting functionality. 
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An important feature with respect to utilising the design for safety critical systems is the physical and 
functional separation of non-critical functionality (resided in Cmd) from the critical functionality (resided in 
C1 and C2). The redundant controllers provide protection against random hardware failure that may 
affect control operations and the voter assures that no potential erroneous signalling due to random 
hardware failure is performed. Protection against systematic failure is handled by adequate development 
processes (e.g., safety management activities and quality management activities) and is not addressed 
here. 
The roles and responsibilities represented in the pattern are:  
• S: System – represents the system defined by the Dual Modular Redundant. The system (e.g. a 
railway interlocking system) interacts with an overall system or human operator (e.g. a train 
leader through a centralised train control system) and the plant that is controlled (e.g. distant 
light signals, main light signals, and track switches). 
• C1: Controller – responsible for providing control signals (e.g. interlocking control signals) based 
on plant states and commands from the overall system or some operator. 
• C2: Controller – responsible for providing control signals (e.g. interlocking control signals) based 
on plant states and commands from the overall system or some operator.  
• Cmd: Command – responsible for the interaction with an overall system such that commands 
(e.g. from an operator) may be communicated to the control system. Cmd may also be 
responsible for secondary functions such as data logging.  
• V: Voter – responsible for activating plant control in accordance with the commands given by the 
dual controllers and take proper safe actions in the case of disagreement (that is an indication of 
a component failure) between the controllers. 
Instantiation Rule: An artefact S (see Figure 28 and Figure 27) instantiates the Dual Modular 
Redundantpattern if: 
• S is a specification of the hardware design and/or the software design of a control system. 
• S specifies a system containing at least two redundant controller parts that operate in parallel 
and that interface with a voting mechanism. 
• S specifies a system part that provides an interface with an overall system and the dual 
controllers such that orders may be given to, and indications obtained from, the controllers. 
• S specifies a system part that is responsible for providing a voting mechanism such that 
protection against random failure is detected and may be mitigated.  
Related Patterns:The pattern relates to the other patterns in the following manner: 
• Any product requirement pattern that might be used to derive the functional requirements for the 
system. 
• Any process requirement pattern that might be used to assess and derive safety functional 
requirements for the system. 
• Any safety case pattern that might be used as a means to argue that the system is adequately 
safe for its purpose.  
Known Uses: In Norway, a commonly used interlocking system type known as NSB-94 uses a dual 
modular redundant design as described here. Critical functions, such as the interlocking functionality, are 
implemented in terms of two identical PLCs (Programmable Logic Controllers) that operate in parallel. A 
voting mechanism ensures that no random hardware failure may lead to potentially harmful signalling, 
e.g., no train receives a go (green light signal) if there is any disagreement between the controllers (2-
out-of-2 voting to give a go). Given that one controller commands a stop signal (red light signal) and the 
other controller commands a go signal for a given light signal then a stop is signalled (1-out-of-2 voting to 
give a stop). 
HWR-1052 
- 46 - 
 
8.4.2 Textual syntax 
name( Dual Modular Redundant ) 
prodsolpatternsignature( 
  Dual Modular Redundant 
  output(  
  designparameter( Cmd ) 
  designparameter( C1 ) 
  designparameter( C2 ) 
  designparameter( V ) 
  designparameter( S ) 
  ) 
 ) 
intent( Describe the design of a system S that offers a simple and cost effective) 
applicability( The Dual Modular Redundant pattern is intended for the following situations) 
problem( The main aspects to be considered when providing protection against failure are) 
designsolution( 
  umldiagram( uml( Dual Modular Redundant Design) ) 
  The component Cmd is responsible for communicating with an overall system 
) 
instantiationrule(  
  designparameter( S )  
  Dual Modular Redundant 
  rule( S is a specification of the hardware design and/or the software design of) 
  rule( S specifies a system containing at least two redundant controller parts that ..) 
 rule( S specifies a system part that provides an interface with...) 
 rule( S specifies a system part that is responsible for providing a...) 
) 
relatedpatterns(  
  Dual Modular Redundant  
  The pattern relates to the other patterns in the following manner 
) 
knownuses( In Norway, a commonly used interlocking system type known as) 
8.4.3 Translation 
Dual Modular Redundant is a generalised solution to the challenges described in the following. Dual 
Modular Redundant belongs to a category of patterns that defines a design solution as a means to 
handle a commonly occurring development challenge. The pattern delivers the output: 
• A specification of the design of Cmd 
• A specification of the design of C1 
• A specification of the design of C2 
• A specification of the design of V  
• A specification of the design of S 
The intent of the pattern is to: Describe the design of a system S that offers a simple and cost effective 
The scenarios for which the pattern typically may be applied are as follows: The Dual Modular 
Redundant pattern is intended for the following situations 
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The main challenges addressed by the pattern are described in the following: The main aspects to be 
considered when providing protection against failure are 
The solution is defined by  Dual Modular Redundant Design . 
The component Cmd is responsible for communicating with an overall system and  
The pattern Dual Modular Redundant is instantiated by instantiating the output S according to the 
following rules: 
• S is a specification of the hardware design and/or the software design of 
• S specifies a system containing at least two redundant controller parts that... 
• S specifies a system part that provides an interface with... 
• S specifies a system part that is responsible for providing a... 
The following describes patterns that are closely related to Dual Modular RedundantThe pattern relates 
to the other patterns in the following manner 
The following describes known uses of the pattern: In Norway, a commonly used interlocking system 
type known as 
8.5 Example 5: Overall Safety 
8.5.1 Pattern definition 
Name: Overall Safety 
Pattern Signature: Overall Safety is defined with the signature illustrated in Figure 29. 
In Figure 29, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the pattern: 
• ToD is short for Target of Demonstration. 
• QualMng is short for Quality Management. 
• SafMng is short for Safety Management. 
• TechSaf is short for Technical Safety. 
• Case short for Safety Case 
 
Figure 29 Overall Safety – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Provide a structure for the specification of an overall strategy (or plan) for the safety 
demonstration Case of a target system ToD. The overall strategy is a means to document the set of 
practices that jointly provide confidence in the procurement of a safe system. This entails addressing 
managerial and technical aspects relevant with respect to the procurement of the system under 
constructions such that an effective top-down deduction of the safety demonstration may be provided. 
The focus of the pattern is on how to combine strategies on different safety concerns into an overall 
strategy such that it may be claimed and proven with confidence that the system is sufficiently safe. 
Applicability: The Overall Safety pattern is intended for the following situations: 
• At the initial stages of development in order to outline the main set of demonstration strategies 
and how these may be combined in order to demonstrate system safety. 
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• Prior to project initiation as a means for stakeholders (vendor, customer, licensee) to reflect upon 
main demonstration challenges and their possible solution. 
• As a means to specify the top-level strategies in a safety case demonstration. 
Problem: The main aspects to be considered when providing a solution for the demonstration of safety 
are: 
• Quality management: it is necessary to demonstrate that the quality of the system is, and shall 
continue to be, controlled by an effective quality management system. Quality management is a 
means to minimise the occurrence of human errors at each stage in the development life cycle, 
and thus to reduce the risk of systematic faults in the system. 
• Safety management: it is necessary to demonstrate that the safety management is controlled by, 
and shall continue to be, controlled by and effective means. Safety management is a means to 
reduce the occurrence of safety-related human errors throughout the life cycle, and thus 
minimise the residual risk of safety-related systematic faults. 
• Technical safety: it is necessary to demonstrate the safety of the technical design.  
• Strategy identification: in order to plan and effectively apply a suitable demonstration strategy at 
the different system/subsystem, it is important to identify as early as possible the main lines of 
demonstration. This will reduce the cost related to performing safety assessment by avoiding 
those activities that does not support an effective safety demonstration. In addition, if the choice 
of demonstration strategies does not provide the necessary confidence, then there is a risk of not 
getting safety approval. The effect of not getting a safety approval may induce a great cost 
related to e.g. performing additional work in order to get approval, or loss of returns if the project 
is stopped.  
• Effectiveness: it is important that the demonstration strategy is effective in providing the 
necessary safety demonstration. To develop safety related and safety critical systems is costly, 
mainly due to the activities required to assure and demonstrate that the system is sufficiently 
safe. It is important for a vendor to choose strategies that minimise cost but provide required 
results. 
• Confidence: it is important to choose a demonstration strategy that has the potential to provide 
the necessary confidence for the procurement of a safe system. At the end, an approval body 
decides upon acceptance or not. In a development project, the effectiveness of different 
demonstration strategies must be weighed against the estimated cost and the ability to fulfil the 
primary goal, to provide the necessary confidence. 
• Acceptance: it is important that the choice of demonstration strategies are acceptable for all 
involved parties such that they represent an effective means for demonstrating safety and may 
be applied in a manner that provides confidence that the system is safe. 
Argument Structure Solution: Figure 30 and Table 2 jointly represent the demonstration solution and 
should be read together. Figure 30 illustrates the decomposition of the safety argument in a tree 
structure annotated in GSN notation. Table 2 details the tree structure by defining node types and the 
expected content of the nodes. 
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Figure 30 Overall Safety – Argument Structure 
Associated with the contextual elements of the argument structure, the following is assumed: 
• ToD: identifies the target system under consideration; 
Table 2 Overall Safety – Argument Structure Details 
Node Node Type Node Content Description 
Case Goal ToD is safe 
ToD Context Definition of parameter ToD (Target of Demonstration) 
AllConc Strategy ToD is demonstrated safe by demonstrating that QM (Quality 
Management), SM (Safety Management), and TS (Technical Safety) 
is sufficiently addressed 
SepConcern Justification Justification for the appropriateness of the separation of the 
demonstration concerning QM, SM, and TS 
QualMng Goal ToD is safe with respect to proper QM (Quality Management) 
SafMng Goal ToD is safe with respect to the SM (Safety Management) concern 
TechSaf Goal ToD is safe with respect to the TS (Technical Safety) concern 
Instantiation Rule: An artefact Case (see Figure 30 and Figure 29) instantiates the Overall Safety 
pattern if: 
• Case represents the conclusion in a top-down decomposable safety argumentation on the safety 
of a target system (the target is identified by the instantiation of ToD). 
• Case represents the root node in a tree like presentation of the safety argument as indicated in 
Figure 30. 
• Every element of the decomposable safety argument where Case is the root node, is traceable 
to a unique abstract safety case element as indicated with GSN notation in Figure 30. An 
abstract safety case element is instantiated by adapting the descriptions in column “Node 
Content Description” in Table 2 to the context that is addressed in order to define a structure as 
given in Figure 30. 
• Case expresses the decomposition of a main claim, that a target system is sufficiently safe for its 
intended purpose by a strategy of claiming sufficient quality management (the claim expressed in 
the node QualMng), safety management (the claim expressed in the node SafMng), and 
technical safety (the claim expressed in the node TechSaf). Note: No guidance is given in this 
pattern on how to decompose the safety argument parts represented by the claims QualMng, 
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SafMng and TechSaf down to its supporting evidences, suitable patterns supporting such a 
decomposition should be conferred. 
Related Patterns: The Overall Safety pattern is related to other patterns in the following manner: 
• May be supported by other safety case patterns for detailing those parts that are not fully 
developed, e.g. the pattern Technical Safety may be used to detail a demonstration on the issue 
of demonstrating that a system is technical safe and thus detail further the decomposition of the 
node TechSaf presented in Figure 30. 
• May be used in order to establish a safety demonstration for a design derived from a design 
pattern being sufficiently safe for its intended purpose 
8.5.2 Textual syntax 
name( Overall Safety ) 
procrsafcasepatternsignature( 
  Overall Safety 
  input( documentationparameter( ToD ) ) 
 output(  
  safetycaseparameter( QualMng ) 
  safetycaseparameter( SafMng ) 
  safetycaseparameter( TechSaf )  
   safetycaseparameter( Case ) 
  ) 
 ) 
intent( Provide a structure for the specification of an overall strategy ) 
applicability( The Overall Safety pattern is intended for the following situations ) 
problem( The main aspects to be considered when providing a solution for the demonstration of ) 
argstructuresolution( 
  gsndiagram(  
   gsn( Overall Safety – Argument Structure ) 
   goal( Case ) 
  context( ToD ) 
   undevelopedgoal( QualMng ) 
  undevelopedgoal( SafMng ) 
  undevelopedgoal( TechSaf ) 
  )  
  Associated with the contextual elements of the argument structure, the following is assumed 
) 
instantiationrule(  
  requirementparameter( Case )  
  Overall Safety 
  rule( Case represents the conclusion in a top-down decomposable safety argumentation... ) 
 rule( Case represents the root node in a tree like presentation of the safety... ) 
  rule( Every element of the decomposable safety argument where Case is the root note... ) 
 rule( Case expresses the decomposition of a main claim, that a target system is ) 
) 
relatedpatterns(  
  Overall Safety  
  The Overall Safety pattern is related to 
) 
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8.5.3 Translation 
Overall Safety is a generalised solution to the challenges described in the following. Overall Safety 
belongs to a category of pattern that addresses challenges of demonstrating that safety objectives are 
met and defines its solution as a structure of arguments.  
The pattern requires the input: 
• A description ToD. 
The pattern delivers the output: 
• A safety case element QualMng 
• A safety case element SafeMng 
• A safety case element TechSaf 
• A safety case element Case. 
The intent of the pattern is to: Provide a structure for the specification of an overall strategy 
The scenarios for which the pattern typically may be applied are as follows: The Overall Safety pattern is 
intended for the following situations 
The main challenges addressed by the pattern are described in the following: The main aspects to be 
considered when providing a solution for the demonstration of 
The safety case solution is defined by Overall Safety – Argument Structure . In the diagram Overall 
Safety – Argument Structure, the following elements represent the parameters of the pattern: 
• Case represents an output of the pattern once instantiated. 
• ToD represents an input that describes the context of the associated element in the diagram. 
• QualMng represents an output that needs to be instantiated and further developed. 
• SafMng represents an output that needs to be instantiated and further developed. 
• TechSaf represents an output that needs to be instantiated and further developed. 
Associated with the contextual elements of the argument structure, the following is assumed 
The pattern Overall Safety is instantiated by instantiating the output Case according to the following 
rules: 
• Case represents the conclusion in a top-down decomposable safety argumentation... 
• Case represents the root node in a tree like presentation of the safety... 
• Every element of the decomposable safety argument where Case is the root note... 
• Case expresses the decomposition of a main claim, that a target system is 
The following describes patterns that are closely related to Overall Safety: The Overall Safety pattern is 
related to 
8.6 Example 6: Safety Requirements Satisfied 
8.6.1 Pattern definition 
Name: Safety Requirements Satisfied 
Pattern Signature: Safety Requirements Satisfied is defined with the signature illustrated in Figure 31. 
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In Figure 31, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the pattern: 
• ToD is short for Target of Demonstration. 
• Req is short for Requirements. 
• ReqSat is short for Requirements Satisfied. 
• Case is short for Safety Case. 
 
Figure 31 Safety Requirements Satisfied - Pattern Signature 
Intent: Provide a structure for the specification of a safety demonstration Case showing that a system 
ToD is safe by arguing that all safety requirements Req are satisfied.  
Example #1: a system S shall satisfy the requirements identified as R1, R2, SR1 and SR2 where SR1 
and SR2 are safety requirements and R1 and R2 are functional requirements. In order to demonstrate 
that S is sufficiently safe for its intended purpose it is enough to demonstrate that SR1 and SR2 are 
satisfied. In order for system S to provide the intended function then R1 and R2 must be satisfied but as 
these requirements do no impact on safety they are not addressed in the safety case. 
Applicability: The Safety Requirements Satisfied pattern is intended for the following situations: 
• When it is required to provide an explicit demonstration of the ability of a system to uphold safety 
invariants expressed as safety requirements. 
Problem: The main aspects to be considered when providing a solution for the demonstration of safety 
are: 
• Completeness of specification: it is necessary to provide confidence that the set of safety 
requirements is complete or contain all relevant requirements. 
• Correct demonstration approach: it is necessary to provide confidence that for each requirement, 
the chosen approach for demonstration is suitable. 
• Confirming evidences: it is necessary to provide confidence that for each chosen demonstration 
approach, confirming evidences for a safety claim is available or may be provided. 
Argument Structure Solution: Figure 32 and Table 3 jointly represent the demonstration solution and 
should be read together. Figure 32 illustrates the decomposition of the safety argument in a tree 
structure annotated in GSN notation. Table 3 details the tree structure by defining node types and the 
expected content of the nodes. 
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Figure 32 Safety Requirements Satisfied – Argument Structure 
Associated with the contextual elements of the argument structure, the following is assumed: 
• ToD: identifies the target system under consideration. 
• Req: represents a set of safety requirements associated with the target system ToD. 
Table 3 Safety Requirements Satisfied - Argument Structure Details 
Node Node Type Node Content Description 
Case Goal ToD satisfies Req 
ToD Context Definition of ToD 
Req Context Definition or Req 
AllReq Strategy ToD is acceptably safe as all safety requirements are addressed 
and found satisfied 
ReqSetCom Justification Justification for the requirements set Req being complete or 
contain all safety requirements that are relevant for ToD 
ReqSetAdd Justification Justification for all elements of the set Req are accounted for. 
Elements may be addressed individually or in groups, any 
grouping of requirements needs to be justified. 
ReqSat Goal The requirement r, element of Req, is satisfied 
Instantiation Rule: A demonstration artefact Case (see Figure 32 and Figure 31) instantiates the Safety 
Requirements Satisfied pattern if: 
• Case is a safety demonstration of a target system ToD. 
• Every element of Case is traceable to a unique abstract safety case element as indicated with 
GSN notation in Figure 32. An abstract safety case element is instantiated by applying the 
descriptions in column “Node Content Description” in Table 3 in order to define a structure as 
given in Figure 32. 
• Case expresses the decomposition of a main claim, that a target system ToD is safe, by a 
strategy of demonstrating that all safety requirements Req associated with the system ToD are 
satisfied. 
Related Patterns: The pattern is related to other patterns in the following manner: 
• May be used for detailing demonstration concerns addressed in the Technical Safety pattern on 
demonstrating that risk is explicitly addressed by demonstrating that the safety requirements, 
defined on the basis of risk assessment, are satisfied. 
• May be used together with the Establish System Safety Requirements pattern that may be 
applied in order to derive safety requirements, Safety Requirements Satisfied is then used to 
develop a demonstration that argues that identified requirements are satisfied. 
8.6.2 Textual syntax 
name( Safety Requirements Satisfied ) 
prodsafcasepatternsignature( 
  Safety Requirements Satisfied 
  input(  
   documentationparameter( ToD )  
   requirementparameter( Req ) 
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  ) 
 output(  
   safetycaseparameter( ReqSat ) 
  safetycaseparameter( Case ) 
  ) 
 ) 
intent( Provide a structure for the specification of a safety demonstration Case showing ) 
applicability( The Safety Requirements Satisfied pattern is intended for the following situations ) 
problem( The main aspects to be considered when providing a solution for the demonstration of  ) 
argstructuresolution( 
  gsndiagram(  
   gsn( Overall Safety – Argument Structure ) 
   goal( Case ) 
  context( ToD ) 
  context( Req ) 
   undevelopedgoal( ReqSat ) 
  )  
  Associated with the contextual elements of the argument structure, the following is assumed 
) 
instantiationrule(  
  requirementparameter( Case )  
  Safety Requirements Satisfied 
  rule( Case is a safety demonstration of a target system ToD. ) 
  rule( Every element of Case is traceable to a unique abstract safety case element... ) 
 rule( Case expresses the decomposition of a main claim ) 
) 
relatedpatterns(  
  Safety Requirements Satisfied  
  The pattern is related other patterns in the following manner  
) 
8.6.3 Translation 
Safety Requirements Satisfied is a generalised solution to the challenges described in the following. 
Safety Requirements Satisfied belongs to a category of patterns that addresses challenges of 
demonstrating that safety objectives are met and defines its solution as a structure of arguments.  
The pattern requires the input: 
• A description ToD. 
• A set of requirements Req. 
The pattern delivers the output: 
• A safety case element ReqSat 
• A safety case element Case. 
The intent of the pattern is to: Provide a structure for the specification of a safety demonstration Case 
showing 
The scenarios for which the pattern typically may be applied are as follows: The Safety Requirements 
Satisfied pattern is intended for the following situations 
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The main challenges addressed by the pattern are described in the following: The main aspects to be 
considered when providing a solution for the demonstration of 
The safety case solution is defined by  gsn( Overall Safety – Argument Structure ) . In Overall Safety – 
Argument Structure, the following elements represent the parameters of the pattern: 
• Case represents an output of the pattern once instantiated. 
• ToD represents an input that describes the context of the associated element in the diagram. 
• Req represents an input that describes the context of the associated element in the diagram. 
• ReqSat represents an output that needs to be instantiated and further developed. 
Associated with the contextual elements of the argument structure, the following is assumed 
The pattern Safety Requirements Satisfied is instantiated by instantiating the output Case according to 
the following rules: 
• Case is a safety demonstration of a target system ToD. 
• Every element of Case is traceable to a unique abstract safety case element... 
• Case expresses the decomposition of a main claim 
 
The following describes patterns that are closely related to Safety Requirements Satisfied: The pattern is 
related to other patterns in the following manner 
9. EXAMPLE TRANSLATIONS OF COMPOSITE PATTERNS 
In this section we exemplify the translation of a chosen set of composite patterns into a text in English 
that provide a semantic for the patterns. Each composite pattern and associated translation is presented 
in separate sections where individual subsections provide a pattern definition, the representation of the 
pattern in its textual syntax, and finally the result of translating the textual syntax into English. 
The composite patterns used in this section for exemplifying the translation of patterns into their 
semantics are chosen in the following manner:  
• Example 1, described in Section 9.1 exemplifies the translation of a small composite pattern 
consisting of a combination of the basic patterns Establish System Safety Requirements 
presented in Section 8.1 and Dual Modular Redundant presented in Section 8.4. The composite 
contains all the main elements of the SaCS pattern language with no simplification of the visual 
presentation, e.g., the icons used for denoting the type of parameters is not omitted in order to 
simplify the visualisation although this may be done. 
• Example 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 described in Section 9.2, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5, and 9.6, respectively, represents 
the composite patterns that were applied for addressing the development challenges in the case 
reported in HWR-1037 [5]. As the patterns are taken from a case, we find them being 
representative of what may be expected in terms of complexity and expressiveness from the 
application of SaCS. The patterns in the different examples represent a modularly defined 
composition of patterns that is bound together in the composite presented in Example 6. 
• Example 7, described in Section 9.7, presents a composite pattern where the relationships 
defined between the patterns within the composites presented in Example 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are 
contained within one pattern definition instead of a modular one. The identifiers used for the 
artefacts presented in Example 7 differ from those in Example 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, as it is a 
constructed example.  
• Example 1 to Example 7 are selected as every pattern type, parameter type, artefact type, 
relation, and annotations that are available in the SaCS pattern language are covered. The 
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examples also cover the simplifications that can be made to the visual presentation of a patterns 
as well as the possibility to modularise a pattern specification. 
In the presentation of the textual syntax and the translation results we have slightly formatted the text to 
increase readability. Text in italics is used for identifiers that are found in the graphical presentations. 
9.1 Example 1: Safe DMR 
9.1.1 Pattern definition 
Figure 33 illustrates a composite pattern named Safe DMR. We read the figure from the left corner of the 
figure towards the right repeatedly from the top and downwards like reading a book.  The first graphical 
elements identify the inputs to the composite, the name of the composite and the outputs of the 
composite. The next set of graphical elements defines the constituents of the composite, e.g. patterns, 
relations and instantiation orders. 
 
Figure 33 Safe DMR – Composite Pattern 
A composite pattern may model the intended or actual application of a combination of patterns. We 
assume that the composite depicted in Figure 33 models the intended application of patterns in some 
context, thus the instantiation of parameters are visualised.  
Assume that the composite pattern Safe DMR models the application of patterns in a context where the 
following documentation represents parameter instantiations: 
• System Context Description is a document describing the intended context and the function of 
the system under development  
• Risk Assessment describes the result of a risk assessment of the system at hand and presents 
an overview of every relevant hazard with respect to the operation of the system in its intended 
context.  
• Requirement Specification is a specification of the safety requirements associated with the 
system at hand. The requirements are defined as a result of applying the Safe DMR pattern with 
the documentations System Context Description and Risk Assessment as input.  
• Design Specifications is a design specification that details the technical design of a system in 
accordance with the requirements identified in the Requirement Specification.  
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Figure 33 is similar to the one presented in Figure 4 but where the explanatory annotations are removed.  
9.1.2 Textual syntax 
The translation of the composite pattern in Figure 33 into its textual syntax gives the following: 
declaration(  
  Safe DMR 
  publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( ToA ) )  
  publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( Risks ) ) 
  publicoutputparameter( designparameter( S ) ) 
 instantiates( 
   documentationartefact( System Context Description )  
   documentationparameter( ToA ) 
  ) 
  instantiates( 
   documentationartefact( Risk Assessment ) 
   documentationparameter( Risks ) 
  ) 
 instantiates( 
   designartefact( Design Specification ) 
   designparameter( S ) 
  ) 
 ) 
 content( 
 Safe DMR 
  containedpatterndeclaration( 
   procreqpatternreference( Establish System Safety Requirement )  
   publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( ToA ) )  
   publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( Risks ) ) 
   localoutputparameter( requirementparameter( Req ) ) 
   instantiates( 
    requirementartefact( Requirement Specification ) 
    documentationparameter( Req ) 
   )  
  ) 
 containedpatterndeclaration( 
   prodsolpatternreference( Dual Modular Redundant) 
   publicoutputparameter( designparameter( S ) ) 
  ) 
  satisfies( 
   prodsolpatternreference( Dual Modular Redundant ) 
   designparameter( S ) 
   procreqpatternreference( Establish System Safety Requirements ) 
   requirementparameter( Req ) 
  ) 
  serialinstantiation( 
   procreqpatternreference( Establish System Safety Requirements ) 
   prodsolpatternreference( Dual Modular Redundant ) 
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 )  
 ) 
9.1.3 Translation 
The translation of the textual syntax of the composite pattern illustrated in Figure 33 results in the 
following English text: 
Safe DMR requires the input:  
• a description ToA 
• a description Risks 
An assignment of an input of Safe DMR is assigned to every correspondingly named input with public 
accessibility of contained patterns. An input defined with public accessibility is when introduced in the 
following demarked “(public)”, otherwise demarked “(local)”. 
Safe DMR delivers the output:  
• a design specification S 
An output of Safe DMR is delivered when the correspondingly named output, with public accessibility, is 
delivered from a contained pattern. An output with public accessibility is when introduced in the following 
demarked “(public)”, otherwise demarked “(local)”. 
Safe DMR is instantiated such that: 
• the description System Context represents ToA 
• the description Risk Assessment represents Risks 
• the design Design Specification represents S  
Safe DMR contains the patterns Establish System Safety Requirement and Dual Modular Redundant. 
Req (local) is the output of the process pattern Establish System Safety Requirements when applied to 
ToA (public) and Risks (public). Establish System Safety Requirements is instantiated such that: 
• the requirements Requirement Specification represents Req  
S (public) is the output of the design pattern Dual Modular Redundant. 
S is required to satisfy the requirements defined by Req where:  
• S is the output from the design pattern Dual Modular Redundant. 
• Req is the output from the process pattern Establish System Safety Requirements. 
Safe DMR defines the following order for instantiating patterns:  
• The pattern Establish System Safety Requirements should be instantiated before the pattern 
Dual Modular Redundant. 
9.2 Example 2: Functional Requirements 
9.2.1 Pattern definition 
In the composite pattern illustrated in Figure 34, the icons denoting the type of a parameter is not used in 
order to simplify the visual presentation. In the translation of the pattern into its textual syntax, the 
parameter types are indicated although not visualised in Figure 34 as these are known from the 
specifications of the respective referenced patterns detailed in [5]. 
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Figure 34 Functional Requirements – Composite Pattern (from [5]) 
 
9.2.2 Textual syntax 
The translation of the composite pattern in Figure 34 into its textual syntax gives the following: 
declaration(  
  Functional Requirements 
  publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( Mch ) )  
  publicoutputparameter( requirementparameter( F-Req ) ) 
 ) 
 content( 
 Functional Requirements 
  containedpatterndeclaration( 
   prodreqpatternreference( Station Interlocking Requirements )  
   publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( Mch ) )  
   localoutputparameter(  
    parametersetalias( 
    alias( 2TR )  
     requirementparameter( Req )  
    ) 
   ) 
  ) 
 containedpatterndeclaration( 
   prodreqpatternreference( Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements)  
   publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( Mch ) )  
   localoutputparameter(  
    parametersetalias( 
    alias( LCR )  
     requirementparameter( Req )  
    ) 
   ) 
  ) 
  combines( 
   prodreqpatternreference( Station Interlocking Requirements ) 
   parametersetalias( alias( 2TR ) ) 
   procreqpatternreference( Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements ) 
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   parametersetalias( alias( LCR ) ) 
   publicoutputparameter( parametersetalias( alias( F-Req ) ) ) 
  ) 
  serialinstantiation( 
   prodreqpatternreference( Station Interlocking Requirements ) 
   prodsolpatternreference( Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements) 
 )  
 ) 
9.2.3 Translation 
The translation of the textual syntax of the composite pattern illustrated in Figure 34 results in the 
following English text: 
Functional Requirements requires the input 
• a description Mch 
An assignment of an input of Functional Requirements is assigned to every correspondingly named input 
with public accessibility of contained patterns. An input defined with public accessibility is when 
introduced in the following demarked “(public)”, otherwise demarked “(local)”. 
Functional Requirements delivers the output 
• a set of requirements F-Req 
An output of Functional Requirements is delivered when the correspondingly named output, with public 
accessibility, is delivered from a contained pattern. An output with public accessibility is when introduced 
in the following demarked “(public)”, otherwise demarked “(local)”. 
Functional Requirements contains the patterns Station Interlocking Requirements and Level Crossing 
Interlocking Requirements. 
2TR (alias for Req) (local) is the output of the requirements pattern Station Interlocking Requirements 
when applied to Mch (public). 
LCR (alias for Req) (local) is the output of the requirements pattern Level Crossing Interlocking 
Requirements when applied to Mch (public). 
2TR and LCR are combined in a union where:  
• 2TR is the output from the requirements pattern Station Interlocking Requirements. 
• LCR is the output from the requirements pattern Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements. 
• The result of combining is represented by the set named F-Req (public). 
Functional Requirements defines the following order for instantiating patterns:  
• The pattern Station Interlocking Requirements should be instantiated before the pattern Level 
Crossing Interlocking Requirements. 
9.3 Example 3: Safety Requirements 
9.3.1 Pattern definition 
Figure 35 illustrates a composite pattern named Safety Requirements. In the translation of the pattern 
into its textual syntax, the parameter types are indicated although not visualised in Figure 35 as these 
are known from the specifications of the respective referenced patterns detailed in [5]. 
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Figure 35 Safety Requirements – Composite Pattern (from [5]) 
9.3.2 Textual syntax 
The translation of the composite pattern in Figure 35 into its textual syntax gives the following: 
declaration(  
  Safety Requirements 
  publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( ToA ) )  
 publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( Haz ) ) 
  publicoutputparameter( requirementparameter( S-Req ) ) 
 ) 
 content( 
 Safety Requirements 
  containedpatterndeclaration( 
   procreqpatternreference( Hazard Analysis )  
   publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( ToA ) )  
   publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( Haz ) ) 
  localinputparameter( documentationparameter( AnHaz) ) 
   localoutputparameter( documentationparameter( HzLg ) ) 
  ) 
  containedpatterndeclaration( 
   procreqpatternreference( Risk Analysis )  
   publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( ToA ) )  
  localinputparameter( documentationparameter( Haz ) ) 
  localinputparameter( documentationparameter( CrcCat ) ) 
   localoutputparameter( documentationparameter( Risks ) ) 
  ) 
  containedpatterndeclaration( 
   procreqpatternreference( Establish System Safety Requirements )  
   publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( ToA ) )  
  localinputparameter( documentationparameter( Risks ) ) 
   publicoutputparameter(  
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    parametersetalias( 
    alias( S-Req ) 
     requirementparameter( Req )  
    ) 
   ) 
  ) 
 containedpatterndeclaration( 
   procsolpatternreference( FTA )  
   publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( ToA ) )  
  publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( Haz ) ) 
   localoutputparameter( documentationparameter( FT ) ) 
  ) 
 containedpatterndeclaration( 
   procsolpatternreference( SIL Classification )  
   publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( Haz ) )  
  localinputparameter( documentationparameter( Risks ) ) 
   localoutputparameter( documentationparameter( FncCat ) ) 
  ) 
 assigns( 
   procreqpatternreference( Hazard Analysis ) 
   documentationparameter( HzLg )  
   procreqpatternreference( Risk Analysis ) 
   documentationparameter( Haz ) 
  ) 
  assigns( 
   procrepatternreference( Risk Analysis ) 
   documentationparameter( Risks )  
   procreqpatternreference( Establish System Safety Requirements ) 
   documentationparameter( Risks ) 
  ) 
 assigns( 
   procsolpatternreference( FTA ) 
   documentationparameter( FT )  
   procreqpatternreference( Hazard Analysis ) 
   documentationparameter( AnHaz ) 
  ) 
 assigns( 
   procsolpatternreference( SIL Classification ) 
   documentationparameter( FncCat )  
   procreqpatternreference( Risk Analysis ) 
   documentationparameter( CrCat ) 
  ) 
   serialinstantiation( 
   procreqpatternreference( Hazard Analysis ) 
   procreqpatternreference( Risk Analysis ) 
 ) 
 parallelinstantiation( 
   procreqpatternreference( Hazard Analysis ) 
   procsolpatternreference( FTA ) 
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 ) 
  serialinstantiation( 
   procreqpatternreference( Risk Analysis ) 
   procreqpatternreference( Establish System Safety Requirements ) 
 ) 
 parallelinstantiation( 
   procreqpatternreference( Risk Analysis ) 
   procsolpatternreference( SIL Classification ) 
 ) 
 ) 
9.3.3 Translation 
The translation of the textual syntax of the composite pattern illustrated in Figure 35 results in the 
following English text: 
Safety Requirements requires the input: 
• a description ToA 
• a description Haz  
An assignment of an input of Safety Requirements is assigned to every correspondingly named input 
with public accessibility of contained patterns. An input defined with public accessibility is when 
introduced in the following demarked “(public)”, otherwise demarked “(local)”. 
Safety Requirements delivers the output: 
• a set of requirements S-Req 
An output of Safety Requirements is delivered when the correspondingly named output, with public 
accessibility, is delivered from a contained pattern. An output with public accessibility is when introduced 
in the following demarked “(public)”, otherwise demarked “(local)”. 
Safety Requirements contains the patterns Hazard Analysis, Risk Analysis, Establish System Safety 
Requirements, FTA, and SIL Classification. 
HzLg (local) is the output of the process pattern Hazard Analysis when applied to ToA (public), Haz 
(public), and AnHaz (local).  
Risks (local) is the output of the process pattern Risk Analysis when applied to ToA (public), Haz (local), 
and CrCat (local).  
S-Req (alias for Req) (public) is the output of the process pattern Establish System Safety Requirements 
when applied to ToA (public) and Risks (local).  
FT (local) is the output of the method pattern FTA when applied to ToA (public) and Haz (public).  
FncCat (local) is the output of SIL Classification when applied to Haz (public) and Risks (local). 
HzLg is assigned to Haz where: 
• HzLg is the output of the process pattern Hazard Analysis. 
• Haz is input to the process pattern Risk Analysis. 
Risks is assigned to Risks where: 
• Risks is the output of the process pattern Risk Analysis. 
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• Risks is input to the process pattern Establish System Safety Requirements. 
FT is assigned to AnHaz where: 
• FT is the output of the method pattern FTA. 
• AnHaz is input to the process pattern Hazard Analysis. 
FncCat is assigned to CrCat where: 
• FncCat is the output of the method pattern SIL Classification. 
• CrCat is input to the process pattern Risk Analysis. 
Safety Requirements defines the following order for instantiating patterns: 
• The pattern Hazard Analysis should be instantiated before the pattern Risk Analysis. 
• The patterns Hazard Analysis and FTA may be instantiated in parallel. 
• The pattern Risk Analysis should be instantiated before the pattern Establish System Safety 
Requirements. 
• The patterns Risk Analysis and SIL Classification may be instantiated in parallel. 
9.4 Example 4: Requirements 
9.4.1 Pattern definition 
In the composite pattern illustrated in Figure 36, icons for denoting the type of a parameter is not used in 
order to simplify the visual presentation. In the translation of the pattern into its textual syntax, the 
parameter types are indicated as these are known and may be found in the respective definitions of the 
patterns referred to within a composite pattern. The definitions of the referenced patterns are provided in 
Section 9.2 and 9.3. 
 
Figure 36 Requirements – Composite Pattern (from [5]) 
 
9.4.2 Textual syntax 
The translation of the composite pattern in Figure 36 into its textual syntax gives the following: 
declaration(  
  Requirements 
  publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( Mch ) )  
  publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( Haz ) ) 
  publicoutputparameter( requirementparameter( Req ) ) 
 ) 
 content( 
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 Requirements 
  containedpatterndeclaration( 
   compositepatternreference( Functional Requirements )  
   publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( Mch ) )  
   localoutputparameter( requirementparameter( F-Req ) ) 
  ) 
 containedpatterndeclaration( 
   compositepatternreference( Safety Requirements )  
   publicinputparameter( 
    parametersetalias( 
    alias( Mch )  
     documentationparameter( ToA )  
    ) 
   ) 
   publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( Haz ) ) 
   localoutputparameter( requirementparameter( S-Req ) ) 
  ) 
  combines( 
   compositepatternreference( Functional Requirements ) 
   requirementparameter( F-Req ) 
   compositepatternreference( Safety Requirements ) 
   requirementparameter( S-Req  ) 
   publicoutputparameter(  
    parametersetalias(  
     alias( Req )  
    )  
   ) 
  ) 
  serialinstantiation( 
   compositepatternreference( Functional Safety ) 
   compositepatternreference( Safety Requirements ) 
 )  
 ) 
9.4.3 Translation 
The translation of the textual syntax of the composite pattern illustrated in Figure 36 results in the 
following English text: 
Requirements requires the input 
• a description Mch 
• a description Haz 
An assignment of an input of Requirements is assigned to every correspondingly named input with public 
accessibility of contained patterns. An input defined with public accessibility is when introduced in the 
following demarked “(public)”, otherwise demarked “(local)”. 
Requirements delivers the output 
• a set of requirements Req 
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An output of Requirements is delivered when the correspondingly named output, with public accessibility, 
is delivered from a contained pattern. An output with public accessibility is when introduced in the 
following demarked “(public)”, otherwise demarked “(local)”. 
Requirements contains the patterns Functional Requirements and Safety Requirements. 
F-Req (local) is the output of the composite pattern Functional Requirements when applied to Mch 
(public). 
S-Req (local) is the output of the composite pattern Safety Requirements when applied to Mch (alias for 
ToA) (public) and Haz (public). 
F-Req and S-Req are combined in a union where:  
• F-Req is the output from the composite pattern Functional Requirements. 
• S-Req is the output from the composite pattern Safety Requirements. 
• The result of combining is represented by the set named Req (public). 
Requirements defines the following order for instantiating patterns:  
The pattern Functional Requirements should be instantiated before the pattern Safety Requirements. 
9.5 Example 5: Safety Case 
9.5.1 Pattern definition 
Figure 37 illustrates a composite pattern named Safety Case. In the translation of the pattern into its 
textual syntax, the parameter types are indicated although not visualised in Figure 37 as these are 
known from the specifications of the respective referenced patterns detailed in [5]. 
 
 
Figure 37 Safety Case – Composite Pattern (from [5]) 
9.5.2 Textual syntax 
The translation of the composite pattern in Figure 37 into its textual syntax gives the following: 
declaration(  
  Safety Case 
  publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( ToD ) )  
  publicinputparameter( requirementparameter( Req ) ) 
  publicoutputparameter( safetycaseparameter( Case ) ) 
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 ) 
 content( 
 Safety Case 
  containedpatterndeclaration( 
   procsafcasepatternreference( Overall Safety )  
   publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( ToD ) )  
   publicoutputparameter( safetycaseparameter( Case ) ) 
   localoutputparameter( safetycaseparameter( TechSaf ) ) 
   ) 
 containedpatterndeclaration( 
   prodsafcasepatternreference( Technical Safety ) 
  publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( ToD ) ) 
   localoutputparameter( safetycaseparameter( Case ) ) 
  localoutputparameter( safetycaseparameter( ERE ) ) 
  ) 
 containedpatterndeclaration( 
   prodsafcasepatternreference( Safety Requirements Satisfied ) 
  publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( ToD ) ) 
  publicinputparameter( requirementparameter( Req ) ) 
   localoutputparameter( safetycaseparameter( Case ) ) 
  ) 
  details( 
   prodsafcasepatternreference( Technical Safety ) 
   safetycaseparameter( Case ) 
   procsafcasepatternreference( Overall Safety ) 
   requirementparameter( TechSaf ) 
  ) 
 details( 
   prodsafcasepatternreference( Safety Requirements Satisfied ) 
   safetycaseparameter( Case ) 
   prodsafcasepatternreference( Technical Safety ) 
   requirementparameter( ERE ) 
  ) 
  serialinstantiation( 
   procsafcasepatternreference( Overall Safety ) 
   prodsafcasepatternreference( Technical Safety ) 
 )  
 serialinstantiation( 
   prodsafcasepatternreference( Technical Safety ) 
   prodsafcasepatternreference( Safety Requirements Satisfied ) 
 ) 
 ) 
9.5.3 Translation 
The translation of the textual syntax of the composite pattern illustrated in Figure 37 results in the 
following English text: 
Safety Case requires the input: 
• a description ToD 
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• a set of requirements Req  
An assignment of an input of Safety Case is assigned to every correspondingly named input with public 
accessibility of contained patterns. An input defined with public accessibility is when introduced in the 
following demarked “(public)”, otherwise demarked “(local)”. 
Safety Case delivers the output: 
• a safety case specification Case 
An output of Safety Case is delivered when the correspondingly named output, with public accessibility, 
is delivered from a contained pattern. An output with public accessibility is when introduced in the 
following demarked “(public)”, otherwise demarked “(local)”. 
Safety Case contains the patterns Overall Safety, Technical Safety, and Safety Requirements Satisfied. 
TechSaf (local) and Case (public) are the outputs of the safety case pattern Overall Safety when applied 
to ToD (public).  
Case (local) and ERE (local) are the outputs of the safety case pattern Technical Safety when applied to 
ToD (public).  
Case (local) is the output of the safety case pattern Safety Requirements Satisfied when applied to ToD 
(public) and Req (public). 
Case is required to detail TechSaf where: 
• Case is the output of the safety case pattern Technical Safety. 
• TechSaf is the output of the safety case pattern Overall Safety. 
Case is required to detail ERE where: 
• Case is the output of the safety case pattern Safety Requirements Satisfied. 
• ERE is the output of the safety case pattern Technical Safety. 
Safety Requirements defines the following order for instantiating patterns: 
• The pattern Overall Safety should be instantiated before the pattern Technical Safety. 
• The pattern Technical Safety should be instantiated before the pattern Safety Requirements 
Satisfied. 
9.6 Example 6: Pattern Solution 
9.6.1 Pattern definition 
Figure 38 illustrates a composite pattern named Pattern Solution. In the translation of the pattern into its 
textual syntax, the parameter types are indicated although not visualised in Figure 38 as these are 
known from the specifications of the respective referenced patterns. The referenced patterns are taken 
from [5] and in addition detailed in Section 8.4, 9.4, and 9.5. 
HWR-1052 
- 69 - 
 
 
Figure 38 Pattern Solution – Composite Pattern (from [5]) 
9.6.2 Textual Syntax 
The translation of the composite pattern in Figure 38 into its textual syntax gives the following: 
declaration(  
  Pattern Solution 
  publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( Mch ) )  
  publicinputparameter( requirementparameter( Haz ) ) 
 publicoutputparameter( requirementparameter( Req ) ) 
 publicoutputparameter( designparameter( S ) ) 
  publicoutputparameter( safetycaseparameter( Case ) ) 
 instantiates( 
   documentationartefact( System description in Section 2 )  
   documentationparameter( Mch ) ) 
  instantiates( 
   documentationartefact( Hazards described in Section 6.2.1 )  
   documentationparameter( Haz ) ) 
 instantiates( 
   requirementartefact( Requirements defined in Section 10.1 )  
   requirementparameter( Req ) ) 
 instantiates( 
   designartefact( Design described in Section 10.2 )  
   designparameter( S ) ) 
 instantiates( 
   safetycaseartefact( Safety Case described in Section 10.3)  
   safetycaseparameter( Case ) ) 
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 ) 
 content( 
 Pattern Solution 
  containedpatterndeclaration( 
   compositepatternreference( Requirements )  
   publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( Mch ) ) 
  publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( Haz ) )  
   publicoutputparameter( requirementparameter( Req ) ) 
   localoutputparameter( requirementparameter( S-Req ) ) 
  instantiates( 
    requirementartefact( Safety Requirements defined in Section 10.1)  
    requirementparameter( S-Req ) ) 
   ) 
 containedpatterndeclaration( 
   compositepatternreference(Safety Case ) 
  localinputparameter( documentationparameter( ToD ) ) 
   localinputparameter( requirementparameter( Req ) ) 
  publicoutputparameter( safetycaseparameter( Case ) ) 
  ) 
 containedpatterndeclaration( 
   prodsolpatternreference( Dual Modular Redundant ) 
   publicoutputparameter( designparameter( S ) ) 
  ) 
  assigns( 
   compositepatternreference( Requirements ) 
   requirementparameter( S-Req ) 
   compositepatternreference( Safety Case ) 
   requirementparameter( Req ) 
  ) 
 satisfies( 
  designpatternreference( Dual Modular Redundant ) 
   designparameter( S ) 
   compositepatternreference( Requirements ) 
   requirementparameter( Req ) 
  ) 
  assigns( 
   designpatternreference( Dual Modular Redundant ) 
   designparameter( S ) 
   compositepatternreference( Safety Case ) 
   documentationparameter( ToD ) 
  ) 
 demonstrates( 
   compositepatternreference( Safety Case ) 
   safetycaseparameter( Case ) 
  designpatternreference( Dual Modular Redundant ) 
   designparameter( S ) 
  ) 
  serialinstantiation( 
   compositepatternreference( Requirements ) 
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   designpatternreference( Dual Modular Redundant ) 
 )  
 serialinstantiation( 
   compositepatternreference( Requirements ) 
   compositepatternreference( Safety Case ) 
 ) 
 parallelinstantiation( 
   compositepatternreference( Safety Case ) 
   designpatternreference( Dual Modular Redundant ) 
 ) 
 ) 
9.6.3 Translation 
The translation of the textual syntax of the composite pattern illustrated in Figure 38 results in the 
following English text: 
Pattern Solution requires the input: 
• a description Mch 
• a description Haz 
An assignment of an input of Pattern Solution is assigned to every correspondingly named input with 
public accessibility of contained patterns. An input defined with public accessibility is when introduced in 
the following demarked “(public)”, otherwise demarked “(local)”. 
Pattern Solution delivers the output: 
• a set of requirements Req  
• a design specification S 
• a safety case specification Case 
An output of Pattern Solution is delivered when the correspondingly named output, with public 
accessibility, is delivered from a contained pattern. An output with public accessibility is when introduced 
in the following demarked “(public)”, otherwise demarked “(local)”. 
Pattern Solution is instantiated such that: 
• the description System description in Section 2 represents Mch 
• the description Hazards described in Section 6.2.1 represents Haz 
• the requirements Requirements defined in Section 10.1 represents Req 
• the design Design described in Section 10.2 represents S 
• the safety case Safety case described in Section 10.3 represents Case 
Pattern Solution contains the patterns Requirements, Safety Case, and Dual Modular Redundant. 
Req (public) and S-Req (local) are the outputs of the composite pattern Requirements when applied to 
Mch (public) and Haz (public). Requirements is instantiated such that: 
• the requirements Safety Requirements defined in Section 10.1 represents S-Req  
Case (public) is the output of the composite pattern Safety Case when applied to ToD (local) and Req 
(local).  
S (public) is the output of the design pattern Dual Modular Redundant. 
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S-Req is assigned to Req where: 
• S-Req is the output of the composite pattern Requirements. 
• Req is input to the composite pattern Safety Case. 
S is required to satisfy the requirements defined by Req where: 
• S is the output of the design pattern Dual Modular Redundant. 
• Req is the output of the composite pattern Requirements. 
S is assigned to ToD where: 
• S is the output of the design pattern Dual Modular Redundant. 
• ToD is input to the composite pattern Safety Case. 
Case is required to demonstrate safety of S where: 
• Case is the output of the composite pattern Safety Case. 
• S is the output of the design pattern Dual Modular Redundant. 
Pattern Solution defines the following order for instantiating patterns: 
• The pattern Requirements should be instantiated before the pattern Dual Modular Redundant. 
• The pattern Requirements should be instantiated before the pattern Safety Case. 
• The patterns Safety Case and Dual Modular Redundant may be instantiated in parallel. 
9.7 Example 7: Two Track Station Interlocking 
9.7.1 Pattern definition 
Figure 39 illustrates a composite pattern named Two Track Station Interlocking. The pattern presents the 
same relationships defined between the patterns within the composites presented in Example 2, 3, 4, 5, 
and 6 but then contained within one pattern definition instead of a modular one. The composite is 
constructed in order to exemplify a non-modular presentation of the same information as presented in the 
mentioned examples, besides different identifiers being used for artefact references. 
Assume that the composite pattern Two Track Station Interlocking in Figure 39 models the application of 
patterns in a context where the following documentation represents parameter instantiations: 
• Ref. System Description is a document describing the intended context and function of the 
system under development  
• Ref. Hazard Description is a document describing the result of a risk assessment of the system 
under development.  
• Ref. Two Track Station Requirement Specification is a specification of the requirements. 
• Ref. Level Crossing Requirements Specification is a specification of requirements. 
• Ref. Safety Requirements Specification is a specification of requirements. 
• Ref. Design Specification is a specification of a design. 
• Ref. Safety Demonstration is a safety case description.  
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Figure 39 Two Track Station Interlocking – Composite Pattern 
9.7.2 Textual syntax 
The translation of the composite pattern in Figure 39 into its textual syntax gives the following: 
declaration(  
  Two Track Station Interlocking 
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  publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( ToA ) )  
 publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( Haz ) ) 
  publicoutputparameter( requirementparameter( Req ) ) 
  publicoutputparameter( designparameter( S ) ) 
  publicoutputparameter( safetycaseparameter( Case ) ) 
  instantiates( 
   documentationartefact( Ref. System Description )  
   documentationparameter( ToA ) ) 
  instantiates( 
   documentationartefact( Ref. Hazards Description )  
   documentationparameter( Haz ) ) 
 instantiates( 
   designartefact( Ref. Design Specification )  
   designparameter( S ) ) 
 instantiates( 
   safetycaseartefact( Ref. Safety Demonstration )  
   safetycaseparameter( Case ) ) 
 ) 
 content( 
 Two Track Station Interlocking 
  containedpatterndeclaration( 
   prodreqpatternreference( Station Interlocking Requirements )  
   publicinputparameter(  
    parametersetalias( 
    alias( ToA )  
     documentationparameter( Mch )  
    )  
   ) 
   localoutputparameter( 
   parametersetalias( 
    alias( 2TR ) 
     requirementparameter( Req )  
    ) 
   ) 
  instantiates( 
    requirementartefact( Ref. Two Track Station Requirements Specification )  
    requirementparameter( Req )  
   ) 
  ) 
  containedpatterndeclaration( 
   prodreqpatternreference( Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements)  
   publicinputparameter(  
    parametersetalias( 
    alias( ToA ) 
     documentationparameter( Mch )  
    )  
   ) 
   localoutputparameter( 
   parametersetalias( 
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    alias( LCR ) 
     requirementparameter( Req )  
    ) 
   ) 
  instantiates( 
    requirementartefact( Ref. Level Crossing Requirements Specification )  
    requirementparameter( Req )  
   ) 
  ) 
  containedpatterndeclaration( 
   procreqpatternreference( Hazard Analysis )  
   publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( ToA ) ) 
  publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( Haz ) )  
   localinputparameter( documentationparameter( AnHaz ) ) 
  localoutputparameter( documentationparameter( HzLg ) ) 
  ) 
 containedpatterndeclaration( 
   procsolpatternreference( FTA )  
   publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( ToA ) ) 
  publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( Haz ) )  
   localoutputparameter( documentationparameter( FT ) ) 
  ) 
 containedpatterndeclaration( 
   procreqpatternreference( Risk Analysis )  
   publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( ToA ) ) 
   localinputparameter( documentationparameter( Haz ) ) 
  localinputparameter( documentationparameter( CrCat ) ) 
  localoutputparameter( documentationparameter( Risks ) ) 
  ) 
  containedpatterndeclaration( 
   procsolpatternreference( SIL Classification )  
   localinputparameter( documentationparameter( Haz ) ) 
  localinputparameter( documentationparameter( Risks ) ) 
  localoutputparameter( documentationparameter( FncCat ) ) 
  ) 
 containedpatterndeclaration( 
   procreqpatternreference( Establish System Safety Requirements )  
   publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( ToA ) ) 
   localinputparameter( documentationparameter( Risks ) ) 
  localoutputparameter( 
   parametersetalias( 
    alias( S-Req ) 
     requirementparameter( Req )  
    ) 
   ) 
  instantiates( 
    requirementartefact( Ref. Safety Requirements Specification )  
    requirementparameter( Req )  
   ) 
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  ) 
 containedpatterndeclaration( 
   prodsolpatternreference( Dual Modular Redundant )  
   publicoutputparameter( designparameter( S ) ) 
  ) 
 containedpatterndeclaration( 
   procsafcasepatternreference( Overall Safety )  
   publicinputparameter( documentationparameter( ToD ) ) 
  publicoutputparameter( safetycaseparameter( Case ) ) 
  localoutputparameter( safetycaseparameter( TechSaf ) ) 
  ) 
 containedpatterndeclaration( 
   prodsafcasepatternreference( Technical Safety )  
   localoutputparameter( safetycaseparameter( Case ) ) 
  localoutputparameter( safetycaseparameter( ERE ) ) 
  ) 
 containedpatterndeclaration( 
   prodsafcasepatternreference( Safety Requirements Satisfied )  
   localoutputparameter( safetycaseparameter( Case ) ) 
  localinputparameter( requirementparameter( Req ) ) 
  ) 
 combines( 
   prodreqpatternreference( Station Interlocking Requirements ) 
   parametersetalias( alias( 2TR ) ) 
   prodreqpatternreference( Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements) 
   parametersetalias( alias( LCR ) ) 
   procreqpatternreference( Establish System Safety Requirements ) 
   parametersetalias( alias( S-Req ) ) 
   publicoutputparameter(  
    parametersetalias(  
     alias( Req ) 
     parameterset( 
      alias( 2TR ) 
     alias( LCR ) 
     alias( S-Req ) 
     ) 
    ) 
   ) 
  ) 
 assigns( 
   procreqpatternreference( Hazard Analysis ) 
   documentationparameter( HzLg ) 
   procreqpatternreference( Risk Analysis ) 
   documentationparameter( Haz ) 
  ) 
 assigns( 
   procreqpatternreference( Hazard Analysis ) 
   documentationparameter( HzLg ) 
   procsolpatternreference( SIL Classification ) 
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   documentationparameter( Haz ) 
  ) 
 assigns( 
   procsolpatternreference( FTA ) 
   documentationparameter( FT ) 
   procreqpatternreference( Hazard Analysis ) 
   documentationparameter( AnHaz ) 
  ) 
 assigns( 
   procreqpatternreference( Risk Analysis ) 
   documentationparameter( Risks ) 
   procreqpatternreference( Establish System Safety Requirements ) 
   documentationparameter( Risks ) 
  ) 
 assigns( 
   procreqpatternreference( Risk Analysis ) 
   documentationparameter( Risks ) 
   procsolpatternreference( SIL Classification ) 
   documentationparameter( Risks ) 
  ) 
 assigns( 
   procsolpatternreference( SIL Classification ) 
   documentationparameter( FncCat ) 
   procreqpatternreference( Risk Analysis ) 
   documentationparameter( CrCat ) 
  ) 
 satisfies( 
  prodsolpatternreference( Dual Modular Redundant ) 
   designparameter( S )  
  patterngroupreference(  
    Station Interlocking Requirements 
   Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements 
   Establish System Safety Requirements  
   ) 
   parametersetalias( alias( Req ) ) 
  ) 
 assigns( 
   prodsolpatternreference( Dual Modular Redundant ) 
   designparameter( S ) 
   procsafcasepatternreference( Overall Safety ) 
   documentationparameter( ToD ) 
  ) 
 demonstrates( 
   procsafcasepatternreference( Overall Safety ) 
   safetycaseparameter( Case ) 
   prodsolpatternreference( Dual Modular Redundant ) 
   designparameter( S ) 
  ) 
 details( 
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  prodsafcasepatternreference( Technical Safety ) 
   safetycaseparameter( Case )  
  procsafcasepatternreference( Overall Safety ) 
   safetycaseparameter( TechSaf ) 
  ) 
 details( 
  prodsafcasepatternreference( Safety Requirements Satisfied ) 
   safetycaseparameter( Case )  
  prodsafcasepatternreference( Technical Safety ) 
   safetycaseparameter( ERE ) 
  ) 
 assigns( 
   procreqpatternreference( Establish System Safety Requirements ) 
   parametersetalias( alias( S-Req ) ) 
   prodsafcasepatternreference( Safety Requirements Satisfied ) 
   requirementparameter( Req ) 
  ) 
 serialinstantiation( 
   prodreqpatternreference( Station Interlocking Requirements) 
   prodreqpatternreference( Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements) 
 ) 
 serialinstantiation( 
   prodreqpatternreference( Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements ) 
   procreqpatternreference( Hazard Analysis ) 
 ) 
 parallelinstantiation( 
   procreqpatternreference( Hazard Analysis ) 
   procsolpatternreference( FTA ) 
 ) 
 serialinstantiation( 
   procreqpatternreference( Hazard Analysis ) 
   procreqpatternreference( Risk Analysis ) 
 ) 
 parallelinstantiation( 
   procreqpatternreference( Risk Analysis ) 
   procsolpatternreference( SIL Classification ) 
 ) 
 serialinstantiation( 
   procreqpatternreference( Risk Analysis ) 
   procreqpatternreference( Establish System Safety Requirements ) 
 ) 
 serialinstantiation( 
   procreqpatternreference( Establish System Safety Requirements ) 
   prodsolpatternreference( Dual Modular Redundant ) 
 ) 
 serialinstantiation( 
   prodsopatternreference( Dual Modular Redundant ) 
   procsafcasepatternreference( Overall Safety ) 
 ) 
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 serialinstantiation( 
   procrsafecasepatternreference( Overall Safety) 
   prodsafcasepatternreference( Technical Safety ) 
 ) 
 serialinstantiation( 
   prodsafcasepatternreference( Technical Safety ) 
   prodsafcasepatternreference( Safety Requirements Satisfied ) 
 ) 
 ) 
9.7.3 Translation 
The translation of the textual syntax of the composite pattern illustrated in Figure 39 results in the 
following English text: 
Two Track Station Interlocking requires the input: 
• a description ToA 
• a description Haz 
An assignment of an input of Two Track Station Interlocking is assigned to every correspondingly named 
input with public accessibility of contained patterns. An input defined with public accessibility is when 
introduced in the following demarked “(public)”, otherwise demarked “(local)”. 
Two Track Station Interlocking delivers the output: 
• a set of requirements Req 
• a design specification S 
• a safety case specification Case 
An output of Two Track Station Interlocking is delivered when the correspondingly named output, with 
public accessibility, is delivered from a contained pattern. An output with public accessibility is when 
introduced in the following demarked “(public)”, otherwise demarked “(local)”. 
Two Track Station Interlocking is instantiated such that: 
• the description Ref. System Description represents ToA 
• the description Ref. Hazards Description represents Haz 
• the design Ref. Design Specification represents S 
• the safety case Ref. Safety Demonstration represents Case 
Two Track Station Interlocking contains the patterns Station Interlocking Requirements, Level Crossing 
Interlocking Requirements, Hazard Analysis, FTA, Risk Analysis, SIL Classification, Establish System 
Safety Requirements, Dual Modular Redundant, Overall Safety, Technical Safety, and Safety 
Requirements Satisfied. 
2TR (alias for Req) (local) is the output of the requirement pattern Station Interlocking Requirements 
when applied to ToA (alias for Mch) (public). Station Interlocking Requirements is instantiated such that: 
• the requirements Ref. Two Track Station Requirements Specification represents Req 
LCR (alias for Req) (local) is the output of the requirement pattern Level Crossing Interlocking 
Requirements when applied to ToA (alias for Mch) (public). Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements is 
instantiated such that: 
• the requirements Ref. Level Crossing Requirements Specification represents Req 
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HzLg is the output of the process pattern Hazard Analysis when applied to ToA (public), Haz (public), 
and AnHaz (local). 
FT (local) is the output of the method pattern FTA when applied to ToA (public), and Haz (public). 
Risks (local) is the output of the process pattern Risk Analysis when applied to ToA (public), Haz (local), 
and CrCat (local). 
FncCat (local) is the output of the method pattern SIL Classification when applied to Haz (local), and 
Risks (local). 
S-Req (alias for Req) (local) is the output of the process pattern Establish System Safety Requirements 
when applied to ToA (public), and Risks (local). Establish System Safety Requirements is instantiated 
such that: 
• the requirements Ref. Safety Requirements Specification represents Req 
S (public) is the output of the design pattern Dual Modular Redundant. 
Case (public), and TechSaf (local) are the outputs of the safety case pattern Overall Safety when applied 
to ToD (public). 
ERE (local), and Case (local) are the outputs of the safety case pattern Technical Safety.  
Case (local) is the output of the safety case pattern Safety Requirements Satisfied when applied to Req 
(local). 
2TR, LCR, and S-Req are combined in a union where: 
• 2TR is the output from the requirement pattern Station Interlocking Requirements. 
• LCR is the output from the requirement pattern Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements. 
• S-Req is the output from the process pattern Establish System Safety Requirements. 
• The result of combining is represented by Req (alias for the set consisting of 2TR, LCR, and S-
Req) (public). 
HzLg is assigned to Haz where: 
• HzLg is the output from the process pattern Hazard Analysis. 
• Haz is input to the process pattern Risk Analysis. 
HzLg is assigned to Haz where: 
• HzLg is the output from the process pattern Hazard Analysis. 
• Haz is input to the method pattern SIL Classification. 
FT is assigned to AnHaz where: 
• FT is the output from the method pattern FTA. 
• AnHaz is input to the process pattern Hazard Analysis. 
Risks is assigned to Risks where: 
• Risks is the output from the process pattern Risk Analysis. 
• Risks is input to the process pattern Establish System Safety Requirements. 
Risks is assigned to Risks where: 
• Risks is the output from the process pattern Risk Analysis. 
• Risks is input to the method pattern SIL Classification. 
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FncCat is assigned to CrCat where: 
• FncCat is the output from the method pattern SIL Classification. 
• CrCat is input to the process pattern Risk Analysis. 
S is required to satisfy the requirements defined by Req where: 
• S is the output from the design pattern Dual Modular Redundant. 
• Req is the output from the patterns Station Interlocking Requirements, Level Crossing 
Interlocking Requirements, and Establish System Safety Requirements. 
S is assigned to ToD where: 
• S is the output from the design pattern Dual Modular Redundant. 
• ToD is input to the safety case pattern Overall Safety. 
Case is required to demonstrate safety of S where: 
• Case is the output from the safety case pattern Overall Safety. 
• S is the output from the design pattern Dual Modular Redundant. 
Case is required to detail TechSaf where: 
• Case is the output from the safety case pattern Technical Safety. 
• TechSaf is the output from the safety case pattern Overall Safety. 
Case is required to detail ERE where: 
• Case is the output from the safety case pattern Safety Requirements Satisfied. 
• ERE is the output from the safety case pattern Technical Safety. 
S-Req is assigned to Req where: 
• S-Req is the output from the process pattern Establish System Safety Requirements. 
• Req is input to the safety case pattern Safety Requirements Satisfied. 
Two Track Station Interlocking defines the following order for instantiating patterns: 
• The pattern Station Interlocking Requirements should be instantiated before the pattern Level 
Crossing Interlocking Requirements. 
• The pattern Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements should be instantiated before the pattern 
Hazard Analysis. 
• The patterns Hazard Analysis and FTA may be instantiated in parallel. 
• The pattern Hazard Analysis should be instantiated before the pattern Risk Analysis. 
• The patterns Risk Analysis and SIL Classification may be instantiated in parallel. 
• The pattern Risk Analysis should be instantiated before the pattern Establish System Safety 
Requirements. 
• The pattern Establish System Safety Requirements should be instantiated before the pattern 
Dual Modular Redundant. 
• The pattern Dual Modular Redundant should be instantiated before the pattern Overall Safety. 
• The pattern Overall Safety should be instantiated before the pattern Technical Safety. 
• The pattern Technical Safety should be instantiated before the pattern Safety Requirements 
Satisfied. 
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10. CONCLUSIONS 
The SaCS pattern language has been designed as support for developing conceptual safety designs. 
The support is offered by a set of patterns acting as guidance on different aspects of conceptual safety 
design and by a notation for modelling how a combined set of patterns are applied for conceptualisation. 
The patterns of the language are divided into two main groups, basic patterns and composite patterns. 
The available basic patterns in SaCS, fully detailed in [4] and [5], are defined in a format that allows the 
essence of a problem and its solution to be comprehended without any additional explanation. A 
composite pattern is defined graphically in order to facilitate a simple presentation of a potentially 
complex combination of patterns. A composite may also specify the application of patterns for 
documentation purposes.  
This report details the syntax of SaCS patterns and further details a structured semantics for the 
patterns. A pattern in SaCS has input and output parameters and may be instantiated in different 
contexts. The semantics of a pattern facilitates a common understanding of the pattern and its 
application. The translation of patterns into their semantics is divided into two steps: step one is to 
translate a pattern definition into its textual syntax, and step two is to translate a textual syntax into 
English. The first step is for basic patterns described in Section 3, and for composite pattern described in 
Section 5 and further detailed in Section 6. The second step is performed by matching an expression 
defined according to a textual syntax with an appropriate semantic rule to form an understandable text in 
English. The semantic rules are described for basic patterns in Section 4, and for composite patterns in 
Section 7. Examples of the systematic translation of several basic patterns and several composite 
patterns are provided in Section 8 and in Section 9, respectively. We find the translation relative 
straightforward to perform, meaning that little knowledge beyond the definition of the syntax and the 
structured semantics of patterns as presented in this report is required in order to perform the translation. 
The translation procedure should be possible to automate. 
The intention of translating patterns into English is to facilitate a common understanding of the meaning 
patterns in a commonly used spoken and written language. The words and sentences in the semantic 
rules are words and sentences in English. The rules are defined to facilitate a translation of a textual 
syntax, fragment by fragment, into an understandable text in English. The fragmented translations are 
systematically combined into a description of the pattern as a whole.  The resulting translations are 
expressed as a text in English that may be understood. 
We have also applied SaCS in two cases, fully detailed in HWR-1029 [4] and HWR-1037 [5], in order to 
test the applicability of the SaCS method and the SaCS pattern language for conceptual safety design. In 
both cases the pattern language provided the needed expressiveness in terms of providing a suitable set 
of patterns and a notation for modelling the application of patterns.  
For the reasons mentioned above we argue that the SaCS pattern language facilitates the specification 
of patterns and their application as guidance for conceptual safety design. Further, we argue that the 
translation of SaCS patterns into their semantics is straightforward. 
  
HWR-1052 
- 83 - 
 
11. REFERENCES 
[1] H. E. I. Dahl, I. Hogganvik, K. Stølen, Structured Semantics for the CORAS Security Risk 
Modelling Language, STF07 A970, SNTEF ICT, 2007 
[2] GSN Working Group, GSN Community Standard, version 1.0, York, England, 2011. 
[3] J. G. Hall, L. Rapanotti, and M. Jackson, Problem Frame Semantics for Software Development, 
Software and Systems Modeling, Volume 4, Number 2, pp. 189-198, 2005 
[4] A. A. Hauge and K. Stølen, A Pattern-based Method for Safe Control Systems – Exemplified 
Within Nuclear Power Production, HWR-1029, OECD Halden Reactor Project, 2013. 
[5] A. A. Hauge and K. Stølen, A Pattern-based Method for Safe Control Systems – Exemplified 
Within Railway Signalling, HWR-1037, OECD Halden Reactor Project, 2013. 
[6] International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), IEC61025, Edition 
2.0, 2006 
[7] ISO/IEC 14977:1996(E). Information technology – Syntactic metalanguage – Extended BNF, first 
edition, 1996.  
[8] M. Jackson, Problem Frames: Analysing and Structuring Software Development Problems, 
Addison-Wesley Longman Publishing Co., 2001. 
[9] T. Kelly and R. Weaver, The Goal Structuring Notation – A Safety Argument Notation, In 
Proceedings of the dependable systems and networks 2004 workshop on assurance cases, 2004 
[10] M. S. Lund, A. Refsdal, and K. Stølen, Semantics for UML models for dynamic behaviour: A 
survey of different approaches. In book titled Model-Based Engineering of Embedded Real-Time 
Systems, LNCS 6100, pp. 77-103, Springer, 2010. 
[11] OMG, Unified Modeling Language: Superstructure, version 2.4.1, OMG Document: formal/2012-
05-07, Object Management Group, 2012 
 
Chapter 10
Paper 2: A Pattern-based Method
for Safe Control Conceptualisation
Exempliﬁed Within Nuclear Power
Production
Instead of the paper we have included the full technical report, HWR-1029 rev 2, OECD
Halden Reactor Project, Institute for energy technology, Halden, Norway, 2014.
211
Paper 2: A Pattern-based Method for Safe Control Conceptualisation Exempliﬁed
Within Nuclear Power Production
212
HWR-1029 rev 2 
  
 
 __________________ OECD HALDEN REACTOR PROJECT _________________  
A Pattern-based Method for Safe Control Conceptualisation – 
Exemplified Within Nuclear Power Production 
by 
André A. Hauge1,2 and Ketil Stølen2,3 
1Institute for energy technology, OECD Halden Reactor Project,  
2 Department of Informatics, University of Oslo, Norway 
 3 Department of Networked Systems and Services, SINTEF ICT 
andre.hauge@hrp.no, ketil.stolen@sintef.no 
2014-06-04 
  
  
NOTICE 
THIS REPORT IS FOR USE BY 
HALDEN  PROJECT PARTICIPANTS ONLY 
 The right to utilise information originating from the research work of the Halden Project is limited     
 to persons and undertakings specifically given the right by one of the Project member organisa-     
 tions in accordance with the Project's rules for "Communication of Results of Scientific Research     
 and Information". The content of this report should thus neither be disclosed to others nor be     
 reproduced, wholly or partially, unless written permission to do so has been obtained from the     
 appropriate Project member organisation. 
HWR-1029 rev 2 
   
FOREWORD 
The experimental operation of the Halden Boiling Water Reactor and associated research 
programmes are sponsored through an international agreement by:  
 
• the Institutt for energiteknikk (IFE), Norway, 
• the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre SCK•CEN, acting also on behalf of other public 
or private organisations in Belgium, 
• the Risø DTU National Laboratory for Sustainable Energy, Technical University of  Denmark, 
• the Finnish Ministry of Employment and the Economy (TYÖ), 
• the Electricité de France (EDF), 
• the Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, representing a 
German group of companies working in agreement with the German Federal Ministry 
of Economics and Technology, 
• the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES), 
• the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), acting also on behalf of other 
public or private organisations in Korea, 
• the Spanish Centro de Investigaciones Energéticas, Medioambientales y Tecnológicas 
(CIEMAT), representing a group of national and industry organisations in Spain, 
• the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM), representing public and privat nuclear 
organisations in Sweden, 
• the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate ENSI, representing also the Swiss 
nuclear utilities (Swissnuclear) and the Paul Scherrer Institute, 
• the National Nuclear Laboratory (NNL), representing a group of nuclear licensing and 
industry organisations in the United Kingdom, and 
• the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), 
and as associated parties: 
• Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), 
• the Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI), representing a 
group of nuclear research and industry organisations in Japan 
• the Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd. (MNF) 
• the Czech Nuclear Research Institute (NRI), 
• the French Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN), 
• the Ulba Metallurgical Plant JSC in Kazakhstan,  
• the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, KFKI Atomic Energy Research Institute, 
• the JSC "TVEL" and NRC "Kurchatov Institute", Russia, 
• All-Russian Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plants Operation (VNIIAES), Russia, 
• the Slovakian VUJE - Nuclear Power Plant Research Institute, and 
• EU JRC Institute for Transuranium Elements, Karlsruhe, 
and associated parties from USA: 
• the Westinghouse Electric Power Company, LLC (WEC), 
• the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI),  
• the Global Nuclear Fuel (GNF) – Americas, LLC and GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy, LLC, and 
• the US Department of Energy (DOE) 
 
The right to utilise information originating from the research work of the Halden Project is limited to 
persons and undertakings specifically given this right by one of these Project member organisations. 
Recipients are invited to use information contained in this report to the discretion normally applied to 
research and development programmes. Recipients are urged to contact the Project for further and 
more recent information on programme items of special interest. 
    
 
Institutt for energiteknikk 
OECD HALDEN REACTOR PROJECT 
 
Title 
A Pattern-based Method for Safe Control Conceptualisation – Exemplified Within 
Nuclear Power Production 
Author: 
André A. Hauge and Ketil Stølen 
Document ID: 
HWR-1029 rev 2 
 
 
First issued: 
February 2013 
Keywords: 
conceptual safety design; pattern language; safety 
Abstract: 
This HWR exemplifies the application of a pattern-based method, called Safe 
Control Systems (SaCS), on a case from the nuclear domain. The method is 
supported by a pattern language and provides guidance on development of 
conceptual safety designs. By a conceptual safety design we mean an early 
stage specification of system requirements, system design, and safety case for a 
safety critical system. The SaCS pattern language offers six different kinds of 
basic patterns as well as operators for combining basic patterns into composite 
patterns. A composite pattern may be instantiated into a conceptual safety 
design. 
 
 
Issue Date:  Name Signature Date 
2014-06-04 Prepared by: André A. Hauge Sign. 2014-04-20 
Confidential grade: Reviewed by: Vikash Katta Sign. 2014-05-19 
HRP Only Approved by: Terje Johnsen Sign. 2014-06-04 
04 
 MAIL TELEPHONE TELEFAX  TELEFAX  
 P.O. BOX 173 +47 69 21 22 00 Administration + 47 69 21 22 01 IND/OC div. + 47 69 21 24 90 
 NO-1751 HALDEN  Nuclear Safety + 47 69 21 22 01 VISIT/RID/COSS div. + 47 69 21 24 60 
 Norway  Purchasing Office + 47 69 21 24 40  Reactor Plant + 47 69 21 24 70 
 
HWR-1029 rev 2 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 1
2. SUCCESS CRITERIA ............................................................................................ 2
3. THE CASE: LOAD FOLLOWING MODE CONTROL ............................................ 3
4. ELICIT FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS .............................................................. 6
4.1 Pattern Selection ................................................................................................. 6
4.2 Pattern Instantiation ............................................................................................. 8
4.3 Pattern Composition .......................................................................................... 10
5. ESTABLISH DESIGN BASIS ............................................................................... 11
5.1 Pattern Selection ............................................................................................... 11
5.2 Pattern Instantiation ........................................................................................... 12
5.3 Pattern Composition .......................................................................................... 15
6. ELICIT SAFETY REQUIREMENTS ..................................................................... 17
6.1 Pattern Selection ............................................................................................... 17
6.2 Pattern Instantiation ........................................................................................... 18
6.3 Pattern Composition .......................................................................................... 24
7. REVISE DESIGN ................................................................................................. 26
8. ESTABLISH SAFETY CASE ............................................................................... 27
8.1 Pattern Selection ............................................................................................... 27
8.2 Pattern Instantiation ........................................................................................... 28
8.3 Pattern Composition .......................................................................................... 31
9. COMBINE FRAGMENTS ..................................................................................... 33
9.1 Pattern Composition .......................................................................................... 33
10. SUMMARY OF RESULTS ................................................................................. 35
10.1 Requirements Specification ............................................................................. 35
10.2 Design Specification ........................................................................................ 36
10.3 Safety Case Specification ................................................................................ 40
11. DISCUSSION ..................................................................................................... 42
12. CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................. 47
13. REFERENCES .................................................................................................. 48
APPENDIX A OVERVIEW OF THE SACS PATTERN LANGUAGE ....................... 50
A.1 The SaCS Method ............................................................................................. 50
A.2 The SaCS Pattern Language ............................................................................ 54
HWR-1029 rev 2 
 
A.3 The SaCS Graphical Notation ........................................................................... 56
APPENDIX B THE PATTERNS ............................................................................... 60
B.1 Variable Demand for Service ............................................................................. 64
B.2 FMEA ................................................................................................................. 70
B.3 FTA .................................................................................................................... 73
B.4 I&C Functions Categorisation ............................................................................ 76
B.5 Trusted Backup ................................................................................................. 79
B.6 Establish Concept .............................................................................................. 85
B.7 Hazard Identification .......................................................................................... 89
B.8 Hazard Analysis ................................................................................................. 92
B.9 Risk Analysis ..................................................................................................... 95
B.10 Establish System Safety Requirements .......................................................... 99
B.11 Overall Safety ................................................................................................ 102
B.12 Technical Safety ............................................................................................ 106
B.13 Code of Practice ............................................................................................ 110
B.14 Cross Reference ............................................................................................ 114
B.15 Explicit Risk Evaluation ................................................................................. 117
B.16 Safety Requirements Satisfied ...................................................................... 121
B.17 Assessment Evidence ................................................................................... 124
B.18 Process Quality Evidence ............................................................................. 127
B.19 Process Compliance Evidence ...................................................................... 130
B.20 Deterministic Evidence .................................................................................. 133
B.21 Probabilistic Evidence ................................................................................... 137
B.22 Basic Assumption Evidence .......................................................................... 141
HWR-1029 rev 2 
- 1 - 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This report presents a pattern-based method, referred to as Safe Control Systems 
(SaCS), facilitating development of conceptual safety designs of safety critical systems. 
By a conceptual safety design we mean an early stage specification of system 
requirements, system design, and safety case for a safety critical system. A summary 
of HWR-1029 is published in [11]. Intended users of SaCS are system developers, 
safety engineers, as well as hardware and software engineers. SaCS has also been 
applied for the development of a conceptual safety design of an example railway 
interlocking system, documented in HWR-1037 [12]. 
The SaCS method interleaves three main activities each of which is divided into sub-
activities: 
S. Pattern Selection – The purpose of this step is to support the conception of a 
safety design with respect to a given development case by:  
a. Selecting SaCS patterns for requirement elicitation.  
b. Selecting SaCS patterns for establishing design basis.  
c. Selecting SaCS patterns for establishing safety case. 
C. Pattern Composition The purpose of this step is to specify the intended use of 
the selected patterns by:  
a. Specifying compositions of patterns.  
b. Specifying instantiations of patterns. 
I. Pattern Instantiation The purpose of this step is to instantiate the composite 
pattern specification by:  
a. Selecting pattern instantiation order.  
b. Conducting stepwise instantiation. 
Established formats for expressing design solutions, e.g., as presented in [1], [3], [5], 
[8], and [10], do not provide sufficient guidance for their users on whether the solution 
presented is applicable within a safety critical system context. A safety critical system 
design may be regarded as being sufficiently safe for its intended purpose only when 
the necessary evidence providing safety assurance has been established. Safety 
assurance is achieved by evidence providing confidence in a system being developed 
according to a suitable process as well as evidence for the system possessing required 
quality characteristics. The SaCS method has been developed to improve state-of-the-
art in the following sense: 
• Safety focus: The SaCS method improves state-of-the-art by offering six kinds of 
basic patterns reflecting the practises used for development of safety critical 
systems. Patterns are categorised according to two perspectives on how to 
achieve safety assurance: Process Assurance and Product Assurance. Both 
perspectives details patterns according to three aspects: Requirement, Solution, 
and Safety Case. Each basic pattern contains an instantiation rule that may be 
used for assessing whether a result is an instantiation of a pattern. The patterns 
support the procurement and demonstration of a safe design concept. 
• Pattern composition: The SaCS method improves state-of-the-art by providing a 
graphical notation for the specification of a pattern composition. The graphical 
notation is used to explicitly detail the composition and may be used to assess 
whether a conceptual safety design is an instantiation of a pattern composition. 
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The SaCS pattern language is inspired by classical pattern literature, e.g., [1], [5], and 
[8]. The patterns are defined based on safety domain needs as expressed in 
international safety standards and guidelines, e.g., [14], [16], [17], [18], [19], and [27]. 
The graphical notation is inspired by languages for system modelling and research 
within human cognitive processes and visualisation theory, e.g., [6], [25], [23], and [28].  
This report describes the application of the SaCS method and its supporting pattern 
language on an example case from the nuclear domain. 
The report is structured as follows: Section 1 introduces the SaCS method and its 
intended contribution to state-of-the-art. Section 2 outlines our hypothesis and main 
predictions. Section 3 describes the case on developing a load following reactor control 
design. Section 4 exemplifies how functional requirements are elicited. Section 5 
exemplifies how a design basis is established. Section 6 exemplifies how safety 
requirements for an initial design are elicited. Section 7 describes the revision of the 
base design based on inputs from the step on establishing safety requirements. 
Section 8 exemplifies how a safety case for demonstrating that the design is safe is 
established. Section 9 exemplifies how fragments of the pattern solution are combined 
into an overall pattern solution for the case. Section 10 summarises results. Section 11 
discusses the fulfilment of success criteria. Section 12 concludes. 
Appendix A provides an overview of the SaCS method. Appendix B contains pattern 
definitions. 
2. SUCCESS CRITERIA 
The SaCS method intends to support users like system developers, safety engineers, 
hardware engineers, and software engineers in the early stages of system 
development. The primary objective is to facilitate development of conceptual safety 
designs of safety critical systems. A safety critical system [22] represents here a 
system that upon failure may result in loss of life, significant damage to environment, or 
unacceptable economic losses. A system may be regarded as sufficiently safe for its 
intended purpose if it is free form unacceptable failures. In order for stakeholders to 
take informed decisions upon the further development of a system design concept into 
its implementation, the safety objectives as well as information on the ability of a 
system design to enforce safety should also be provided. In order to capture this need, 
we provide a definition of a conceptual safety design as follows: 
Definition A conceptual safety design is a triple consisting of an early stage 
specification of: 
• system requirements (R), 
• system design (D), 
• safety case (S). 
An implementation I satisfies a conceptual safety design (R, D, S) if there exists a 
safety case SC in accordance with S that demonstrates that I is safe with respect to the 
specifications of R and D. Although the objective of a safety case is to argue that an 
implementation is sufficiently safe to apply in its intended context, the SaCS method 
only addresses the activities leading to the specification of a conceptual safety design. 
In the same way as a system design is refined into its implementation, so is the safety 
case specification refined into a safety case. 
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The SaCS method provides a pattern-based method supporting the development of 
conceptual safety designs by systematically building a case specific composite pattern 
specification that is instantiated in order to provide a conceptual safety design. We 
define instantiate in the context of SaCS as follows: 
Definition A conceptual safety design instantiates a SaCS composite pattern if each 
element of the triple can be instantiated from the SaCS composite pattern according to 
the instantiation rules of the individual patterns within the composite and according to 
the rule for composition. 
In the context of SaCS, safety engineering concepts and best practices are expressed 
by patterns, e.g., design pattern, requirement pattern, safety case pattern. A result of 
instantiating a pattern, e.g., a design specification, a requirement specification, or a 
safety case specification, is the result of applying a pattern in a specific context. Each 
basic SaCS pattern describes its instantiation rule. The instantiation rule provides 
guidance on valid instantiations of the pattern. As a conceptual safety design according 
to the definition is a triple of different and related specifications, the SaCS method must 
in order to be effective for safety design conceptualisation facilitate the procurement of 
the triple. We claim that SaCS is effective for this task by facilitating the specification of 
a composite pattern that is easily instantiated into a conceptual safety design, and 
define our hypothesis as follows: 
H: The SaCS method facilitates effective and efficient development of conceptual 
safety designs that are:  
• In accordance with safety objectives. 
• At a sufficient level of detail.  
• Easy to use.  
In order to test our hypothesis, we deduce the following predictions that should hold for 
the conceptual safety design that is produced when applying SaCS on the load 
following case described in Section 3: 
P: Application of the SaCS method on the load following case described in Section 3 
results in a conceptual safety design that characterises the load following case and is 
easily instantiated from a composite SaCS pattern. Furthermore, the conceptual safety 
design: 
a) Is in accordance with safety objectives – the conceptual safety design is defined 
in agreement with safety objectives. 
b) Is at a sufficient level of detail – the conceptual safety design is expressed in a 
manner that is sufficiently detailed for an early stage specification and may be 
easily understood. 
c) Is easy to use – the conceptual safety design may be easily extended, detailed 
or refined. 
3. THE CASE: LOAD FOLLOWING MODE CONTROL 
In many countries, power-producing nuclear reactors are controlled in a base load 
mode that is at maximum effect. In countries where a large share of the consumed 
electricity comes from nuclear power plants (NPP), there is a need for controlling the 
electricity production in accordance with demand that is varying with time, this is called 
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operating in a load following mode [24]. In France, approximately 75 % of the total 
electricity production is generated by nuclear power [24]. In order to adjust production 
according to demand variances, load following mode control is applied.  
There are two primary drivers that necessitate load following mode control: (1) the need 
to manoeuvre NPP power production in line with daily and seasonal variances in power 
demand; and (2) the need to mitigate power production fluctuation amongst power 
producing utilities in a power grid. For the latter driver, the intent is to assure that the 
total power production in the grid meets a given demand and that loss of production 
due to intermittent power producers (e.g. wind and solar power utilities) or sudden fall in 
production at a utility may be mitigated. 
Load following may be performed differently depending on the type of reactor. In the 
case of a Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR), sketched out in Figure 1, electricity 
production is typically controlled using: 
• Control rods: Control rods are inserted into the core, leading to the control rods 
absorbing neutrons and thereby reducing the fission process. 
• Coolant as moderator: Boron acid is added in the primary cooling water, leading 
to the coolant absorbing neutrons and thereby reducing the fission process. 
Control rods may be efficiently used to adjust core reactivity; significant change in effect 
may be experienced within minutes, as the core will react immediately upon insertion. 
The process can also be reversed in an equally efficient manner by retracting the 
control rods. When using boron acid as a moderator, there is a time delay of several 
hours to reach destined reactivity level. Reversing the process requires filtering out the 
boron from the moderator, which is a slow and costly process. The concentration of 
boron acid in the moderator is controlled via the letdown and makeup channels. Water 
is drained via the letdown channel, and purified water with or without boron acid is 
supplied via the makeup channel. 
When using boron acid in the coolant as moderator, fuel is consumed evenly in the 
reactor as the coolant circulates in the core. When using the control rods as moderator, 
the fuel is consumed unevenly in the reactor as the control rods are inserted at specific 
sections of the core and normally they would not be fully inserted. When fuel rods are 
replaced, good fuel economy is that the fuel is fully used. 
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Figure 1 provides a simplified view of the process and the design of the system that 
controls the process in our case. 
 
 
Figure 1 - The main parts of the PWR 
The plant process in Figure 1 consists of different controlled loops where pressurised 
water is heated in the core and circulated in the primary loop. Thermal energy is 
transferred from the primary loop to a secondary loop in a steam generator. Steam 
provided by the steam generator drives a turbine. The turbine drives an electrical 
generator that produces electricity to the grid. 
A system (system of systems) interacts with the process in order to control the thermal 
output of the reactor. We delimit the complexity of the illustration by only including the 
main systems and by focusing on the two subsystems of the “Process Control” system 
that are relevant for our case, identified as “Control Rod Information and Control 
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System” and “Boron Control System”. These two systems interact with the plant 
process by sending actuation signals to the RDA (Rod Drive Actuators) and CVCA 
(Chemical Volume Control Actuators), respectively. 
A successful introduction of an adaptable load following mode control requires 
satisfying the following goals: 
G1 Produce according to demand: assure high manoeuvrability so that production 
may be easily scaled and assure precision by compensating for fuel burn up. 
G2 Cost optimisation: assure optimal balance of control means (use of control rods 
versus boron acid to moderate process) with respect to cost (cost associated 
with the use of control rods versus boron acid to moderate process). 
G3 Fuel utilisation: assure optimal fuel utilisation 
In the following sections, we will exemplify the application of the SaCS method for 
deriving an adaptable load following mode control system. The system under 
development is referred to as ALF (Adaptable Load Following). ALF is intended as an 
upgrade of an existing NPP control system. The architecture of the existing NPP 
system is illustrated in Figure 1. Adaptability [7] is introduced as a means to 
automatically calibrate the controller performing control rod control during operation in 
order to accommodate fuel burn up. The scope is limited to goal G1 only. 
4. ELICIT FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
4.1 Pattern Selection 
The selection of SaCS basic patterns1 is performed by the use of the pattern selection 
map illustrated in Figure 22. Selection starts at the upper left corner and follows the 
direction of the arrows through the selection map. Pattern selection ends when all 
selection points have been explored. A diamond represents a choice between 
alternatives where more than one alternative may be chosen. The patterns with the 
symbol “*” next to their names in Figure 2 are used in this report. The different icons 
placed adjacent to pattern identifiers in Figure 2 symbolises different types of patterns. 
The different pattern types are indicated in Figure 3. The patterns are defined in 
Appendix B. 
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Figure 2 Pattern Selection Map 
All the patterns in Figure 2 are known as Basic Patterns. Each of these patterns 
belongs to one of the two groups called Process Assurance patterns and Product 
Assurance patterns. Within each of these two groups of patterns we define three kinds 
of patterns: Requirement, Solution, and Safety Case. For example, the Solution type 
within Process Assurance is for patterns on methods supporting the process of 
developing the product. Whereas the Solution type within Product Assurance is for 
patterns on design of the product to be developed. Figure 3 illustrates the different 
icons that may be used for identifying the classification of a pattern.  
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Figure 3 Icons for symbolising different types of patterns 
In choice (A) of Figure 2, different product assurance requirement patterns are 
indicated. We assume in this report that the information provided in Section 2 
sufficiently details the development objectives and context such that the pattern 
Establish Context may be passed. The pattern Variable Demand for Service in choice 
(A) captures the problem of specifying requirements for a system that shall adjust 
control of a NPP that experiences changes in demand for electricity as well as in the 
power production environment. The pattern is regarded as suitable for elicitation of 
requirements with respect to the objective defined by goal G1 described in Section 2.  
4.2 Pattern Instantiation 
The pattern Variable Demand for Service referred to in Figure 2 is a product assurance 
requirement pattern. The pattern is described in appendix B.1, and an excerpt from the 
pattern is given in Figure 4. 

 
Figure 4 Excerpt - Variable Demand for Service 
Figure 4 defines a SaCS adapted version (annotated with the dotted drawn enclosing 
frame, rectangles with arrows on the edges of the frame indicates input and output 
parameters) of the problem frames notation [20]. It provides the requirements analyst 
with a means for elaborating upon the problem of change in a NPP production 
environment in order to derive requirements (represented by Req) for a system under 
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construction (represented by the element Machine) that shall control a plant 
(represented by Plant) such that a given objective (represented by Obj) is fulfilled. 
When Variable Demand for Service is instantiated, the Req parameter indicated in 
Figure 4 is instantiated with respect to the context given by the instantiation of the 
parameters Obj and Plnt. In Section 4.1, we selected the Variable Demand for Service 
pattern as support for eliciting requirements for a PWR system upgrade with respect to 
goal G1. Therefore, the parameter Obj is instantiated in the context of the defined goal 
identified by G1, and the parameters Plnt and Mch are instantiated in the context of the 
specification of the PWR system (see Figure 1) that represents the context of the ALF 
system upgrade.  When instantiated, the parameter Plnt represents the nuclear power 
production process and the equipment that is controlled (e.g., the reactor, pressuriser, 
steam turbine, and generator) and Mch represents the instrumentation and control 
system that performs control. It is the Process Control system that performs control and 
the ALF system is intended to be a part of Process Control.  
The Variable Demand for Service pattern described in appendix B.1 includes the 
definition of a set of abstract requirements. The abstract requirements are identified in 
the pattern description on the form “R.n” where n is a running number. We derive 
requirements for the ALF system by the use of the Variable Demand for Service pattern 
where the outputs of pattern instantiation are context specific requirements on the form 
“FR.n” where n is a running number. The outcome of pattern instantiation is collected in 
Table 1 where the column with heading “Req. ID” contains unique identifiers for each 
derived requirement, the column with heading “Ref. ID” contains a reference to the 
abstract requirement defined in Variable Demand for Service that served as its basis, 
and the column with heading “Requirement” contains the requirement text. 
Table 1 Requirements for Variable Demand for Service 
Req. 
ID 
Ref. 
ID 
Requirement 
FR.1 R.1 ALF system shall monitor the demand for electricity required by the grid 
by acquiring the GDfE (Grid Demand for Electricity) signal from the 
PCBUS (Process Control BUS).  
FR.2 R.1 ALF system shall monitor the reactor power output by acquiring the 
RPM (Reactor Power Measured) signal from SENS (SENsor data 
acquisition). 
FR.3 R.1 ALF system shall monitor the control rod position by acquiring the CRP 
(Control Rod Pattern) signal from SENS (SENsor data acquisition). 
FR.4 R.1 ALF system shall monitor the boron acid concentration by acquiring the 
BC (Boron Concentration) signal from SENS (SENsor data acquisition). 
FR.5 R.2 ALF system shall acquire GDfE signal by polling the PCBUS. 
FR.6 R.2 ALF system shall acquire validated RPM, CRP, BC signals by request to 
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SENS. 
FR.7 R.3 ALF system shall poll for GDfE signal at a rate 10 times per second.  
FR.8 R.5 ALF system shall maintain a history over GDfE, CRP, BC and RPM. 
FR.9 R.5 ALF system shall calculate a value DEVRP (DEViation from Required 
Power) that shall indicate non-optimal reactor control when operating in 
load following mode. 
FR.10 R.6 ALF system shall calculate an indicator CALCI (CALibrate Control rod 
pattern Indicator) that shall identify the need for calibration of control rod 
patterns by the use of the history of DEVRP, CRP and BC. 
FR.11 R.9 ALF system shall provide a mechanism for automatic calibration of 
control rod patterns based on CALCI indicator. 
FR.12 R.10 ALF system shall activate calibration of the control rod patterns when 
the need to calibrate is indicated by the CALCI indicator. 
FR.13 R.13 ALF system shall provide reactor control by providing actuation signals 
to RDA and CVCA. 
4.3 Pattern Composition 
Figure 5 illustrates a composite pattern named Functional Requirements defined 
according to the syntax of SaCS [13]. The composite contains only one pattern that is 
named Variable Demand for Service.  
 
Figure 5 Definition of the composite "Functional Requirements" 
A composite pattern describes an intended use of a set of patterns (containing at least 
one pattern). A specific pattern is referred to by the use of a pattern reference. A 
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pattern reference is illustrated by placing an identifier of a pattern that is referenced 
adjacent to an icon identifying the type of the pattern. 
Figure 5 specifies a composite pattern named Functional Requirements. Input 
parameters to the composite are Obj, Mch, and Plnt. Output parameter of the 
composite is F-Req. The horizontal line below the composite pattern icon demarks the 
end of the declaration of the composite, and everything beneath the line defines the 
content of the composite. The composite contains one pattern named Variable Demand 
for Service. The input and output parameters of the composite is matched to the 
parameters that are defined as inputs (symbolised with a thick black arrow pointing 
towards a list of parameters) and outputs (symbolised with a thick black arrow pointing 
away from a list of parameters) in the content part of the composite pattern by a 
matching of parameter identifiers. An alias F-Req is defined for the parameter Req of 
the pattern Variable Demand for Service. Any instantiation of the input parameters to 
the composite implies that the correspondingly named input parameters of the 
contained patterns, here Variable Demand for Service, are similarly instantiated. Any 
instantiation of an output parameter of a contained pattern implies that the 
correspondingly named output parameter of the composite is similarly instantiated. An 
instantiation of a parameter is symbolised by drawing a dotted line between an artefact 
reference (consisting of an icon for symbolising the type of artefact and an identifier for 
providing a reference to a specific artefact) and a parameter. 
5. ESTABLISH DESIGN BASIS 
5.1 Pattern Selection 
In choice (E) of Figure 2, a set of alternative design patterns can be selected. We go 
from eliciting functional requirements in Section 4, to considering design alternatives 
that may fulfil the required function here as an alternative to strictly following the order 
that is depicted in Figure 2, i.e., from choice (A) to choice (E) instead of from choice (A) 
to Hazard Identification to choice (B) and so on. All design patterns in choice (E) 
describes adaptable control concepts. The patterns differ in how adaptable control is 
approached and how negative effects due to potential erroneous adaptation are 
mitigated. 
The Trusted Backup pattern, referred to in Figure 2 and defined in Appendix B.5, 
describes a system concept where an adaptable controller may operate freely in a 
delimited operational state space. Safety is assured by a redundant non-adaptable 
controller that operates in a broader state space and in parallel with the adaptable 
controller. A control delegator grants control privileges to the most suitable controller at 
any given time based on switching rules and information from safety monitoring.  
The Trusted Backup is selected as a design basis for the ALF system based on an 
evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the different design patterns with 
respect to their ability to fulfil functional requirements, i.e., FR.1 to FR.13, identified in 
Section 4. 
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5.2 Pattern Instantiation 
Figure 6 is an excerpt from the Trusted Backup pattern. A part of the definition of the 
pattern is a UML [25] diagram and this is reproduced in Figure 6. The pattern definition 
also includes textual descriptions expressing the expected interactions between system 
parts. Requirements may be associated with the system (denoted S for short in Figure 
6) or any part (denoted AC, AL, CL, TC, M, CD for short) described by the pattern. 
When the Trusted Backup pattern was instantiated, the requirements defined in Section 
4 were associated with the component denoted as S in the pattern description. 
 
 
Figure 6 Excerpt – Trusted Backup 
The instantiation of Trusted Backup resulted in a design specification identified as ALF 
Dgn. The ALF Dgn specification is here represented by the system illustrated in Figure 
7, Figure 8 and Figure 9 as well as the belonging textual descriptions. The ALF Dgn 
design is an interpretation of the Trusted Backup pattern in the context described in 
Section 3.  
The following is a mapping between parts of the ALF Dgn and parts described in the 
Trusted Backup pattern:  
• ALF in Figure 7 is an instance of S in Figure 6. 
• ACRAC in Figure 8 is an instance of AC in Figure 6. 
• CCRAC in Figure 8 is an instance of TC in Figure 6. 
• CRA in Figure 8 is an instance of CD in Figure 6. 
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• CRC in Figure 8 is intended to contain a part providing the monitoring 
functionality as represented by the M part of Figure 6 in addition to other 
functionality. 
• The iBUS interface in Figure 7 represents the interface towards the reactor 
controller and relevant reactor process data identified as the interfaces o, I and r 
in Figure 6. 
• The interfaces iRDA and iCVCA in Figure 7 represents the interface to plant 
actuators identified as interface c in Figure 6. 
• The iSENS interface in Figure 7 represents the interface to plant sensors 
identified as interface y in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 7 The ALF Design 
The ALF system illustrated in Figure 7 consists of two interacting subsystems, CRICS 
(Control Rod Information and Control System) and BCS (Boron Control System). The 
CRICS system is detailed in Figure 8, and the BCS system is detailed in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 8 The CRICS system 
The CRICS system illustrated in Figure 8 incorporates adaptability in the part identified 
as ACRAC. As stated in [24], fuel burn up has significant influence on the 
manoeuvrability of the reactor such that a higher boron acid concentration is required in 
the beginning of the fuel cycle than later in order to moderate reactivity. The 
concentration of boron acid is decreased with time. At the end of the fuel cycle the 
boron concentration is almost zero and the control rods are in the upper position, thus 
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the manoeuvrability of the reactor decreases. The ACRAC system is intended to 
automatically adjust and calibrate the control rod insertion patterns in the core and 
compensate for fuel burn up. The ACRAC system is also intended to account for the 
decreased need for boron acid in the moderator as the fuel reaches the end of the fuel 
cycle.  
 
 
Figure 9 The BCS system 
The CRICS system illustrated in Figure 8 is intended to work in the following manner: 
• CRC monitors the process control bus at a frequency of 10 times per second 
through the interface iBUS for commands from plant operator or other systems 
that affect control rod control. CRC also sends control status information to the 
process control bus. Signals that are handled by CRC are: 
o AcBL, DeAcBL – activate or deactivate base-load generation (constant 
power). 
o AcPFC, DeAcPFC – activate or deactivate primary frequency control 
(short term or immediate change, seconds scale, of electricity generation 
to variation in demand detected by variations in frequency in the grid). 
o AcSFC, DeAcSFC – activate or deactivate secondary frequency control 
(adaptation of electricity generation over a longer time frame, minutes 
scale, by adapting electricity generation to a frequency deviation over a 
time period). 
o AcLF, DeAcLF – activate or deactivate load following (e.g., a variable load 
programme with one or several power changes over a period of 24 
hours).  
o AcAC, DeAcAC - activate of deactivate adaptable control. When an AcAC 
or DeACAC is retrived, CRC forwards the signal to CRA. 
o GDfE – provides information on the grid demand for electricity. 
• SDA is responsible for gathering validated sensor signals (through the interface 
iSENS). Signals that are acquired by SDA are: 
o RPM – provides a measure of reactor power. 
o CRP – provides data on control rod position in the core. 
• ACRAC is responsible for providing control rod control and shall automatically 
calibrate control rod actuation patterns in order to compensate for fuel 
degradation. The ACRAC system shall: 
o Retrieve from CRC and SDA the signals GDfE, CRP and RPM. 
o Provide control rod actuation signals to CRA. 
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o Calculate a value DEVRP that shall be used as an indicator for non-
optimal reactor control when operating in load following mode. 
o Calculate a value CALCI that shall indicate if calibration of control rod 
patterns is required. 
o Calibrate control rod control patterns automatically when the value of 
CALCI gives a clear indication on suboptimal control. 
o Interact with the BCC system in order to request specific Boron acid 
concentration levels and thus seek an optimal balance of control rods and 
boron acid moderation of the process.  
• CCRAC is responsible for providing control rod control. The CCRAC system 
shall: 
o Retrieve from CRC and SDA the signals GDfE, CRP and RPM. 
o Provide control rod actuation signals to CRA. 
• CRA is responsible for deciding upon which of the two systems, CCRAC or 
ACRAC, that will perform control rod actuation by passing forward actuation 
signals from one of them to RDA. CCRAC and ACRAC are two diverse systems 
for control rod control where the former is assumed here to be an existing control 
rod control system and the latter is the adaptable control rod system that is part 
of the upgrade. Both systems operate in parallel and provide actuation signals to 
RDA. The RDA system is assumed to consist of the drive motors and other 
mechanisms for inserting and retracting control rods. When an AcAC signal is 
received from CRC then actuation signals from ACRAC will be allowed and 
preferred for actuation of RDA. When a DeAcAC signal is received from CRC 
only actuation signals from CCRAC actuation will be allowed for actuation of 
RDA. 
The BCS system illustrated in Figure 9 is intended to work in the following manner: 
• BCC monitors the process control bus at a frequency of 10 times per second 
through the interface iBUS for commands from plant operator or other systems 
that affect boron acid concentration control. BCC also sends control status 
information to the process control bus. Signals that are handled by BCC are: 
o acracBC – informs on the boron concentration level required by the 
ACRAC system. 
o opBC – informs on the boron concentration level required by an operator.  
• SDA is responsible for gathering and validating sensor signal on boron 
concentration in the primary loop. 
• BCA is responsible for providing actuation signals to the different subsystems of 
the CVCA such that a required boron concentration level required to be met may 
be achieved. The CVCA system is here assumed to consist of valves, piping, 
boron acid tank, water tanks, and all appliances necessary to supply water via 
the makeup channel and allow draining of water via the letdown channel. 
 
The requirements FR.1 to FR.13 are regarded as accounted for by the specification of 
the ALF system and its different subsystems as given here. 
5.3 Pattern Composition 
Figure 10 illustrates a composite pattern named Design. The composite contains only 
one pattern that is named Trusted Backup. The description of the ALF system 
presented in Section 5.2 is here assumed to represent the instantiation of the 
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parameter S of the pattern Trusted Backup. The instantiation of S is symbolised by 
drawing a dotted line between the parameter S and the associated artefact reference 
(consisting of an icon for symbolising the type of artefact, here a design artefact, and an 
identifier that provides a reference to the artefact). 
 
Figure 10 Design – Composite Pattern 
Figure 11 illustrates a composite pattern named Intermediate Solution #1. Intermediate 
Solution #1 is here a dummy used for explaining the intended use of the composite 
named Design together with the composite Functional Requirements that was defined 
in Section 4.3. 
 
Figure 11 Fragment showing use of "Design" composite 
The reference to a parameter S of the pattern named Design in Figure 11 is a reference 
to the parameter S of the pattern Trusted Backup as the Design composite (defined in 
Figure 10) contains Trusted Backup and because the parameter S of Design is 
matched to the parameter S of Trusted Backup.  
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In Figure 11, a satisfies relation (illustrated with a bullet connected to a checkmark with 
a solid line) is used to associate requirements (denoted F-Req) with a description of a 
system (denoted S). The satisfies relation indicates that any instantiation of S (that is a 
parameter of the pattern named Design) shall satisfy any instantiation of F-Req (that is 
a parameter of the composite pattern Functional Requirements). The composite named 
Functional Requirements is detailed in Figure 5.  
6. ELICIT SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
6.1 Pattern Selection 
Once a design is selected in choice (E) of Figure 2, traversal of the pattern selection 
map is restarted from the pattern Hazard Identification as the pattern that has to be 
selected prior to Hazard Identification is already considered in Section 4.1. The pattern 
Hazard Identification defines the process of identifying potential hazards and 
requirements for documenting the process results. We select the pattern as a means 
for identifying hazards associated with the ALF system. 
In choice (B) of Figure 2, a set of method patterns supporting hazard identification is 
provided. The FMEA pattern is selected under the assumption that a Failure Modes 
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is suitable for identifying potential failure modes of the 
ALF system and the hazards associates with these failure modes. 
Once a hazard identification method is selected, further traversal of Figure 2 leads to 
the pattern Hazard Analysis, we select this pattern as support as it provides guidance 
on the process of deriving potential causes of hazards.  
In choice (C) of Figure 2, process solution patterns supporting hazard analysis may be 
selected. The FTA pattern is selected as support for Hazard Analysis under the 
assumption that a top-down Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) assessment is a suitable 
complement to the bottom-up assessment provided by FMEA. 
Traversal of Figure 2 from choice (C) leads to the pattern Risk Analysis. The pattern 
provides guidance on how to address identified hazards with respect to their potential 
severity and likelihood and how to establish a notion of risk. We select the pattern as a 
support for establishing risks associated with the ALF system. 
In choice (D) of Figure 2, domain specific patterns capturing different methods for 
criticality classification are indicated. The I&C Functions Classification is selected as 
the ALF system is developed within a nuclear context and the pattern provides 
guidance on classification of nuclear Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems. 
Traversal of Figure 2 from choice (D) leads to the pattern Establish System Safety 
Requirements. The pattern describes the process of eliciting requirements on the basis 
of identified risks. We select this pattern as support for establishing safety requirements 
for the ALF system. 
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6.2 Pattern Instantiation 
Safety requirements are defined on the basis of risk assessment. The process 
requirement patterns selected in Section 6.1 support a risk-based process of eliciting 
safety requirements and may be applied sequentially according to the following order: 
1. Hazard Identification: is detailed in appendix B.7 and is applied as guidance on 
the process of identifying hazards. The FMEA pattern described in appendix B.2 
is used as support on hazard identification by a method of analysing failure 
modes. 
2. Hazard Analysis: is detailed in appendix B.8 and is applied as guidance on the 
process of identifying the potential causes of hazards. The FTA pattern 
described in appendix B.3 is used as support for hazard analysis by a method of 
constructing fault trees. 
3. Risk Analysis: is detailed in appendix B.9 and is applied as guidance on the 
process of combining information on hazards, the likely severity of hazards as 
well as the likelihood of hazards occurring into a notion of risk. The I&C Function 
Categorisation pattern described in appendix B.4 is used as support for risk 
classification. 
4. Establish System Safety Requirements: is detailed in appendix B.10 and is 
applied as guidance on the process of defining safety requirements on the basis 
of identified risks. 
Assume that the Hazard Identification pattern is applied on the load following case such 
that the parameter: 
• ToA is associated with ALF Dgn design (see Section 5). 
• IdHz is represented by the table produced by applying the FMEA pattern (see 
Table 2 below). 
• HzLg represents the hazard log provided when the pattern is instantiated. 
Table 2 represents the result of applying a high level FMEA assessment on the ACRAC 
part of the ALF system. We assume that FMEA is applied on all parts of ALF but delimit 
our scope to the ACRAC part.  
Table 2 ALF FMEA 
ID Item Func. Failure 
Mode 
Failure 
Cause 
Local 
Effect 
(ALF) 
System 
Effect 
(PWR) 
FM.1 ACRAC Provides 
control rod 
control 
functionality 
and 
performs 
self-
calibration 
of control 
rod 
patterns 
Fails to 
provide 
control rod 
actuation 
Adaptation 
mechanism 
interferes 
with control 
function. 
Erroneously 
adapted 
control 
function 
No signal 
from 
ACRAC, 
detected by 
CRA, 
mitigated by 
CCRAC 
None 
FM.2 Provides Erroneously ACRAC Increase in 
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wrong 
control rod 
actuation 
adapted 
control 
function 
commands 
erroneously 
no control 
rod 
moderation 
reactor 
power level 
towards an 
upper 
bound 
FM.3 Provides 
sub-optimal 
control rod 
actuation – 
to high 
moderation 
Erroneously 
adapted 
control 
function 
ACRAC 
commands 
control rods 
inserted 
more than 
needed 
Power 
output 
lower than 
power 
demand 
FM.4 Provides 
sub-optimal 
control rod 
actuation – 
to low 
moderation 
Erroneously 
adapted 
control 
function 
ACRAC 
commands 
control rods 
inserted 
less than 
needed 
Power 
output 
higher than 
power 
demand 
FM.5 Fails to self-
calibrate 
Adaptation 
mechanism 
failure 
ACRAC 
control rod 
patterns is 
unchanged 
Decreased 
precision in 
power 
output 
moderation 
We assume that the system effect associated with failure mode FM.2 in Table 2 
requires a further assessment. We regard the possible system effects of the other 
failure modes as tolerable and thus a more detailed assessment is at this stage of 
development not required. The hazard log HzLg will contain an overview of all identified 
hazards associated with the system. In the load following case we assume that there 
exists one hazard related to the effect of failure mode FM.2 that are defined as “H.1 
Reactor power level more than upper bound” documented in a manner like illustrated in 
Table 3.  
Table 3 Hazard Log (Version 1) 
ID Description Cause Reference Mitigation 
H.1 Reactor power 
level more than 
upper bound 
Erroneously 
adapted control 
function 
ALF FMEA, 
FM.2 
 
Assume that the Hazard Analysis pattern is applied on the load following case such that 
the parameter: 
• ToA is associated with ALF Dgn (see Section 5). 
• Haz is associated with the hazard H.1 as given in Table 3. 
• IdCsHz is represented by the fault tree provided by applying the FTA pattern. 
• HzLg represents the hazard log produced when the Hazard Analysis pattern is 
instantiated. 
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Table 4 represents a tabular representation of a fault tree resulting from a high level 
FTA assessment of the system. The hazard H.1 has several potential causes, we only 
provide details with respect to the potential causes arising from errors within the 
ACRAC system, other potential causes are not detailed and are marked as out of 
scope.  
Table 4 ALF FTA 
Hazard H.1: Reactor power level more than upper bound 
AND 
C.1: Process Control system fails to keep power level within 
bounds 
C2: 
Operator 
fails to 
manually 
keep 
power 
level 
within 
bounds 
C.3: 
Protection 
system 
fails to 
perform 
reactor 
trip upon 
power 
level 
equal or 
more than 
upper 
bound 
AND 
C.1.1: Erroneously adapted ACRAC 
control function 
C.1.2: 
Erroneous 
CCRAC 
control 
function 
C.1.3: 
Erroneous 
CRA 
granting 
of control 
privileges 
Out of 
scope 
Out of 
scope 
OR 
C.1.1.1: 
Erroneous 
adaptation 
algorithm 
C.1.1.2: 
Erroneous 
validation 
of 
correctness 
of control 
function 
adaptation 
C.1.1.3: 
Erroneous 
configuration 
of control 
function with 
updated 
parameters  
Out of 
scope 
Out of 
scope 
 
Table 4 identifies three potential failures that can lead to an erroneously adapted 
ACRAC control function, identified as C.1.1.1, C.1.1.2 and C.1.1.3. We assume that the 
hazard log produced when instantiating the Hazard Analysis pattern is used to maintain 
an overview of all hazards and their potential causes. Table 5 represents the updated 
hazard log. 
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Table 5 Hazard Log (Version 2) 
ID Description Cause Reference Mitigation 
H.1 Reactor power 
level more 
than upper 
bound 
Erroneously 
adapted 
control 
function 
ALF FMEA - 
FM.2 
ALF FTA – 
C.1.1.1, C1.1.2, 
C.1.1.3 
 
Operator fails 
to manually 
keep power 
level 
ALF FTA – C.2  
Protection 
system fails to 
perform 
reactor trip 
upon power 
level 
ALF FTA – C.3  
 
Assume that the Risk Analysis pattern is applied on the load following case such that 
the parameter: 
• ToA is associated with ALF Dgn design (see Section 5). 
• Haz is represented by the hazard log produced when instantiating the Hazard 
Analysis pattern (see Table 5). 
• ClsSev and ClsLi are not used as the notion of risk in this case is guided by the 
I&C Functions Categorisation pattern that provides guidance on the 
categorisation of nuclear power plants instrumentation and control systems 
according to the importance of their functions on plant safety. 
• ClsCr is represented by the I&C Functions Categorisation pattern. 
• Risks is represented by the documentation provided when the pattern is 
instantiated and contain an overview of all system hazards, potential contribution 
of subsystem failure to identified hazards, classification of subsystems, and 
possible mitigations. 
We assume that the ALF system is addressed with respect to the criticality of the 
function it provides on overall system safety by the use of the I&C Function 
Categorisation pattern, categorising ALF as a category C system. We assume that the 
plant operators and the protection system are the primary means for assuring plant 
safety. Although the plant operators and the protection system represent barriers that 
may trip the reactor in the event of an adaptation failure within the ACRAC part of the 
ALF system, an unplanned reactor trip is an event that is surely unwanted. Thus, 
mitigations for avoiding such events are needed. We assume that among a set of 
possible mitigations to avoid erroneously adaptation of the ACRAC function, the most 
promising risk reducing measures are to: only allow incremental adaptation of the 
adaptable control function; disable the adaptable control function from performing 
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control while it is updated; and validate every proposed adaptation before the controller 
is updated. Table 6 represents the hazard log updated with possible mitigations. 
Table 6 Hazard Log (Version 3) 
Id Description Cause Reference  Mitigations 
H.1 Reactor 
power level 
more than 
upper 
bound 
Erroneously 
adapted 
control 
function 
ALF FMEA - 
FM.2 
ALF FTA – 
C.1.1.1, C1.1.2, 
C.1.1.3 
Only allow incremental 
adaptation of the adaptable 
control function. 
Disable the adaptable control 
function from performing control 
while it is updated. 
Validate every proposed 
adaptation before effectuating 
the update.  
Figure 12 represents an excerpt of the Establish System Safety Requirements pattern 
and describes a SaCS adapted version (adapted by a dotted drawn frame with dotted 
drawn rectangles on the edges representing input or output parameters) of a UML [25] 
activity diagrams. Figure 12 and the other elements of the pattern description provide 
the analyst with a means for elaborating upon the problem of establishing safety 
requirements based on inputs on the risks associated with a given target. 
Assume that Establish System Safety Requirements is instantiated such that: 
• Risks is associated with the risk of hazard H.1 due to erroneous adapted control 
function (see Table 6).  
• ToA is associated with the ALF Dgn design (see Section 5).  
• Reg is not used here in order to reduce the exemplification of SaCS. The 
parameter could be associated with the standard IEC61513 [15] and IEC62138 
[17]. The standard IEC61513 provides general requirements for systems 
important to safety and the standard IEC62138 provides guidance on software 
aspects for systems performing category C function.  
• Req represents the requirements set provided when the pattern is instantiated. 
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Figure 12 Excerpt – Establish System Safety Requirements 
We assume that the instantiation of the Establish System Safety Requirements pattern 
produces a set of safety requirements contained in Table 7. Furthermore, we assume 
that satisfying these requirements is regarded as providing a sufficiently safe system.  
Document Safety 
Requirements
Reg
Risks
Establish Safety 
Requirements Qualitatively
Establish Safety 
Requirements Quantitatively
Qualitative Safety Requirements
Quantitative Safety Requirements
Confer laws, regulations, 
and standards
Confer risk analysis regulatory specific
risk reducing measures
risk reducing measures
system specific 
risk reducing measures Req
ToA Identify Target
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Table 7 ALF Safety Requirements 
Req Reference Description 
SR.1 HazLog, H.1 
ALF FTA, 
C1.1.1 
ALF shall adapt the adaptable control function in increments. 
SR.2 HazLog, H.1 
ALF FTA, 
C1.1.2 
ALF shall evaluate each increment of the adaptable control 
function for potential erroneous adaptations of the adaptable 
control function. 
SR.3 HazLog, H.1 
ALF FTA, 
C1.1.3 
ALF shall disable adaptive control during the time period when 
the adaptable controller is modified.  
SR.4 HazLog, H.1 
ALF FTA, 
C1.1.3 
ALF shall assure that configured parameters are correctly 
modified before enabling adaptable control. 
SR.5 HazLog, H.1 
ALF FTA, 
C1.1.2 
The System shall assure no negative effects on system safety 
in the event of erroneous adaptation of the adaptable 
controller part of the ALF subsystem. 
6.3 Pattern Composition 
Figure 13 illustrates a composite pattern named Safety Requirements. The composite 
Safety Requirements illustrated in Figure 13 is defined such that the intended 
instantiation order of the patterns as presented in Section 6.2 is indicated. The arrows 
that connect different patterns (e.g., the arrow pointing from the parameter HzLg of the 
pattern Hazard Identification towards the parameter Haz of the pattern Hazard 
Analysis) symbolise assigns relations. The direction of the arrow indicates that a 
parameter associated with a source pattern must be instantiated before it may be used 
as an input to the instantiation of a parameter associated with a target pattern.  
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Figure 13 Fragment showing use of "Safety Requirements" composite 
In Figure 13 we assume that the instantiation of the pattern Hazard Identification 
produces an output represented by the hazards described in Section 6.2. This is 
indicated in Figure 13 by connecting an artefact reference with the parameter it 
represents. An artefact reference is symbolised with a grey icon and an identifier for the 
artefact. The text “Hazard Log (Version 1) – described in Section 6.2” represents our 
identifier and is placed adjacent to an icon representing the type of artefact (here a 
documentation artefact). The artefact reference is connected to the parameter it 
instantiates with a dotted line. The dotted line represents an instantiates relation.  
The input parameter ToA of Hazard Analysis is not connected to any pattern, the 
instantiation of this parameter is implied by the instantiation of the correspondingly 
named input parameter to the composite. According to the syntax of SaCS, every 
pattern contained in the composite Safety Requirements that has an input parameter 
with public accessibility (thick arrow) that is named ToA is automatically assigned to the 
instantiation of the input parameter ToA of the composite Safety Requirements. In a 
similar manner, the instantiation of the output parameter S-Req (defined as an alias for 
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the parameter Req) of the pattern Establish System Safety Requirements is an 
instantiation of the output parameter S-Req of the pattern Safety Requirements. 
The FMEA method pattern is a support for the process requirement pattern Hazard 
Identification. The FMEA pattern describes a method for identification of hazards, and 
the artefact that is produced upon pattern instantiation is a table (represented by Tbl) 
intended to contain the results of the assessment described by the pattern. The Hazard 
Identification pattern may take identified hazards as input (represented by IdHaz). The 
assigns relation here combines the FMEA pattern and the Hazard Identification pattern. 
The assigns relation matches any instantiation of the parameter Tbl to IdHaz.  
The pattern I&C Functions Categorisation reflects the method for risk classification 
used within a nuclear context. We assume here that the instantiation of this pattern 
provides a classification of the ALF system as a category C system. The classification 
of the ALF system as a category C system implies that every mandatory requirement 
associated with the development of category C systems as detailed in e.g. the standard 
IEC62138 [17] shall be met. We delimit the demonstration of the SaCS method to 
address the safety requirements SR.1 to SR.5 only. 
7. REVISE DESIGN 
The preliminary design described in Section 5.2 should be revisited in order to assure 
that it satisfies the safety requirements defined in Section 6. If the design describes a 
system that is not able to satisfy the safety requirements it should be revised.  
We assume that revision is only needed with respect to a detailing of the ACRAC 
behaviour and amend the design specification with the UML sequence diagram 
presented in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14 Sequence diagram illustrating the controller adaptation process 
Figure 14 illustrates the main sequence for adapting the controller part of ACRAC. The 
inline decomposition of ACRAC reflects functional parts of the ACRAC controller.  
8. ESTABLISH SAFETY CASE 
8.1 Pattern Selection 
Patterns supporting safety demonstration is provided from choice (F) and onwards in 
Figure 2. We select Safety Requirements Satisfied in choice (F) as support for deriving 
a safety case demonstrating that the safety requirements (identified in Section 6) are 
satisfied. We assume that the Assessment Evidence pattern in choice (G) is the most 
suitable for addressing the safety requirement SR.5 as the satisfaction of the 
requirement may not directly be demonstrated with a reference to the design 
specification, but rather an assessment of the design. The Deterministic Evidence 
pattern in choice (G) is regarded as suitable for addressing the requirements SR.1 to 
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SR.4 as these requirements should be able to be demonstrated met on the basis of the 
features of the design specification. 
8.2 Pattern Instantiation 
Given that the Safety Requirements composite illustrated in Figure 13 is instantiated 
and have produced the safety requirements SR.1 to SR.5 (see Section 6.2), then the 
Safety Requirements Satisfied pattern selected in Section 8.1 may be instantiated with 
the requirements as input. The Safety Requirements Satisfied is described in appendix 
B.16 and defines a demonstration strategy where safety is demonstrated by addressing 
all the safety requirements. The successful use of this pattern is based on the 
assumption that satisfying the safety requirements ensures a sufficiently safe system, 
this was assumed in Section 6.2. Figure 15 illustrates the result of applying Safety 
Requirements Satisfied pattern in the context of demonstrating that ALF Dgn is safe.  
 
Figure 15 The “ALF Case” safety case 
Figure 16 represents an excerpt from the pattern Deterministic Evidence and defines a 
parameterised argument structure annotated by a SaCS adapted version of the GSN 
notation [2][4][9][21][26]. The parameters of the argument structure shall be bound 
such that: 
• ToD sets the target of the safety demonstration. 
• Cond sets the condition that is claimed satisfactory assessed and satisfied. 
• The evidence (e.g., reference to documentation) that may be conferred and that 
state that Cond is satisfied is set by CondEv. 
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Figure 16 Excerpt - Deterministic Evidence 
Figure 17 represents the result from instantiating the Deterministic Evidence pattern 
that is a safety case expressed in GSN notation. The pattern was applied such that the 
parameter ToD represented the ALF Dgn design, and the parameter Cond represented 
the safety requirements SR.1 to SR.4. 
 
Figure 17 The "ReqSat A Case" safety case 
The Assessment Evidence pattern is described in appendix B.17, an excerpt from the 
pattern is given in Figure 18. Figure 18 defines a parameterised argument structure 
annotated by a SaCS adapted version of the GSN notation. The argument structure 
decomposes an overall claim via sub-claims down to evidences. The parameters of the 
argument structure shall be bound such that: 
• ToD sets the target of the safety demonstration.  
• Cond sets the condition that is claimed satisfactory assessed and satisfied. 
• Crit sets the criterion that shall be fulfilled in order for an assessment approach 
to provide satisfactory results. 
• The rationale for the criteria being proper is given in the justification node 
identified as ValidSetOfCriteria. 
• Mtd sets the method that is applied. 
• The rationale for the method being suitable by satisfying criteria is given in the 
justification node identified as MethodSuitable. 
• The evidence (e.g., reference to documentation) that may be conferred and that 
state that condition is satisfied is set by CndSatEv. 
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Figure 18 Excerpt – Assessment Evidence 
In the instantiation of the Assessment Evidence pattern, the target of demonstration is 
the ALF Dgn. The condition to be addressed is the safety requirement SR.5. However, 
we also need to identify the method that shall be applied in order to perform the 
assessment. Further, the criteria that shall be applied in order to determine that a 
specific method is suitable must be identified. In addition, the chosen method must be 
applied in order to provide assessment results that confirm the main claim, i.e., ALF 
Dgn satisfies SR.5.  
The instantiation of the Assessment Evidence pattern produces a safety demonstration 
that argues that the overall system (represented by the ALF system) satisfies the 
requirement SR.5. The instantiation result is presented in Figure 19 as an argument 
structure expressed with the GSN notation. We assume here for the sake of the 
argument that: 
• The FMEA and FTA assessment methods, used in Section 6, represent the 
approaches that are recognised as suitable for assessing the system with 
respect to satisfaction of the identified safety requirements. 
• The results from applying FMEA and FTA, identified as ALF FMEA and ALF 
FTA, respectively, represent valid evidences. 
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Figure 19 The “ReqSat B Case” safety case 
 
8.3 Pattern Composition 
Figure 20 specifies the composite Safety Requirements. The inputs to the instantiation 
of Safety Requirements may be seen from the assignment of the parameters ToD 
(short for Target of Demonstration) and Req (short for Requirements). The two assigns 
relations connecting artefact references with parameters indicate the assignments of 
the parameters. The instantiation of the Safety Requirements Satisfied pattern provides 
the main basis for demonstrating that the ALF system is suitably safe. Two different 
safety case patterns named Deterministic Evidence and Assessment Evidence are 
applied as support for arguing that the different safety requirements are sufficiently 
addressed. The Assessment Evidence pattern details a demonstration strategy that is 
applied for arguing that requirement SR.5 is met. The Deterministic Evidence pattern 
details a demonstration strategy that is applied for arguing that the requirements SR.1 
to SR.4 are met.  
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Figure 20 Composite pattern named "Safety Case" 
Two details relations are used in Figure 20 to identify those parts of the pattern Safety 
Requirements Satisfied that are further detailed by the support of the patterns 
Deterministic Evidence and the pattern Assessment Evidence. A details relation is 
illustrated as a line connecting a black box with a set of smaller white shapes with a 
black stroke. The details relation between Safety Requirements Satisfied and 
Deterministic Evidence indicates that the instantiation of the parameter Case of 
Deterministic Evidence details the instantiation of the parameter ReqSat A of Safety 
Requirements Satisfied. 
The artefact produced upon the instantiation of the Assessment Evidence pattern is 
named ReqSat B Case (See Figure 19). ReqSat B Case details the artefact ReqSat B 
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(See Figure 15 and Figure 20) produced upon the instantiation the Safety 
Requirements Satisfied pattern.  
9. COMBINE FRAGMENTS 
9.1 Pattern Composition 
Figure 21 defines the composite Pattern Solution and illustrates how the different 
composite patterns defined in the previous sections are combined. 
 
Figure 21 Composite pattern named “Pattern Solution” 
Figure 21 documents the concepts and best practices applied in order to derive a 
conceptual safety design for the case by the identifying the patterns used as support. 
The different patterns references identifies that patterns applied. The relations describe 
how patterns are combined. The result of pattern instantiation is given by the different 
artefact references. The traceability between development artefacts and the patterns 
that was used as support is provided by the use of the instantiates relation. 
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Applying the SaCS method in iterations may refine the composite illustrated in Figure 
21 as well as the conceptual safety design derived by instantiating it. As we have only 
addressed the goal G1 in this report, a second iteration over the SaCS method in the 
case should also address the goals G2 and G3 from Section 3. 
 
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10. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
This section summarises the result of applying the SaCS method on the case outlined 
in Section 3. The application of SaCS on the load following case was scoped such that 
only goal G1 described in Section 3 was addressed. Section 4 to Section 9 describes 
the application of SaCS in the case. The composite pattern in Figure 21 presented in 
Section 9 references the patterns applied in the case. The instantiation of the 
composite expressed in Figure 21 represents the conceptual safety design derived for 
the case.  
A conceptual safety design, according to the definition given in Section 2, is a triple 
consisting of an early stage specification of system requirements, system design, and 
safety case of a safety critical system. A conceptual safety design for the load following 
case is represented by the specifications described in Section 10.1, 10.2 and 10.3. The 
specifications are extracted from the information produced upon the instantiation of the 
patterns as described in Section 4.2, 5.2, 6.2, 7 and 8.2. 
10.1 Requirements Specification 
The following abbreviations are used in the specification of the requirements that is 
contained in Table 8 and Table 9: 
• ALF: Adaptable Load Following system 
• GDfE: Grid Demand for Electricity 
• PCBUS: Process Control BUS 
• RPM: Reactor Power Measured 
• SENS: SENsor data acquisition System 
• CRP: Control Rod Pattern 
• BC: Boron Concentration 
• DEVRP: DEViation from Required Power 
• CALCI: CALibrate Control rod pattern Indicator 
• RDA: Rod Drive Actuators 
• CVCA: Chemical and Volume Control Actuators 
Table 8 Functional Requirements 
Req Description 
FR.1 ALF system shall monitor the demand for electricity required by the grid by 
acquiring the GDfE signal from the PCBUS. 
FR.2 ALF system shall monitor the reactor power output by acquiring the RPM signal 
from SENS. 
FR.3 ALF system shall monitor the control rod position by acquiring the CRP signal 
from SENS. 
FR.4 ALF system shall monitor the boron acid concentration by acquiring the BC 
signal from SENS. 
FR.5 ALF system shall acquire GDfE signal by polling the PCBUS. 
FR.6 ALF system shall acquire validated RPM, CRP, BC signals by request to 
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SENS. 
FR.7 ALF system shall poll for GDfE signal at a rate 10 times per second.  
FR.8 ALF system shall maintain a history over GDfE, CRP, BC and RPM. 
FR.9 ALF system shall calculate a value DEVRP that shall indicate non-optimal 
reactor control when operating in load following mode. 
FR.10 ALF system shall calculate an indicator CALCI that shall identify the need for 
calibration of control rod patterns by the use of the history of DEVRP, CRP and 
BC. 
FR.11 ALF system shall provide a mechanism for automatic calibration of control rod 
patterns based on CALCI indicator. 
FR.12 ALF system shall activate calibration of the control rod patterns when the need 
to calibrate is indicated by the CALCI indicator. 
FR.13 ALF system shall provide reactor control by providing actuation signals to RDA 
and CVCA. 
 
Table 9 Safety Requirements 
Req Description 
SR.1 ALF shall adapt the adaptable control function in increments. 
SR.2 ALF shall evaluate each increment of the adaptable control function for 
potential erroneous adaptations of the adaptable control function. 
SR.3 ALF shall disable adaptive control during the time period when the adaptable 
controller is modified.  
SR.4 ALF shall assure that configured parameters are correctly modified before 
enabling adaptable control. 
SR.5 The System shall assure no negative effects on system safety in the event of 
erroneous adaptation of the adaptable controller part of the ALF subsystem. 
10.2 Design Specification 
Figure 22 is a UML component diagram illustrating graphically the overall ALF design. 
ALF consist of two parts, CRICS (Control Rod Information and Control System) and 
BCS (Boron Control System). 
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Figure 22 The “ALF” system 
Figure 23 details the CRICS system and Figure 24 details the BCS system. Adaptability 
is incorporated in the CRICS system in the part identified as ACRAC. The ACRAC 
system is responsible for automatically calibrating the control rod insertion patterns as 
the reactor fuel is degraded during the fuel life cycle. The ACRAC system shall also 
account for the decreased need for boron acid in the moderator as the fuel reaches the 
end of the fuel cycle.  
 
Figure 23 The “CRICS” System 
 
 
Figure 24 The “BCS” system 
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The CRICS system shall work in the following manner: 
• CRC monitors the process control bus at a frequency of 10 times per second 
through the interface iBUS for commands from plant operator or other systems 
that affect control rod control. CRC also sends control status information to the 
process control bus. Signals that are handled by CRC are: 
o AcBL, DeAcBL – deactivate or activate base-load generation (constant 
power). 
o AcPFC, DeAcPFC – deactivate or activate primary frequency control 
(short term or immediate change of electricity generation to variation in 
demand detected by variations in frequency in the grid). 
o AcSFC, DeAcSFC – activate or deactivate secondary frequency control 
(adaptation of electricity generation over a longer time frame, minutes 
scale, by adapting electricity generation to a frequency deviation over a 
time period). 
o AcLF, DeAcLF – activate or deactivate load following (e.g. a variable load 
programme with one or several power changes over a period of 24 
hours).  
o AcAC, DeAcAC – activate of deactivate adaptable control. When an 
AcAC or DeAcAC is retrieved, CRC forwards this to CRA. 
o GDfE – provide information on the grid demand for electricity. 
• SDA is responsible for gathering validated sensor signals (through the interface 
iSENS). Signals that are acquired by SDA are: 
o RPM – That provides a measure of reactor power. 
o CRP – That provides data on control rod position in the core. 
• ACRAC is responsible for providing control rod control and shall automatically 
calibrate control rod actuation patterns in order to compensate for fuel 
degradation. The ACRAC system shall: 
o Retrieve from CRC and SDA the signals GDfE, CRP and RPM. 
o Provide control rod actuation signals to CRA. 
o Calculate a value DEVRP that shall be used as an indicator for non-
optimal reactor control when operating in load following mode. 
o Calculate a value CALCI that shall indicate if calibration of control rod 
patterns is required. 
o Perform calibration of control rod patterns automatically when CALCI 
provides a clear indication on suboptimal control. 
o Interact with the BCC system in order to request specific Boron acid 
concentration levels and thus seek an optimal balance of control rods and 
boron acid moderation of the process.  
• CCRAC is responsible for providing control rod control. The CCRAC system 
shall: 
o Retrieve from CRC and SDA the signals GDfE, CRP and RPM. 
o Provide control rod actuation signals to CRA. 
• CRA is responsible for deciding upon which of the two systems, CCRAC or 
ACRAC, that will perform control rod actuation by passing forward actuation 
signals from one of them to RDA. CCRAC and ACRAC are two diverse systems 
for control rod control where the former is assumed here to be an existing control 
rod control system and the latter is the adaptable control rod system that is part 
of the upgrade. Both systems operate in parallel and provide actuation signals to 
RDA. The RDA system is assumed to consist of the drive motors and other 
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mechanisms for inserting and retracting control rods. When an AcAC signal is 
received from CRC then actuation signals from ACRAC will be allowed and 
preferred for actuation of RDA. When a DeAcAC signal is received from CRC 
only actuation signals from CCRAC actuation will be allowed for actuation of 
RDA. 
The BCS system is intended to work in the following manner: 
• BCC monitors the process control bus at a frequency of 10 times per second 
through the interface iBUS for commands from plant operator or other systems 
that affect boron acid concentration control. BCC also sends control status 
information to the process control bus. Signals that are handled by BCC are: 
o acracBC – That informs on the boron concentration level required by the 
ACRAC system. 
o opBC – That informs on the boron concentration level required by an 
operator.  
• SDA is responsible for gathering and validating sensor signal on boron 
concentration in the primary loop. 
• BCA is responsible for providing actuation signals to the different subsystems of 
the CVCA such that a required boron concentration level may be achieved. The 
CVCA system is here assumed to consist of valves, piping, boron acid tank, 
water tanks and all appliances necessary to supply of water via the makeup 
channel and allow draining of water via the letdown channel. 
Figure 25 is a UML sequence diagram illustrating how the ACRAC system shall adapt 
its control function. The inline decomposition of ACRAC reflects functional parts of the 
ACRAC controller. 
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Figure 25 Sequence diagram “sd Adaptation” describing ACRAC behaviour 
10.3 Safety Case Specification 
Figure 26, Figure 27 and Figure 28 illustrates graphically the ALF safety case. The 
safety case only addresses technical safety aspects by addressing the safety 
requirements, issues like quality management or safety management is not addressed. 
The safety case provided here illustrates the safety demonstration strategy as outlined 
at the initial stage of ALF development.  
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Figure 26 The "ALF Case" safety case 
Figure 26 expresses that the ALF design is sufficiently safe for its purpose by a strategy 
of demonstrating that safety requirements are satisfied. The safety case described by 
Figure 26 contains references to decomposed parts of the case that are illustrated in 
Figure 27 and Figure 28 respectively. Figure 27 addresses the safety requirements 
SR.1 to SR.4 and demonstrates by providing references to relevant parts of the design 
specification that these requirements are satisfied. Figure 28 addresses the safety 
requirement SR.5 and demonstrates that the requirement is satisfied by providing 
reference to the relevant safety assessment as supporting evidence. 
 
Figure 27 The "ReqSat A Case" safety case 
The reference to “sd Adaptation” evidence in Figure 27 refers to the sequence diagram 
provided in Figure 25. 
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Figure 28 The "ReqSat B Case" safety case 
The references to ALF FMEA and ALF FTA in Figure 27 are references to the results of 
the FMEA and FTA assessments provided in Section 6.2, given in Table 2 and Table 4, 
respectively.  
11. DISCUSSION 
The main intention with this report is to demonstrate the applicability of the SaCS 
method on a relevant case. Each step in the application of the SaCS method in the 
case is performed by the authors; thus, the following discussion represents a self-
evaluation. However, each step of the SaCS method is documented in a manner that 
allows others to perform an independent evaluation of the feasibility of the SaCS 
method. 
The suitability of the SaCS method and its supporting pattern language in providing a 
utility for a user is in this section discussed by elaborating upon the fulfilment of the 
success criteria defined in Section 2 that states: 
P: Application of the SaCS method on the load following case described in Section 3 
results in a conceptual safety design that characterises the load following case and is 
easily instantiated from a composite SaCS pattern. Furthermore, the conceptual safety 
design: 
a) Is in accordance with safety objectives – the conceptual safety design is defined 
in agreement with safety objectives. 
b) Is at a sufficient level of detail – the conceptual safety design is expressed in a 
manner that is sufficiently detailed for an early stage specification and may be 
easily understood. 
c) Is easy to use – the conceptual safety design may be easily extended, detailed 
or refined. 
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Firstly, a conceptual safety design according to the definition given in Section 2 is a 
triplet consisting of specification of system requirements, system design, and safety 
case. The three different kinds of specifications that constitutes a conceptual safety 
design for the case are documented in separate sections, Section 10.1, 10.2, and 10.3, 
respectively. Thus, at least the conceptual safety design for the case consists of the 
required specification parts.  
Secondly, we find it fair to argue that the conceptual safety design is easily instantiated 
from a composite SaCS pattern if each of its parts, described in Section 10.1, 10.2 and 
10.3, are easily instantiated from the composite pattern for the case. Figure 21 
represents the composite pattern for the case. A pattern needs to be interpreted by a 
user in its application context in order to be useful, which is a process that may be 
difficult to document. Although we have tried to provide a detailed description of the 
pattern instantiation process, we do not present how a pattern is interpreted in its 
context other than documenting the result of pattern instantiation. It is the pattern 
definitions, the descriptions of the application of patterns in the case, and the 
descriptions of the results of pattern instantiation that represents the documentation 
that allows others to perform an independent evaluation of the feasibility of the SaCS 
approach. In the following, we argue that each of the specifications described in 
Section 10.1, 10.2 and 10.3 are easily instantiated from the composite in Figure 21. 
A composite pattern shall be instantiated according to the rules for composition. The 
rules for composition are to some extent given in Appendix A.3. The complete syntax 
and semantics of the SaCS pattern language is described in [13], which includes the 
rules for composition. In the process of instantiating a composite pattern, the first task 
is to decide the order in which contained patterns within the composite should be 
instantiated. The instantiation order of the patterns within a composite may be deduced 
from the relations that connect the contained patterns. A second task is to instantiate 
the contained patterns according to the decided order as well as according to their 
instantiation rule. The instantiation rule of a basic pattern is stated within a separate 
section of its definition. The definitions of the patterns used in this report are fully 
documented in Appendix B.  
The conceptual safety design presented in Section 10 is derived as a solution for the 
problem context described in Section 3. The conceptual safety design is the outcome of 
the instantiation of the composite pattern defined in Figure 21. The composite in Figure 
21 represents a specification of the combined use of the four composite patterns 
defined in Figure 5, Figure 10, Figure 13, and Figure 20. The four composites specify 
the use of the basic patterns defined in Appendix B according to the syntax of the 
SaCS pattern language defined in [13]. It may be deduced from Figure 21 that 
Functional Requirements and Safety Requirements can be instantiated in parallel. The 
Design pattern should be instantiated prior to Safety Case. The pattern instantiation 
order is deduced on the basis of the rules for composition as defined in [13], especially 
the rules for connecting patterns by the use of relations.  
We argue that the requirements specification described in Section 10.1 is easily 
instantiated from the composite pattern described in Figure 21 through the instantiation 
of the composites named Functional Requirements and Safety Requirements. In Figure 
21, it is specified that the requirements derived by the use of the Functional 
Requirements pattern is given in Section 4.2. It is also specified that the requirements 
derived by the use of the Safety Requirements pattern is given in Section 6.2. By 
HWR-1029 rev 2 
- 44 - 
 
inspecting Section 4.2 and Section 6.2, the descriptions of the instantiation of 
Functional Requirements and Safety Requirements are found.  
Figure 5 specifies the composite named Functional Requirements and how its only 
constituent pattern, named Variable Demand for Service, is instantiated as support for 
eliciting requirements. Basically, Functional Requirements is instantiated by the 
instantiation of Variable Demand for Service. Section 4.2 describes the instantiation of 
the Variable Demand for Service, while the pattern itself is defined in appendix B.1. The 
requirements are derived by instantiating Variable Demand for Service according to its 
instantiation rule. The instantiation rule of Variable Demand for Service is part of the 
pattern definition presented in appendix B.1. The instantiation rule expresses how a set 
of abstract requirements defined in the pattern may be used to define context specific 
requirements. Table 1 provides the traceability between the abstract requirements 
defined within the pattern Variable Demand for Service and the requirements defined 
for the case. 
The composite Safety Requirements defined in Figure 13 expresses a combination of 
several basic patterns. The detailed description of the instantiation of the contained 
patterns of Safety Requirements is given in Section 6.2. In short, the safety 
requirements are the outcome of instantiating the pattern Establish System Safety 
Requirements contained within Safety Requirements. The other patterns within Safety 
Requirements are used as support for deriving the necessary information required for 
specifying the safety requirements, such as identifying the hazards associated with the 
system in question and the potential causes of these hazards. Each constituent pattern 
of Safety Requirements is detailed in Appendix B. The outcomes of instantiating the 
different patterns of Safety Requirements are documented in Section 6.2. Figure 13 
identifies the relationship between different development artefacts and the patterns that 
used as support for their definition. The development artefacts referred to in Figure 13 
are documented in Table 2 to Table 7. 
We argue that the design specification described in Section 10.2 is easily instantiated 
from the composite pattern described in Figure 21 through the instantiation of the 
composite named Design. The Design composite is defined in Figure 10. It consists of 
only one pattern named Trusted Backup. The Trusted Backup pattern is defined in 
appendix B.5 and includes, as every other basic pattern, an instantiation rule providing 
guidance on how the pattern should be instantiated. The instantiation of the Trusted 
Backup pattern is described in Section 5.2. A detailed explanation of the relation 
between the abstract design presented in the pattern and the specification of the ALF 
system is also given in Section 5.2. 
We argue that the safety case specification described in Section 10.3 is easily 
instantiated from the composite pattern identified in Figure 21 with the name Safety 
Case. The pattern Safety Case is defined in Figure 20 where a combined use of the 
basic patterns Safety Requirements Satisfied, Assessment Evidence, and Deterministic 
Evidence is specified. The definitions of the basic patterns are given in the appendices 
B.16, B.17, and B.20, respectively. The outcome of applying the patterns, which is a 
safety case specified according to the GSN notation [9], is derived by assigning values 
to the parameters of the pattern structure specified by the composite diagram in Figure 
20 and conduct a stepwise instantiation of the patterns. Once the input parameters of 
each pattern are assigned their values, the guidance provided by the pattern 
descriptions may be systematically followed in order to derive results. Section 8.2 
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describes how each of the mentioned basic patterns is instantiated as well as how the 
outcomes are combined into a safety case. 
As argued above, the conceptual safety design for the case is the result of the 
systematic application of SaCS patterns. We think that the application of the SaCS 
method in the case is described to a level of detail that allows the feasibility of the 
SaCS approach to be independently evaluated by others. In this report, the SaCS 
method is defined in Appendix A, each step of applying the SaCS method in the case is 
described in Section 4 to Section 9, each basic pattern that is used in order to derive 
results is defined in Appendix B, and the language for specifying SaCS patterns is 
outlined in Appendix A and fully detailed in [13].  
Regarding a), we argue that the conceptual safety design is defined in agreement with 
safety objectives as follows. 
Section 10.1, 10.2, and 10.3 describes the three different specifications that represent 
the conceptual safety design for the case. The conceptual safety design is defined in 
accordance with safety objectives in the following manner: 
• Section 10.1 contains a description of the safety objectives. The safety 
objectives are represented by the safety requirements described in Table 9. The 
safety requirements are established by the application of the composite pattern 
named Safety Requirements as described earlier. The Safety Requirements 
composite describe the systematic application of patterns as support for 
establishing the risk associated with the use of the system under development 
as well how these risks are used to define safety requirements. The system 
under development is outlined in Section 3 along with a description of its 
intended context of operation. 
• Section 10.2 contains description of a system design that accommodates the 
safety requirements presented in Table 9 as well as the functional requirements 
presented in Table 8. Although the system design is defined in accordance with 
the safety requirements, it is mainly the safety case defined in Section 10.3 that 
express to which extent the safety requirements are satisfied. 
• Section 10.3 contains a description of a safety case arguing that the safety 
requirements are met. The safety case is specified by the use of the GSN 
notation. The semantic of GSN allows the relationship between the claims put 
forward in the safety case and the supporting evidences for claims to be easily 
identified. The safety case in Section 10.3 demonstrates that the system design 
presented in Section 10.2 is sufficiently safe for its intended purpose by a 
strategy of showing that the safety requirements presented in Section 10.1 are 
met. The safety case reference different parts of the system design as 
supporting evidence for claims. The assumption that the system is sufficiently 
safe given that the safety requirements are met is rationalised in Section 6.2.  
The three specifications serve different purposes where the system requirements 
specification captures the objectives of the system under construction. The system 
design specification represents an early stage technical description of a system that 
fulfils objectives. The safety case expresses in what way the safety objectives are 
fulfilled.  
Regarding b), we argue that the conceptual safety design is at a sufficient level of detail 
as follows. 
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According to the definition in Section 2, a conceptual safety design is an early stage 
specification. By an early stage specification it is here meant a description that shows 
the main features of a solution for a given problem. Although the specification is not 
expected to be complete, a conceptual safety design is of little use if it does not clearly 
convey a potential solution for the problem in question in a manner that may be easily 
understood. We find it reasonable to argue that the conceptual safety design is at a 
sufficient level of detail if it is expressed in a manner that clearly shows how the 
objectives of the case is intended to be solved. Furthermore, the conceptual safety 
design should be expressed in a format that may be easily understood by its intended 
users. 
The objective in the case as it is expressed in Section 3 is to derive an adaptable load 
following mode control system concept that offers a high degree of reactor 
manoeuvrability as well as precision by automatically compensating for fuel burn up. An 
initial starting point in the application of the SaCS method is the development objective 
stated in Section 3. The outcome of applying the SaCS method is the conceptual safety 
design presented in Section 10. Through the process of applying the SaCS method, the 
overall development objective is refined into a requirements specification and further 
into a system design. The requirements specification is intended to detail what is 
required by the system under development in order to satisfy the overall objective. 
Each step in the application of the SaCS method is detailed in Section 4 to Section 9. 
Furthermore, Appendix B details every basic SaCS patterns applied in this report. In 
this sense, all the necessary information required in order to trace the end result step-
by-step through the application of the SaCS method back to the initial development 
objective is available.  
The conceptual design is a triplet where each part is described in the following formats: 
• The requirements specification, described in Section 10.1, is defined textually in 
natural language. Requirements specifications are commonly expressed in 
natural language. 
• The design specification, described in Section 10.2, is defined by a combination 
of UML diagrams and textual descriptions. UML is a commonly used modelling 
language for describing systems in terms of their structure and behaviour.  
• The safety case specification, described in Section 10.3, is defined with GSN. 
The GSN notation facilitates structuring a safety argument with simple graphical 
constructs that requires little effort to be understood.  
Although textual specifications of requirements, GSN, and UML models in general 
should be understandable for the intended users of SaCS, this may not be the case for 
the specifications provided here. We have not tested the specifications on potential 
users of SaCS in order to investigate if the specifications are easy to understand, but 
rather provide the specifications themselves. 
Regarding c), we argue that the conceptual safety design is easy to use as it may be 
easily extended, detailed or refined as follows. 
The system design in Section 10.2 is a refinement of the requirements in Section 10.1, 
the requirements are derived on the basis of systematic analysis of the development 
objectives and the context described in Section 3. The scope of investigating the 
applicability of the SaCS method was limited to only addressing goal G1. The 
conceptual safety design may be refined by repeating the process and account for all 
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the development objectives described in Section 3. The repetition of the SaCS method 
to address the other objectives does not necessarily imply that each part of the 
conceptual safety design is changed; a high degree of reuse is expected. The 
conceptual safety design presented in Section 10 is described at a high level of 
abstraction, and it may be difficult at this stage to evaluate if the design is easy to refine 
into an implementation. However, we find the specification informative enough for 
experts to judge whether the concept described is feasible and detailed enough to use 
as a starting point for further refinement. 
The requirements specification in Section 10.1 consists of requirements that are 
uniquely identified. Any requirement may be detailed or rephrased; the modified 
requirement will then exist in another version. Requirements may be added to the 
specification easily by adding a unique requirement identifier and associated 
requirement text. 
The design specification is described by UML. UML has a rich language for specifying 
different aspects of a system. The design specified in Section 10.2 may be easily 
reused, extended and detailed by using the UML language. Examples may be to detail 
the structure and behaviour of the ALF design by using UML diagrams like class 
diagrams, sequence diagrams, state machine diagrams and activity diagrams. 
The safety case specification is described by GSN. GSN offers constructs for 
modularising a safety argument such that existing argument structures may be easily 
reused. The scope of the safety case in Section 10.3 may be extended easily by, e.g., 
adding nodes to the existing tree structure, adding sub trees to the structure, or make 
the existing safety case a sub tree in a larger argument structure.  
12. CONCLUSIONS 
In this report we have exemplified the application of the SaCS-method on the load 
following mode control application. We have tried to argue that the SaCS method 
facilitates effective and efficient development of conceptual safety designs on the basis 
of the demonstration of the application of the SaCS on the load following case. The 
application of SaCS is described in Section 4 to Section 9. The fulfilment of success 
criteria is discussed in Section 11.  
The conceptual safety design summarised in Section 10 is instantiated from several 
basic SaCS patterns within a case specific composite SaCS pattern that is illustrated in 
Figure 21. Each basic pattern (defined in Appendix B) has clearly defined inputs and 
outputs and provides guidance on instantiation through defined instantiation rules (see 
sections identified with heading “Instantiation Rule” of each individual pattern). The 
combination of instantiation results from several patterns is defined by relations (the 
relations are defined in Appendix A.3). The conceptual safety design is built 
systematically according to the SaCS-method (described in Appendix A.1) in 
manageable steps (exemplified in Section 4 to Section 9) by instantiating pieces (basic 
patterns) of the whole (composite pattern) and merge results.  
The conceptual safety design described in Section 10 is consistent with the definition 
given in Section 2. A conceptual design is a triple consisting of a specification of system 
HWR-1029 rev 2 
- 48 - 
 
requirements, system design, and safety case, each of which is detailed in Section 
10.1, Section 10.2, and Section 10.3, respectively. 
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APPENDIX A OVERVIEW OF THE SACS PATTERN LANGUAGE 
A.1 THE SACS METHOD 
Figure 29 illustrates the activities of the SaCS method. The three main activities are: 
pattern selection; pattern composition; and pattern instantiation (denoted S, C and I for 
short). The main activities may be performed in parallel and their sub-activities may be 
interleaved. The sub-activities of S, C and I shall be performed in order (e.g., S.a is 
performed before S.b) but sub-activities of one main activity may be interleaved by sub-
activities of another main activity (e.g., S.a is performed, I.a is performed, I.b is 
performed, and then S.b is performed). 
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Figure 29 The SaCS Method 
Pattern Selection – The purpose of this activity is to select the relevant SaCS patterns 
to support the conception of a safety design with respect to a given development case. 
In SaCS, a special focus is on offering patterns for capturing the requirements for the 
system design under development, patterns on design solutions, and patterns on safety 
demonstration. The sub-activities are:  
a) Select SaCS Patterns for Requirement Elicitation: requirements may be elicited 
as a result of applying patterns reflecting a process assurance perspective or a 
product assurance perspective. Patterns supporting the process assurance 
perspective are process requirement patterns and process solution patterns that 
support elicitation of requirements by applying a specific process and by 
applying specific methods. Patterns supporting the product assurance 
perspective are product requirement patterns that supports elicitation of 
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requirements by focusing on system specific phenomena, e.g., analysis of the 
interaction between entities within a system design;  
b) Select SaCS Patterns for Establishing Design Basis: a design basis may be 
established by the support of design patterns. The selection of an appropriate 
design pattern as support for system design should be performed by comparing 
the strengths and weaknesses of the concepts as expressed in the different 
patterns with the needs as expressed by the system requirements in order to 
evaluate if a pattern is able to offer a solution that satisfy the needs. The system 
requirements are defined on the basis instantiating the patterns selected in step 
a).  
c) Select SaCS Patterns for Establishing Safety Case: a safety case represents a 
means to systematically argue that a specific system design is sufficiently safe 
for its intended purpose. Different safety case patterns express different 
strategies for arguing safety. In order to select a suitable safety case pattern that 
offers relevant guidance on safety demonstration, the demonstration challenges 
that occur in a given context should be assessed and matched with the 
appropriate patterns that express their solution. 
Pattern Composition – The purpose of this activity is to specify the use of a set of 
patterns within a composite pattern specification by the activities:  
a) Specify Compositions of Patterns: a composite pattern is a structure of patterns 
defined according to the syntax of SaCS [13] where operators are used to 
combine patterns. A composite pattern may be detailed as a combination of 
basic patterns, composite patterns, or as a combination of basic and composite 
patterns. 
b) Specify Instantiations of Patterns: a composite pattern may be annotated 
according to the syntax of SaCS [13] to indicate a specific application of the 
pattern. The specification of the instantiation of input and output parameters of a 
pattern expresses the instantiation of the pattern. 
Pattern Instantiation – The purpose of this activity is to systematically instantiate a set 
of patterns. A user may choose whether to perform pattern composition prior to pattern 
instantiation or vice versa. Pattern instantiation is performed by the activities:  
a) Select Pattern Instantiation Order: If the set of patterns to be instantiated 
consists of only one basic pattern or a composite pattern consisting of one basic 
pattern there is no need to select instantiation order. Given a set with more than 
one pattern, the user must deduce the instantiation order by checking whether 
there are any dependencies between the patterns in the set, e.g., investigate if a 
pattern requires an input that is provided as a result of instantiating another 
pattern. Dependencies are modelled in a composite pattern by the use of 
relations. Guidance on the order of instantiating patterns may also be given 
within a composite by the annotations for indicating instantiation order.  
b) Conduct Stepwise Instantiation: every basic SaCS pattern defines its 
parameters. Every composite pattern may be described as a structure of basic 
patterns combined with operators that acts on the parameters. Thus, when a 
composite pattern is instantiated, it is actually the basic patterns that are 
instantiated. The input parameters express the information required for pattern 
instantiation. The output parameters express the expected results of pattern 
instantiation. In order to instantiate a basic pattern, a user must confer the 
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respective pattern description and interpret the guidance provided with respect 
to the context it is applied. 
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A.2 THE SACS PATTERN LANGUAGE 
There are six kinds of basic patterns available in SaCS. These are: 
• Process Assurance Requirement Pattern: the pattern type is inspired by the 
recommended practises associated with the development of safety critical 
systems as given in safety standards, e.g., [EN50129] and [ED-12B], where 
confidence in achieving a safe product is to a large degree provided by following 
a recommended process.  
• Product Assurance Requirement Pattern: the pattern type is inspired by the 
problem frames approach [Jackson 2001]. The problem frames approach is a 
means to specify the problem domains and interaction phenomena between 
problem domains in order to derive requirements for the system that is under 
development. 
• Process Assurance Solution (Method) Pattern: the pattern type is defined as a 
means to document specific methods that represent common safety methods. 
• Product Assurance Solution (Design) Pattern: the type is inspired by the well-
known [Gamma et al. 1995] approach to describe design solutions.  
• Process Assurance Safety Case Pattern: the type is defined as a means to 
document the structure of claims such that it may be logically deduced and 
concluded that a target system is sufficiently safe. The case depends primarily 
on process-oriented claims, arguments and evidences. 
• Product Assurance Safety Case Pattern: the type is similar to the Process Safety 
Case type but the described safety case depends primarily on product-oriented 
claims, arguments and evidences. 
In addition to the six kinds of basic patterns there is an additional type identified as 
Composite Pattern. The composite pattern type is provided as a means for a user to 
detail a specific integration of patterns. A composite pattern is specified by the use of a 
graphical notation where the basic building blocks are basic patterns. The SaCS 
graphical notation is outlined in appendix A.3. 
Patterns are integrated in a composite pattern specification by the use of relations 
between the parameters of a source pattern and the parameters of a target pattern. 
The following parameter types are provided in SaCS: 
• Requirement: represents a parameter that shall be recognised as a specification 
of requirements. 
• Design: represents a parameter that shall be recognised as a specification of a 
design. 
• Safety Case: represents a parameter that shall be recognised as a specification 
of a safety case. 
• Documentation: represents a parameter that is not required to be strongly typed 
in SaCS (explicit data types are requirements, design and safety case) but 
represents data that is required to be documented.  
[EN50129] CENELEC, Railway Applications – Communication, Signalling and 
Processing Systems – Safety Related Electronic Systems for Signalling, EN50129, 
European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization, 2003. 
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[ED-12B] EUROCAE, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment 
Certification, ED-12B, European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment, 1992. 
[Jackson 2001] M. Jackson, Problem Frames – Analysing and Structuring Software 
Development Problems, Addison-Wesley, 2001. 
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A.3 THE SACS GRAPHICAL NOTATION 
The following icons are used to identify the different types of artefacts that may be 
referred to within a composite SaCS pattern.  
 
The parameters of a pattern indicate what artefacts are required to be provided or what 
artefacts are produced upon pattern instantiation. An artefact reference is used to give 
a reference to a concrete artefact that represents the instantiation of a parameter. In a 
diagram, an artefact is related to the parameter it instantiates by a dotted drawn line. 
The following icons are used to identify the type of a parameter.  
 
In a composite pattern, it is optional to include an icon symbolising the type of a 
parameter. The icons are simply smaller versions of the icons for symbolising artefacts, 
but represented in white and placed inside a black circle. An icon is placed adjacent to 
an identifier for a parameter in order to symbolise its type.  
Parameters are always visualised inside a parameter list. A parameter list is visualised 
by square brackets, where the parameters are listed inside the square brackets. If the 
list contains more than one parameter, then parameters are separated by comma. 
 
An arrow pointing towards a parameter list indicates that the parameters listed inside 
the square brackets are input parameters (i.e., input to the pattern to which the 
parameter list is placed adjacent to). An arrow pointing away from a parameter list 
indicates that the parameters inside the parameter list are output parameters (i.e., 
output of the pattern to which the parameter list is placed adjacent to). 
A parameter may represent a compound entity consisting of several elements. It is 
possible to detail the elements of a parameter by a notation for indicating a set. It is 
also possible to create an alias for a parameter.  
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The set annotation is used to denote that the elements listed inside the curly bracket 
are elements of a set.  
The alias operator is right-associative; an identifier to the left of the operator represents 
an alias for any parameter or set indicated to the right of the operator.  
A reference to seven different types of patterns may be given within the definition of a 
composite SaCS pattern, where six of these are references to basic SaCS patterns and 
the seventh type may be used to reference composite SaCS patterns.  
The following icons identify the three different types of process assurance patterns that 
may be referenced within a composite SaCS pattern. 
 
The following icons identify the three different types of product assurance patterns that 
may be referenced within a composite SaCS pattern. 
 
The following icon is used when referring to a composite pattern.  
   
Relations are used to model a relationship between an artefact and a parameter. 
Relations can also be used to model a relationship between two patterns in the form of 
a relationship between the respective parameters of the related patterns. The following 
icons identify the different types of relations in SaCS. 
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The instantiates relation is used to associate an artefact with a parameter indicating 
that the artefact instantiates the parameter.  
The assigns relation is used to denote that one or more output parameters of a pattern 
is assigned to one or more input parameters of a related pattern. The arrow always 
points towards the input parameters. 
The combines relation is used to denote that the outputs of the patterns that are related 
are combined, the result is a set consisting of the union of all outputs. Optionally a 
parameter list may be placed adjacent to the icon in the middle of the relation symbol to 
denote the result of combining.  
The details relation is used to denote that an output of a pattern is detailed by the 
output of a related pattern. The black box is associated with the output that is detailed; 
the set of smaller icons is associated with the output that details. 
The satisfies relation is used to denote that an output of a pattern (typically an 
instantiation of a requirement parameter, which is a requirement artefact) is satisfied by 
the output of a related pattern (typically an instantiation of a design parameter, which is 
a design artefact). The bullet is associated with the output that describes what shall be 
satisfied (e.g., a requirement), while the checkmark is associated with the output that 
describes the fulfilment (e.g., describes a system design in accordance with 
requirements). 
The demonstrates relation is used to denote that an output (typically an instantiation of 
a safety case parameter, which is a safety case artefact) demonstrates safe the output 
(typically an instantiation of a design parameter, which is a design artefact) of a related 
pattern. The stamp icon is associated with the output that provides a safety 
demonstration; the arrow points towards the output that is demonstrated safe. 
A composite pattern consists of a declaration followed by its content. The declaration is 
recognised by an icon similar (but larger) to the one in a composite pattern reference. 
The declaration also contains a specification of the inputs and outputs of the 
composite. A line at the bottom of the declaration denotes the end of the declaration, 
and the content of the composite is visualised below the line. 
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The content of a composite pattern consists of a description of a combination of 
patterns by the use of the different graphical elements described in this appendix (e.g., 
pattern references, parameters, artefacts references, and relations).  
Guidance may be given on the intended instantiation order of patterns. Superimposing 
pattern reference icons on top of a grey arrow indicates the recommended instantiation 
order.  
 
The direction of the arrow indicates the pattern instantiation order, patterns placed 
closer to the starting point of the arrow is instantiated prior to patterns placed close to 
the tip of the arrow. Patterns may have no specific order, then this is visualised as a 
parallel instantiation. 
In the example of the serial instantiation, two composite pattern references A and B are 
superimposed in a sequence on a grey arrow indicating that A should be instantiated 
before B. 
In the example of the parallel instantiation, each of the two composite pattern 
references A and B are superimposed on separate arrows, indicating that A and B may 
be instantiated in parallel. 
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APPENDIX B THE PATTERNS 
Table 10 provides an overview of the available basic patterns in SaCS. The last column 
identifies the appendix where each pattern is described.  
The patterns in their current version represent best practices established as pattern 
descriptions inspired by the following safety standards and guidelines: 
• Representing the railway domain: 
o EN50126: Railway Applications – The Specification and Demonstration of 
Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, and Safety (RAMS), European 
Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization, 1999.  
o EN50129: Railway Applications – Communication, Signalling and 
Processing Systems – Safety Related Electronic Systems for Signalling, 
European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization, 2003. 
o EN50128: Railway Applications – Communication, Signalling and 
Processing Systems – Software for Railway Control and Protection 
Systems, European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization, 
2001.  
o ERA/GUI/01-2008/SAF: Guide for the application of the Commission 
Regulation on the adoption of a common safety method on risk evaluation 
and assessment as referred to in Article 6(3)(a) of the Railway Safety 
Directive, European Railway Agency, 2009. 
• Representing the aviation domain:  
o ED-12B: Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment 
Certification, European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment,1992. 
o ED-79: Certification Considerations for Highly-Integrated or Complex 
Aircraft Systems, European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment, 
1996. 
o ED-109: Guidelines for Communication, Navigation, Surveillance, and Air 
Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) Systems Software Integrity Assurance, 
European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment, 2002. 
• Representing the nuclear domain: 
o IEC61226: Nuclear Power Plants – Instrumentation and Control Systems 
Important to Safety – Classification of Instrumentation and Control 
Functions, International Electrotechnical Commission, 2009. 
o IEC60880: Nuclear Power Plants – Instrumentation and Control Systems 
Important to Safety – Software Aspects for Computer-Based Systems 
Performing Category A Functions, International Electrotechnical 
Commission, 2006. 
o IEC62138: Nuclear Power Plants – Instrumentation and Control Systems 
Important for Safety – Software Aspects for Computer-Based Systems 
Performing Category B or C Functions, International Electrotechnical 
Commission, 2004. 
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Table 10 Summaries of Patterns 
Product Assurance Solution (Design) Pattern 
Name Short Description Ref. 
Trusted Backup Specifies a design solution where an adaptable controller 
operates in a limited and safe part of a partitioned state 
space 
B.5 
Process Assurance Solution (Method) Pattern 
Name Short Description Ref. 
FMEA Captures the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis method B.2 
FTA Captures the Fault Tree Analysis method B.3 
I&C Functions 
Categorisation 
Captures the method for classification of nuclear power 
plant systems according to their importance to safety as 
defined in IEC61226 
B.4 
Product Assurance Requirement Pattern 
Name Short Description Ref. 
Variable Demand 
for Service 
Concerns the elicitation of requirements for a control 
system that shall control a nuclear power plant production 
of electricity to meet a variable demand  
B.1 
Process Assurance Requirement Patterns 
Name Short Description Ref. 
Establish Concept  Concerns the process of establishing the purpose of the 
system and any constraints B.6 
Hazard 
Identification 
Concerns the process of identifying any hazards 
applicable to the operation of the system B.7 
Hazard Analysis Concerns the process of identifying potential causes of 
hazards  B.8 
Risk Analysis Concerns the process of assessing the severity of 
accidents should hazardous event occur and assessment 
of the likelihoods of such events 
B.9 
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Establish System 
Safety 
Requirements 
Concerns the process of specifying safety requirements 
on the basis of proposed risk mitigations B.10 
Process Assurance Safety Case Pattern 
Name Short Description Ref. 
Overall Safety Demonstration of system safety by diverse means applied 
on individual system parts 
B.11 
Process Quality 
Evidence 
Demonstration of claim support obtained on the basis of a 
high quality process B.18 
Process 
Compliance 
Evidence 
Demonstration of claim support obtained by 
demonstrating compliance to an acknowledged process  
B.19 
Product Assurance Safety Case Patterns 
Name Short Description Ref. 
Technical Safety Demonstration of a safe system by addressing the 
technical aspects B.12 
Code of Practice  Demonstration of system safety by means of applying 
well proven practices that implies required quality B.13 
Cross Reference Demonstration of system safety by implied strategy to 
similar reference system that is already approved B.14 
Explicit Risk 
Evaluation 
Demonstration of system safety by addressing all risk 
explicitly B.15 
Safety 
Requirements 
Satisfied 
Demonstration of system safety by addressing all safety 
requirements B.16 
Assessment 
Evidence 
Demonstration of claim support obtained on the basis of 
assessment B.17 
Deterministic 
Evidence 
Demonstration of claim support obtained by a 
deterministic approach B.20 
Probabilistic 
Evidence 
Demonstration of claim support obtained on the basis of a 
probabilistic approach B.21 
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Basic Assumption 
Evidence 
Demonstration of claim support based on rationale and/or 
indications such that no further evidence is required B.22 
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B.1 VARIABLE DEMAND FOR SERVICE 
Name: Variable Demand for Service 
Pattern Signature: Variable Demand for Service is defined with the signature 
illustrated in Figure 30. 
In Figure 30, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the 
pattern: 
• Plnt is short for Plant. 
• Mch is short for Machine. 
• Obj is short for Objective. 
• Req is short for Requirements. 
 
Figure 30 Variable Demand for Service – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Support the specification of requirements Req for a control system that is 
required to adapt its control function in order to deliver service according to demand 
when there is a variable demand for the service and the conditions for delivering 
service changes. The plant Plnt that is controlled is a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). The 
service provided by the NPP is electricity production The control system under 
construction is expected to inflict NPP control in such a manner that objectives Obj of 
providing service as demanded is satisfied by an adaptable control function. 
Applicability: The Variable Demand for Service pattern is suitable to apply in the 
following situations: 
• When there is expected changes in the demand for service provided by a NPP 
where the change in demand is of an unpredictable nature; 
• When the expected change in demand is intended to be accommodated with an 
adaptable control function in order to optimize electricity production according to 
demand at all times with minimal cost (e.g. production cost, waste production). 
Problem: The main aspects relevant for establishing functional requirements for the 
adaptable control function are: 
• Nature of Change: What changes in demand may be expected from the 
environment that shall be addressed by the adaptable control function. 
• Objective: What is the objective(s) for introducing an adaptable control function 
and is an adaptable control function the most suitable means for satisfying the 
objective(s). 
• Conflicting Objectives: Given multiple objectives, if there exist conflicts between 
the possible fulfilments of objectives, what characterises when one objective 
should be pursued before another. 
• Monitoring: What characterises the change(s) with respect to available input 
data. 
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• Detection: What are the input patterns that indicate a non-optimal control 
function that may be used to trigger adaptation of the control function. If there 
exists no direct input for detecting change, a challenge is to define an 
aggregated value formed by basic input data such that a significant change is 
positively detected and false positives are eliminated. 
• Response: How shall the system respond to change by adapting the control 
function. If the change impacts on the ability to satisfy several objectives, how 
shall it be evaluated which objective are the most significant. Given that the 
control function is adapted, a challenge is to assured that service is still provided 
although adaptation of the control function is performed. 
• Variability: What part of the system is allowed to vary in order to provide the 
ability to adapt, e.g., only the control function. 
• Constraints: What part of the control function is not allowed to vary and should 
always be maintained. 
• Timing: When is adaptation of the function allowed: on demand, discrete steps, 
or continuous adaptation. 
• Timeliness: What constraints are associated with the time that may be used for 
adapting the control function. 
Problem Frame Analysis Solution: Figure 31 illustrates the Variable Demand for 
Service problem frames diagram. 
 
Figure 31 - Variable Demand for Service - Problem Frame Diagram 
The input parameters associated with the problem frame diagram shall be interpreted 
as: 
• Obj: represents the objective that is addressed and which the requirements of 
the requirement set Req should support; 
• Plnt: represents the plant that is controlled, the plant is here decomposed into 
Sensors and Actuators and EUC (Equipment Under Control) where EUC 
represents the remaining physical entities besides sensors and actuators; 
• Mch: represents the machine to be constructed or an existing system that is 
modernised and that controls plant. 
The output expected by pattern instantiation is identified as: 
• Req: represents the set of requirements derived on the basis of instantiating the 
pattern according to the defined instantiation rule. 
MonitorDetect
ControlAdapt
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The problem domains that are represented in the problem frame diagram shall be 
interpreted as: 
• Environment: represents an entity (e.g. a power grid) demanding service (e.g. 
electricity) produced by Plnt. In the scenario addressed in this pattern, the 
environment always requires service but at a variable quantity over time. Further 
it is assumed that the quantity of service may not be predicted at any given time 
(e.g. electricity demand) thus rapid response to change in demand is required. 
The change in demand is expected to be accommodated by an altered 
interaction between the Plnt and the Environment (e.g., the electricity provided 
by Plnt to Environment). The Machine is expected to adapt its control of the Plnt 
such that the service provided by Plnt to Environment is optimised in order to 
fulfil objectives with minimal waste production. 
The main challenges associated with the fulfilment of an objective Obj arise in the 
interaction between entities in the following interfaces: 
• A: represents how the Machine becomes aware of the change in demand for 
service where: 
o Sensors provide signals on the status of the Plnt; 
o Monitor receives sensor signals such that the Machine may process 
these. 
• B: represents how the Machine responds to an altered demand for service 
where: 
o Control sends control signals to the Actuators in order to affect Plnt 
behaviour; 
o Actuators act according to the behaviour demanded by control signals of 
the Controller. 
• C: represents how Plant and Environment interact where: 
o Plant provides service (e.g., electricity) to Environment; 
o Environment provides a demand for service (e.g., demand for electricity) 
to Plant. 
Requirements for the Machine may be elicited with respect to four functions. The 
identified functions denote neither physical parts nor any software solution, but denote 
designed problem domains that are addressed separately, these are: 
• Monitor: represents the functionality for interacting with the sensors of a plant; 
• Detect: represents the functionality for detecting the need to adapt the control 
function; 
• Adapt: represents the functionality for adapting the control function (represented 
by Control) based on data provided by the function for detecting the need to 
adapt (represented by Detect); 
• Control: represents the functionality for controlling a plant (represented by Plant) 
by sending commands to its actuators (represented by Actuators). 
The four functions are addressed with respect to the challenges arising in the interface 
between functions denoted as: 
• M1: representing the interface between Monitor and Detect. 
• M2: representing the interface between Detect and Adapt. 
• M3: representing the interface between Adapt and Control. 
• M4: representing the interface between Monitor and Control.  
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There are two loops that are interesting: 
• Control loop: The control loop is responsible for upholding the service. In Figure 
31, the control loop is represented by the interactions:   
o Data on interface: A  Processing of data by: Monitor  Data on 
interface: M4  Processing of data by: Control  Data on interface: B. 
• Adaptation loop: The adaptation loop is responsible for modifying the control 
function in order to improve service or reduce the cost associated with delivering 
the service. In Figure 31, the adaptation loop is represented by the following 
interactions: 
o Data on interface: A  Processing of data by: Monitor  Data on 
interface: M1  Processing of data by: Detect  Data on interface: M2  
Processing of data by: Adapt  Data on interface: M3  Processing of 
data by: Control  Data on interface: B. 
Table 11 provides support for elicitation of requirements with respect to the problem as 
outlined in Figure 31 and in the description of main interfaces and functions. A list of 
abstract requirements is given in Table 11, representing an abstract version of the 
requirement set identified as Req.  
The following abbreviations are used in Table 11 and symbolises requirement 
attributes. A user shall give value to the attributes: 
• act: one or more specific actuators 
• actVal: one or more specific actuator values 
• sig: one or more specific sensor signals 
• sigVal: one or more specific sensor signal values 
• mtdA: method for sensor signal acquisition (e.g., push or pull) 
• mtdV: method for validation  
• mtdP: method for defining input patterns 
• mtdAd: method for adaptation of a control function 
• ptrn: one or more sensor signal patterns 
• rtd: represents a rate (e.g., x times pr. minute) 
• tm: represents a period of time (e.g., x seconds) 
 
Table 11 – Abstract Requirements 
ID Requirement Note on instantiation 
Function: Monitor Interfaces: A; M1 
R.1 Mch shall monitor sig Detail each signal that is required to be 
monitored.  
R.2 Mch shall acquire sig by mtdA  For each signal: detail how it shall be 
acquired. 
R.3 Mch shall acquire sig at a rate 
rtd 
For each signal: detail the rate at which it 
should be acquired. 
R.4 Mch shall validate sig by mtdV For each signal: detail how it shall be 
validated.  
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Function: Detect Interfaces: M1; M2 
R.5 Mch shall detect ptrn Detail each signal pattern (combination of 
signals) that shall be detected and which 
provides indication on non-optimal control 
function. 
R.6 Mch shall acquire ptrn by mtdP  For each pattern: detail how it shall be 
acquired on the basis of a specific 
combination of signals. 
R.7 Mch shall acquire ptrn at a rate 
rtd 
For each pattern: detail the rate at which it 
should be acquired. 
R.8 Mch shall validate sig by mtdV For each pattern: detail how it shall be 
validated.  
Function: Adapt Interfaces: M2, M3 
R.9 Mch shall modify the control 
function with mtdAd when ptrn 
is detected 
For each combination of mtdAd and ptrn, 
detail explicit requirements. 
R.10 Mch shall adapt the control 
function at a rate no less than 
rtd 
Detail how often adaptation shall be 
performed. 
R.11 Mch shall perform an 
adaptation of the control 
function no longer than rtd 
Detail constraints with respect to time for 
performing an adaptation of the control 
function. 
R.12 Mch shall validate an 
adaptation by mtdVal 
Detail how it shall be assured that the 
adaptation is correct. 
Function: Control Interfaces: M3, M4, B 
R.13 Mch shall control act Detail each actuator that shall be controlled.  
R.14 Mch shall actuate act with 
actVal when sig is sigVal else 
actVal 
Detail all combinations of values for input 
signals that lead to a specific actuation of 
actuators. 
R.15 Mch shall actuate act within tm 
of detection of sig with sigVal 
Detail time constraints for actuation upon 
detection. 
R.16 Mch shall perform act within 
time 
Detail time constraints for completing 
actuation. 
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Instantiation Rule: An artefact Req (see Figure 31 and Figure 30) instantiates the 
Variable Demand for Service pattern if: 
• Req is a set of requirements. 
• Every requirement of Req is an instance of an abstract requirement. Abstract 
requirements are defined in column “Requirement” of Table 11. An abstract 
requirement is instantiated by applying the guidance provided in the column 
“Notes on instantiation” described in Table 11. 
• Every requirement of Req is traceable to a unique abstract requirement. 
• Every requirement of Req describes a property, behaviour or a constraint of the 
system (identified by the instantiation of Mch). 
• Every requirement of Req is relevant for the satisfaction of at least on objective 
(identified by the instantiation of Obj). 
Related Patterns: The Variable Demand for Service pattern is related to other patterns 
in the following manner: 
• May succeed Establish Concept given that its instantiation produces a 
description of goals and functions relevant to detail further by the use of Variable 
Demand for Service. 
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B.2 FMEA 
Name: FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis) 
Pattern Signature: FMEA is defined with the signature illustrated in Figure 32. 
In Figure 32, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the 
pattern: 
• ToA is short for Target of Assessment. 
• Tbl is short for Table 
 
Figure 32 FMEA – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Provide guidance on the application of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) method. The intent of an FMEA is to identify failure modes that may lead to 
system failure or some target ToA under evaluation. The FMEA result is commonly 
summarised in a table Tbl. The pattern may be used as support for qualitative or 
quantitative analysis of an item(s), component(s), subsystem(s), or a system(s). 
FMEA’s may be combined, e.g., individual assessment of components may represent a 
component level FMEA assessment that provide input to a subsystem level FMEA. In 
the case where FMEA’s build upon each other, the identified effects of a component 
level FMEA may represent the failure modes in a subsystem level FMEA. 
Applicability: The FMEA pattern is suitable to apply in the following situation: 
• When a system, subsystem, component or item needs to be assessed with 
respect to: 
o Potential failure modes. 
o Likely cause(s) of failure modes. 
o Likely effect(s) of the occurrence of a failure mode. 
Problem: The main challenges associated with methods for assessment of the 
potential failure modes are:  
• Efficiency: To support efficient application such that results are provided with 
minimal use of resources. 
• Structured: To support a structured assessment and of the characteristics of a 
target such that the potential for not delivering its function as intended is 
identified along with its likely causes and system effects. 
• Communication: To support communication of results on a form that allows 
different actors to understand findings with minimal effort.  
Method Solution: Figure 33 illustrates the FMEA method pattern diagram. The 
following steps may apply the FMEA method systematically:  
• Step 1 – Identify Item (Item): What is the item that is analysed. Is the target of 
assessment ToA one specific item or may the target be decomposed to a set of 
items. 

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• Step 2 – Identify Function (Func): For each item in the table, describe its 
associated functions (Func). 
• Step 3 – Define Failure Mode (F. Mode): For each identified function, describe 
the potential failure modes. 
• Step 4 – Define Failure Cause (F. Cause): For each failure mode, describe the 
likely failure cause. 
• Step 5 – Define Local Effect (L. Effect): for each failure mode, describe the local 
effect, meaning what is the effect on operation of the item that is analysed. 
• Step 6 – Define System Effect (S. Effect): for each failure mode, describe the 
likely system effect, meaning what is the likely effect of the failure of the item in 
the context it is intended to be used. 
• Step 7 – Define Severity (Sev.): Define the severity of effects identified in step 6. 
• Step 8 – Identify Failure Rate (F. Rate): Identify the expected rate of occurrence 
associated with the failure mode. This may be given qualitatively or quantitatively 
depending on the nature of the item analysed and availability of data and 
methods for estimation of occurrences. 
• Step 9 – Define Recommended Action (R. Act.): Define recommended action in 
order to avoid fault, detect and isolate the fault given an occurrence, or 
otherwise tolerate the fault. 
 
Figure 33 Method Pattern Diagram – FMEA example 
Instantiation Rule: An artefact Tbl (see Figure 33 and Figure 32) instantiates the 
FMEA pattern if: 
• Tbl is a tabular documentation of the assessment results from applying the steps 
described in Section “Method Solution”. 
• Every row of Tbl contains a description of a potential failure mode of the target 
that is assessed (identified by the instantiation of ToA). 
• Every row of Tbl contains a description of the likely effects of a failure mode on 
the target that is assessed (identified by the instantiation of ToA). 
Related Patterns: The FMEA pattern is related to other patterns in the following 
manner: 
• May support Hazard Identification pattern by providing a method for performing 
identification of potential causes of hazards, the information provided in the 
system effects column of the FMEA table identify system level hazards. 
• May support Hazard Analysis pattern by providing a method for identification of 
failure modes and potential causes of hazards. 
• May support Risk Analysis pattern by providing a method for performing 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of hazards.  
ToA
Tbl
Item Func. F.Mode F.Cause L.Effect S.Effect Sev. F. Rate R. Act.
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Known Uses: failure modes and effect analysis is a commonly applied method within 
safety critical domains and is described in several standards and guidelines, e.g. 
nuclear domain [NUREG–0492], aerospace [ARP4761], and the more general 
applicable standard [IEC60812]. 
[NUREG–0492] NRC, Fault Tree Handbook, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
1981. 
[ARP4761] SAE, Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment 
Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment, Society of Automotive Engineers, 
1996. 
[IEC60812] IEC, Analysis techniques for system reliability – Procedure for failure mode 
and effects analysis (FMEA), Edition 2.0, International Electrotechnical Commission, 
2006. 
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B.3 FTA 
Name: FTA (Fault Tree Analysis) 
Pattern Signature: FTA is defined with the signature illustrated in Figure 34. 
In Figure 34, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the 
pattern: 
• ToA is short for Target of Assessment. 
• UE is short for Unwanted Event. 
• FT is short for Fault Tree 
 
Figure 34 FTA – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Support a systematic and deductive assessment of the potential causes of 
identified unwanted events UE of a target ToA. The pattern describes the fault tree 
analysis method and provides guidance on its application. A fault tree FT is expressed 
as a tree where the root of the tree denotes the unwanted event UE (e.g., representing 
a system hazard) that is analysed. Leaf nodes denote basic events (e.g., system 
component failure modes) that may lead to the unwanted event. The primary goal is to 
identify minimal cut sets by the use of the tree structure. A cut set expresses a set of 
basic events such that if these are present at the same time, the unwanted event will 
occur. A minimal cut set expresses the minimal set of basic events that may lead to an 
unwanted event. 
Applicability: The FTA pattern is intended for the following situations: 
• As a means to deduce potential causes of unwanted events. 
• As a means to identify combinations of faults that may lead to unwanted events. 
• As a means to analyse system concepts, simple systems or complex systems. 
Problem: The main challenges associated with methods for assessment of the 
potential causes of an unwanted event are: 
• Efficiency: To support efficient application with minimal use of resources. 
• Logical: To support a logical specification of the dependencies between an 
unwanted event that is investigated and the potential causes that is identified 
through the assessment. 
• Communication: To support communication of results on a form that allows 
different actors to understand findings with minimal effort. 
Method Solution: Figure 35 exemplifies a fault tree and outlines the relationships 
between a fault tree and the inputs and outputs of the FTA pattern.  
 

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Figure 35 FTA example diagram 
The following steps may apply the FTA method systematically: 
• Step 1 – Define the top event: The intent is to define the top event that represent 
the root of a fault tree and the event that is analysed (UE.Top in Figure 35). 
• Step 2 – Construct fault tree: The intent is to construct the fault tree by 
deductively constructing the tree in a top-down manner by the use of graphical 
elements symbolising events and gates. An unwanted event should state what is 
the fault/failure under consideration. Gates (e.g., the “OR” gate in Figure 35) are 
used to define the combination of antecedents (e.g., basic event E.1, UE.Sub1, 
or UE.Sub2) that imply the consequent (e.g., UE.Top). Decomposition of an 
unwanted event (e.g., UE.Top) should not be described by connecting a series 
of gates down to basic events, intermediate unwanted events should be defined 
(e.g., UE.Sub1 and UE.Sub2). Basic events answer “how” questions by defining 
how a system component or element may experience a fault/failure.  
• Step 3 – Find minimal cut sets: The intent is to deduce from the tree structure 
the combination of basic events that may lead to the top event and arrange 
these in order. The set with lowest order (contains least number of basic events) 
is most significant. In Figure 35, the event UE.Top occurs if event E.1 occurs 
(minimal cut set of order 1). The top event also occurs if events E.2 and E.3 
occur or if events E.4 and E.5 occur (cut sets of order 2). There are many cut 
sets of order 3, 4, and 5 but these are less significant. 
• Step 4 – Qualitative Analysis: The intent is to analyse the fault tree qualitatively 
in order identify week points of the system with respect to the top event. This 
may be performed on the basis of cut sets. If there exists cut-sets of order 1 then 
the system is vulnerable to single point of failure. If there exists none cut sets of 
order 1 but the events in the cut sets of order 2 have identical characteristics, 
then the system may be susceptible to common cause failures. 
• Step 5 – Quantitative Analysis: The intent is to calculate the probability of a top 
event by combining probabilities of basic events (given that probabilities of basic 
events may be provided). The probability of UE.Top in Figure 35 may be 
calculated by a combination of the following general rules: 
o The probability of an event A ‘’AND’’ an event B is expressed:  
UE
FT
UE.Top
E.1 E.2 E.3 E.4 E.5
UE.Sub2UE.Sub1
Legend
Unwanted Event
Basic Event
AND gate
OR gate
ToA
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P(A*B) = P(A) * P(B) 
o The probability of an event A ‘’OR’’ an event B is expressed:  
P(A+B) = P(A) + P(B) – (P(A) * P(B)) 
Instantiation Rule: A documentation artefact FT (see Figure 35 and Figure 34) 
instantiates the FTA pattern if: 
• FT is a set of fault trees. 
• Every fault tree of FT is instantiated by applying the guidance provided in 
Section “Method Solution” for all unwanted events (identified by the instantiation 
of UE). For a specific target ToA, this means that every unwanted event UE that 
represents a suitable top event in the analysis is systemically assessed 
according to the process outlined through Steps 1 to Step 5. 
• Every fault tree of FT is traceable to a unique unwanted event (identified by the 
instantiation of UE). 
• Every fault tree of FT describes the relation between an unwanted event, 
represented as a top node in the tree structure, and potential initiating events 
(e.g. HW/SW failures) associated with a target system (identified by the 
instantiation of ToA). 
Related Patterns: The FTA pattern is related to other patterns in the following manner: 
• May support Hazard Analysis pattern by providing a method for performing 
identification of potential causes of hazards. 
• May support Risk Analysis pattern by providing a method for performing 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of hazards.  
Known Uses: Fault tree analysis is a commonly applied method within safety critical 
domains and is described in several standards and guidelines, e.g. nuclear domain 
[NUREG–0492], aerospace [ARP4761], and the more general applicable standard 
[IEC61025]. 
[NUREG–0492] NRC, Fault Tree Handbook, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
1981. 
[ARP4761] SAE, Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment 
Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment, Society of Automotive Engineers, 
1996. 
[IEC61025] IEC, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Edition 2.0, International Electrotechnical 
Commission, 2006. 
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B.4 I&C FUNCTIONS CATEGORISATION 
Name: I&C Functions Categorisation 
Pattern Signature: I&C Functions Categorisation is defined with the signature 
illustrated in Figure 36. 
In Figure 36, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the 
pattern: 
• ToA is short for Target of Assessment. 
• FncCat is short for Function Categorisation 
 
Figure 36 I&C Functions Categorisation – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Provide guidance on the classification of functions FncCat of a target ToA 
where the target is a nuclear power plants instrumentation and control system and the 
functions are classified according to their importance to safety. Functions important to 
safety are typically distributed over several system and subsystems. The intent of the 
categorisation is to: provide a means for assigning requirements for functions in a 
consistent manner; provide a means to differentiate requirements for development of 
functions according to their potential impact on safety. The classification of functions 
allows detailed requirements to be associated with different categories of functions. The 
classification represents a means to categorise a system with respect to the importance 
of its functions on safety. The result FncCat provided upon pattern instantiation may be 
used as input to activities on the refinement of the system design, e.g., as input to the 
modularisation of a system separating critical functions from non-critical functions into 
different sub-systems. The result may also be used in order to plan the optimal the 
allocation of resources, e.g., assigning more resources to the development of critical 
functions than none-critical functions. 
Applicability: The I&C Functions Categorisation pattern is suitable to apply in the 
following situations: 
• When developing an instrumentation and control system within the nuclear 
power plant domain. 
• When the categorisation of functions shall be performed according to 
[IEC61226]. 
Problem: The main challenges associated with categorisation of the functions of critical 
systems are: 
• Criticality: provide categorisation of systems based on an evaluation of the 
criticality of the functions it offers.  
• Conformity: provide categorisation of systems such that systems of similar 
category may be associated with the same set of rules. 
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Method Solution: Figure 37 illustrates the I&C Functions Categorisation method 
pattern diagram. The following steps may apply the method systematically:  
• Step 1 – Identify design basis: Collect data detailing the nature of the plant (e.g., 
reactor type), I&C design (e.g., detailing redundancy of mechanical and electrical 
systems and equipment), data on PIE3 (Postulated Initiating Event) associated 
with the plant and their main mitigating functions and support functions. 
• Step 2 – Define functions: Identify and define the functions that shall be 
performed by the system, e.g., reactor shutdown, post-accident monitoring, 
monitoring and controlling performance of individual systems or items or access 
control. Identify functions and requirements for functions in accordance with 
[IEC60964]. 
• Step 3 – Category Assignment: The intent is to categorise each function 
identified in Step 2. The applicable categories are denoted A, B, or C. Functions 
that may not be assigned to any of these three categories are denoted non-
classified. The relationship between the characteristics of a function and 
category may be shortly summarised as: 
o A: Denote functions that play a principal role in the achievement and 
maintenance of plant safety. May also be assigned to functions whose 
failure could directly lead to accident conditions. 
o B: Denote functions that play a complementary role to category A 
functions in the achievement and maintenance of plant safety. May also 
be assigned to functions whose failure could initiate design basis event or 
worsen the severity of design basis event; 
o C: Denote functions that play an auxiliary or indirect role in the 
achievement or maintenance of plant safety. Category C includes 
functions that have some safety significance, but are not category A or B. 
• Step 4 – Detail system requirements: Detail requirements for the system that 
shall provide the implementation of the functions identified in Step 3.  
• Step 5 – Identify subsystems and items: Identify subsystems, components, items 
that shall fulfil the requirements identified in Step 4. 
• Step 6 – Refinement of category assignment: Once the system design matures 
such that redundancy, diversity and other technical requirements of the functions 
are determined more exactly (e.g., on the basis of safety assessment) the 
classification list shall be refined and revised. 
• Step 7 – List functions and assigned categories: The final list of functions with an 
associated category for each function shall be documented and maintained 
under configuration control. 
 
                                                
3 PIE - event identified during design as capable of leading to anticipated operational 
occurrences or accident conditions, ref [IEC61226] 
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Figure 37 Method Pattern Diagram – I&C Functions Categorisation example 
Instantiation Rule: A documentation artefact FncCat (see Figure 37 and Figure 36) 
instantiates the I&C Functions Categorisation pattern if: 
• FncCat is a documentation of the results from a classification of the functions of 
a target system (identified by the instantiation of ToA). 
• FncCat represents the intermediate results from applying the steps 1 to 3 
described in Section “Method Solution” or the full results from applying steps 1 to 
7 in Section “Method Solution”. 
• Every function described in FncCat is categorised as an A, B, or C function 
according to categorisation given in [IEC61226] or otherwise is not categorised. 
Related Patterns: The I&C Functions Categorisation pattern is related to other 
patterns in the following manner: 
• May support Risk Analysis pattern by providing a categorisation scheme for the 
categorisation of a system that is assessed with respect to risk. 
Known Uses: The pattern represents the method for categorising systems within a 
nuclear context as defined in the standard [IEC61226]. 
[IEC61226] IEC, Nuclear Power Plants – Instrumentation and control important to 
safety – Classification of instrumentation and control functions, Edition 3.0, International 
Electrotechnical Commission, 2009. 
[IEC60964] IEC, Nuclear Power Plants – Control Rooms – Design, Edition 2.0, 
International Electrotechnical Commission, 2009. 
 
ToA
FncCat
Design
Func. Cat. Rationale
F.1 B
F.2 C
F.3 C
System ToA
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B.5 TRUSTED BACKUP 
Name: Trusted Backup 
Pattern Signature: The Trusted Backup is defined with the signature illustrated in 
Figure 38. 
In Figure 38, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the 
pattern: 
• S is short for System (S is a design artefact that includes all the other design 
artefacts below). 
• AC is short for Adaptable Controller. 
• AL is short for Adaptation Logic. 
• CL is short for Control Logic. 
• TC is short for Trusted Controller. 
• CD is short for Control Delegator. 
• M is short for Monitor. 
 
 
Figure 38 Trusted Backup – Pattern Signature 
Intent: The intent of the pattern is to allow an adaptable controller AC, which might be 
of arbitrary assurance level, to control a safety related plant. The adaptable controller is 
here introduced in order to accommodate changes in the plant as a means to uphold 
service despite changes (e.g., adjust to plant degradation) or improve service over time 
(e.g., better fitting of control law). The intent is to divide the operational state space 
associated with some controlled plant into regions. An adaptable controller is in this 
control scheme not a trusted component, thus, it is only granted control privileges in 
those regions, called safety regions, where there are no negative effects of controller 
failure. In order to provide service in those regions, which are not safety regions, or 
take over control if the adaptable controller experiences failure, a redundant trusted 
controller TC is granted control privileges. The controllers are developed according to 
different principles in which the trusted controller guarantees safe control, but is less 
resilient to changes in the plant, whereas the adaptable controller accommodates 
changes and can optimise accordingly, but do not guarantee safe control. The system 
S controls the plant in a manner that emphasizes both optimal and safe control, a 
control delegator CD delegates control privileges to the most suitable controller 
depending on the state of the plant.  
The pattern employs a strategy that facilitates the utilisation of adaptable control for 
optimising critical control functions, but where effort required for demonstrating that the 
system is safe is to a large degree minimised. The adaptable controller is intended to 
provide an increase in performance in changing environments compared to a 
conventional software system. Erroneous operation of the adaptable controller should 
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have no negative impact on safety, thus the adaptive controller may be of an arbitrary 
assurance level. 
Applicability: The Trusted Backup pattern is suitable to apply in the following 
situations: 
• Control scenarios where there is a need for a high degree of exploration of 
alternative adaptive control solutions, e.g., prototyping or upgrade scenarios. As 
the safety of the system is not ensured by the adaptive control component, the 
adaptive controller or the adaptation logic may be rapidly changed. 
• When there is an existing trusted control system that lacks the ability to 
accommodate changes. Adding the adaptable controller, safety monitoring, and 
control delegation functionality may provide additional adaptable control 
functionality. 
Problem: The main aspects to be considered when establishing an adaptable and 
critical system concept are: 
• Resilience and flexibility: the benefit of an adaptable system is that it provides 
the ability to respond to internal (e.g., component failures) and external changes 
(e.g., changes to the operating environment) with resilience and flexibility. An 
adaptable system may be particularly useful to handle changes that occur in an 
unpredictable manner. If the change is not of an unpredictable nature, other 
techniques may be a better solution. It is essential that the nature of the change 
that shall be accommodated by adaptability be understood such that the 
adaptable feature is effective.  
• Determinism: for each adaptation of a system, a new system is provided. In 
order to argue that a system is, and will continue to be, sufficiently safe for its 
purpose, it is essential that its behaviour may be determined. It is not possible to 
determine the behaviour of an adaptable system unless all possible inputs may 
be determined and all potential adaptations of the system may be determined. 
As it is not feasible to determine the adaptable system behaviour in all potential 
operational scenarios, determinism must be provided in those states that may 
impact on the safety property. It must be guaranteed that the system is 
sufficiently safe for its intended purpose. 
Design Solution: Figure 39 illustrates the main structure of components and their 
interfaces, annotated in UML notation, which play a part in obtaining a Trusted Backup 
design. 
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Figure 39 - Structure 
Delegation of control is governed by the Control Delegator part that based on 
received/requested system and plant state information grant control privileges to one of 
its delegates. Given that there are not detected any failures to any of its delegates, the 
Control Delegator delegates control according to a defined Delegation Scheme. 
Controller adaptation initiates in response to the result of the detection and analysis of 
change provided by the Monitor. Once the need to adapt is identified, the Adaptation 
Logic adapts the Control Logic accordingly. In order to assure a safe control process, 
the Adaptable Controller is deactivated for the period of time when this controller is 
modified. The Trusted Controller will then continuously provide service and thus assure 
safety. 
The following participants and their respective responsibilities are represented in the 
Trusted Backup pattern:  
• S: System – represents the system defined by the Trusted Backup pattern. The 
system interacts with a human operator and controls a plant. 
• AC: Adaptable Controller – is here decomposed into an Adaptation Logic part 
and a Control Logic part. 
• CL: Control Logic – responsible for providing control signals based upon the 
current plant state and reference data points.  
• AL: Adaptation Logic – is responsible for accommodating changes to the plant or 
the environment in which the plant operates by adapting the Control Logic. It is 
here assumed that the absence of side effects due to adaptation may not be 
adequately evaluated, thus a high level of trust may not be awarded the control 
logic or the adaptation logic. The Adaptation Logic is here provided as an 
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external adaptation mechanism (external to the respective controller identified as 
Control Logic).  
• TC: Trusted Controller – is responsible for providing control signals based upon 
the current plant state and reference data points. It is assumed that it may be 
demonstrated that the Trusted Controller always operates in a correct and 
sufficiently safe manner.  
• CD: Control Delegator – is responsible for delegation of control such that control 
privileges are granted to the most suitable controller of a set of alternative 
controllers in such a manner that plant safety is always assured and secondly 
that the most optimal controller for a given situation is always sought. All 
controllers operate in parallel where a set of delegation rules define which 
controller is granted control privileges in each state, the remaining controllers 
being suppressed. 
• M: Monitor – is responsible for monitoring the plant, monitoring the performance 
of the system, and identifying the need to adapt the adaptable controller to the 
plant and/or environmental changes. 
The Control Delegator provides important functionality with respect to preserving 
system safety. It must be assured that it grants control privileges to the most suitable 
controller at all times. The pattern is suitable when there are no means of reverting to a 
previous stored plant state given a failure scenario, thus it would be important to 
support a forward recovery strategy. Given that an adaptable controller gives an 
erroneous control signal, the potential danger this signal inflicts must be mitigated from 
the current execution point. Means of achieving a forward recovery feature is provided 
here by the redundant controllers, health monitoring and conservative control 
delegation rules. Potentially hazardous control behaviour may arise if the Control 
Delegator grants control privileges to a non-trusted control component in a plant state 
where a worst-case erroneous control sequence may not be mitigated. With respect to 
providing guarantee of safe delegation of control, the following must be known: (1) the 
potential hazards associated with the plant; (2) worst case failure scenario and the 
failure modes of the adaptive controller, which may lead to identified hazards, and (3) 
the capability of the trusted controller with respect to stabilising a plant. 
Software adaptations are intended to be limited to the adaptable controller only. The 
objective of the adaptable controller is to optimise control with respect to some 
performance goal, how this is achieved is of minor concern here, although a part 
named Adaptation Logic is assumed to contain the rules for how to adapt the Control 
Logic according to some identified need to adapt. The Monitor part is assumed to 
identify the need to adapt based on analysis of the plant and its environment. 
Variability of the system is isolated to the Control Logic part of the Adaptable Controller. 
This Control Logic part might exist in various versions over time as the Adaptation 
Logic adapts the control function in response to plant or environmental events. A 
specification of the potential for system variability may thus be provided once the 
Adaptation Logic is specified. 
There will be no variability of the system service in the part of the operating state space 
for which only the backup controller may operate as the backup controller is assumed 
to be a deterministic controller. Variability of the system service will be experienced in 
the part of the operating state space for which the adaptable controller may operate 
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and in those scenarios it is granted control privileges, as different versions of the 
Control Logic may provide different outputs when acting on the same input. 
Instantiation Rule: An artefact S (see Figure 39 and Figure 38) instantiates the 
Trusted Backup pattern if: 
• S is a specification of the hardware design and/or the software design of a 
control system. 
• S specifies a system containing at least two diverse controller parts that operate 
in parallel. 
• S specifies at least one adaptable controller and at least one trusted controller. 
By adaptable controller, it is meant a controller that can be automatically 
modified during operation. By trusted controller, it is meant a controller design 
that is able to be demonstrated adequately safe for its purpose. 
• S specifies a system part that is responsible for delegating control privileges to 
(or switching between) the most suitable controller among a set of available 
controllers at any given time according to defined rules. 
Related Patterns: The Trusted Backup design relates to the other patterns in the 
following manner: 
• May be used together with any pattern that provides requirements for the 
behaviour of the system, or a detailing of the design of the system described. 
Known Uses: A number of applications with adaptive control are referenced in [Åström 
and Wittenmark 1994]. One application is related to a chemical reactor control system 
where an adaptive controller was implemented on a reactor at Berol Kemi AB in 1982. 
As poor control may not only result in lowered production but also lead to potentially 
fatal events as explosions, it is vital to uphold the safety property of the plant. The 
system operator may switch between a conventional controller with manual mode 
tuning or an adaptive controller with automatic tuning to control the flow and 
temperature of the chemicals in the plant. Experiences showed that that temperature 
fluctuation was significantly reduced with the adaptive system. In addition, the operator 
could focus on other tasks as the time spent supervising reactor temperature was not 
necessary. 
A representative example is described in [Schumann et al. 2006]. The authors refer to a 
NASA project called IFCS (Intelligent Flight Control System). The IFCS project utilised 
an on-line adaptive neural network in order to optimize aircraft performance during 
normal and adverse conditions. The neuro-controller was designed to enable a pilot to 
maintain control and safely land an aircraft that had suffered major systems failure or 
combat damage. Control surface failures may conflict with the design assumptions of 
an aircraft flight control system, with the effect that it is unable to handle the situation. 
The IFCS neuro-controller compensates for discrepancies between a reference model 
of the flight dynamics to any “new” flight dynamics model in order to maintain the best 
possible flight performance. The adaptive neural network software “learns” the new 
flight characteristics, on-board and in real time, thereby helping the pilot to maintain or 
regain control and prevent a potentially catastrophic aircraft accident. 
The Trusted Backup pattern enables utilisation of adaptive control in a manner similar 
to the principles advocated in the Simplex architecture [Sha 2001]. Sha [Sha 2001] 
refer to the Boeing 777 flight control system as an example of a system that uses the 
ideas of the Simplex architecture in practise. The system uses two controllers, a 
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sophisticated “normal” controller that is customised for the Boeing 777 and a secondary 
controller that is simple and well proven through 25 years of use and based on the 
Boeing 747 control laws. The “normal” controller provides a higher level of performance 
and it must operate within the bounds given by the secondary controller, which assure 
safe flight control. The Boeing 777 case is comparable to the Trusted Backup pattern 
main line of though. Although an adaptable controller is not utilised in the Boeing 777, 
the “normal” controller represents a software controller that is an assessment and 
safety demonstration challenge. The secondary controller and the mechanism for 
switching among controllers is a means for providing safety assurance. 
[Åström and Wittenmark 1994] K. J. Åström and B. Wittenmark, Adaptive Control, 2nd 
edition, Addison-Wesley, 1994. 
[Schumann et al. 2006] J. Schumann, P. Gupta, and S. Jacklin. Toward Verification and 
Validation of Adaptive Aircraft Controllers. In IEEE Aerospace Conference. IEEE Press, 
USA, 2006. 
[Sha 2001] L. Sha. Using Simplicity to Control Complexity. IEEE Software, 18:20-28, 
2001. 
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B.6 ESTABLISH CONCEPT 
Name: Establish Concept 
Pattern Signature: Establish Concept is defined with the signature illustrated in Figure 
40. 
In Figure 40, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the 
pattern: 
• Env is short for Environment. 
• Pur is short for Purpose. 
• IdFunc is short for Identification of Functions. 
• IdHuInt is short for Identification of Human Interactions. 
• IdSyInt is short for Identification of System Interactions. 
• IdHz is short for Identification of Hazards  
• Conc is short for Concept. 
 
 
Figure 40 Establish Concept – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Support the capture of an initial system concept description Conc in a 
systematic manner. The intent of the pattern is to define how an initial specification of a 
system concept shall be derived and documented by: i) outlining the main 
characteristics of the process of deriving a conceptual description; and ii) defining 
requirements for specifying the system concept. The pattern captures the problem of 
establishing the purpose Pur of the system under construction and its context Env of 
use to such a degree that enables subsequent conceptual development of a technical 
solution.  
Applicability: The Establish Concept pattern is suitable to apply in the following 
situations: 
• Prior to project initiation as a means to reflect upon the development challenges 
that shall be addressed. 
• At the initial stages of conceptual development in order to systematically capture 
the main purpose and constraints applicable to the system under construction. 
Problem: The main aspects to be considered when establishing the system concept 
are: 
• Capture the goals: To clearly define the goals of the system under construction 
in order to define its purpose. 
• Define scope and context: To clearly define any delimitation of the scope of 
operation and operating context. 
• Identify functions: To clearly define the system functions and how these 
functions support the stated goals. 
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• Identify interactions: To clearly define the interactions that the system under 
construction has with the process/plant to be controlled, any human operator 
and any other system. 
• Identify know hazards: To obtain on the basis of an early specification of a 
system concept, a high level definition of the potential hazards applicable to the 
system under construction.  
Process Solution: Figure 41 illustrates the Establish Concept process annotated in a 
UML activity diagram. 
 
 
Figure 41 Establish Concept – Activity Diagram 
 
The parameters associated with the activity diagram illustrated in Figure 41 may be 
interpreted as follows: 
• Env (Environment): represents relevant data on the environment of the system 
under construction that may be used to determine influences that directly or 
indirectly affects the system.  
• Prp (Purpose): represents relevant data providing information on goals, high-
level requirements, functions or constraints that may be used as input to derive 
the purpose of the system under construction. 
• IdFunc (Identification of Functions): represents the result from any method 
supporting the activity of deriving the functions of the system. 
• IdHuInt (Identification of Human Interactions): represents the result from any 
method supporting the activity of identifying human interactions. 
• IdSyInt (Identification of System Interactions): represents the result from any 
method supporting the activity of identifying interacting systems and their 
interactions. 
• IdHz (Identification of Hazards): represents the result from any method 
supporting the identification of relevant hazards. 
The activities identified in Figure 41 intend to serve the following purpose: 
• Define Goals, Scope, and Context: based on available documentation, the intent 
of the activity is to clearly define the purpose of the system. The purpose of the 
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system is defined by establishing the goals to be achieved and by defining any 
operational and contextual constraints in the fulfilment of these goals. 
• Identify System Functions: the intent of the activity is to define the high-level 
functions that shall be satisfied by the system under construction such that 
stated goals are fulfilled. Traceability between defined goals and system 
functions should be provided. 
• Identify Human Interactions: the intent of the activity is to define how operators 
are intended to interact with the system under construction. 
• Identify Interactions with Systems: the intent of the activity to define how the 
system under construction will interact with other systems. The required and 
provided services of the system under construction shall be detailed to such a 
level that dependencies to other systems are identified. 
• Identify Relevant Hazards: the intent of the activity is to identify any relevant 
hazard with respect to operation of the system under construction in its intended 
context. The introduction of a hazard identification activity early in the design 
process facilitates effective identification of the potential dangers that the system 
under construction may inflict, allowing effective risk reduction and early 
application of mitigating measures. 
• Document Concept: the intent of the activity is to document the findings of the 
Establish Concept process in a suitable format. The findings are the result of 
each activity defined in Figure 41. 
Instantiation Rule: A documentation artefact Conc (see Figure 41 and Figure 40) 
instantiates the Establish Concept pattern if: 
• Conc is a documentation of the results from applying the process described in 
Section “Process Solution”. 
• Conc specifies the assumptions, and the justifications for design choices, made 
during the process of establishing the concept. 
• Conc specifies the goals associated with the system under development. 
• Conc specifies the scope, context of operation, and the functions to be fulfilled 
by the system under development. 
• Conc specifies all intended interactions with other systems and human 
operators. 
• Conc specifies all foreseeable hazards that are applicable to the system under 
development. 
• Conc specifies the traces to all source documentation that are used in order to 
establish its content. 
Related Patterns: The Establish Concept pattern may be used as a starting point to 
the development of the system to be constructed. The results obtained from applying 
the pattern may then be used in order to guide the selection of appropriate subsequent 
patterns to support the expressed concept. The Establish Concept is related to other 
patterns in the following manner: 
• May be used with any design pattern, or set of design patterns, that satisfies the 
concept description obtained from instantiating Establish Concept. 
• May precede Hazard Identification. The Hazard Identification pattern addresses 
the process of identifying hazards associated with the operation of given system 
that may be described in the results from instantiating Establish Concept. 
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Known Uses: The pattern captures the intent of the first stage of the system life cycle 
as presented in several safety standards, to notable standards are [IEC61508] and 
[EN50126]. 
[IEC61508] International Electrotechnical Commission, Functional safety of 
electrical/electronic/ programmble electronic safety-related systems, IEC 61508, Edition 
2.0, 2010. 
[EN50126] European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization, Railway 
Applications – The specification and demonstration of Reliability, Availability, 
Maintainability and Safety (RAMS), EN 50126, 1999. 
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B.7 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
Name: Hazard Identification 
Pattern Signature: Hazard Identification is defined with the signature illustrated in 
Figure 42. 
In Figure 42, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the 
pattern: 
• ToA is short for Target of Assessment. 
• Src is short for Source. 
• IdHz is short for Identified Hazards. 
• HzLg is short for Hazard Log. 
 
Figure 42 Hazard Identification – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Support the capture of relevant hazards IdHz with respect to the operation of a 
target system ToA in a specific context and document these in a hazard log HzLg. The 
intent of the pattern is to define the process of identifying potential hazards associated 
with the operation of a target system in a given context. The pattern expresses: i) the 
main characteristics of the process of identifying hazards; and ii) the requirements for 
specifying process results in a hazard log.  
Applicability: The Hazard Identification pattern is suitable to apply in the following 
situations: 
• When the system under construction is intended to be used in a context where 
there exists safety concerns (e.g., potential threats to life or environment). 
• When it is known, or there are indications that the system under construction 
may impact on safety.  
Problem: The main aspects to be considered when identifying potential hazards are: 
• Scope: To correctly delimit the scope of the analysis such that the cost of 
performing hazard identification is minimised, but where the scope is sufficiently 
broad to capture all relevant safety concerns. 
• Sources: To provide confidence that all relevant historic data valuable for 
identifying potential hazards of the system under construction are accounted for. 
Relevant data sources may be data related to e.g., known incidents, known 
accidents, and assessments of comparable systems. 
• Methods: To provide confidence that the methods applied in order to identify 
hazards are suitable and are able to provide the intended results. The intended 
result is to identify all relevant hazards. 
• Completeness: To provide confidence that all relevant hazards within the scope 
are identified. 
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Process Solution: Figure 43 illustrates the Hazard Identification process annotated in 
a UML activity diagram. 
 
Figure 43 Hazard Identification – Activity Diagram 
The input parameters associated with activity diagram may be interpreted as follows: 
• ToA (Target of Assessment): represents the entity that the hazard identification 
concerns. 
• Src (Source): represents data providing information on potential causes of 
hazards. 
• IdHz (Identified Hazards): represents the results from any method supporting the 
activity of identifying hazards. 
The activities identified in Figure 43 intend to serve the following purpose: 
• Identify Scope of Analysis: the intent of the activity is to define the boundary of 
the investigation, its objectives, and a strategy for how to satisfy the objectives. 
The strategy should involve a plan for the study, set the responsibilities of those 
involved, describe how data shall be collected and detail a schedule. 
• Identify Relevant Data Sources: the intent of the activity is to systematically 
identify and document relevant sources of information that provide information 
on potential hazards relevant with respect to the intended use of the system 
under construction in its context. Relevant hazards data captured from sources 
shall be documented. 
• Identify System Applicable Hazards: the intent of the activity is to provide an 
examination of a target (ToA) with respect to its context by the use of relevant 
methods. A set of complementary methods may be used as long as the total 
coverage is in accordance with the scope of the analysis. 
• Document Hazards: the intent of the activity is to combine all relevant 
information with respect to the identification and analysis of hazards in a 
document form containing all identified hazards and their potential causes. 
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Instantiation Rule: An artefact HzLg (see Figure 43 and Figure 42) is the result of the 
instantiation of the Hazard Identification pattern if: 
• HzLg is a documentation of the results from applying the process described in 
Section “Process Solution”. 
• HzLg is a documentation of all relevant hazards associated with the use of a 
target system (identified by the instantiation of ToA) in a specific context. 
• Every hazard of HzLg is uniquely identified. 
• Every hazard of HzLg describes a potential danger of the use of a target system 
in its context. 
• Every hazard of HzLg is traceable to its origin documentation, meaning the 
document where the hazard is identified (identified by the instantiation of Src or 
IdHz). 
Related Patterns: The Hazard Identification pattern is related to other patterns in the 
following manner: 
• May succeed Establish Concept in terms of representing a natural follow up 
once a concept is established. 
• May precede Hazard Analysis by providing an initial hazard log identifying 
relevant hazards associated with a target. The Hazard Analysis may then further 
address identified hazards in order to determine their potential causes. 
• May be used in order to address an abstract design defined in a design pattern 
or the instantiation of a design pattern with respect to potential hazards in a 
given context 
• May be used together with any method pattern that supports identification of 
hazards. 
Known Uses: The pattern describes a process of identifying hazards in accordance 
with the practice as described in several safety standards and guidelines, to notable 
standards are [IEC61508] and [EN50129]. 
[IEC61508] International Electrotechnical Commission, Functional safety of 
electrical/electronic/ programmble electronic safety-related systems, IEC 61508, Edition 
2.0, 2010. 
[EN50129] European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization, Railway 
Applications – Communications, signalling and processing systems – Safety related 
electronic systems for signalling, EN 50129, 2003. 
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B.8 HAZARD ANALYSIS 
Name: Hazard Analysis 
Pattern Signature: Hazard Analysis is defined with the signature illustrated in Figure 
44. 
In Figure 44, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the 
pattern: 
• ToA is short for Target of Assessment. 
• Src is short for Source. 
• Haz is short for Hazards. 
• IdCsHz is short for Identified Causes of Hazards. 
• HzLg is short for Hazard Log. 
 
Figure 44 Hazard Analysis – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Support the assessment of a target system ToA by defining the process of 
deriving the potential causes of hazards Haz. The expected result of applying the 
pattern is a hazard log HzLg that documents the hazards Haz and the potential causes 
of hazards IdCsHz associated with a system ToA. The hazard log HzLg facilitates the 
evaluation of the potential of the system to negatively affect safety. The pattern 
describes: 1) the main characteristics of the process of hazard analysis, and 2) the 
main requirements for specifying the result of the process in a hazard log. 
Applicability: The Hazard Analysis pattern is suitable to apply in the following 
situations: 
• When the system under construction is intended to be used in a context where 
there exists safety concerns (e.g. potential threats to life or environment). 
• When hazards applicable to a system under construction are given and the 
potential causes of identified hazards are required to be identified. 
Problem: The main aspects to be considered when performing hazards analysis are: 
• Scope: To correctly delimit the scope of the analysis such that the cost of 
performing hazard analysis is minimised, but where the scope is sufficiently 
broad to capture all relevant safety concerns. 
• Hazards: To ensure that the sources providing data on hazards relevant for the 
system under construction provide valid information. 
• Sources: To ensure that the sources required for identifying potential causes of 
hazards are accounted for. Sources may represent experience data on 
incidents, accidents, and safety assessments. 
• Methods: To ensure that the methods applied in order to assess the potential 
causes of hazards are suitable and are able to provide the intended results. The 
intended result is to identify all relevant causes of hazards.  
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• Causes: To ensure that the potential causes that can lead to hazards are 
identified. 
• Completeness: To ensure that all relevant hazards are assessed with respect to 
potential causes. 
Process Solution: Figure 45 illustrates the Hazard Analysis process annotated in a 
UML activity diagram. 
 
Figure 45 Hazard Analysis – Activity Diagram 
The input parameters associated with the activity diagram may be interpreted as 
follows: 
• ToA (Target of Assessment): represents the entity that the hazard analysis 
concerns. 
• Haz (Hazards): represents information on identified hazards. 
• Src (Source): represents information on potential causes of hazards. 
• IdCsHz (Identified Causes of Hazards): represents the results from any method 
supporting the activity of identifying potential causes of hazards. 
The main activities intend to serve the following purpose: 
• Identify Scope of Analysis: the intent of the activity is to define the boundary of 
the investigation, its objectives, and a strategy for how to satisfy the objectives 
defined. The strategy should involve a plan for the study, set the responsibilities 
of those involved, describe how data shall be collected and detail a schedule. 
• Identify Relevant Data Sources on Hazards: the intent of the activity is to gather 
information on identified hazards applicable to the system under construction, 
here the target of assessment. 
• Derive Causes of Hazards: the intent of the activity is to assess a target in order 
to identify its potential contribution to events that may lead to hazards. The target 
should be assessed by examining relevant historic data and by the use of 
relevant assessment methods. One method or a set of complementary methods 
may be used as long as the total coverage is in accordance with the defined 
scope of analysis. 
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• Document Hazards and Causes: the intent of the activity is to combine all 
relevant information with respect to the identification and analysis of hazards in a 
document form containing all identified hazards and their potential causes. 
Instantiation Rule: An artefact HzLg (see Figure 45 and Figure 44) is the result of the 
instantiation of the Hazard Analysis pattern if: 
• HzLg is a documentation of the results from applying the process described in 
Section “Process Solution”. 
• HzLg is a documentation of all relevant hazards associated with the use of a 
target system (identified by the instantiation of ToA) in a specific context. 
• Every hazard of HzLg is uniquely identified. 
• Every hazard of HzLg describes a potential danger of the application of a target 
system in a specific context. 
• Every hazard of HzLg is traceable to its origin documentation, meaning the 
document where the hazard is identified (identified by the instantiation of Haz or 
Src). 
• Every hazard is associated with a description of potential causes. 
• Every potential cause associated with a hazard is traceable to its origin 
documentation, meaning the document (identified by the instantiation of IdCsHz) 
where the causal relationship may be identified. 
Related Patterns: The Hazard Analysis pattern is related to other process requirement 
patterns in the following manner: 
• May succeed Hazard Identification in terms of supplementing the hazard log 
provided as an output of Hazard Identification with information on potential 
causes of hazards. 
• May precede Risk Analysis by providing as a deliverable, a set of hazards and 
potential causes associated with the operation of a target system (ToA) such 
that risk may be determined. 
• May be used in order to address an abstract design defined in a design pattern 
or the instantiation of a design pattern with respect to its potential contribution to 
hazards. 
• May be used together with other method patterns that support assessment of the 
causes of hazards. 
Known Uses: The pattern describes a process of identifying the potential causes of 
hazards in accordance with the practice as described in several safety standards and 
guidelines, to notable standards are [IEC61508] and [EN50129]. 
[IEC61508] International Electrotechnical Commission, Functional safety of 
electrical/electronic/ programmble electronic safety-related systems, IEC 61508, Edition 
2.0, 2010. 
[EN50129] European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization, Railway 
Applications – Communications, signalling and processing systems – Safety related 
electronic systems for signalling, EN 50129, 2003. 
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B.9 RISK ANALYSIS 
Name: Risk Analysis 
Pattern Signature: Risk Analysis is defined with the signature illustrated in Figure 46. 
In Figure 46, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the 
pattern: 
• ToA is short for Target of Assessment. 
• Haz is short for Hazards. 
• ClsSev is short for Classification of Severity. 
• ClsLi is short for Classification of Likelihood. 
• ClsCr is short for Classification of Criticality. 
• Risks is not abbreviated. 
 
Figure 46 Risk Analysis – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Support the assessment of a target system ToA with respect to risk. A process 
for risk assessment supports this where the result of an analysis of the likelihood of 
hazards as well as the result of an analysis of the severity of an accident associated 
with the occurrence of a hazard is combined into a notion of risk. The expected result 
Risks of applying the pattern represents a notion of the potential danger of applying the 
target system in a given context. 
Applicability: The Risk Analysis pattern may be suitable to apply in the following 
situation: 
• When the system under construction is already analysed with respect to its 
potential contribution to hazards in its intended context. 
Problem: The main aspects to be considered when performing risk analysis are: 
• Defined target: to clearly state what is the target of the assessment and correctly 
delimit the scope of the risk analysis. 
• Hazards: assessment of risk is performed on the basis of hazards and their 
potential causes associated with a target. It is expected that data on hazards 
and hazard causes will be provided. 
• Classification: in order to establish a notion of risk in a consistent manner such 
that risk associated with different systems or system entities can be easily 
compared. A categorisation scheme for discretising data on severity, likelihoods 
and risk is commonly applied. 
• Estimation: in order to provide a notion of risk, severity and likelihood estimates 
are required to be provided either quantitatively or qualitatively. 
• Mitigations: in order to sustain a certain risk level or reduce a risk to an 
acceptable level, mitigating means (or risk reduction means) are used. A part of 
risk analysis is to identify potential mitigations. 
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Process Solution: Figure 47 illustrates the Risk Analysis process specified using a 
UML activity diagram. 
 
 
Figure 47 Risk Analysis – Activity Diagram 
The input parameters associated with activity diagram may be interpreted as follows: 
• ToA (Target of Assessment): represents the target of the assessment that is 
analysed with respect to risk. 
• Haz (Hazards): represents the hazards that are associated with the target. 
• ClsSev: represents the results from any method supporting the classification of 
the severity of hazards. 
• ClsLi: represents the result from any method supporting the classification of 
likelihood of hazards. 
• ClsCr: represents the results from any method supporting the classification of 
risk where risk is represented as a combined measure of the associated severity 
and the associated likelihood of hazards. 
The main activities intend to serve the following purpose: 
• Initiate Risk Analysis: the intent of the activity is to define the target of 
assessment, its intended context of operation, and identify hazards associated 
with the use of the target system in its context. It is expected that relevant 
information for risk analysis be provided as documentation of the target system. 
Relevant information include system hazards as well as the unwanted events 
associated with the operation of the target system that might lead to hazards. 
• Address Hazard Severity: the intent of the activity is to address the severity of 
the consequence of hazards. 
• Address Hazard Likelihood: the intent of the activity is to address the likelihood 
of occurrence of each hazard. 
• Establish Notion of Risk: the intent of the activity is to combine data on likelihood 
of a hazard occurring and data on severity of the consequence of a hazard into a 
notion of risk. 
Risks
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• Identify Risk Mitigations: the intent of the activity is to identify risk reduction in 
the form of mitigations to reduce the likelihood of a hazard occurring and/or the 
severity of the consequence should a hazard occur. 
• Document Risk & Mitigations: the intent of the activity is to combine all relevant 
information with respect to the assessment of risk in a document form containing 
all relevant risks and associated mitigations. 
Instantiation Rule: An artefact Risks (see Figure 47 and Figure 46) is the result of 
instantiating the Risk Analysis pattern if: 
• Risks is a documentation describing every relevant risk associated with the use 
of a target system (identified by the instantiation of ToA) in a specific context.  
• Every risk of Risks is uniquely identified. 
• Every risk of Risks is traceable to its origin documentation. By origin 
documentation, we mean: the document where the hazard relevant to risk is 
identified (identified by the instantiation of Haz), documentation on estimates on 
the severity of the consequence of hazards (identified by the instantiation of 
ClsSev), documentation on estimate of the likelihood of hazard (identified by the 
instantiation of ClsLi).  
• Every risk of Risks is associated with a description of mitigation. The description 
should describe any dependencies or possible mitigations for reducing risk to an 
acceptable level. 
• Every mitigation associated with a risk is stated such that its purpose and how it 
reduces risk can be clearly identified. 
Related Patterns: The Risk Analysis pattern is related to other patterns in the following 
manner: 
• May succeed Hazard Analysis in terms of supplementing the assessment of 
relevant hazards and their potential causes with information on the associated 
risk, e.g., by adding likelihood estimates and severity estimates associated with 
hazards. 
• May precede Establish System Safety Requirements by providing information on 
the risks associated with the operation of the system, and information on 
required mitigations and potential mitigations in order to reduce risk. This 
ensures that the specification of safety requirements is based on a risk 
assessment of a target system. 
• May be used in order to address the instantiation of a design pattern with 
respect to risk. 
• May be used with other method patterns that support assessment or 
categorisation of the severity of the consequence of hazards. 
• May be used with other method patterns that support the assessment or 
categorisation of the likelihood of the causes of hazards. 
• May be used with other method patterns that support the classification of risk. 
Known Uses: The pattern describes a process of assessing risk in accordance with 
the practice as described in several safety standards and guidelines, to notable 
standards are [IEC61508] and [EN50129]. 
[IEC61508] International Electrotechnical Commission, Functional safety of 
electrical/electronic/ programmble electronic safety-related systems, IEC 61508, Edition 
2.0, 2010. 
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[EN50129] European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization, Railway 
Applications – Communications, signalling and processing systems – Safety related 
electronic systems for signalling, EN 50129, 2003. 
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B.10 ESTABLISH SYSTEM SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
Name: Establish System Safety Requirements 
Pattern Signature: Establish System Safety Requirements is defined with the 
signature illustrated in Figure 48. 
In Figure 48, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the 
pattern: 
• ToA is short for Target of Assessment. 
• Reg is short for Regulations. 
• Risks is not abbreviated; represents the documentation of the risks associated 
with the application of ToA in its intended context. 
• Req is short for Requirements. 
 
 
Figure 48 Establish System Safety Requirements – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Support the specification of system safety requirements Req on the basis of a 
risk-based approach. The safety requirements describe the required measures to be 
satisfied by the system ToA to assure the necessary safety integrity. The general 
approach for defining safety requirements is to define them on the basis of the result of 
a risk assessment Risks, especially the mitigations identified as means to reduce risk to 
an acceptable level. The pattern describes the general process of capturing the 
requirements that must be satisfied in order to assure safety. 
Applicability: The Establish System Safety Requirements pattern is intended for the 
following situations: 
• When the system under construction may negatively affect the overall system 
safety. 
• When there are identified measures that can mitigate identified risks and can be 
used as input to the specification of safety requirements. 
Problem: The main aspects relevant to address when establishing the safety 
requirements are: 
• Characteristics: To define the system characteristics to be satisfied such that the 
occurrence of unwanted events are minimised or avoided. 
• Functions: To define the safety functions that assures safe operations. 
• Constraints: To define the functional constrains that sufficiently delimit potentially 
hazardous operations. 
• Environment: To define the operational environment that ensures safe 
operations. 
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• Compliance: To define the requirements that are required to be satisfied in order 
to comply with laws, regulation and standards, as a minimum the mandatory 
requirements related to assurance of safety. These requirements include 
requirements on applying some specific development process, perform certain 
activities, or make use of specific techniques. 
Process Solution: Figure 49 illustrates the Establish System Safety Requirements 
process specified using a UML activity diagram. 
 
 
Figure 49 Establish System Safety Requirements – Process Flow 
The input parameters associated with the activity diagram may be interpreted as 
follows: 
• ToA (Target of Assessment): represents the target system for which safety 
requirements should be established. 
• Reg (Regulations): represents any source of information describing mandatory 
or recommended practices (e.g. as provided in laws, regulations or standards) 
valuable for identifying risk reducing measures. 
• Risks: represents risks associated with the target system. 
The main activities serve the following purpose: 
• Identify target: the intent of the activity is to identify ToA. The description of the 
target should as a minimum include a definition of the system and its 
boundaries, its operational profile, functional requirements, and safety integrity 
requirements. 
• Confer laws, regulations, and standards: the intent of the activity is to capture all 
relevant data (requirements for risk reducing measures) from relevant sources 
(normative references) in order to outline the set of risk reducing measures that 
shall be met by compliance. Each source is inspected in order to identify, as a 
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minimum, the mandatory risk reducing measures that shall be met in order to be 
compliant. 
• Confer risk analysis: the intent of the activity is to capture all the relevant data on 
risk analysis of the system that is under construction in order to outline the 
system specific risk reducing measures that shall be met. 
• Establish safety requirements qualitatively: the intent of the activity is to define 
safety requirements on the basis of those identified risk reducing measures 
required applied, and which can be demonstrated fulfilled with qualitative 
reasoning. 
• Establish safety requirements quantitatively: the intent of the activity is to define 
safety requirements on the basis of those identified risk reducing measures 
required applied, and which can be demonstrated fulfilled with quantitative 
reasoning. 
• Document safety requirements: the intent of the activity is to detail all relevant 
information with respect to the requirements in a system safety requirements 
specification. For each requirement defined in the requirement specification, 
information detailing what influenced its definition should be provided, e.g., the 
associated risks, assumptions, calculations, and justifications. 
Instantiation Rule: An artefact Req (see Figure 49 and Figure 48) is the result of a 
process that instantiates the Establish System Safety Requirements pattern if: 
• Req is a set of requirements. 
• Req is a result of applying a process illustrated in Figure 49 and described in 
Section “Process Solution”. The process is initiated by an activity on describing 
the target ToA. Once a description of the target system and its operational 
context is provided, the next activities shall identify the risk reducing measures to 
be applied to the target by conferring relevant laws, regulations and standards 
as well as the result of target specific risk analysis for guidance. Once all the 
relevant risk-reducing measures are identified, these shall be used as a basis to 
define the requirements to be met by the target system or by the process to be 
followed while developing the target. The requirements are defined quantitatively 
or qualitatively depending on the nature of the risk reducing measure that is 
addressed. The requirements are documented in a requirement specification 
Req.  
• Every requirement of Req is traceable to relevant risks (identified by the 
instantiation of Risks), and/or regulatory requirements (identified by the 
instantiation of Reg). 
• Every requirement of Req is justified such that any assumptions, calculations, 
and assessments that support the specification of the requirement as a safety 
requirement are provided. 
Related Patterns: The Establish System Safety Requirements pattern is related to 
other patterns in the following manner: 
• May succeed the Risk Analysis pattern that supports identifying risks. The 
Establish System Safety Requirements may be applied as support for defining 
the requirements to be fulfilled in order to reduce risk to an acceptable risk level. 
• May be used in order to detail requirements for the design that is a result of an 
instantiation of a design pattern. 
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B.11 OVERALL SAFETY 
Name: Overall Safety 
Pattern Signature: Overall Safety is defined with the signature illustrated in Figure 50. 
In Figure 50, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the 
pattern: 
• ToD is short for Target of Demonstration. 
• QualMng is short for Quality Management. 
• SafMng is short for Safety Management. 
• TechSaf is short for Technical Safety. 
• Case is short for Safety Case 
 
Figure 50 Overall Safety – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Provide a structure for the specification of an overall strategy (or plan) for the 
safety demonstration Case of a target system ToD. The overall strategy is a means to 
document the set of practices that jointly provide confidence in the system being 
sufficiently safe for its intended use. The pattern describes a top-down deductive 
strategy to build the safety demonstration with a focus on establishing the overall 
argument for adequate managerial and technical safety. The focus of the pattern is on 
how to combine strategies on different safety concerns into an overall strategy such 
that it may be claimed and proven with confidence that the system is sufficiently safe. 
Applicability: The Overall Safety pattern is intended for the following situations: 
• At the initial stages of development in order to outline the main set of 
demonstration strategies, and how these strategies may be combined to 
demonstrate system safety. 
• Prior to project initiation as a means for stakeholders (vendor, customer, safety 
authority) to reflect upon the main demonstration challenges and possible 
solutions. 
Problem: The main aspects to be considered when providing a solution for the 
demonstration of safety are: 
• Quality management: it is necessary to demonstrate that the quality of the 
system is controlled by an effective quality management system. Quality 
management is a means to minimise the occurrence of human errors at each 
stage of the development life cycle, and thus to reduce the risk of systematic 
faults in the system. 
• Safety management: it is necessary to demonstrate that safety management is 
controlled by effective means. Effective safety management facilitates to reduce 
the occurrence of safety-related human errors throughout the life cycle and the 
risk of safety-related systematic faults. 
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• Technical safety: it is necessary to demonstrate the safety of the technical 
design.  
• Strategy identification: in order to plan and effectively apply a suitable 
demonstration strategy for different systems, it is important to identify as early as 
possible the main lines of demonstration. This will reduce the cost related to 
performing safety assessment by avoiding those activities that does not support 
an effective safety demonstration. In addition, if the choice of demonstration 
strategies does not provide the necessary confidence, then there is a risk of not 
getting safety approval. The effect of not getting a safety approval may induce a 
great cost as additional work may be required in order to receive approval, or 
there will be a loss of returns if a project is discontinued.  
• Effectiveness: it is important that the demonstration strategy is effective in 
providing the necessary safety demonstration. To develop safety related and 
safety critical systems is costly, mainly due to the activities required to assure 
and demonstrate that the system is sufficiently safe. It is important for a vendor 
to choose strategies that minimise cost but provide required results. 
• Confidence: it is important to choose a demonstration strategy that has the 
potential to convince some safety authority reviewing the evidences that 
sufficient safety is achieved. In a development project, the effectiveness of 
different demonstration strategies must be weighed against the estimated cost 
and the ability of building confidence. 
• Acceptance: it is important that the choice of demonstration strategies are 
acceptable for all involved parties such that they represent an effective means 
for demonstrating safety and may be applied in a manner that provides 
confidence that the system is safe. 
Argument Structure Solution: Figure 51 and Table 12 together present the 
demonstration solution, and therefore should be read together.  Figure 51 illustrates the 
decomposition of the safety argument in a tree structure using GSN notation. Table 12 
details the tree structure by defining the type and expected content of each node. 
 
Figure 51 Overall Safety – Argument Structure 
Associated with the contextual elements of the argument structure, the following is 
assumed: 
• ToD: identifies the target system under consideration. 
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Table 12 Overall Safety – Argument Structure 
Node Node Type Node Content Description 
Case Goal ToD is safe 
ToD Context Definition of parameter ToD (Target of Demonstration) 
AllConc Strategy ToD is demonstrated safe by demonstrating that QM 
(Quality Management), SM (Safety Management), and 
TS (Technical Safety) is sufficiently addressed 
SepConcern Justification Justification for the appropriateness of the separation of 
the demonstration concerning QM, SM, and TS 
QualMng Goal ToD is safe with respect to proper QM (Quality 
Management) 
SafMng Goal ToD is safe with respect to the SM (Safety Management) 
concern 
TechSaf Goal ToD is safe with respect to the TS (Technical Safety) 
concern 
 
Instantiation Rule: An artefact Case (see Figure 51 and Figure 50) instantiates the 
Overall Safety pattern if: 
• Case represents the overall claim in a top-down decomposable safety 
argumentation on the safety of a target system (the target is identified by the 
instantiation of ToD). 
• Case represents the root node in a tree like presentation of the safety argument 
as indicated in Figure 51. 
• Every element of the decomposable safety argument where Case is the root 
node, is traceable to a safety case node as indicated in Figure 51. A safety case 
node is instantiated by adapting the descriptions in column “Node Content 
Description” in Table 12 to the context that is addressed in order to define a 
structure as given in Figure 51. 
• Case and the associated safety argumentation expresses the decomposition of 
a main claim, that a target system is sufficiently safe, for its intended purpose by 
a strategy of claiming sufficient quality management (the claim expressed in the 
node QualMng), safety management (the claim expressed in the node SafMng), 
and technical safety (the claim expressed in the node TechSaf). Note: No 
guidance is given in this pattern on how to decompose the safety argument parts 
represented by the claims QualMng, SafMng and TechSaf down to its 
supporting evidences, suitable patterns supporting such a decomposition should 
be conferred. 
Related Patterns: The Overall Safety pattern is related to other patterns in the 
following manner: 
• May be supported by other safety case patterns for detailing those parts that are 
not fully developed, e.g., the pattern Technical Safety may be used to as support 
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on the issue of demonstrating that a system is technical safe and thereby detail 
the node TechSaf presented in Figure 51. 
• May be used as support for the safety demonstration of a design derived from a 
design pattern. 
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B.12 TECHNICAL SAFETY 
Name: Technical Safety 
Pattern Signature: Technical Safety is defined with the signature illustrated in Figure 
52. 
In Figure 52, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the 
pattern: 
• ToD is short for Target of Demonstration. 
• Case is short for Safety Case. 
• CoP is short for Code of Practice. 
• CrRef is short for Cross Reference. 
• ERE is short for Explicit Risk Estimation. 
 
Figure 52 Technical Safety – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Provide a structure for the specification of a safety demonstration Case showing 
that a system ToD is safe by arguing that it is developed according to an accepted 
code of practice, is similar to an already accepted system, or risk being explicitly 
addressed and sufficiently reduced. The intent is to provide an argument structure for 
demonstration on sufficient technical safety. The pattern facilitates early identification of 
the set of different overall demonstration strategies that may be applied in order to 
provide confidence that a system is sufficiently safe. 
Example: a system S is decomposed into the subsystems Sub 1 and Sub 2. Sub 1 is a 
system where showing compliance to a code of practice is a commonly accepted 
approach for safety demonstration. Sub 2 is a system includes novel technical 
solutions. Relying on a code of practice safety demonstration strategy of novel 
technical solutions may challenge our confidence as complying with a code is not 
necessarily sufficient. Therefore, for demonstration of Sub 2, a risk estimation strategy 
is chosen. The safety demonstration for system S consists of a combination of the 
safety demonstrations applied on the subsystems with the addition of the 
argumentation for this combination being sufficient. 
Applicability: The Technical Safety pattern is suitable to apply in the following 
situations: 
• At the initial stages of development in order to outline the main set of 
demonstration strategies to be applied for addressing technical safety concerns. 
• Prior to project initiation as a means for stakeholders (e.g, vendor, customer) to 
reflect upon main challenges associated with the demonstration of technical 
safety and possible solutions. 
Problem: The main aspects to be considered when providing a solution for the 
demonstration of technical safety are: 
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• Implicit vs Explicit Safety Demonstration Strategy: the necessary confidence in a 
safety demonstration may be provided by an implicit demonstration strategy, 
e.g., referring to the application of a code of practice that is known to mitigate 
certain risks. Another strategy is to compare the target of demonstration to a 
similar system that already has received approval. If an implicit demonstration 
strategy is not sufficient, an explicit demonstration strategy must be performed 
that requires information on the risks associated with the target. 
• Effectiveness: it is important that the demonstration strategy is effective in 
providing the necessary safety demonstration. To develop safety related and 
safety critical systems is costly, mainly due to the activities required to assure 
and demonstrate that the system is sufficiently safe. It is important for a vendor 
to choose strategies that minimise cost but provide required results. 
• Confidence: it is important to choose a demonstration strategy that has the 
potential to convince some safety authority reviewing the evidences that 
sufficient safety is achieved. In a development project, the effectiveness of 
different demonstration strategies must be weighed against the estimated cost 
and the ability of building confidence. 
• Acceptance: it is important that the choice of demonstration strategies are 
acceptable for all involved parties such that they represent an effective means 
for demonstrating safety and used in a manner that provide confidence that the 
system is safe. 
Argument Structure Solution: Figure 53 and Table 13 together present the 
demonstration solution, and therefore should be read together. Figure 53 illustrates the 
decomposition of the safety argument in a tree structure using the GSN notation. Table 
13 details the tree structure by defining the type and expected content of each node. 
 
 
Figure 53 Technical Safety – Argument Structure 
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Table 13 Technical Safety – Argument Structure 
Node Node 
Type 
Node Content Description 
Case Goal ToD is safe 
ToD Context Definition of parameter: ToD (Target of Demonstration) 
AllSubsysSaf
e 
Strategy ToD is demonstrated safe by demonstrating that all 
subsystems t of ToD is safe 
ValidDivision Justificatio
n 
Rationale for the division of ToD into subsystems 
ValidStrategy Justificatio
n 
Rationale for the use of correct safety demonstration 
strategy on each subsystem of ToD as a means to 
demonstrate that ToD is safe 
CoP Goal Subsystem t of ToD is safe by means of Code of Practice 
CrRef Goal Subsystem t of ToD is safe by means of Cross Reference 
ERE Goal Subsystem t of ToD is safe by means of Explicit Risk 
Estimation 
Associated with the contextual elements of the argument structure, the following is 
assumed: 
• ToD: identifies the target system under consideration. 
Instantiation Rule: An artefact Case (see Figure 53 and Figure 52) instantiates the 
Technical Safety pattern if: 
• Case is a safety demonstration of a target system (identified by the instantiation 
of ToD). 
• Every element of Case is traceable to a safety case node as indicated in Figure 
53. A safety case node is instantiated by applying the descriptions in column 
“Node Content Description” in Table 13 to the context that is addressed in order 
to define a structure as given in Figure 53. 
• Case and the associated safety argumentation expresses the decomposition of 
a main claim, that a target system is technically safe for its purpose by a strategy 
of claiming that all subsystems are sufficiently safe. 
• Subsystems are claimed sufficiently safe by a strategy of reference to a code of 
practice, or cross-reference and comparison to a similar and proven system, or 
explicit risk estimation.  
Related Patterns: The Technical Safety pattern is related to other patterns in the 
following manner: 
• May be used for detailing the claims on technical safety in the Overall Safety 
pattern. 
• The Codes Of Practice pattern may be used to address the CoP node of this 
pattern by referencing common development practices. 
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• The Cross Reference pattern may be used to address the CrRef node in this 
pattern by comparing a target to a similar reference system that is an assured 
system and thus provide an implicit safety demonstration. 
• The Explicit Risk Evaluation pattern may be used to address the ERE node in 
this pattern by explicitly addressing risk associated with a target. 
Known Uses: The pattern describes a structure for arguing safety with a focus on 
technical aspects that may be seen as a variant of Part 4 of the safety case required by 
the standard [EN 50129] on issues related to demonstration of technical safety 
[EN50129] European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization, Railway 
Applications – Communications, signalling and processing systems – Safety related 
electronic systems for signalling, EN 50129, 2003. 
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B.13 CODE OF PRACTICE 
Name: Code of Practice 
Pattern Signature: Code of Practice is defined with the signature illustrated in Figure 
54. 
In Figure 54, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the 
pattern: 
• ToD is short for Target of Demonstration. 
• Haz is short for Hazards. 
• Code is short for Code of practice. 
• Case is short for Safety Case. 
• AppOfCode is short for Application of Code. 
 
Figure 54 Code of Practice – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Support the definition of a safety demonstration strategy Case claiming that a 
target system ToD is safe by the application of a code of practices Code known to 
provide control of a set of hazards Haz. By complying with the code, the underlying 
assumption is that some kinds of hazards are controlled, implying that a target ToD is 
safe with respect to some hazards assured through hazard control evidenced in the 
proper application of an accepted code of practice. The motivation for applying the 
pattern is to reduce the effort required to demonstrate that a particular practice is safe 
to apply by choosing practises that are pre-qualified and accepted in a domain for 
being effective in achieving required result.  
Example #1: a software system S is developed to a high integrity level by formal 
methods. In domain D, the use of a formal method approach A for specifying 
requirements, design, and implementation is a highly recommended technique. As 
there is a code of practise with respect to the accepted use of approach A for high 
integrity systems, the approach may be claimed suitable and safe to apply with 
reference to the code. 
Example #2: a software system S is assessed by different methods; one of these is a 
method M (e.g., fault tree analysis). In domain D, the use of M for software assessment 
is commonly used and accepted as an effective means to identify the causes that may 
lead to hazards. The method itself is then a pre-qualified method and needs no further 
motivation. Demonstration evidences associated with the method may then be reduced 
to providing confidence that the method was applied correctly, reducing the need to 
demonstrate that the method is suitable. 
Applicability: The Code of Practice pattern is suitable to apply in the following 
situations: 
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• When there exist widely acknowledged codes of practice in the domain that have 
a generic acceptance as an effective means. 
• When there exist acknowledged codes of practice in other relevant domain that 
have a generic acceptance as an effective means. The code needs then to be 
justified and be acceptable to any assessment body or approval body. 
Problem: The main aspects to be considered when providing a solution for the 
demonstration of according to a code of practice are: 
• Hazard Control: it needs to be established which code of practise is used to 
control which hazards such that it is clear what objective is fulfilled by the choice 
of a code. 
• Relevance: is the code relevant for the system to be demonstrated safe. This 
needs to be verified. 
• Coverage: with respect to cover a set of hazards, some by code of practise and 
some by other means, it is important to establish the coverage of hazards 
claimed by the set of code and define the residual set of hazards that are not 
addressed by the code. 
• Deviation from code: is there some deviation from the referenced code to the 
applied code. Any deviation from code should be stated as well as the rationale 
for deviating. 
Argument Structure Solution: Figure 55 and Table 14 together present the 
demonstration solution, and should therefore be read together. Figure 55 illustrates the 
decomposition of the safety argument in a tree structure using the GSN notation. Table 
14 details the tree structure by defining the type and the expected content of each 
node. 
 
Figure 55 Code of Practice – Argument Structure 
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Table 14 Code of Practice – Argument Structure 
Node Node Type Node Content Description 
Case Goal ToD is safe 
ToD Context Definition of ToD 
HazMitByCode Strategy ToD is free from Haz by correct application a suitable 
set of codes 
Haz Context Definition of Haz, denoting the hazards associated 
with system 
ValidCode Assumption Assumption that the set of chosen practices is valid 
by reference to source 
SuitableCode Justification Rationale over the set of codes provides suitable 
defences against hazards 
AppOfCode Goal Application of code complied with Code 
Code Context Definition of Code 
A convenient structure of the argument is to add as many AppOfCode goal nodes as 
there are identified hazards (or groups of hazards if a code provides defence against a 
number of hazards), and directly attach these to the strategy HazardMitByCode. For 
each AppOfCode goal, attach a context description describing the code and develop 
the goal further with a suitable evidence pattern such that evidence of compliance to 
code is provided.  
Associated with the contextual elements of the argument structure, the following is 
assumed: 
• ToD (Target of Demonstration): identifies the target system under consideration. 
• Haz: represents the hazards associated with the target system and its 
environment. 
• h: may represent a hazard or a group of hazards in the set Haz. 
• Code: represents the set of methods, procedures or other measures that is a 
code of practice. 
Instantiation Rule: An artefact Case (see Figure 55 and Figure 54) instantiates the 
Code of Practice pattern if: 
• Case is a safety demonstration of a target system (identified by the instantiation 
of ToD). 
• Every element of Case is traceable to a safety case node as indicated in Figure 
55. A safety case node is instantiated by applying the descriptions in column 
“Node Content Description” in Table 14 to the context that is addressed in order 
to define a structure as given in Figure 55. 
• Case and the associated argumentation expresses the decomposition of a main 
claim, that a target system is safe with respect to a given hazard by a strategy of 
claiming compliance to a code of practice. 
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Related Patterns: The Code of Practise pattern is related to other patterns in the 
following manner: 
• May be used for detailing a demonstration goal of any safety case pattern where 
arguing compliance to a specific code is used as a strategy for arguing that the 
goal is satisfied. 
Known Uses: The pattern defines a structure for arguing safety objectives being met 
on the basis of the application of well-proven practices. The strategy of arguing safety 
on the basis of the application of a code of practice is a strategy expressed in the 
European Regulation on common safety methods within railway and its associated 
application guideline [ERA/GUI/01-2008/SAF]. 
[ERA/GUI/01-2008/SAF] Guide for the application of the Commission Regulation on the 
adoption of a common safety method on risk evaluation and assessment as referred to 
in Article 6(3)(a) of the Railway Safety Directive, European Railway Agency, 2009. 
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B.14 CROSS REFERENCE 
Name: Cross Reference 
Pattern Signature: Cross Reference is defined with the signature illustrated in Figure 
56. 
In Figure 56, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the 
pattern: 
• ToD is short for Target of Demonstration. 
• ToR is short for Target of Reference. 
• Crit is short for Criteria. 
• Case is short for Safety Case. 
• CritSat is short for Criteria Satisfied. 
 
Figure 56 Cross Reference – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Support the definition of a safety demonstration strategy Case claiming a target 
system ToD is sufficiently safe by comparison to a similar reference system ToR that 
already has received safety approval. The motivation is to reduce the effort required to 
demonstrate safe a system by comparison to a reference system. Given that hazards 
associated with the new system are similar and handled similarly to those of a 
reference system, the assumption is that the new system is equally safe as the 
reference system and thus is safe by cross reference. 
Applicability: The Cross Reference pattern is suitable to apply in the following 
situations: 
• When there exists a reference system that has a safety approval and is proven 
in use to have an acceptable safety level. 
• When the system under consideration and the reference system is similar in the 
following manner: 
o Similar functions and interfaces. 
o Similar operating conditions. 
o Similar environmental conditions. 
Problem: The main aspects to be considered when providing a demonstration solution 
according to a cross reference strategy are: 
• Comparison: the whole case is founded on the ability to show that hazards, 
functions, operating conditions and other important aspects associated with a 
target system are similar to the reference system. It is imminent that the 
comparison shows that the two systems are similar enough to conclude the 
system is safe by comparison to an approved reference system. 
• Documentation: in order to be able to do a comparison with a reference system, 
it is necessary to have available a proper set of documentation of the reference 
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system at a level of detail such that the characteristics of the system with respect 
to the criteria used for comparison are shown. 
• Assessment: the assessment of similarity between the system under 
consideration and the reference system must motivate the conditions that 
establish the foundation for concluding that these systems are similar, or 
otherwise state the differences so that these conditions may be addressed with 
other means of demonstration. 
Argument Structure Solution: Figure 57 and Table 15 together present the 
demonstration solution, and should be read together. Figure 57 illustrates the 
decomposition of the safety argument in a tree structure using the GSN notation. Table 
15 details the tree structure by defining the type and expected content of each node. 
  
Figure 57 Cross Reference – Argument Structure 
 
Table 15 Cross Reference – Argument Structure 
Node Node 
Type 
Node Content Description 
Case Goal ToD is safe by reference to a similar system ToR that 
has received safety approval  
ToD Context Definition of ToD 
ToR Context Definition of ToR 
SimilarSystems Strategy ToD is safe as system ToR is safe and ToD is similar to 
ToR with respect to criteria Crit (e.g., Crit = 
{environment, operating conditions, hazards, functions, 
mitigations}) 
SimilarAndRefIs
Safe 
Assumpti
on 
ToD is similar by comparison to ToR. ToR has received 
safety approval. As ToD is similar to ToR then ToD is 
sufficiently safe. 
CompCriteriaSat Justificati
on 
Rationale over the criteria Crit for comparison is correct 
(e.g., the set {environment, operating conditions, 
	
 		

 	
	

c:

	

	

HWR-1029 rev 2 
- 116 - 
 
hazards, functions, mitigations}) and offers adequate 
coverage of those aspects that is needed for 
comparison 
Crit Context Definition of Crit (criteria for comparison) 
CritSat Goal ToD is similar to ToR with respect to criteria c in Crit 
Associated with the contextual elements of the argument structure, the following is 
assumed: 
• ToD: identifies the target system under consideration. 
• ToR: represents a reference system, the system that ToD is claimed to be 
similar to. 
• Crit: represents the set of criteria or conditions that is used for comparison. If the 
two systems are sufficiently similar on all conditions in this set, then system S is 
sufficiently similar to the reference system and an implicit safety demonstration 
may be developed. 
• c: represents an individual criteria part of the set of criteria defined by Crit.  
Instantiation Rule: An artefact Case (see Figure 57 and Figure 56) instantiates the 
Cross Reference pattern if: 
• Case is a safety demonstration of a target system (identified by the instantiation 
of ToD). 
• Case uses an acceptably safe reference system (identified by the instantiation of 
ToR), that is similar to the target system, as a means for comparison.  
• Every element of Case is traceable to a safety case node as indicated in Figure 
55. A safety case node is instantiated by applying the descriptions in column 
“Node Content Description” in Table 14 to the context that is addressed in order 
to define a structure as given in Figure 55. 
• Case and the associated safety argumentation expresses the decomposition of 
a main claim, that a target system is safe, by an implicit safe demonstration 
strategy of comparing the target system with a similar reference system that is 
already found to be acceptably safe for use in a similar context. 
Related Patterns:  
The Cross Reference pattern is related to other safety case patterns in the following 
manner: 
• May be used for detailing a demonstration goal of any safety case pattern 
concerned with arguing the suitability of a system for use in a particular context 
by a comparison to a similar and already approved reference system. 
Known Uses: The pattern describes a structure for arguing safety objectives being 
satisfied by a system on the basis of a comparison with a similar and already accepted 
system. The strategy is expressed in the application guideline to the European 
Regulation on common safety methods within railway [ERA/GUI/01-2008/SAF]. 
[ERA/GUI/01-2008/SAF] Guide for the application of the Commission Regulation on the 
adoption of a common safety method on risk evaluation and assessment as referred to 
in Article 6(3)(a) of the Railway Safety Directive, European Railway Agency, 2009. 
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B.15 EXPLICIT RISK EVALUATION 
Name: Explicit Risk Evaluation 
Pattern Signature: Explicit Risk Evaluation is defined with the signature illustrated in 
Figure 58. 
In Figure 58, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the 
pattern: 
• ToD is short for Target of Demonstration. 
• Risks is not abbreviated. 
• QualACr is short for Qualitative Acceptance Criteria. 
• QuantACr is short for Quantitative Acceptance Criteria. 
• Case is short for Safety Case. 
• QualAcc is short for Qualitative Acceptance. 
• QuantAcc is short for Quantitative Acceptance. 
 
Figure 58 Explicit Risk Evaluation – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Support the definition of a safety demonstration strategy Case claiming a target 
system ToD is safe by assuring that the presence of risk in the system is at an 
acceptable level by the use of adequate risk evaluation strategies. The demonstration 
structure is scaled systematically such that every identified risk is addressed 
individually. As different kinds of risks may require different handling, depending on 
their qualitative or quantitative nature, different risk estimation philosophies are 
supported. 
Example #1: a software system S within the railway domains is associated with the 
risks R1 and R2. As S is intended to be operated within the railway domain, certain 
acceptance criteria may be required met as defined within the domain specific 
standard, e.g., compliance to SIL 3 requirements within the standard EN50128. All risk, 
here R1 and R2, mare be required to be addressed with respect to the acceptance 
criteria, here associated with the development of SIL 3 system defined in the standard 
EN50128. 
Applicability: The Explicit Risk Evaluation pattern is suitable to apply in the following 
situations: 
• When the system applies novel technical solution or is developed by novel 
techniques. 
• When there are no existing acknowledged codes of practice that may be applied 
in order control the risk. 
• When there are no existing similar systems that have received safety approval, 
and have proven quality in practise and may serve as a reference system in a 
Cross Reference demonstration approach.  
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Problem: The main aspects to be considered when providing a solution for the 
demonstration according to an explicit risk evaluation strategy are: 
• Risk Estimation: it is necessary to provide a qualitative or quantitative estimate 
of the risk such that it may be possible to compare a stated risk with a risk 
acceptance criterion. 
• Safety Measures: it is necessary to identify risk-reducing measures such that it is 
clear what renders a risk as acceptable. 
• Acceptance Criteria: it is necessary to establish the acceptance criteria such that 
the boundary between non-acceptable risk and acceptable risk is clear. 
Argument Structure Solution: Figure 59 and Table 16 together represent the 
demonstration solution, and should therefore be read together. Figure 59 illustrates the 
decomposition of the safety argument in a tree structure using the GSN notation. Table 
16 details the tree structure by defining the type and the expected content of each 
node. 
 
Figure 59 Explicit Risk Evaluation – Argument Structure 
 
Table 16 Explicit Risk Evaluation – Argument Structure 
Node Node Type Node Content Description 
Case Goal ToD is safe 
ToD Context Definition of ToD 
AllRisksAcceptable Strategy ToD is acceptably safe as all operational 
scenarios only contain acceptable Risks 
Risks Context Definition or Risks 
AllRisksIdentified Justification The set Risks contains all important risks 
AllRisksAddressed Justification All elements of the set Risks are addressed 
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systematically, either qualitatively or 
quantitatively depending on the nature of each 
risk r in Risks 
QualAcc Goal The risk r, element of Risks, is acceptable by 
comparison to qualitative acceptance criteria 
QualACr 
QuantAcc Goal The risk r, element of Risks, is acceptable by 
comparison to quantitative acceptance criteria 
QuantACr 
QualACr Context Definition of QualACr 
QuantACr Context Definition of QuantACr 
Associated with the contextual elements of the argument structure, the following is 
assumed: 
• ToD: identifies the target system under consideration. 
• Risks: represents a set of risk associated with the target system S. 
• QualACr: represents a set of criteria, expressed in a qualitative manner, required 
to be satisfied in order to accept a specific risk as sufficiently reduced. 
• QuantACr: represents a set of criteria, expressed in a quantitative manner, 
required to be satisfied in order to accept a specific risk as sufficiently reduced. 
Instantiation Rule: An artefact Case (see Figure 59 and Figure 58) instantiates the 
Explicit Risk Evaluation pattern if: 
• Case is a safety demonstration of a target system (identified by the instantiation 
of ToD). 
• Every element of Case is traceable to a safety case node as indicated in Figure 
59. A safety case node is instantiated by applying the descriptions in column 
“Node Content Description” in Table 16 to the context that is addressed in order 
to define a structure as given in Figure 59. 
• Case and the associated argumentation expresses the decomposition of a main 
claim, that a target system is safe, by a strategy of explicitly addressing all risks 
associated with the system (identified by the instantiation of Risks). 
Related Patterns: The Explicit Risk Evaluation pattern is related to other patterns in 
the following manner: 
• May be used for detailing the goal ERE in the Technical Safety pattern 
concerned with demonstrating that the risks associated with a system is explicitly 
addressed. 
• May be used to develop a safety demonstration for an instantiation of a design 
pattern where it is assumed that no implicit argument is suitable such that the 
safety property of the system must be explicitly addressed. 
Known Uses: The pattern describes a structure for arguing safety objectives being 
satisfied on the basis of explicitly addressing the risks associated with a target system. 
The strategy is expressed in the application guideline to the European Regulation on 
common safety methods within railway [ERA/GUI/01-2008/SAF]. 
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[ERA/GUI/01-2008/SAF] Guide for the application of the Commission Regulation on the 
adoption of a common safety method on risk evaluation and assessment as referred to 
in Article 6(3)(a) of the Railway Safety Directive, European Railway Agency, 2009. 
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B.16 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS SATISFIED 
Name: Safety Requirements Satisfied 
Pattern Signature: Safety Requirements Satisfied is defined with the signature 
illustrated in Figure 60. 
In Figure 60, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the 
pattern: 
• ToD is short for Target of Demonstration. 
• Req is short for Requirements. 
• ReqSat is short for Requirements Satisfied. 
• Case is short for Safety Case. 
 
Figure 60 Safety Requirements Satisfied – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Provide a structure for safety demonstration Case that a system ToD is safe, by 
arguing that all safety requirements Req are satisfied.  
Example: a system S shall satisfy the functional requirements R1 and R2, and safety 
requirements SR1 and SR2. In order to demonstrate that S is sufficiently safe for its 
intended purpose it is enough to demonstrate that SR1 and SR2 are satisfied. In order 
for system S to provide the intended function then R1 and R2 must be satisfied, but as 
these requirements do no impact safety they are not addressed in the safety 
demonstration. 
Applicability: The Safety Requirements Satisfied pattern is intended for the following 
situation: 
• When it is required to provide an explicit demonstration of the ability of a system 
to uphold safety invariants that are expressed as safety requirements. 
Problem: The main aspects to be considered when providing a solution for the 
demonstration of safety are: 
• Completeness of specification: it is necessary to provide confidence that the set 
of safety requirements is complete, i.e. contain all relevant requirements. 
• Correct demonstration approach: it is necessary to provide confidence that for 
each requirement, the chosen approach for demonstrating that the requirement 
is satisfied is suitable. 
• Confirming evidences: it is necessary to provide confidence that for each chosen 
demonstration approach, confirming evidences is available or will be provided. 
Argument Structure Solution: Figure 61 and Table 17 together present the 
demonstration solution, and therefore should be read together. Figure 61 illustrates the 
decomposition of the safety argument in a tree structure using GSN notation. Table 17 
details the tree structure by defining the type and expected content of each node. 
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Figure 61 Safety Requirements Satisfied – Argument Structure 
Associated with the contextual elements of the argument structure, the following is 
assumed: 
• ToD: identifies the target system under consideration. 
• Req: represents a set of safety requirements associated with the target system 
ToD. 
Table 17 Safety Requirements Satisfied - Argument Structure 
Node Node Type Node Content Description 
Case Goal ToD satisfies Req 
ToD Context Definition of ToD 
Req Context Definition or Req 
AllReq Strategy ToD is acceptably safe as all safety requirements are 
addressed and found satisfied 
ReqSetCom Justification Justification for the requirements set Req being 
complete or contain all safety requirements that are 
relevant for ToD 
ReqSetAdd Justification Justification for all elements of the set Req are 
accounted for. Elements may be addressed 
individually or in groups, any grouping of requirements 
needs to be justified. 
ReqSat Goal The requirement r, element of Req, is satisfied 
 
Instantiation Rule: A demonstration artefact Case (see Figure 61 and Figure 60) 
instantiates the Safety Requirements Satisfied pattern if: 
• Case is a safety demonstration of a target system ToD. 
• Every element of Case is traceable to a safety case node as indicated in Figure 
61. A safety case node is instantiated by adapting the descriptions in column 
“Node Content Description” in Table 17 to the context that is addressed in order 
to define a structure as given in Figure 61. 
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• Case and the associated safety argumentation expresses the decomposition of 
a main claim, that a target system ToD is safe, by a strategy of demonstrating 
that all safety requirements Req associated with the system ToD are satisfied. 
Related Patterns: The Safety Requirements Satisfied pattern is related to other 
patterns in the following manner: 
• May be used to detail the ERE node of Technical Safety concerned with 
demonstrating that risk is explicitly addressed by demonstrating that the safety 
requirements, defined on the basis of risk assessment, are satisfied. 
• May be used together with the Establish System Safety Requirements. Establish 
System Safety Requirements can be applied in order to derive the safety 
requirements. Safety Requirements Satisfied is then used to develop a 
demonstration that argues that identified requirements are satisfied. 
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B.17 ASSESSMENT EVIDENCE 
Name: Assessment Evidence 
Pattern Signature: Assessment Evidence is defined with the signature illustrated in 
Figure 62. 
In Figure 62, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the 
pattern: 
• ToD is short for Target of Demonstration. 
• Cond is short for Condition. 
• Crit is short for Criteria. 
• Mtd is short for Method. 
• CndSatEv is short for Condition Satisfied Evidence 
• Case is short for Safety Case. 
 
Figure 62 Assessment Evidence – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Provide a structure for the specification of a safety demonstration Case where a 
piece of evidence CndSatEv, obtained on the basis of an assessment, provides support 
for claiming that some condition Cond associated with a target ToD is satisfied.  
Applicability: The Assessment Evidence pattern is suitable to apply in the following 
situations: 
• When there exists documentable evidence that is provided on the basis of a 
systematic assessment of a target.  
• When the assessment method used is commonly accepted as suitable for the 
assessment performed and where the result of its application provides 
supporting evidence for safety claims. 
Problem: The main aspects to be considered when providing a solution for the 
demonstration of safety are: 
• Target: it is necessary that the assessment report clearly states the target of the 
assessment. 
• Objective: It is necessary that the objective of the assessment be clearly stated. 
• Method: it is necessary to clearly identify the method(s) applied in order to 
perform the assessment such that it may be determined if the applied method(s) 
was suitable to apply in order to address the target with respect to the 
assessment objective. 
• Scope: it is necessary that the scope of the assessment is clearly stated such 
that the depth of the assessment may be obtained from the report. 
• Assumptions: it is necessary that the assumptions on the application of the 
method or on the specification of scope is clearly stated such that it may be 
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determined if the assessment is suitable to reference with respect to a stated 
demonstration claim. 
• Results: it is necessary that the result of the assessment be clearly stated such 
that the assessment results also may be assessed. 
• Conclusions: it is necessary that assessment summarises its results into a 
conclusion such that what has been achieved is clearly stated as well as the 
conditions for which the result is valid.  
Argument Structure Solution: Figure 63 and Table 18 together present the 
demonstration solution, and should therefore be read together. Figure 63 illustrates the 
decomposition of the safety argument in a tree structure using the GSN notation. Table 
18 details the tree structure by defining the type and the expected content of each 
node. 
Figure 63 Assessment Evidence – Argument Structure 
 
Table 18 Assessment Evidence – Argument Structure 
Node Node Type Node Content Description 
Case Goal ToD satisfies Cond  
ToD Context Definition of ToD 
Cond Context Definition of Cond 
CritSatByMtd Strategy Assessment method Mtd satisfies criteria Crit thus 
the assessment result is valid 
Crit Context Definition of Crit  
Mtd Context Definition of Mtd  
ValidSetOfCriteria Justification Justification for the set Crit represents the 
characteristics of a valid assessment approach 
MethodSuitable Justification Justification for Mtd satisfies Crit and thus is a 
suitable assessment approach 
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CndSat Goal Condition Cond is assessed by Mtd and found 
fulfilled 
CndSatEv Solution Description of CndSatEv 
Associated with the contextual elements and the solution elements of the argument 
structure, the following is assumed: 
• ToD: identifies the target system under consideration. 
• Cond: identifies the condition that is assessed. 
• Crit: represents the set of criterias that must be fulfilled in order for the 
assessment approach to represent a valid assessment. 
• Mtd: identifies the method applied in order to obtain evidences. 
• CndSatEv: represents the documentable evidence supporting the claim provided 
in the argument. 
Instantiation Rule: An artefact Case (see Figure 63 and Figure 62) instantiates the 
Assessment Evidence pattern if: 
• Case is a safety demonstration of a target system (identified by the instantiation 
of ToD). 
• Every element of Case is traceable to a safety case node as indicated in Figure 
63. A safety case node is instantiated by adapting the descriptions in column 
“Node Content Description” in Table 18 to the context that is addressed in order 
to define a structure as given in Figure 63. 
• Case and the associated argumentation expresses the decomposition of a main 
claim, that a target system is safe with respect to a stated condition (identified by 
the instantiation of Cond), by a strategy of arguing that a specific assessment 
method (identified by the instantiation of Mtd) satisfies criteria (identified by the 
instantiation of Crit) for assessing the condition in a suitable manner. The 
assessment evidence (identified by the instantiation of CndSatEv) confirms that 
Cond is satisfied. 
Related Patterns: The Assessment Evidence pattern is related to other patterns in the 
following manner: 
• May be used for detailing a demonstration goal of any safety case pattern that 
rely on evidences obtained on the basis of assessment in order to support the 
claim defined by the goal. 
Known Uses: The pattern describes an argument structure where a claim is supported 
by evidence derived on the basis the application of a suitable assessment method. One 
example of the need to argue that a suitable assessment technique has been applied 
may be seen from Appendix A of [EN 50128]. Table A.9 within Appendix A provides 
recommendations on the application of specific techniques for assessing software 
depending on their software safety integrity level (SWSIL) classification. 
[EN50128] European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization, Railway 
Applications – Communications, signalling and processing systems – Software for 
railway control and protection systems, EN 50128, 2001. 
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B.18 PROCESS QUALITY EVIDENCE 
Name: Process Quality Evidence 
Pattern Signature Process Quality Evidence is defined with the signature illustrated in 
Figure 64. 
In Figure 64, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the 
pattern: 
• ToD is short for Target of Demonstration. 
• Cond is short for Condition. 
• Proc is short for Process. 
• QualChar is short for Quality Characteristics. 
• CharSatEv is short for Characteristics Satisfied Evidence. 
• Case is short for Safety Case. 
 
Figure 64 Process Quality Evidence – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Provide a structure for the specification of a safety demonstration Case showing 
that some condition Cond is met by a system ToD on the basis of evidence that results 
from application of a non-standardised process that assures quality. The motivation for 
applying the pattern is when a non-standardised process is applied as a means to 
address a stated concern. As the applied process is not standardised or otherwise well 
established within its application domain, a compliance argument is not sufficient and 
an additional rationale of the suitability of the process must be provided.  
Applicability: The Process Quality Evidence pattern is suitable to apply in the following 
situations: 
• When an applied process that is well established in a company or other domain 
than in the domain for which the safety demonstration are developed. 
• When the process is not a recommended practice within the target domain. 
• When the process is novel but satisfies required qualities and/or has proven 
effective and thus is of adequate quality for its intended purpose. 
Problem: The main aspects to be considered when providing a solution for the 
demonstration of safety are: 
• Characteristics: it is necessary to identify the quality characteristics required to 
be supported by the process that establishes it as a good process. 
• Documentation: it is necessary to identify the documentations that establish that 
the process comply to the required characteristics. 
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Argument Structure Solution: Figure 65 and Table 19 together present the 
demonstration solution, and should therefore be read together. Figure 65 illustrates the 
decomposition of the safety argument in a tree structure using the GSN notation. Table 
19 details the tree structure by defining the type and expected content of each node. 
 
Figure 65 Process Quality Evidence – Argument Structure  
 
Table 19 Process Quality Evidence – Argument Structure 
Node Node Type Node Content Description 
Case Goal Condition Cond associated with ToD is addressed by 
process Proc 
ToD Context Definition of ToD 
Cond Context Definition of Cond 
Proc Context Definition of Proc 
ProcSatChar Strategy Process Proc satisfies quality characteristics 
QualChar and thus is of adequate quality 
QualChar Context Definition of QualChar 
QualCharCorrect Justification Justification for the characteristics expressed in 
QualChar covers the characteristics of a process that 
is suitable in order to address condition Cond 
QualCharSat Goal CharSatEv document the fulfilment of quality 
characteristic QualChar 
CharSatEv Solution Definition of CharSatEv 
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Associated with the contextual elements of the argument structure, the following is 
assumed: 
• ToD: identifies the target system under consideration. 
• Cond: identifies the condition to be addressed by means of an established 
process. 
• Proc: identifies the process applied in order to address the specified condition. 
• QualChar: represents the set of quality characteristics associated with the 
process that jointly provide confidence in that the process is suitable to apply in 
order to address the stated condition. 
• CharSatEv: represents the documentable description that establishes that the 
process satisfies the required quality characteristics. 
Instantiation Rule: An artefact Case (see Figure 65 and Figure 64) instantiates the 
Process Quality Evidence pattern if: 
• Case is a safety demonstration of a target system (identified by the instantiation 
of ToD). 
• Every element of Case is traceable to a safety case node as indicated in Figure 
65. A safety case node is instantiated by applying the descriptions in column 
“Node Content Description” in Table 19 to the context that is addressed in order 
to define a structure as given in Figure 65. 
• Case and the associated argumentation expresses the decomposition of a main 
claim, that a target system is safe with respect to a stated condition (identified by 
the instantiation of Cond), by a strategy of arguing that a specific process 
(identified by the instantiation of Proc) satisfies a set of quality characteristics 
(identified by the instantiation of QualChar). The assessment evidence (identified 
by the instantiation of CharSatEv) confirms that quality characteristics are 
satisfied. 
Related Patterns: The Process Quality Evidence pattern is related to other patterns in 
the following manner: 
• May be used together with any safety case pattern for detailing a demonstration 
goal where arguing and providing evidence for that a certain development 
process has been followed is adequate for addressing the concern addressed by 
the goal. 
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B.19 PROCESS COMPLIANCE EVIDENCE 
Name: Process Compliance Evidence 
Pattern Signature Process Compliance Evidence is defined with the signature 
illustrated in Figure 66. 
In Figure 66, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the 
pattern: 
• ToD is short for Target of Demonstration. 
• Cond is short for Condition. 
• Proc is short for Process. 
• AppGde is short for Application Guidance. 
• CompEv is short for Compliance Evidence. 
• Case is short for Safety Case. 
 
Figure 66 Process Compliance Evidence – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Provide a structure for the specification of a safety demonstration Case showing 
that some condition Cond is met by a system ToD on the basis of evidence of 
compliance to a well-known and recommended practice. The motivation for applying 
the pattern is to reduce the effort required in order to motivate and demonstrate that a 
certain process is adequate by reference to a recommended or mandatory processes 
that is widely known within a domain to be effective. In such a situation, the 
demonstration effort is reduced to the demonstration of compliance, as the process 
itself is pre-approved. 
Applicability: The Process Compliance Evidence pattern is suitable to apply in the 
following situations: 
• When there exist recommended process practices within a domain that clearly 
state the situations for which a given practice is recommended and there is a 
match between the recommended situation of use and the objective for applying 
the process. 
• When it may be established that there is a match between the recommended 
application of a process and the application of the process.  
Problem: The main aspects to be considered when providing a solution for the 
demonstration of safety based on process compliance are: 
• Documentation: it is necessary to identify the documentations that establish that 
the process is suitable for the intended purpose. 
• Compliance: it is necessary to argue that the process is applied as intended. 
Argument Structure Solution: Figure 67 and Table 20 together present the 
demonstration solution, and should therefore be read together. Figure 67 illustrates the 
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decomposition of the safety argument in a tree structure using GSN notation. Table 20 
details the tree structure by defining the type and expected content of each node. 
Figure 67 Process Compliance Evidence – Argument Structure 
 
Table 20 Process Compliance Evidence – Argument Structure 
Node Node Type Node Content Description 
Case Goal ToD satisfies Cond by compliance to process Proc 
ToD Context Definition of ToD 
Cond Context Definition of Cond 
Proc Context Definition of Proc 
ProcCompl Strategy Process Proc is associated with application guideline. 
Compliance to Proc is shown by demonstrating 
compliance to application guideline AppGde  
ProcessSuitable Justification Justification for the required characteristics defined in 
Cond are covered by the characteristics of the 
process Proc 
AppGde Context Definition of AppGde 
ReqSat Goal Documentation CompEv state the fulfilment of all 
requirements of AppGde  
CompEv Solution Definition of CompEv 
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Associated with the contextual elements of the argument structure, the following is 
assumed: 
• ToD: identifies the target system under consideration; 
• Cond: identifies the condition to be addressed by means of an established 
process; 
• Proc: identifies the process applied in order to address the specified condition; 
• AppGde: represents the requirements and guidance to the application of the 
process; 
• CompEv: represents the reference to a documentable description that 
establishes that process has been followed. 
Instantiation Rule: A demonstration artefact Case (see Figure 67 and Figure 66) 
instantiates the Process Compliance Evidence pattern if: 
• Case is a safety demonstration of a target system (identified by the instantiation 
of ToD). 
• Every element of Case is traceable to a unique abstract safety case element as 
indicated with GSN notation in Figure 67. An abstract safety case element is 
instantiated by applying the descriptions in column “Node Content Description” in 
Table 20 in order to define a structure as given in Figure 67. 
• Case expresses the decomposition of a main claim, that a target system is safe 
with respect to a stated condition (identified by the instantiation of Cond), by 
demonstrating compliance to a commonly accepted process (identified by the 
instantiation of Proc). The evidence (identified by the instantiation of ChompEv) 
contains information on the application of the process in line with requirements 
(identified by the instantiation of AppGde). 
Related Patterns: The Process Compliance Evidence pattern is related to other 
patterns in the following manner: 
• May be used for detailing a demonstration goal of any safety case pattern where 
arguing and providing evidence for compliance to a certain development process 
is adequate for addressing the concern addressed by the goal. 
Known Uses: The pattern describes an argument structure where the evidence of 
compliance to a process that is widely known as providing effective results is used to 
argue that a claim is met. A typical use of this strategy may be to claim that, e.g., the 
software in a given system is developed according to the process described in a 
particular software safety standard as [EN50128] or [IEC 60880] and thereby providing 
support to a claim on adequate software development process. 
[EN50128] European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization, Railway 
Applications – Communications, signalling and processing systems – Software for 
railway control and protection systems, EN 50128, 2001. 
[IEC 60880] Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems important to 
safety – Software aspects for computer-based systems performing category A 
functions, IEC 60880,  International Electrotechnical Commission, 2006. 
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B.20 DETERMINISTIC EVIDENCE 
Name: Deterministic Evidence 
Pattern Signature: Deterministic Evidence is defined with the signature illustrated in 
Figure 68. 
In Figure 68, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the 
pattern: 
• ToD is short for Target of Demonstration. 
• Cond is short for Condition. 
• CondElmEv is short for Condition Element Evidence. 
• CondEv is short for Condition Evidence 
• Case is short for Safety Case. 
• VldAsm is short for Valid Assumption. 
 
Figure 68 Deterministic Evidence – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Provide a structure for the specification of a safety demonstration Case showing 
that a condition Cond is met by a target system ToD on the basis of a deterministic 
evaluation of the target. The motivation for applying the pattern is when it is possible to 
provide irrefutable evidence for some condition always being either true or false. 
Example #1: a simple system S undergoes exhaustive testing where all possible 
system states are tested. Thus, the evidence from the exhaustive system test may be 
used to prove that the system cannot enter any potential hazardous states. 
Example #2: a characteristic C of a system S is proven to be always true by a logical 
argument that establish that there are no events such that S may not be characterised 
as C. 
The two examples both provide deterministic evidence, the former example by an 
empirical approach of testing all possibilities, the latter example by a logic reasoning 
approach. 
Applicability: The Deterministic Evidence pattern is suitable to apply in the following 
situations: 
• When there is some characteristic of the system that requires irrefutable 
evidence in order to establish required confidence. If this is the case, then 
measures must be taken in order to provide the ability to obtain the deterministic 
evidence. 
• When there exists evidence that supports the establishment of a deterministic 
argument as it provides a high degree of confidence in support of a claim. 
Problem: The main aspects to be considered when providing a solution for the 
demonstration of safety are: 
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• Claim: it is necessary to define the claim along with any exceptions such that it is 
clear what is always true and/or what is always false. 
• Reasoning: it is necessary to define the reasoning steps that are used to 
combine assumptions to assertions. 
• Assumption: it is necessary to establish the assumption on which the 
deterministic evidence is based, i.e. the axioms.  
• Data: an assumption may be of a nature such that it expresses an established 
truth and thus requires no further evidence, or it may be of such a nature that the 
assumption needs to be confirmed in order to provide a valid foundation in an 
argument. Either way, a rationale or supporting data should be provided in order 
to establish an assumption as valid. 
Argument Structure Solution: Figure 69 and Table 21 together present the 
demonstration solution, and therefore should be read together Figure 69 illustrates the 
decomposition of the safety argument in a tree structure using GSN notation. Table 21 
details the tree structure by defining the type and expected content of each node. 
 
Figure 69 Deterministic Evidence – Argument Structure 
 
Table 21 Deterministic Evidence – Argument Structure 
Node Node 
Type 
Node Content Description 
Case Goal ToD satisfies Cond 
ToD Context Definition of ToD 
Cond Context Definition of Cond 
CondDecomposed Strategy Cond is systematically decomposed. Every 
decomposed element and the composition of 
elements supports Cond  
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ProperDecomposit
ion 
Justificati
on 
Justification of proper decomposition of the condition 
Cond into decomposed elements 
DecompValid Goal Decomposed element c is determined on the basis of 
a valid assumption (VldAsm) and/or evidence 
(CondElmEv) 
VldAsm Goal Assumption element a is valid 
CondElmEv Solution Evidence establishing condition element c 
CondValid Goal Cond is established 
CondEv Solution Evidence establishing condition Cond on the basis of 
all proposition elements c 
Associated with the contextual elements of the argument structure, the following is 
assumed: 
• ToD: identifies the target system under consideration. 
• Cond: represents the condition that is addressed. 
• CondElmEv: represents the reference to a documentable description that 
establishes in a deterministic manner the truth associated with an element of the 
condition that is addressed. 
• CondEv: represents the reference to a documentable description that 
establishes in a deterministic manner the truth associated with the conditions 
that is addressed based on the set of condition elements. 
Instantiation Rule: An artefact Case (see Figure 69 and Figure 68) instantiates the 
Deterministic Evidence pattern if: 
• Case is a safety demonstration of a target system (identified by the instantiation 
of ToD). 
• Every element of Case is traceable to a safety case node as indicated in Figure 
69. A safety case node is instantiated by adapting the descriptions in column 
“Node Content Description” in Table 21 to the context that is addressed in order 
to define a structure as given in Figure 69. 
• Case and the associated safety argumentation expresses the decomposition of 
a main claim, that a target system is safe with respect to or satisfies a stated 
condition (identified by the instantiation of Cond), by a strategy of establishing an 
irrefutable argument.  
Related Patterns: The Deterministic Evidence pattern is related to other patterns in the 
following manner: 
• May be used for detailing a demonstration goal of any safety case pattern where 
arguing and providing evidence for the concern addressed by the goal being 
satisfied must be based on irrefutable evidence. 
Known Uses: The pattern describes an argument structure where a claim is supported 
by evidence that demonstrates the claim being fully predictable. One example of the 
need for deterministic evidence support is related to the recommendation expressed in 
Table A.12 within Appendix A of [EN 50128] requiring for SIL 4 classified software no 
dynamic objects, no dynamic variables, and no conditional jumps. 
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[EN50128] European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization, Railway 
Applications – Communications, signalling and processing systems – Software for 
railway control and protection systems, EN 50128, 2001. 
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B.21 PROBABILISTIC EVIDENCE 
Name: Probabilistic Evidence 
Pattern Signature: Probabilistic Evidence is defined with the signature illustrated in 
Figure 70. 
In Figure 70, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the 
pattern: 
• ToD is short for Target of Demonstration. 
• Cond is short for Condition. 
• Mtd is short for method. 
• Crit is short for Criteria. 
• CritSatEv is short for Criteria Satisfied Evidence. 
• ProbEv is short for Probabilistic Evidence. 
• Case is short for Safety Case. 
 
Figure 70 Probabilistic Evidence – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Provide a structure for the specification of a safety demonstration Case showing 
that a condition Cond or a claim associated with a target system ToD is satisfactory met 
on the basis of evidence obtained by a quantitative assessment of the target. The 
motivation for applying the pattern is when there exists sufficient quantitative 
information such that the occurrence of some event may be predicted with sufficient 
confidence to support a safety claim.  
Applicability: The Probabilistic Evidence pattern is suitable to apply in the following 
situations: 
• When there exists quantitative information that may be used directly or 
systematically combined such that it supports a quantitatively expressed claim. 
• Typically used in order to provide a notion of the degree for which a system 
fulfils a specific property (e.g., availability, reliability, safety) by a method of 
calculation and combination of random hardware failure probabilities obtained on 
individual hardware items. 
Problem: The main aspects to be considered when providing a solution for the 
demonstration of safety are: 
• Result: it is necessary that the probabilistic result is clearly stated in order to 
avoid ambiguity. 
• Validity of Result: it is necessary to identify the characteristics of the process of 
how the result was obtained in order to provide confidence in the result and 
render possible to reproduce it. 
• Assumptions: it is necessary to document the assumptions regarding any 
circumstances that render the probabilistic evidence valid or otherwise in which 
situation the result is not valid.  
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• Method: it is necessary to document by which method the result was obtained. 
Argument Structure Solution: Figure 71 and Table 22 together present the 
demonstration solution, and therefore should be read together. Figure 71 illustrates the 
decomposition of the safety argument in a tree structure using the GSN notation. Table 
22 details the tree structure by defining the type and expected context of each node. 
Figure 71 Probabilistic Evidence – Argument Structure 
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Table 22 Probabilistic Evidence – Argument Structure 
Node Node 
Type 
Node Content Description 
Case Goal Cond occurs with probability p in ToD. 
ToD Context Definition of ToD 
Cond Context Definition of Cond 
SuitableApproa
ch 
Strategy The occurrence of Cond is obtained based on Mtd. Mtd 
satisfies Crit thus result is trustworthy. 
Mtd Context Definition of Mtd 
Crit Context Definition of Crit 
CorrectCriteria Justificati
on 
Rationale over the Crit being suitable for characterising 
the ability of Mtd to provide trustworthy quantitative 
results 
CritSatisfied Goal Application of Mtd satisfies criteria c 
ProbResult Goal Mtd establishes that condition Cond occurs with 
probability p 
CritSatEv Solution Evidence documenting that Mtd satisfies criteria c 
ProbEv Solution Evidence documenting that Cond occurs with probability 
p 
Associated with the contextual elements of the argument structure, the following is 
assumed: 
• ToD: identifies the target system under consideration. 
• Cond: represents conditions to be fulfilled that are associated with probability of 
occurrence. 
• Mtd: represents the method applied in order to obtain a probability for some 
given event. 
• Crit: represents the criteria that shall be fulfilled by the method that is applied in 
order to give confidence in the probabilistic result being correct. 
• CritSatEv: represents the reference to a documentable description that 
establishes that the criteria are satisfied. 
• ProbEv: represents the reference to a documentable description that establishes 
that Cond occurs with probability p. 
Instantiation Rule: An artefact Case (see Figure 71 and Figure 70) instantiates the 
Probabilistic Evidence pattern if: 
• Case is a safety demonstration of a target system (identified by the instantiation 
of ToD). 
• Every element of Case is traceable to a safety case node as indicated in Figure 
71. A safety case node is instantiated by adapting the descriptions in column 
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“Node Content Description” in Table 22 to the context addressed in order to 
define a structure as given in Figure 71. 
• Case and the associated argumentation expresses the decomposition of a main 
claim, that a condition (identified by the instantiation of Cond) occurs with a 
specific probability that is acceptable and thus is sufficiently safe. The probability 
is established on the basis of an acceptable method and backed up by 
evidences.  
Related Patterns: The Probabilistic Evidence pattern is related to other patterns in the 
following manner: 
• May be used for detailing a demonstration goal of any safety case pattern where 
it is sufficient to argue and provide evidence for the concern addressed by the 
goal occurs with a certain probability and thus is acceptable. 
Known Uses: The pattern describes an argument structure where the evidence 
supporting a claim is derived on the basis of probabilistic methods. Appendix A of [EN 
50128] identifies some of the recommended techniques to be used as support 
developing the software for railway signalling and protections systems. Several of these 
techniques such as reliability block diagram, fault tree analysis, and Markov models 
may be used to derive probabilistic results. 
[EN50128] European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization, Railway 
Applications – Communications, signalling and processing systems – Software for 
railway control and protection systems, EN 50128, 2001. 
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B.22 BASIC ASSUMPTION EVIDENCE 
Name: Basic Assumption Evidence 
Pattern Signature: Basic Assumption Evidence is defined with the signature illustrated 
in Figure 72. 
In Figure 72, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the 
pattern: 
• ToD is short for Target of Demonstration. 
• Cond is short for Condition. 
• AsmEv is short for Assumption Evidence. 
• Case is short for Safety Case. 
 
Figure 72 Basic Assumption Evidence – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Provide a structure for the specification of a simple safety demonstration Case 
showing that some condition Cond is met by a system ToD evidenced in an assumption 
that is claimed valid on the basis of a rationale or by the support of evidence indicating 
that the assumption may be used as a basic fact. The assumption is not supported by 
“hard” evidence but expresses a phenomenon that is self-evident such that it may be 
treated as an axiom. If there is no information that supports an assumption, then the 
demonstration must terminate in a rationale and/or evidence that provide indications 
strong enough to establish the assumption as a basic fact.  
Applicability: The Basic Assumption Evidence may be applied in the following 
situations: 
• When there exists no evidence that may be referenced such that a claim may be 
backed up by facts. 
• When there exist strong indications or a rationale such that the assumption may 
be treated as valid. 
Problem: When developing a safety demonstration, some information is based on 
assumptions. An assumption needs to be motivated such that: 
• Rationale: described to an extent that rationalise that the assumption is a basic 
fact that requires no further evidence and that may be accepted as a valid 
assumption. 
• Commonly accepted as truth: described to an extent that provides convincing 
indications that the assumption is valid although no conclusive evidence may be 
provided. 
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Argument Structure Solution: Figure 73 and Table 23 together present the 
demonstration solution, and should therefore be read together. Figure 73 illustrates the 
decomposition of the safety argument in a tree structure using the GSN notation. Table 
23 details the tree structure by defining the type and the expected content of each 
node. 
Figure 73 Basic Assumption Safety – Argument Structure 
 
Table 23 Basic Assumption Evidence – Argument Structure 
Node Node 
Type 
Node Content Description 
Case Goal A valid assumption associated with ToD is Cond 
ToD Context Definition of ToD 
Cond Context Definition of assumption Cond 
Rationalisation Strategy Cond is established by rationale or non-concluding 
evidence 
AssumptionRation
ale 
Justificati
on 
Rationale establishing that assumption Cond is a valid 
basic fact 
AsmEv Solution Evidence documenting that assumption Cond is valid 
Associated with the contextual elements of the argument structure, the following is 
assumed: 
• ToD: identifies the target system under consideration. 
• Cond: identifies the assumption associated with ToD. 
• AsmEv: represents the reference to a documentable description that establishes 
the assumption as a basic fact. 
Instantiation Rule: An artefact Case (see Figure 73 and Figure 72) instantiates the 
Basic Assumption Evidence pattern if: 
• Case is a safety demonstration of a target system (identified by the instantiation 
of ToD). 
• Every element of Case is traceable to a safety case node as indicated in Figure 
73. A safety case node is instantiated by adapting the descriptions in column 
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“Node Content Description” in Table 23 to the context that is addressed in order 
to define a structure as given in Figure 73. 
• Case and the associated argumentation expresses the decomposition of a main 
claim, that an assumption is valid (identified by the instantiation of Asm) justified 
by a rationale and/or documentable evidence.  
Related Patterns: The Basic Assumption Evidence pattern is related to other patterns 
in the following manner: 
• May be used for detailing a demonstration goal of any safety case pattern that 
define a claim which are based on assumptions and where the assumptions are 
not required to be supported by evidences beyond giving a rationale or by 
referencing documentation that establish the assumption as a commonly 
accepted fact. 
Known Uses: The pattern describes an argument structure where a kind of rationale or 
a justified assumption supports a claim such that no further evidence is required. In any 
kind of argumentation there are some axioms that are used as base facts. The 
assumptions used in assuring and justifying that safety objectives are met should be 
justified as required in [IEC61508], [EN50129], and [CommonPosition]. 
[IEC61508] International Electrotechnical Commission, Functional safety of 
electrical/electronic/ programmble electronic safety-related systems, IEC 61508, Edition 
2.0, 2010. 
[EN50129] European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization, Railway 
Applications – Communications, signalling and processing systems – Safety related 
electronic systems for signalling, EN 50129, 2003. 
[CommonPosition] Bel V, Bfs, CSN, ISTech, ONR, SSM, and STUK. Licensing of safety 
critical software for nuclear reactors: Common position of seven European nuclear 
regulators and authorised technical support organisations, 2013. 
Chapter 11
Paper 3: Developing Safe Control
Systems using Patterns for
Assurance
Instead of the paper we have included the full technical report with the title “A Pattern-
based Method for Safe Control Conceptualisation – Exempliﬁed Within Railway Sig-
nalling”, HWR-1037 rev 2, OECD Halden Reactor Project, Institute for energy tech-
nology, Halden, Norway, 2014.
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FOREWORD 
The experimental operation of the Halden Boiling Water Reactor and associated research 
programmes are sponsored through an international agreement by:  
 
• the Institutt for energiteknikk (IFE), Norway, 
the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre SCK•CEN, acting also on behalf of other public or private 
organisations in Belgium, 
• the Risø DTU National Laboratory for Sustainable Energy, Technical University of Denmark, 
• the Finnish Ministry of Employment and the Economy (TYÖ), 
• the Electricité de France (EDF), 
• the Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, representing a 
German group of companies working in agreement with the German Federal Ministry 
of Economics and Technology, 
• the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES), 
• the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), acting also on behalf of other 
public or private organisations in Korea, 
• the Spanish Centro de Investigaciones Energéticas, Medioambientales y Tecnológicas 
(CIEMAT), representing a group of national and industry organisations in Spain, 
• the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM), representing public and privat nuclear 
organisations in Sweden, 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This report demonstrates and presents experiences from the use of a pattern-based method called Safe 
Control Systems (SaCS) for the development of a conceptual safety design for a railway interlocking 
system. A railway interlocking system is a typical safety critical system; an example interlocking system 
serves as a case for evaluating the SaCS method. An error in the specification and/or in the 
implementation of an interlocking system may lead to unacceptable consequences, e.g., deaths due to 
collision of trains caused by signalling failure.  
The SaCS method provides guidance on the development of safety critical systems by the application of 
patterns. SaCS has also been tested out in the nuclear domain for the conceptualisation of a reactor 
control system design [10]. 
The six kinds of basic patterns offered by the SaCS pattern language are categorised according to two 
development perspectives: process assurance and product assurance. Both perspectives detail patterns 
according to three aspects: requirement; solution; and safety case. We distinguish between basic and 
composite patterns. Each basic pattern contains an instantiation rule that may be used to assess 
whether it is correctly instantiated. 
The basic SaCS patterns capture commonly accepted safety engineering practices, e.g., development 
processes and activities, risk assessment methods, and other concepts for providing safety assurance as 
reflected in international safety standards and guidelines, e.g., [13], [14], [15], and [16]. The basic SaCS 
patterns are defined in a format inspired by classical literature on patterns, e.g., the format for expressing 
patterns as defined in [1], [3], and [7]. SaCS patterns differs from patterns defined in classical literature 
with respect to its explicit definition of inputs, outputs, and the instantiation rules that define the transition 
from input to output for each pattern. The SaCS way of explicitly defining the parameters (i.e., inputs and 
outputs) facilitates easy combination of several patterns. The instantiation rules facilitate validation of the 
result of pattern instantiation based on the pattern definition and the given inputs. A composite pattern 
defines a specific combination of patterns and is expressed graphically. The notation for expressing 
composite patterns is inspired by languages for system modelling, e.g., the modelling of patterns by 
collaborations and modularisation of a specification by decomposition in UML [20]. The graphical 
notation is also inspired by the literature related to visualisation, e.g., visualisation of risk analysis [19] 
and general literature on visualisation of complex data [4], [18], and [22]. 
This report describes the SaCS method, and its supporting language in an example driven manner 
based on a case from the railway domain. 
The remainder of this report is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a background on the SaCS 
method and the SaCS pattern language. Section 3 describes the railway case. Section 4 defines the 
success criteria associated with the application of SaCS on a railway case. Sections 5 to 9 exemplify the 
application of the SaCS method. Section 10 summarises the main results from the application of the 
SaCS method. Section 11 discusses the fulfilment of success criteria of the case. Section 12 presents 
related work. Finally, Section 13 concludes.  
Definitions of the basic SaCS patterns used in this report are given in Appendix A. Detailed results from 
pattern instantiation are given in Appendix B. 
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2. THE CASE: RAILWAY INTERLOCKING SYSTEM 
Figure 1 illustrates the main appliances of a train station. The station has two tracks and a level crossing 
(shown with two vertical lines). 
 
Figure 1 A station with two tracks and a level crossing 
The station in Figure 1 is connected in both ends to neighbouring stations with a single track. An 
interlocking system controls the appliances associated with the station in order to safely control the 
movements of trains along defined train routes. The annotations in Figure 1 denote the following: 
• A short line that ends with two or three adjacent circles represents either a distant light signal 
(i.e., dA, dB, dLN, and dMO) or a main light signal (i.e., mA, mB, mL, mM, mN, and mO). Distant 
signals give indication of the expected value of an upcoming main signal in the same direction. 
The purpose of a distant signal is to allow a train driver to know in advance if it is required to stop 
or slow down before a main signal is reached. Main signals indicate if a train is allowed to 
proceed or is required to stop at a specific position on the track. 
• There are two points for switching traffic onto different tracks; these are identified as p1 and p2.  
• Road signals, v1 and v2, are used to indicate to road users if it is allowed to cross the railway 
track or if they must stop. 
• Level crossing signals, w1 and w2, are used to indicate to train drivers if the level crossing is 
secured from road traffic. 
• Level crossing gates, g1 and g2, are used to hinder road users from crossing the track when a 
train is passing the level crossing. 
In the following sections, we will exemplify the application of the SaCS method for deriving the 
specification of the interlocking system. The system is referred to as 2TLCI (2 Tracks and Level Crossing 
Interlocking) system. 2TLCI is intended as a concept for the replacement of an existing interlocking 
system. The identifiers for points, signals, etc. depicted in Figure 1 represent the naming convention 
used in this report. 
Figure 2 outlines the system context of the 2TLCI system where it is expected to replace the system 
named Interlocking System.  
Legend
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Figure 2 Overview of the overall system 
The different entities in Figure 2 represent the following: 
• Operations System: is a system used by an operator (e.g., train dispatcher) to interact with the 
interlocking system and may represent a local operator position (operator position at site) or a 
centralised control position (operator position off-site for remote control). 
• Train Detection Equipment: any equipment that is used to detect the position of a train on a 
specific track section, e.g. track circuit detection, axle-counting equipment or other positioning 
equipment. 
• Level Crossing Equipment: is equipment that is used for controlling a level crossing and it 
includes detectors for the passage of trains at specific points on the track, level crossing gates, 
road signals, and train signals. 
• Point Equipment: is equipment that is used to move trains from one track to another. 
• Lights: represents distant signals and main signals that are used to control the movements of 
trains. 
3. BACKGROUND – SACS 
3.1 The SaCS Method 
The method interleaves three main activities, each of which is divided into sub-activities: 
• Pattern Selection – The purpose of this activity is to support the conception of a design with 
respect to a given development case by:  
o Selecting SaCS patterns for requirement elicitation. 
o Selecting SaCS patterns for establishing design basis. 
o Selecting SaCS patterns for establishing safety case. 
• Pattern Composition – The purpose of this activity is to specify the use of the selected patterns 
by:  
o Specifying compositions of patterns. 
o Specifying instantiations of patterns. 
• Pattern Instantiation – The purpose of this activity is to instantiate the composite pattern 
specification by:  
o Selecting pattern instantiation order.  
o Conducting stepwise instantiation. 
A selection map that is introduced in Section 5.1 supports pattern selection. The pattern language 
outlined in Section 3.2 supports pattern composition. Pattern instantiation is supported by instantiation 
rules defined for every basic pattern (basic patterns are defined in Appendix A). 
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3.2 The SaCS Pattern Language 
The SaCS pattern language consists of a set of patterns (basic SaCS patterns) of different kinds, and a 
graphical syntax for specifying how patterns can be combined (creating composite SaCS patterns) and 
applied in order to derive a conceptual safety design. A composition of patterns (composite for short) 
may be expressed by, e.g., mapping an output parameter of a pattern to an input parameter to a second 
pattern, thereby defining a relationship between the patterns. Relations can be used to combine patterns; 
the relations will be explained by the examples provided in Section 5 to Section 9. A composite may 
reference and use any type of SaCS pattern (i.e., basic pattern or composite pattern) in its definition. The 
syntax and semantics of the SaCS pattern language is described in [11]. Every basic SaCS pattern is 
defined such that it can be used stand-alone. Every pattern is also defined such that it is easy to use 
several patterns together as every input and output parameter of a pattern is explicitly detailed. 
Figure 3 illustrates the main graphical elements used for referring to different types of patterns within the 
specification of a composite pattern. 
 
Figure 3 Icons used in pattern references 
The six types of basic patterns are: 
• Process Assurance Requirement Pattern: this pattern type is inspired by the recommended 
practises for development of safety critical systems as given in safety standards, e.g. [13], [14] 
and [15], where confidence in achieving a safe product is to a large degree provided by following 
a recommended process.  
• Product Assurance Requirement Pattern: this pattern type is inspired by the problem frames 
approach [17]. The problem frames approach is a means to specify the system and its domains 
as well as the interaction phenomena between the system and domains in order to derive 
requirements for the system under development. 
• Process Assurance Solution (Method) Pattern: this pattern type is defined as a means to 
document specific methods (e.g., fault tree analysis) that are widely used within safety 
engineering. 
• Product Assurance Solution (Design) Pattern: this pattern type is inspired by the format for 
describing effective design solutions as patterns as given by Alexander et al. [1] and Gamma et 
al. [7].  
• Process Assurance Safety Case Pattern: this pattern type is defined as a means to document 
the structure of claims and evidences such that it may be logically deduced and concluded that a 
target system is sufficiently safe. This safety case pattern type is used for patterns that primarily 
depend on process-oriented claims, arguments and evidences. 
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• Product Assurance Safety Case Pattern: this pattern type is similar to the Process Safety Case 
type, but is used for patterns that primarily depend on product-oriented claims, arguments and 
evidences. 
4. SUCCESS CRITERIA 
The SaCS method intends to support users like system developers, safety engineers, hardware 
engineers, and software engineers in the early stages of system development. The primary objective is 
to facilitate development of conceptual safety designs of safety critical systems. A safety critical system 
represents here a system that upon failure may result in losses that are determined unacceptable, e.g., 
loss of life, significant damage to environment, or unacceptable economic losses. A system may be 
regarded as sufficiently safe for its intended purpose if it is free form unacceptable failures. In order for a 
stakeholder to take informed decisions upon further development of a design concept, a conceptual 
safety design should contain information on the ability of a design to enforce safety. 
A conceptual safety design is defined in a suitable manner for a given context if it satisfies the following 
definition: 
Definition A conceptual safety design is a triplet consisting of an early stage specification of: 
• system requirements (R), 
• system design (D), 
• safety case (S). 
An implementation I satisfies a conceptual safety design (R, D, S) if there exists a safety case SC in 
accordance with S that demonstrates that I is safe with respect to the specifications of R and D. 
The SaCS method provides a pattern-based method supporting the development of conceptual safety 
designs by systematically building a context specific composite pattern that is instantiated into a 
conceptual safety design. The composite pattern that is provided by applying SaCS represents an 
abstract concept solution whereas its instantiation is a conceptual safety design according to the 
definition.  
We define instantiation in the context of SaCS as follows: 
Definition A conceptual safety design instantiates a SaCS composite pattern if each element of the triple 
can be instantiated from the SaCS composite pattern according to the instantiation rules of the individual 
patterns within the composite and according to the rules for composition. 
In the context of SaCS, abstract concepts are provided by patterns, e.g., requirement patterns, design 
patterns and safety case patterns. Then instantiation of a pattern, e.g., a system design specification, a 
requirement specification, or a safety case specification, is the result of the application of a pattern in a 
specific context. Each basic SaCS pattern describes its instantiation rule. The instantiation rule provides 
guidance on valid instantiations of the pattern. A conceptual safety design according to the definition is a 
triple of different and related specifications. In order to be effective for safety design conceptualisation, 
the SaCS method must therefore facilitate the procurement of such an artefact. We claim that SaCS is 
effective for this task by facilitating the specification of a composite pattern that is easily instantiated into 
a conceptual safety design and define our hypothesis as follows: 
H: The SaCS method facilitates effective and efficient development of conceptual safety designs that 
are:  
• In accordance with safety objectives. 
• At a sufficient level of detail. 
HWR-1037 rev 2 
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• Easy to use.  
In order to test our hypothesis, we deduce the following predictions that should hold for the conceptual 
safety design that is produced when applying SaCS on the interlocking system described in Section 2: 
P: Application of the SaCS method on the interlocking case described in Section 2 results in a 
conceptual safety design that characterises the interlocking case and is easily instantiated from a 
composite SaCS pattern. Furthermore, the conceptual safety design: 
a) Is in accordance with safety objectives – the conceptual safety design is defined in agreement 
with safety objectives. 
b) Is at a sufficient level of detail – the conceptual safety design is defined by parts that are 
appropriate, necessary, sufficiently detailed for an early stage specification, and may be easily 
understood.  
c) Is easy to use – the conceptual safety design may be easily extended, detailed, or refined. 
5. ELICIT FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
5.1 Pattern Selection 
Figure 41 provides an overview of the patterns available in the interlocking case, which are organised into 
a pattern selection map. A pattern selection map visualises a specific kind of relationship between the 
patterns. The kind of relationship that is visualised is the order in which a user is expected to consider 
the relevancy of a pattern for application in a given context. The patterns that are used in this case are 
defined in Appendix A, the definition of those patterns that are not used may be found in HWR-1029 [10].  
The selection process starts at the pattern referenced in the upper left corner of Figure 4 and follows the 
direction of the arrows. Pattern selection ends when all patterns have been considered. The diamond 
symbol represents a choice. Associated with a choice there is a group of relevant patterns where more 
than one pattern may be selected. The letter above a choice is a reference to a correspondingly named 
group of patterns indicated in the lower part of Figure 4. The symbol “*” is used to identify the patterns 
that are used in the interlocking case. 
We assume that the information provided in Section 2 sufficiently details the development objective. 
Furthermore, we assume that the hazards associated with the operation of the interlocking system have 
been identified and that these are: derailment, collision train-train, collision train-object, and level 
crossing accident. Based on these assumptions, the application of the first pattern in the selection map 
named Establish Concept is found to be unnecessary as it supports clarifying the initial objectives of a 
system under construction. 
                                                
1 Abbreviations in Figure 4: HAZID – HAZard IDentification; FMEA – Failure Modes and Effects Analysis; HAZOP – 
HAZard and OPerability Studies; FTA – Fault Tree Analysis; SIL – Safety Integrity Level. 
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Figure 4 Pattern Selection Map 
The patterns Station Interlocking Requirements (defined in Appendix A.1) and Level Crossing 
Interlocking Requirements (defined in Appendix A.2) associated with choice (A) in Figure 4 capture the 
problem of eliciting functional requirements for a system that shall control the appliances available in a 
station with two tracks and a level crossing, respectively, and therefore have been selected for the case.  
5.2 Pattern Instantiation 
Functional requirements in the case are elicited by instantiating the Station Interlocking Requirements 
pattern (defined in Appendix A.1) and the Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements pattern (defined in 
Appendix A.2).  
The Station Interlocking Requirements and the Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements patterns are 
both product assurance requirement patterns, intended as support for deriving the functional 
requirements for the product that shall be developed. In the case, the product to be developed is an 
interlocking system for controlling the appliances of a station as illustrated in Figure 1 in Section 2.  
Figure 5 is an excerpt from the pattern Station Interlocking Requirements and represents a problem 
frame diagram [17] adapted with SaCS specific annotations for explicitly denoting input and output 
parameters. The problem frame diagram and the associated textual description within Station 
Interlocking Requirements provide guidance to the user in analysing the challenges addressed by the 
pattern. 
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Figure 5 Excerpt of the pattern Station Interlocking Requirements 
When the Station Interlocking Requirements pattern is instantiated, its parameter Mch (short for 
Machine) indicated in Figure 5 is initially associated with the description of the 2TLCI system as outlined 
in Section 2. The pattern Station Interlocking Requirements is thus interpreted in the context of 
developing the 2TLCI system. The outcome of applying the pattern according to its instantiation rule is a 
set of requirements, represented by the output parameter Req (short for requirements), specifying how 
train movements shall be controlled along the tracks by the use of the different appliances as outlined in 
Figure 1.  
Instantiation results are summarised in Section 10 of this report. The result of instantiating the Station 
Interlocking Requirements pattern is described in Table 1 in Section 10.1. 
Once the Station Interlocking Requirements pattern is instantiated, the Level Crossing Interlocking 
Requirements pattern is instantiated. The pattern Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements is 
interpreted in the context of development of the 2TLCI system (as with the Station Interlocking 
Requirements pattern) and applied according to its instantiation rule to provide the relevant requirements 
for assuring safe control of a level crossing.  
The result of instantiating the Level Crossing Requirements pattern according to its instantiation rule is 
described in Table 2 in Section 10.1.  
5.3 Pattern Composition 
A composite pattern named Functional Requirements defined according to the syntax of the SaCS 
pattern language is presented in Figure 6. The syntax and semantics for the SaCS pattern language is 
defined in [11]. The Functional Requirements composite pattern defines a relationship between the 
following basic patterns: 
• Station Interlocking Requirements – defined in Appendix A.1. 
• Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements – defined in Appendix A.2. 
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Figure 6 Functional Requirements – Composite Pattern 
A composite pattern consists of a declaration and its content. In Figure 6, the declaration is visualised 
above the horizontal line and identifies the name of the composite pattern that is defined (here the name 
Functional Requirements is given to the composite). In the declaration, the inputs to the composite (here 
a parameter Mch) as well as the outputs (here a parameter F-Req) are also defined. The content of the 
composite is visualised below the horizontal line. 
Whether a parameter of a pattern is an input or an output is indicated by the use of a thick arrow pointing 
either towards (input) or from (output) a parameter. The symbols [ _ ] indicates a list of parameters. The 
inputs and outputs of the composite (visualised in the declaration) are matched with the identifiers to the 
inputs and outputs of the patterns visualised in the content part of the composite. Thus, any instantiation 
of the input parameter Mch of Functional Requirements implies that the input Mch to Station Interlocking 
Requirements and the input Mch to Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements are similarly instantiated. 
Every parameter indicated in Figure 6 may be found in the respective definition of the associated pattern. 
Parameters are classified into different kinds in the SaCS pattern language and Figure 6 can be 
annotated to indicate the classification of parameters. However, in order to simplify the visual 
presentation we have not included symbols indicating the classification of parameters. The annotation 
2TR=Req (the sign “=” enclosed by a circle in Figure 6 symbolises an alias operator) creates an alias 
2TR for the parameter named Req. The annotation LCR=Req creates an alias LCR for the parameter 
Req.  
A combines relation (a line with an icon consisting of two overlapping white circles with black stroke) 
models the relationship between the patterns Station Interlocking Requirements and Level Crossing 
Interlocking Requirements. The result of the combines relation is a set that consists of the requirements 
resulting from instantiating 2TR and the requirements resulting from instantiating LCR, the combined set 
is named F-Req.  
The grey wide arrow illustrated in the background in Figure 6 indicates the recommended pattern 
instantiation order and thus only gives guidance to the process of applying the patterns. 
6. ELICIT SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
6.1 Pattern Selection 
Once the functional requirements have been elicited on the basis of selected patterns from choice (A) of 
Figure 4, the further traversal of the pattern selection map leads to the pattern Hazard Identification. This 
pattern defines the process of identifying potential hazards associated with the use of a target system 
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under assessment in a given context. In choice B, patterns expressing different methods supporting 
hazard identification are offered. None of these are selected as we assumed in Section 5.1 that the 
hazards associated with the system are already identified. 
The Hazard Analysis pattern (defined in Appendix A.4) is selected as it provides guidance on the process 
of deriving the potential causes of hazards. In choice (C) of Figure 4, different process solution patterns 
(representing methods) that support hazard analysis may be selected. The FTA pattern (defined in 
Appendix A.7) is selected as support for Hazard Analysis under the assumption that a top-down fault tree 
analysis is an acceptable and effective method for identifying potential causes of hazards. 
Traversal of the pattern selection map in Figure 4 from the current point leads to the pattern Risk 
Analysis (defined in Appendix A.5). The pattern provides guidance on how to address identified hazards 
and to establish a notion of risk. The SIL Classification pattern (defined in Appendix A.8) is selected as it 
defines the method for classifying railway systems and their components with respect to criticality. 
The pattern Establish System Safety Requirements (defined in Appendix A.6) describes the process of 
establishing safety requirements based on inputs from risk assessment. It is regarded as relevant for the 
case and selected as support. 
6.2 Pattern Instantiation 
Safety requirements are defined based on the results of risk assessment. The process assurance 
requirement patterns selected in Section 6.1 support the process of eliciting safety requirements and are 
applied sequentially according to the following order: 
1. Hazard Analysis – used as support in the process of identifying potential causes of hazards based on 
inputs on applicable hazards. 
2. Risk Analysis – used as support in the process of addressing hazards with respect to their severity 
and likelihood and combine this information into a notion of risk. 
3. Establish System Safety Requirements – used as support in the process of defining requirements 
based on identified risks. 
The instantiation of the patterns selected in Section 6.1 are outlined in the following subsections: 
• Section 6.2.1 describes the instantiation of the patterns Hazard Analysis and FTA. 
• Section 6.2.2 describes the instantiation of the patterns Risk Analysis and SIL Classification. 
• Section 6.2.3 describes the instantiation of the pattern Establish System Safety Requirements. 
6.2.1 Hazard Analysis and Fault Tree Analysis 
Figure 7 is an excerpt of the pattern Hazard Analysis and describes the main process for performing 
hazard analysis. The process described in Figure 7 is illustrated as a UML activity diagram [20] (adapted 
with SaCS specific annotations for explicitly denoting input and output parameters). 
HWR-1037 rev 2 
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Figure 7 Excerpt of the pattern Hazard Analysis 
The Hazard Analysis pattern is instantiated such that: 
• Parameter ToA (short for Target of Assessment) is associated with the system description 
provided in Section 2. 
• Parameter Haz (short for Hazards) is associated with the following hazards (see Section 5.1 for 
the assumption on relevant hazards): 
o Derailment 
o Collision train-train 
o Collision train-object 
o Level crossing accidents 
• Parameter IdCsHz (short for Identified Causes of Hazards) was associated with the results of 
applying the FTA pattern according to its instantiation rule. The input to the instantiation of FTA 
is the system description provided in Section 2 and the list of hazards presented above. The 
result of pattern instantiation is a fault tree expressing the likely causes of hazards.  
• Parameter HzLg (short for Hazard Log) was associated with the result of applying the Hazard 
Analysis pattern according to its instantiation rule.  
The result of applying the Hazard Analysis pattern is detailed in Appendix B.2. The result of applying the 
FTA pattern used as support for Hazard Analysis is detailed in Appendix B.1. 
6.2.2 Risk Analysis and SIL Classification 
Figure 8 is an excerpt from the pattern Risk Analysis. The Risk Analysis pattern (defined in Appendix 
A.5) is applied once the hazards associated with our target are analysed. The SIL Classification pattern 
(defined in Appendix A.8) is applied as support for Risk Analysis.  
The outline of the 2TLCI system as presented in Section 2 and the hazard log established in Section 
6.2.1 (detailed in Appendix B.2) are used as inputs to the application of Risk Analysis, associated with 
the parameters Toa and Haz, respectively. 
Document Hazards and 
Causes
Identify Relevant Data 
Sources on Hazards
Identify Scope of Analysis
Derive Causes of Hazards 
scope
Hazards
Potential causes to hazards
ToA
IdCsHz
HzLg
Haz
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Figure 8 Excerpt from the pattern Risk Analysis 
The intention of performing risk analysis is to identify the potential severity of an accident associated with 
a hazard, and to estimate the likelihood of events leading to the hazard.  
The hazard analysis as described in Section 6.2.1 identifies potential causes of hazards. These potential 
causes of hazards are further used to identify the potential for the occurrence of hazards. As the hazard 
analysis performed in Section 6.2.1 is a qualitative analysis, we do not provide quantitative risk 
estimates. Instead, we deduce a System Integrity level (SIL) from tolerable hazard rates and use the 
results from hazard analysis as an input for identifying the relevant functions that potentially may give 
rise to hazards.  
The results of applying the Risk Analysis pattern are detailed in Appendix B.3. The result indicates, 
based on the assessment of the main functions, that the 2TLCI system is a SIL4 system. The SIL4 
classification implies that a compliance argument must be provided in order to provide assurance of the 
system being developed according to appropriate practices. With appropriate practices it is here meant 
complying with the requirements stated in [13], [14], and [15] that applies to development of SIL4 
systems. 
6.2.3 Establishing the Safety Requirements 
Once the risk analysis associated with our target is performed (represented by the instantiation of the 
Risk Analysis pattern), the following activity is to establish the safety requirements by instantiating the 
Establish System Safety Requirements pattern (defined in Appendix A.6).  
Figure 9 is an excerpt from the definition of the Establish System Safety Requirements pattern and 
presents a UML activity diagram (adapted with SaCS specific annotations for explicitly denoting input 
and output parameters) illustrating the main process for establishing safety requirements. 
Risks
Haz
Document 
Risk & Mitigations
Address 
Hazard Severity
Address
Hazard Likelihood
Initiate Risk Analysis
Establish
Notion of Risk
Identify Risk 
Mitigations
ToA
ClsCrClsSev ClsLi
HWR-1037 rev 2 
- 13 - 
 
 
Figure 9 Excerpt from pattern Establish System Safety Requirements 
The system description provided in Section 2 represents the instantiation of the input parameter ToA of 
Establish System Safety Requirements indicated in Figure 9. The hazard log referred to in Section 6.2.1 
(detailed in Appendix B.2) and the extension of this hazard log represented by the result referred to in 
Section 6.2.2 (detailed in Appendix B.3) represent the instantiation of the input parameter Risks of the 
pattern Establish System Safety Requirements indicated in Figure 9. 
A part of the results described in Section 6.2.2 is a classification of the system under development as a 
SIL4 system, requiring compliance with the standards [13], [14], and [15]. We delimit the scope in this 
case study and do not address compliance issues. Although compliance is important in order to acquire 
the necessary approval from a relevant safety authority, we rather focus on the risks identified in the 
previous sections. The mentioned standards would be associated with the Reg parameter indicated in 
Figure 9 if compliance issues were part of our scope. 
The requirements produced as a result of instantiating the Establish System Safety Requirements are 
presented in Table 3 in Section 10.1. A detailed description of the safety requirements including 
traceability information is given in Appendix B.4. 
6.3 Pattern Composition 
Figure 10 illustrates a composite pattern named Safety Requirements. The composite pattern specifies a 
relationship between the following patterns: 
• Hazard Analysis 
• Risk Analysis  
• Establish System Safety Requirements  
• FTA  
• SIL Classification 
Document Safety 
Requirements
Reg
Risks
Establish Safety 
Requirements Qualitativly
Establish Safety 
Requirements Quantitativly
Qualitative Safety Requirements
Quantitative Safety Requirements
Confer laws, regulations 
and standards
Confer risk analysis regulatory specific
risk reducing measures
risk reducing measures
system specific 
risk reducing measures Req
ToA Identify Target
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Figure 10 Safety Requirements – Composite Pattern 
Figure 10 specifies the Safety Requirements composite. The composite takes as input ToA (short for 
Target of Assessment) and Haz (short for Hazards) and provides as output S-Req (short for Safety 
Requirements). The input parameters ToA and Haz to the composite Safety Requirements are used by 
its contained patterns. The contained patterns also define input parameters named ToA and Haz with 
public accessibility (indicated by the thick black arrow pointing towards a given parameter), thereby 
creating an implied relationship between the similarly named parameters. The output parameter S-Req of 
the pattern Establish System Safety Requirements is denoted as a public output (by the thick black arrow 
pointing away from the parameter S-Req) and is thus listed as an output of the composite.  
The output identified as HzLg of Hazard Analysis is assigned to the input identified as Haz of Risk 
Analysis. The arrow connecting HzLg with Haz denotes an assigns relation. The assigns relation, used 
several times in Figure 10, denotes that the instantiation of an output parameter associated with a source 
pattern shall be assigned to an input parameter associated with a target pattern. 
Figure 11 defines the Requirements composite. The composite is defined in order to make illustrations 
presented later simpler. The Requirements composite consists of the composite for establishing 
functional requirements (defined in Figure 6) and the composite for establishing safety requirements 
(defined in Figure 10).  
The contained patterns in the composite in Figure 11 are related with a combines relation indicating that 
the instantiation of the F-Req parameter and the S-Req parameter shall be combined resulting in Req 
(an identifier for the union of F-Req and S-Req). 
 
Figure 11 Requirements – Composite Pattern 
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7. ESTABLISH DESIGN 
7.1 Pattern Selection 
At choice (D) of Figure 4 there are two available design patterns that may be selected, these are named 
Trusted Backup and Dual Modular Redundant. 
The Trusted Backup pattern describes a system concept where an adaptable controller may operate 
freely in a delimited operational state space. Safety is assured by a redundant non-adaptable controller 
that operates in a broader state space and in parallel with the adaptable controller. A control delegator 
grants control privileges to the most suitable controller at any given time on the basis of switching rules 
and information from safety monitoring. 
The Dual Modular Redundant pattern describes a system concept where two similar controllers operate 
in parallel. The parallel operating redundant controllers and a voting unit provides mitigations against 
random error. 
The Dual Modular Redundant was selected as guidance for establishing the design basis for 2TLCI 
system on the basis of an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the different design patterns 
with respect to facilitating designs that satisfies the requirements. 
7.2 Pattern Instantiation 
Figure 12 is an excerpt from the pattern Dual Modular Redundant (defined in Appendix A.3). It describes 
a system S consisting of two parallel operating controllers, C1 and C2, a component named Cmd that 
provides an interface towards an overall system, and a voter unit named V. 
 
Figure 12 Excerpt from the pattern Dual Modular Redundant 
Figure 13 specifies the 2TLCI system and represents the results from instantiating the Dual Modular 
Redundant pattern in the context described in Section 2. 
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Figure 13 2TLCI – Component Diagram 
The following is a mapping between parts/components of the 2TLCI design, as expressed in Figure 13, 
and parts required by an instantiation of the Dual Modular Redundant: 
• 2TLCI in Figure 13 is an instantiation of S in Figure 12. 
• Control 1 in Figure 13 is an instantiation of C1 in Figure 12. 
• Control 2 in Figure 13 is an instantiation of C2 in Figure 12. 
• Cmd in Figure 13 is an instantiation of Cmd in Figure 12. 
• Vt in Figure 13 is an instantiation of V in Figure 12. 
• The interfaces iTDE, iLCE, iPE and iL in Figure 13 are point-to-point interfaces between the 
2TLCI system and the equipment that is controlled and represents the instantiation of PI in 
Figure 12. 
Only a partial description of the 2TLCI system design is described here, the remaining description is 
provided in Section 10.2. 
 
7.3 Pattern Composition 
Figure 14 defines a composite named Intermediate Pattern Solution. In Figure 14, it is defined that the 
result of instantiating the pattern Dual Modular Redundant is the output S. It is also defined in the figure 
that the result from instantiating the pattern Requirements is the output Req and the S shall satisfy Req. 
From the specification of the pattern Requirements and the pattern Dual Modular Redundant we can find 
that the instantiation of Req is expected to be a specification of requirements and that the instantiation of 
S is expected to be a specification of a system design. 
The relationship between the patterns named Requirements and Dual Modular Redundant is illustrated 
by a satisfies relation, the black filled-in circle/bullet is associated with the output that describes the 
requirements that should be satisfied and the check mark is associated with the system design that 
should satisfy the requirements. 
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Figure 14 Intermediate Pattern Solution – Composite Pattern 
 
8. ESTABLISH SAFETY CASE 
8.1 Pattern Selection 
A safety case is a logical structured argument connecting a main claim through a decomposition of this 
main claim down to evidences. The Overall Safety pattern associated with choice (E) in Figure 4 is 
selected as guidance for developing a safety demonstration strategy on claiming the system in question 
being sufficiently safe by arguing satisfactory quality management, safety management and technical 
safety. The definition of the pattern is provided in Appendix A.9.  
The Technical Safety pattern associated with choice (E) in Figure 4 is selected as guidance for 
developing a demonstration on satisfactory technical safety. The strategy defined by the pattern is to 
explicitly address all risks associated with the system. The definition of the pattern is provided in 
Appendix A.10. 
The Safety Requirements Satisfies pattern associated with choice (E) in Figure 4 is selected as guidance 
for developing a demonstration on satisfaction of safety requirements. Safety requirements are derived 
based on a risk-based process, and therefore this pattern is selected for detailing that risk is explicitly 
addressed (a demonstration strategy that accommodates the Technical Safety pattern) through the 
safety requirements. The definition of the pattern is provided in Appendix A.11. 
8.2 Pattern Instantiation 
Figure 15 is an excerpt of the pattern Overall Safety and illustrates an argument structured using GSN 
notation [8]. The dotted drawn rectangular box represents a SaCS adaptation of the GSN notation, each 
element visualised on one of the edges of the box represents either an input (i.e., the context element 
ToD) or an output (i.e., the goal named Case and the undeveloped goals named QualMng, SafMng, and 
TechSaf).  
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Figure 15 Excerpt of Overall Safety 
The Overall Safety pattern describes a generic argument structure as visualised in Figure 15 for arguing 
that a target system (represented by the parameter ToD) is sufficiently safe for its intended purpose by 
arguing adequate quality management, safety management, and technical safety. The target of 
demonstration is the system specified in Section 7.2. Once the pattern is instantiated according to its 
instantiation rule, the instantiation of the Case parameter represents the root node of a logical argument 
visualised as a tree-like structure. The Overall Safety pattern only provides a partial argument structure 
and the undeveloped goals (denoted using a box with a diamond beneath) must be developed down to 
evidences in order to complete the argument.  
The undeveloped goals identified as QualMng and SafMng in Figure 15 express the need to demonstrate 
satisfactory quality management and safety management, respectively. We do not detail the safety 
argument with respect to quality management and safety management under the assumption that a 
vendor has established routines that are normally common for many projects. Therefore, arguments and 
evidences demonstrating that these routines are suitable and followed will to a large degree consist of 
generic material. The case specific arguments related to demonstration of technical safety are more 
interesting and is thus detailed in this report.  
Figure 16 is an excerpt from the Technical Safety pattern and illustrates a generic structure for arguing 
satisfactory technical safety. The argument structure provides choices in terms of different alternative 
strategies for arguing that a given target is technically safe. One of the strategies described is to argue 
that the system is developed according to an accepted code of practice (represented by the undeveloped 
goal CoP) and thus is safe. A second strategy is to argue that the system is basically identical to a 
reference system (e.g., similar technical platform, similar context of use, similar operational use) that is 
accepted as safe and consequentially the new system should be accepted as being equally safe 
(represented by the undeveloped goal CrRef). A third strategy is to explicitly address all risks associated 
with the system (represented by the undeveloped goal ERE) and show that these are reduced to an 
acceptable level. The Safety Requirements Satisfied pattern is instantiated in order to explicitly address 
risk (by detailing the undeveloped goal ERE of the pattern Technical Safety) by arguing that the safety 
requirements (that are established on the basis of a risk-based process) are satisfied. 
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Figure 16 Excerpt of Technical Safety 
Figure 17 is an excerpt from the Safety Requirements Satisfied pattern and illustrates a generic 
argument structure where a claim is made that a system is safe if every safety requirement associated 
with the system is satisfied. In order to apply Safety Requirements Satisfied, the inputs ToD that 
represents the target that of the safety demonstration as well as Req that represents the safety 
requirements  associated with the target needs to be defined.  
 
 
Figure 17 Excerpt of Safety Requirements Satisfied 
Different strategies can be employed in order to provide a convincing argument showing that a specific 
safety requirement is satisfied. Depending on how a requirement is expressed (e.g., qualitatively or 
quantitatively), a user of the pattern language may choose between different safety case patterns for 
expressing the inference between a claim and its supporting evidence. The different safety case patterns 
with the keyword “Evidence” in Figure 4 provide guidance on bridging the gap between different kinds of 
claims and the evidences used as supporting, e.g., Assessment Evidence, Probabilistic Evidence, or 
Deterministic Evidence. Definition of these patterns is available in HWR-1029 [10]. Here, we simplify the 
argument structure and describe the inference between claims and their supporting evidences by relating 
evidences (represented as GSN solution elements that include references to the associated evidence 
information) directly with claims (represented as GSN goals) in the safety case structure provided upon 
pattern instantiation. 
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The results of instantiating the patterns Overall Safety, Technical Safety and Safety Requirements 
Satisfied provide a safety case structured according to the GSN notation. The instantiation results are 
provided in Section 10.3. 
8.3 Pattern Composition 
Figure 18 illustrates a composite pattern named Safety Case. The Safety Case composite consists of the 
following patterns: 
• Overall Safety. 
• Technical Safety. 
• Safety Requirements Satisfied. 
 
 
Figure 18 Safety Case – Composite Pattern 
Figure 18 specifies that the Safe Case pattern takes as input ToD (short for Target of Demonstration) 
and Req (short for Requirements) and provides as output Case (short for Safety Case).  
The parameter Case that is listed as output of Safety Case is associated with the output Case of the 
pattern Overall Safety, this is indicated by the similarly named parameters and the thick arrows that 
symbolise that the parameters have public accessibility. The Technical Safety pattern also provides an 
output named Case. However, the parameter Case of Technical Safety is defined with local accessibility 
(local accessibility is default) and only acts as a detailing of a part described by the Overall Safety pattern 
as indicated by a details relation. A details relation is illustrated as a black box connected with a solid 
drawn line to three small icons (a circle, a square and a triangle). The black box indicates the output 
parameter that is detailed and the three smaller icons indicate the output parameter that provides a 
detailing. The output Case of Safety Requirements Satisfied pattern details the output ERE of Technical 
Safety. 
9. PATTERN SOLUTION FOR THE CASE 
9.1 Pattern Composition 
Figure 19 illustrates the composite pattern named Pattern Solution that captures every pattern applied in 
the case. Pattern Solution contains the following patterns: 
• Requirements – defined in Figure 11. 
• Dual Modular Redundant – defined in Appendix A.3. 
• Safety Case – defined in Figure 18. 
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Figure 19 Pattern Solution – Composite Pattern 
Figure 19 specifies that an instantiation of S associated with Dual Modular Redundant shall satisfy the 
instantiation of Req associated with the composite Requirements (defined in Figure 11). Further, it is 
specified that the parameter Case of the composite Safety Case demonstrates (illustrated by a 
demonstrates relation) that the output S of Dual Modular Redundant is sufficiently safe. It is also 
specified that the parameter S-Req (represents safety requirements, see Figure 11) of the composite 
Requirements is an input to the Safety Case composite (defined in Figure 18). The instantiation order of 
the patterns is defined by the grey arrow in the background that indicates that the Requirement 
composite shall be instantiated first, and then the Dual Modular Redundant and the Safety Case patterns 
may be instantiated in parallel. 
9.2 Pattern Instantiation 
The composite pattern described in Figure 19 may be applied on several cases (e.g., for developing an 
interlocking system for a station similar to the one described in this report). In order to describe a specific 
application of a composite pattern, annotations for denoting the instantiation of parameters can be added 
to the composite. 
Figure 20 illustrates the different icons and the respective kinds of artefacts they represent. The icons are 
used for indicating the instantiation of parameters in composite SaCS patterns. 
 
Figure 20 Artefact References in SaCS 
Figure 21 is identical to Figure 19 with the addition of annotations for visualising instantiations. An 
instantiation is illustrated within a composite by an icon symbolising the type of artefact referred to 
followed by a string identifying the referred artefact. A dotted line connects an instantiation with the 
parameter it instantiates. The instantiations illustrated in Figure 21 refers to the artefacts that are 
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described in this report. When every composite pattern diagram that is applied in a case is annotated 
with their instantiations, the traceability between the input and output of every pattern and between 
patterns are provided. 
 
Figure 21 Pattern Solution (annotated with instantiations) – Composite Pattern 
10. MAIN RESULTS 
The main results of applying the SaCS method is a set of requirements elicited for the system under 
development (documented in Section 10.1); a design for the system (documented in Section 10.2); and a 
safety case arguing that the system design is sufficiently safe for application in its intended context 
(documented in Section 10.3). Additional results, e.g., the results from hazard identification and hazard 
analysis that are used as a basis for defining the safety requirements, are documented in Appendixes. 
10.1 Requirements Specification 
The requirements that shall be satisfied by the interlocking system for controlling the appliances of the 
station, as outlined in Section 2, are detailed in Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3. The following abbreviations 
and keywords are used in the specification of the requirements: 
Abbreviations and Keywords 
v1, v2: Road signals (see Figure 1) 
w1, w2: Level crossing signals (see Figure 1) 
dA, dB, dLN, dMO: Distant signals (see Figure 1) 
mA, mM, mO, mN, mL: Main signals (see Figure 1) 
p1, p2: Point (see Figure 1) 
g1, g2: Level crossing gate (see Figure 1) 
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A, B, L, M, X, Y: Track Sections (adapted from the example system described in Appendix A.1) 
AX, AY, BX, BY, L, M, N, O: Train routes (adapted from the example system described in Appendix A.1) 
 
Table 1 Station Interlocking Requirements 
ID Requirement 
2T.1 The system shall manage train movements along the following train routes: AX, AY, BX, BY, M, L, N, O. 
2T.2 The system may set a train route AX as locked when:  
a) the train routes AY, M, O, N, BX and BY are in the state not locked; and  
b) point p1 is aligned; and  
c) track sections A, X and B are in the state vacant. 
2T.3 The system shall when a train route AX is set as locked signal:  
a) ExpectProceed for the light signal dA; and 
b) ExpectStop for the light signal dB and dMO; and  
c) Proceed for the light signal mA; and  
d) Stop for the light signal mB, mO, mM and mN. 
2T.4 The system shall when track section A becomes occupied and train route AX is locked signal:  
a) ExpectStop for the light signal dA; and  
b) Stop for the light signal mA. 
2T.5 The system may only release a locked train route AX if the following events occur: 
a) track section A becomes occupied, then track section X becomes occupied;  
b) track section M becomes vacant, then track section A becomes vacant.  
2T.6 The system may only set a train route AY as locked when:  
a) the train routes AX, M, O, L, BX and BY are in the state not locked; and  
b) point p1 is diverging; and  
c) track sections A, Y and B are in the state vacant. 
2T.7 The system shall when a train route AY is set as locked signal:  
a) ExpectProceedSlow for the light signal dA; and  
b) ExpectStop for the light signal dB and dMO; and  
c) ProceedSlow for the light signal mA; and  
d) Stop for the light signal mB, mO and mM. 
2T.8 The system shall when track section A becomes occupied and train route AY is locked signal:  
a) ExpectStop for the light signal dA; and  
b) Stop for the light signal mA. 
2T.9 The system may only release a locked train route AY if the following events occur:   
a) track section A becomes occupied, then track section Y becomes occupied;  
b) track section M becomes vacant, then track section A becomes vacant. 
2T.10 The system may only set a train route BX as locked when:  
a) the train routes AX, AY, O, L, N and BY are in the state not locked, and  
b) point p2 is aligned; and  
c) track sections A, X and B are in the state vacant. 
2T.11 The system shall when a train route BX is set as locked signal:  
a) ExpectStop for the light signal dA, dLN and dMO; and  
b) ExpectProceed for the light signal dB; and  
c) Proceed for the light signal mB; and  
d) Stop for the light signal mA, mO, mN and mL. 
2T.12 The system shall when track section B becomes occupied and train route BX is locked signal:  
a) ExpectStop for the light signal dB; and  
b) Stop for the light signal mB. 
2T.13 The system may only release a locked train route BX if the following events occur:   
a) track section B becomes occupied, then track section X becomes occupied;  
b) track section L becomes vacant, then track section B becomes vacant. 
2T.14 The system may only set a train route BY as locked when:  
a) the train routes AX, AY, M, L, N and BX are in the state not locked, and  
b) point p2 is diverging; and  
b) track sections A, Y and B are in the state vacant. 
2T.15 The system shall when a train route BY is set as locked signal:  
a) ExpectStop for the light signal dA, dLN and dMO; and  
b) ExpectProceedSlow for the light signal dB; and  
c) ProceedSlow for the light signal mB; and  
d) Stop for the light signal mA, mM, mN and mL. 
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2T.16 The system shall when track section B becomes occupied and train route BY is locked signal:  
a) ExpectStop for the light signal dB; and  
b) Stop for the light signal mB. 
2T.17 The system may only release a locked train route BY if the following events occur:  
a) track section B becomes occupied, then track section Y becomes occupied;  
b) track section L becomes vacant, then track section B becomes vacant. 
2T.18 The system may only set a train route M as locked when:  
a) the train routes AX, AY, O and BY are in the state not locked; and  
b) point p1 is aligned; and  
c) track sections M and A are in the state vacant. 
2T.19 The system shall when a train route M is set as locked signal:  
a) ExpectStop for the light signal dA and dB; and  
b) ExpectProceed for the light signal dMO; and  
c) Proceed for the light signal mM; and  
d) Stop for the light signal mA, mB and mO. 
2T.20 The system shall when track section A becomes occupied and train route M is locked signal:  
a) ExpectStop for the light signal dMO; and  
b) Stop for the light signal mM. 
2T.21 The system may only release a locked train route M if the following events occur:   
a) track section A becomes occupied, then track section M becomes occupied;  
b) track section A becomes vacant. 
2T.22 The system may only set a train route L as locked when:  
a) the train routes AY, N, BX and BY are in the state not locked; and  
b) point p2 is aligned; and  
b) track sections B and L are in the state vacant. 
2T.23 The system shall when a train route L is set as locked signal:  
a) ExpectStop for the light signal dA and dB; and 
b) ExpectProceed for the light signal dLN; and  
c) Stop for the light signal mA, mB and mN; and  
d) Proceed for the light signal mL. 
2T.24 The system shall when track section B becomes occupied and train route L is locked signal:  
a) ExpectStop for the light signal dLN; and  
b) Stop for the light signal mL. 
2T.25 The system may only release a locked train route L if the following events occur:   
a) track section B becomes occupied, then track section L becomes occupied;  
b) track section B becomes vacant. 
2T.26 The system may only set a train route N as locked when:  
a) the train routes AX, L, BX and BY are in the state not locked; and  
b) point p2 is diverging; and  
c) track sections B and L are in the state vacant. 
2T.27 The system shall when a train route N is set as locked signal:  
a) ExpectStop for the light signal dA and dB; and 
b) ExpectProceedSlow for the light signal dLN; and  
c) Stop for the light signal mA, mB and mL; and  
d) ProceedSlow for the light signal mN. 
2T.28 The system shall when track section B becomes occupied and train route N is locked signal:  
a) ExpectStop for the light signal dLN; and  
b) Stop for the light signal mN. 
2T.29 The system may only release a locked train route N if the following events occur:   
a) track section B becomes occupied, then track section L becomes occupied;  
b) track section B becomes vacant. 
2T.30 The system may only set a train route O as locked when:  
a) the train routes AX, AY, M and BX are in the state not locked; and  
b) point p1 is diverging; and  
c) track section A and X are in the state vacant. 
2T.31 The system shall when a train route O is set as locked signal:  
a) ExpectStop for the light signal dA and dB; and 
b) ExpectProceedSlow for the light signal dMO; and  
c) Stop for the light signal mA, mB and mM; and  
d) ProceedSlow for the light signal mO. 
2T.32 The system shall when track section A becomes occupied and train route O is locked signal: 
a) ExpectStop for the light signal dMO; and  
b) Stop for the light signal mO. 
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2T.33 The system may only release a locked train route O if the following events occur:  
a) track section A becomes occupied, then track section M becomes occupied;  
b) track section A becomes vacant. 
 
Table 2 Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements 
ID Requirement 
LC.1 The system shall when the level crossing is in the normal state:  
a) signal ExpectStopBeforeCrossing for the light signal wa and wb; and  
b) signal StopBeforeCrossing for the light signal w1 and w2; and  
c) signal Go for the light signal v1 and v2; and  
d) set the gates g1 and g2 in the state Elevated. 
LC.2 The system shall when the level crossing is in the Closed state:  
a) signal ExpectPassageOfCrossingAllowed for the light signal wa and wb; and  
b) signal PassageOfCrossingAllowed for the light signal w1 and w2; and  
c) signal Stop for the light signals v1 and v2; and  
d) set the gates g1 and g2 in the state Closed. 
LC.3 The system shall assure that the level crossing transition to the closed state when:  
a) the coupling point cA is set to true; or 
b) the coupling poin cB is set to true. 
LC.4 The system shall assure that the level crossing transition to normal state (and thus is released from closed state) when:  
a) the train that induced a closed state (by passing the coupling point cA or cB) has passed the level crossing (detected 
by passing the decouple point dA or dB). 
 
Table 3 Safety Requirements 
ID Requirement 
SR.1 A proceed aspect for a main signal belonging to a train route may only be given once the conditions for locking the train 
route are satisfied 
SR.2 A train route may not be locked unless all points belonging to the train route are positioned correctly 
SR.3 A train route may not be locked if a track section in the train route belongs to another train route 
SR.4 A train route may not be locked unless points belonging to the train route are controlled in correct position 
SR.5 A points position may only be altered if conditions for altering its position are satisfied 
SR.6 A points position may not be altered if it belongs to a locked train route 
SR.7 A main signal for a train route that has a point positioned to a diverging track shall not signal less restrictive than proceed 
slow 
SR.8 A distant signal shall show at least as restrictive aspect as its belonging main signal 
SR.9 A train route may not be locked unless all track sections in the train route are vacant 
SR.10 A train route may not be locked unless its safety zone is vacant 
SR.11 A train route may not be locked if it has a part that is shared with another locked train route 
SR.12 An incoming train route that is locked may not be released before the train has arrived the station 
SR13 A train route may not be locked if there is another train route locked over its safety zone 
SR.14 An outgoing train route that is locked may not be released before the train has left the station 
SR.15 An outgoing train route may not be locked unless the line is set in the direction from the train routes starting point 
SR.16 An outgoing train route may not be locked unless the line is vacant 
SR.17 The line may only be set in the direction of an arrival station if the main signals (exit) of the arrival station shows ‘Stop’ 
SR.18 In order to signal proceed aspect for a main signal that has a dependency to a level crossing interlocking, the road traffic 
must be blocked 
SR.19 In order to signal proceed aspect for a distant signal that has a dependency to a level crossing interlocking, the road 
traffic must be blocked 
SR.20 No work is allowed on a track section unless it is blocked 
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SR.21 A train route may not be locked if a track section in the train route is blocked 
10.2 Design Specification 
In the following sections, the 2TLCI system design will be outlined. Figure 2 in Section 2 outlines the 
context for which the 2TLCI system is intended to replace the component identified as Interlocking 
System. Section 10.2.1 describes the main concepts by a UML class diagram. Section 10.2.2 describes 
the main parts of the 2TLCI system illustrated by UML component diagrams. Section 10.2.3 describes 
the behaviour of the system by UML state machine diagrams. 
10.2.1 Main Concepts 
Figure 22 illustrates the main concepts in our system with a UML class diagram presenting the main 
classes and the associations between classes that are modelled. A central concept is the notion of a 
train route, our system is defined in order to control train movements according to eight train routes. A 
train route is composed of several track sections. A given track section may be a part of several train 
routes. A track section may have a point or crossing gates. The train movements along a train route and 
the crossing of a track section by road users are controlled by light signals of different kinds (see 
configuration of light signals along the tracks in Figure 1). The enumerations defined in Figure 22 detail 
the different states for the different appliances. 
 
Figure 22 Main Classes 
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10.2.2 Overview of the Interlocking System 
The 2TLCI system is illustrated in Figure 23.  
 
Figure 23 Illustration of the 2TLCI system 
The 2TLCI system illustrated in Figure 23 is intended to operate in the following manner: 
• Cmd is responsible for the communication between an overall system and 2TLCI and shall be 
able to: 
o Receive commands from an overall system, e.g., Centralised Train Control (CTC) or an 
operator on a local control unit, through the interface iLck.  
o Read the states of Control 1 and Control 2 through the interface iCmd and communicate this 
to the overall system on interface iLck.  
• Control 1 and Control 2 are two components with similar functionality that operates in parallel 
and are responsible for the control of appliances (e.g, lights, points, and level crossing 
equipment) in accordance with commands from a local operator or from an operator associated 
with CTC based on interlocking rules and inputs on train movements (train detection equipment).  
• Vt is responsible for assuring that in the event of disagreement between the commands given by 
the dual controllers, appliances are controlled in a safe manner (e.g., signal stop on all light 
signals). 
10.2.3 Main Functionality 
The UML state machine diagrams in this section describe the main functionality of the 2TLCI system, the 
interlocking component behaviour. The behaviour of the command component and the voter component 
are not detailed. 
Figure 24 illustrates the interlocking state machine. The state machine named Interlocking represents the 
functionality provided by Control 1 and Control 2 in Figure 23. The composite states of the state machine 
are described such that: 
• Lock Train Route is detailed in Figure 25. 
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• Monitor is not detailed. It is expected that Monitor is detailed once the conceptual design has 
matured to describe the mechanisms for performing self checks and performing cross monitoring 
of the other interlocking component (e.g., Control 1 monitors Control 2 and vice versa). 
Every signal is identified with a prefix SIG. A monitoring signal is identified with a prefix SIG_Mon 
whereas a request signal is identified with a prefix SIG_Req. A signal for locking a train route has the 
prefix SIG_Req_LckTR. A signal representing a request for locking a specific train route, e.g., the train 
route AX, is identified as SIG_Req_LckTR_AX. The kind of monitoring signal or request signal is 
indicated by their name in the illustrations that follows, we do not give further details on the signals. 
 
Figure 24 Interlocking - State Machine 
 
Figure 25 Lock Train Route - State Machine 
Figure 25 describes the state machine named Lock Train Route, which was indicated as a composite 
state in Figure 24. Figure 26 defines Lock Train Route AX. Lock Train Route AX is indicated in Figure 25 
as a composite state The remaining composite states in Figure 25 are very similar to Lock Train Route 
AX, therefore, we only provide details with respect to the functionality for locking the train route AX to 
avoid unnecessary repetition. 
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Figure 26 Lock Train Route AX - State Machine 
The state machine defined in Figure 26 uses a composite state named Train Route AX that is defined in 
Figure 27. 
 
Figure 27 Train Route AX - State Machine 
In the specification of the interlocking system as presented above, we have assumed that no train route 
is simultaneously handled such that simultaneous incoming or outgoing traffic is not supported. The 
design specification presented in this report only captures the initial design and the design is 
underspecified in the sense that only the main features are addressed. Issues that typically should be 
Check No Conflicting Train Routes
	
if (AY.getState() == notLocked; and
   M.getState() == notLocked; and
   O.getState() == notLocked; and
   N.getState() == notLocked; and
   BX.getState() == notLocked; and
   BY.getState() == notLocked)
then confTRNotLocked = true;
else conflTRNotLocked = false;
Check Tracks in Train Route are Vacant
	
if (TSA.getState() == vacant; and
    TSX.getState() == vacant; and
    TSB.getState() == vacant)
then tracksVacant = true;
else tracksVacant = false;
Check Point in Correct Position
	
if (P1.getState() == aligned)
then corPos = true;
else corPos = false;
Set Train Route AX Locked
 do/ AX.setState(locked);
Set Point in Correct Position
SIG_Evn_P1A
SIG_Evn_TR_AXL
[corPos]
[else]
[tracksVacant]
[else]/confTRLocked
[confTRNotLocked]
[else]/trackInTROccupied


Train Route AX
Check Tracks in Train Route not Blocked
	
if (TSA.getState() == notBlocked; and
    TSX.getState() == notBlocked; and
    TSB.getState() == notBlocked)
then tracksNotBlocked = true;
else tracksNotBlocked = false;
[else]/trackInTRBlocked
[tracksNotBlocked]
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further detailed are, e.g., tolerance to handle failure events and robustness with respect to unexpected 
changes to the states of appliances.  
10.3 Safety Case Specification 
Figure 28 and Figure 29 outline the main argument, annotated in GSN notation [8], of the safety case 
that is used to argue that the 2TLCI design is suitable for use in the context of controlling the appliances 
of the station. 
 
Figure 28 Safety Case (Part 1) 
The goals in Figure 28 that are not developed are denoted as undeveloped goals. An undeveloped goal 
is annotated with a diamond. The undeveloped goals are assumed to be provided in a later stage of the 
development of the 2TLCI system. Some of the undeveloped goals may be supported by generic safety 
demonstrations common to many development projects within an organisation, e.g., demonstration on 
adequate quality management and safety management is assumed to follow company procedures. Thus, 
we do not explicitly address the undeveloped goals in this report.  
The focus of the safety case in this report is on arguing the satisfactory technical safety of the design 
concept developed for the interlocking system identified as the 2TLCI system. Satisfactory technical 
safety is here primarily demonstrated by addressing the safety requirements. We delimit the detailing in 
this report to the demonstration for requirement SR.1, see goal G6 in Figure 28.  
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Figure 29 Safety Case (Part 2) 
Figure 29 represents the detailing of the goal G6 and addresses the safety requirement SR.1 that is 
defined in Section 10.1. The claim put forward in the goal G6 is supported by a reference to the Lock 
Train Route state machine as evidence. There are defined sub-goals such that the fulfilment of the claim 
expressed in C6 is addressed separately for each train route. The design presented in Section 10.2 only 
details the behaviour for locking train route AX. Thus, we only develop the goal G6.AX for which this 
report provides documentation that is referenced as supporting evidence. 
11. DISCUSSION 
The successfulness of applying the SaCS method in the case is here discussed with respect to the 
success criteria outlined in Section 4. The following discussion represents a self-evaluation as the 
method has been applied in the case by the authors. However, each step is documented in a manner we 
believe is sufficient to allow others to perform an independent evaluation of the feasibility of the SaCS 
approach. The authors have also tested the SaCS method in a case on the development of a reactor 
control system concept [10]. This discussion is influenced by the discussion in [10]. 
We claim that the conceptual safety design specified in Section 10 fulfils the success criteria defined in 
Section 4. Success criteria states that: 
P: Application of the SaCS method on the interlocking case described in Section 2 results in a 
conceptual safety design that characterises the interlocking case and is easily instantiated from a 
composite SaCS pattern. Furthermore, the conceptual safety design: 
a) Is in accordance with safety objectives – the conceptual safety design is defined in agreement 
with safety objectives. 
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b) Is at a sufficient level of detail – the conceptual safety design is defined by parts that are 
appropriate, necessary, sufficiently detailed for an early stage specification, and may be easily 
understood.  
c) Is easy to use – the conceptual safety design may be easily extended, detailed, or refined. 
Regarding the application of the SaCS method resulting in a conceptual safety design that characterises 
the interlocking case and being easily instantiated from a composite pattern, we argue this is satisfied as 
follows. 
Firstly, according to the definition in Section 4, a conceptual safety design is a triplet consisting of an 
early stage specification of system requirements, system design and safety case. The result of applying 
the SaCS method in the case, which is the conceptual safety design, is presented in Section 10. Each 
part of the triplet that constitutes the conceptual safety design in Section 10 is presented in a separate 
sub-section, Section 10.1, Section 10.2, and Section 10.3, respectively. Thus, the conceptual safety 
design consists of the specification parts required by the definition. The sequence of steps in Section 5 to 
Section 9 represents the application of the process of the SaCS method defined in Section 3.1.  
Secondly, the conceptual safety design characterises the case defined in Section 2 by specifying the 
requirements, a technical solution, and a safety case for an interlocking system as indicated in Figure 2 
that can control the train movements at a station with the track configuration as depicted in Figure 1. The 
names for the appliances as indicated in Figure 1 are used consistently in the different specification parts 
presented in Section 10, e.g., the names dA and dB identifying different distant signals. We find it fair to 
argue that the conceptual safety design presents a solution to the control problem presented in Section 2 
and in this manner characterises the case. 
Thirdly, according to the definition in Section 4, a conceptual safety design instantiates a composite 
SaCS pattern if each element of the triplet can be instantiated from a composite according to the 
instantiation rule of the individual patterns within the composite and according to the rules for 
composition. A pattern within a composite is either a basic pattern or a composite pattern. The rules for 
composition are defined by the syntax and semantics of the SaCS pattern language as presented in [11]. 
Each basic pattern defines its instantiation rule. The basic patterns applied in the case are defined in 
Appendix A. The composite pattern for the case is specified in Figure 21. Figure 21 defines a 
composition of the patterns Dual Modular Redundant (defined in Appendix A.3), Requirements (defined 
in Figure 11), and Safety Case (defined in Figure 18). Figure 21 also defines how each of these patterns 
was instantiated in terms of identifying the artefacts that acted as inputs to pattern instantiation as well as 
the outputs produced upon pattern instantiation. A pattern needs to be interpreted by a user in its 
application context in order to be useful, which is a process that may be difficult to document. 
Furthermore, the outcome of this process is also influenced by the knowledge and skills of the user. 
However, it is the pattern definitions, the descriptions of the application of patterns in the case, and the 
descriptions of the results of pattern instantiation that represents the documentation that allows others to 
perform an independent evaluation of the feasibility of the SaCS method. While Section 5 to Section 9 
documents how the SaCS method has been applied in the case and Section 10 documents the end 
result, Appendix B documents the intermediate development artefacts that are not part of the conceptual 
safety design but influenced its definition. In the following, we argue that each of the specifications 
described in Section 10.1, Section 10.2, and Section 10.3 are easily instantiated from the composite in 
Figure 21. 
The specification of the system requirements in Section 10.1 is according to Figure 21 the result of 
applying the Requirements composite. Figure 21 specifies the use of the composite Requirements, and 
the pattern itself is defined in Figure 11. Figure 11 specifies that the requirements representing the 
outcome of applying Functional Requirements shall be combined with the requirements representing the 
HWR-1037 rev 2 
- 33 - 
 
outcome of applying Safety requirements and together represent the outcome of applying Requirements. 
Functional Requirements and Safety Requirements are composites, which are defined in Figure 6 and 
Figure 10, respectively. Both patterns also define a combination of basic patterns defined in Appendix A.  
The result of applying Functional Requirements consists of the combined result of two patterns, named 
Station Interlocking Requirements and Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements. These two patterns 
are defined in Appendix A.1 and Appendix A.2. The instantiation of Station Interlocking Requirements 
and Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements are described in Section 5.2.  
The result of applying Safety Requirements is according to the definition presented in Figure 10 a result 
of applying a combination of five basic patterns. The detailed description of the instantiation of the 
patterns contained in Safety Requirements is given in Section 6.2. In short, the safety requirements are 
the outcome of instantiating the pattern Establish System Safety Requirements contained within Safety 
Requirements. The other patterns within Safety Requirements are used as support for deriving the 
necessary information required for eliciting the safety requirements, such as identifying the hazards 
associated with the system in question and the potential causes of these hazards. While the safety 
requirements derived from pattern instantiation are documented in Section 10.1, the intermediate 
development artefacts from instantiating the patterns within Safety Requirements are documented in 
Appendix B.  
The specification of the system design in Section 10.2 is according to Figure 21 the result of instantiating 
the pattern Dual Modular Redundant. The Dual Modular Redundant pattern is defined in Appendix A.3. 
The instantiation of the Dual Modular Redundant pattern is described in Section 7, including a detailed 
explanation of the traceability between the abstract design presented in the pattern and the specification 
of the interlocking system. 
The specification of the safety case in Section 10.3 is according to Figure 21 the result of instantiating 
the pattern Safety Case. The safety case specifies the main principles for arguing that the proposed 
interlocking system is sufficiently safe for its intended purpose. In Figure 18, the Safety Case composite 
defines that its output is produced by instantiating the pattern named Overall Safety. It is also specified in 
Figure 18 that the pattern Technical Safety is used as support in detailing one of the specification parts 
produced when instantiating Overall Safety. Furthermore, Safety Requirements Satisfied is used as 
support for detailing one of the specification parts produced when instantiating Technical Safety. Section 
8.2 describes how each pattern is applied as support for specifying the safety case. The definitions of the 
patterns Overall Safety, Technical Safety, and Safety Requirements Satisfied are provided in Appendix 
A.  
Regarding a), we argue that the conceptual safety design is in accordance with safety objectives as 
follows.  
The conceptual safety design represented by the specification in Section 10.1, Section 10.2, and Section 
10.3 is defined in accordance with safety objectives in the following manner: 
• Section 10.1 defines the safety objectives in the case. The safety objectives are represented by 
the safety requirements described in Table 3. The safety requirements are established by the 
application of the composite pattern named Safety Requirements as described earlier. Safety 
Requirements describe the systematic application of several patterns as support for establishing 
the risk associated with the system under development as well how these risks are used to 
define safety requirements. Table 33 provides the traceability between the safety requirements 
and some of the important results from risk analysis that served as input to requirements 
specification. The system under development is outlined in Section 2 along with a description of 
its intended context of operation. Section 6 demonstrates how the objectives of the case defined 
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Section 2 is addressed by applying a series of patterns that results in the definition of safety 
requirements. Intermediate development artefacts such as the list of hazards associated with the 
operation of the system, or the assessment of the potential causes of hazards, are documented 
in Appendix B.  
• Section 10.2 contains a specification of a system design that accommodates the safety 
requirements presented in Table 3. Although the system design is defined in accordance with the 
safety requirements, it is mainly the safety case (defined in Section 10.3) that expresses to which 
extent the safety requirements are satisfied. We have chosen to delimit the safety case 
specification by only detailing the argument structure for requirement SR.1. However, the 
undeveloped goals within the specification give a clear indication of how the safety case should 
be developed. 
• Section 10.3 outlines a safety demonstration strategy where the interlocking system under 
development is claimed to be sufficiently safe for its intended purpose by a demonstration of 
adequate quality management, safety management and technical safety. However, it is only the 
claim associated with demonstration of technical safety that is developed, supported by a 
strategy of arguing that the safety requirements are met. The safety case in Section 10.3 
demonstrates the main lines for arguing that the system design presented in Section 10.2 is 
sufficiently safe for its intended purpose. The intended strategy is to show as far as possible that 
the system design accommodates the safety requirements by referencing the relevant part of the 
system design specification as evidence.  
The three specifications serve different purposes. The system requirements specification captures the 
objectives of the system under development. The system design specification represents an early stage 
technical description of a system that fulfils objectives. The safety case expresses in what way the safety 
objectives can be argued fulfilled. 
Regarding b), we argue that the conceptual safety design is at a sufficient level of detail as follows. 
According to the definition in Section 4, a conceptual safety design is an early stage specification. By 
early stage specification, it is here meant a description that shows the main features of a solution for a 
given problem. Although the specification is not expected to be complete, a conceptual safety design is 
of little use if it does not clearly convey a potential solution for the problem in question in a manner that 
can be easily understood. We find it reasonable to argue that the conceptual safety design is at a 
sufficient level of detail if it is expressed in a manner that clearly shows how the objectives of the case is 
intended solved. Furthermore, the conceptual safety design should be expressed in a format that can be 
easily understood by its intended users. 
The objective in the case as it is expressed in Section 2 is to derive an interlocking system that can 
safely control the train movements at train station with two tracks and level crossing. The starting point in 
the application of the SaCS method is the development objective stated in Section 2, and the outcome is 
the conceptual safety design presented in Section 10. Through the process of applying the SaCS 
method, the overall development objective is refined into a requirements specification and further into a 
system design. Each step in the application of the SaCS method is detailed in Section 5 to Section 9. 
Furthermore, Appendix A details every basic SaCS patterns applied in this report. In this sense, the 
necessary information required in order to trace the end result step-by-step through the application of the 
SaCS method back to the initial development objective is available.  
The conceptual design is a triplet where each part is described in the following formats: 
• The requirements specification is defined textually in natural language. Requirements 
specifications are commonly expressed in natural language. 
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• The design specification is defined by a combination of UML diagrams and textual descriptions. 
UML is a commonly used modelling language for describing systems in terms of their structure 
and behaviour.  
• The safety case specification is defined with GSN. The GSN notation facilitates structuring a 
safety argument with simple graphical constructs that requires little effort to be understood.  
Although textual requirements, GSN, and UML models in general should be understandable for the 
intended users of SaCS, this may not be the case for the specifications provided here. We have not 
tested the specifications on potential users of SaCS in order to investigate if the specifications are easy 
to understand, but rather provide the specifications themselves. 
Regarding c), we argue that the conceptual safety design is easy to use as follows. 
The conceptual safety design described in Section 10 represents a specification described at a high 
level, it may be difficult at this stage to evaluate if the design is easy to use in the sense of being easy to 
implement. However, we find the specification informative enough for experts to judge whether the 
described concept is feasible and detailed enough to use as a starting point for further refinement. The 
system design in Section 10.2 is a refinement of the requirements in Section 10.1, and the requirements 
are derived on the basis of systematic analysis of the development objectives and the context described 
in Section 2. The conceptual design may be refined by repeating the SaCS process and iterate over 
pattern selection, pattern instantiation, and pattern composition until the design is in an implementable 
state. 
The requirements specification in Section 10.1 consists of requirements that are uniquely identified. The 
requirement can be further detailed or rephrased; the requirement will then exist in another version. 
Requirements may be added to the specification easily by adding a unique requirement identifier along 
with the associated requirement text. 
With respect to the design part of the conceptual design, the component diagram in Figure 23 illustrates 
the main structure of the interlocking system under development. Figure 23 is a UML composite diagram 
that clearly identifies the internal components of the interlocking system, the interfaces between internal 
components, as well the interfaces with the external systems. The interlocking system modelled in Figure 
23 interacts with the other parts of the overall system via interfaces as illustrated in Figure 2. The main 
functionality of the interlocking system is described in Section 10.2.3, exemplified by the description of 
the functionality for controlling train movements along a train route identified as AX. Figure 24, Figure 25, 
and Figure 26 presents the behaviour of the most important component, e.g., the controllers that are 
responsible for providing the interlocking functionality. The functionality for controlling the train 
movements along the train routes other than AX can be described by specifications similar to the 
specification related to the train route AX. In order to avoid unnecessary repetition, we have not included 
the complete specification. However, we believe that the main features of the design should be easy to 
understand from those specifications provided, e.g., the specification related to AX.  
The safety case specification is described by GSN. GSN offers constructs for modularising a safety 
argument such that existing argument structures can be easily reused. The safety case in Section 10.3 is 
limited to only detail how the requirement SR.1 has been met. The undeveloped goals in the safety case 
structure represent an under specification. Although only the strategy for arguing the satisfaction of SR.1 
is detailed in the safety case, the different undeveloped goals in the argument structure indicates how an 
overall strategy for safety demonstration is approached. The undeveloped goals also identify those parts 
of the safety demonstration that needs to be further developed. The scope of the safety case can be 
extended easily by, e.g., adding nodes to the existing tree structure, adding sub trees to the structure, or 
make the existing safety case a sub tree in a larger argument structure. The safety case is a living 
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document, which should be established at the same time as the design is established, and should be 
maintained throughout the lifecycle of the system. As far as evidences for the suitability of a system for 
its intended use may be provided in the early stages, the safety case at least provides traceability 
between the required functions of the system and features of the design as far as these are specified. 
Any refinement of the design into a more detailed design or into an implementation requires refinement 
of the safety case in order to demonstrate that safety requirements are still satisfied. 
12. RELATED WORK 
To the best of our knowledge, there exists no pattern-based method that combines diverse kinds of 
patterns into compositions like SaCS. However, the concept of systematically applying a set of patterns 
is not new and is inspired by the work of Alexander et al. [1] on patterns supporting the architecture of 
buildings. Important sources of inspiration for our work that are applicable to development of software-
based systems are pattern approaches for: requirements elicitation [12][17], software design [3][7][9], 
and safety demonstration [2][8]. Two challenges associated with the referenced pattern approaches are: 
the integration of patterns is detailed informally; each pattern approach only reflects on one important 
perspective when developing critical systems (e.g., software design [7]). SaCS offers the ability to 
combine different kinds of patterns and to detail the combination. 
The notation for detailing the application of patterns and the focus on establishing a complementing set 
of development artefacts offered by SaCS is motivated by the need within the safety domain for providing 
safety assurance. International safety standards, e.g., [13][14][15], express requirements related to 
providing safety assurance. While safety standards to a large degree describe the required practices 
during development in order to produce systems that may be accepted within a particular domain, SaCS 
provides guidance on applying accepted safety engineering practices. The European railway regulation 
[5] and the associated guideline [6] on common safety methods for risk evaluation and assessment has 
influenced the work on defining SaCS patterns. While the guideline [6] addresses the railway domain, 
SaCS can be applied in different domains by selecting the patterns that are applicable to a given domain. 
13. CONCLUSIONS  
In this report, we have exemplified the application of the SaCS method on the development of a 
conceptual safety design of a railway interlocking system.  
We have tried to demonstrate how the conceptual safety design is instantiated from several basic SaCS 
patterns within a specific composite SaCS pattern. Each constituent basic pattern of the composite 
pattern defined for the case has clearly defined inputs and outputs. Each basic pattern provides guidance 
on how it is intended to be instantiated through defined instantiation rules. The composite pattern details: 
the identifier and type of every pattern applied in order to derive the conceptual design; the pattern 
instantiation order; and the flow of data through the network of patterns giving traceability between 
development artefacts.  
The conceptual safety design is built systematically in manageable steps as exemplified in Section 5 to 9 
by a clearly defined process for pattern selection, instantiation and merging of results. The conceptual 
safety design is a triplet consisting of the system requirements in Section 10.1, the system design in 
Section 10.2, and the safety case in Section 10.3. The conceptual safety design is expressed in a 
manner we think is easy to understand for its intended users. 
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APPENDIX A BASIC SACS PATTERNS 
Appendix A provides the definitions of the patterns used in this report. The reports HWR-1029 and HWR-
1037 describes the application of the SaCS method on two different cases. Some of the patterns are 
used in both cases, thus some of the pattern definitions in this report are also given in HWR-1029. The 
definitions of the patterns Station Interlocking Requirements, Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements, 
Dual Modular Redundant, and SIL Classification given in appendix A.1, A.2, A.3 and A.8, respectively, 
are only presented in this report. 
A.1 STATION INTERLOCKING REQUIREMENTS 
Name: Station Interlocking Requirements 
Pattern Signature: Station Interlocking Requirements is defined with the signature illustrated in Figure 
30. 
In Figure 30, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the pattern: 
• Mch is short for Machine. 
• Req is short for Requirements. 
 
Figure 30 Station Interlocking Requirements – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Support eliciting functional requirements Req for an interlock system Mch that shall control the 
appliances of a train station with two or more tracks at the station area. A typical example of a station 
with two tracks is given in Figure 31.
 
Figure 31 Example – Signal layout at a two track station 
Figure 32 illustrates a typical sectioning of the railway tracks of a two-track station. 
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Figure 32 Example – Track sections and train routes at a station with two tracks 
Applicability: The Station Interlocking Requirements pattern is intended for the following situation: 
• To derive the functional requirements while building or upgrading an interlocking system that 
shall control the appliances of a station with two or more tracks. 
Problem: The main aspects relevant for establishing functional requirements for the interlock system 
are: 
• States of appliances: What are the possible states of the different appliances like distant signals, 
main signals and points. 
• System states: What are the possible system states. 
• Transitions: What are the expected transitions between system states. 
• Safety: Is there some system states or transitions that shall never be allowed and that may be 
hazardous (e.g., simultaneous incoming or outgoing traffic or drive through). 
Problem Frame Analysis Solution: Figure 33 illustrates the Station Interlocking Requirements problem 
frames diagram. 
 
Figure 33 Station Interlocking Requirements – Problem Frame Diagram 
The input parameter associated with the problem frame diagram shall be interpreted as follows: 
• Mch: represents the machine to be constructed or an existing system that is modernised, and 
that is responsible for controlling train movements in a safe manner. 
The expected output from instantiating the pattern is identified as: 
• Req: represents the set of requirements derived on the basis of instantiating the pattern 
according to the defined instantiation rule. 
The problem domains that are represented in the problem frame diagram shall be interpreted as: 
Interlock
Machine  
Interlock
Regime
Req
Mch

Track 
Sections
A
B
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C
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• Points: represents any point part of the track layout (e.g., the two points exemplified in Figure 
31). 
• Track Sections: represents the different sections of the tracks (e.g., as exemplified in Figure 32). 
• Lights: represents the distant signals and the main signals (e.g., as exemplified in Figure 31).
The Interlock Machine shall assure safe allocation of train routes for trains. There are eight possible train 
routes with the configuration exemplified in Figure 32. A train route may be in two states, we name these 
states Locked (allocated to a train) and Not Locked. The Interlock Machine interacts with the appliances 
represented as problem domains in Figure 33 through the following interfaces in order to secure train 
routes: 
• A: represents the interaction between the Interlock Machine and the Points. The points may be in 
two positions; we name these positions Aligned and Diverging. 
• B: represents the interaction between the Interlock Machine and the Track Sections. A track 
section may be in two states, we name these states Vacant and Occupied. 
• C: represents the interaction between the Interlock Machine and the Lights. We assume here 
that the lights may be in the following states depending on the type of signal: 
o A distant signal may be in the states: Expect Proceed, Expect Proceed Slow or Expect Stop. 
o A main signal may be in the states: Proceed, Proceed Slow and Stop. An outbound main 
signal on a diverging track (e.g., mO or mN in Figure 31) can only be in the states Proceed 
Slow or Stop because the train when moving shall only proceed with a limited speed. 
Requirements for the Interlock Machine may be elicited by instantiating the abstract requirements given 
in Table 4. 
Table 4 Station Interlocking Requirements – Abstract Requirements 
ID Requirement Note on instantiation 
R.1 Mch shall manage train movements along 
the following train routes: train routes 
Identify every train route that is required to be controlled (e.g., AX, 
AY,M, as in Figure 32) and that is part of all train routes. 
R.2 Mch may set train route as locked when: 
conditions 
For each train route (e.g., AX in Figure 32): define each condition (e.g., A 
in state Not Locked, X in state Not Locked) part of conditions that must be 
satisfied in order to lock a train route (assign a train route to a train). 
R.3 Mch shall when train route becomes 
locked signal: signalling 
For each train route: define the signalling to be performed once the train 
route is locked. 
R.4 Mch shall detect train route as 
commenced when: conditions  
For each train route (e.g., AX in Figure 32): define each condition (e.g., A 
goes to state Occupied) part of conditions that must be satisfied in order 
to detect the train route as commenced. 
R.5 Mch shall when train route is detected as 
commenced signal: signals 
For each train route (e.g. AX in Figure 32): define the signalling to be 
performed once the train route is detected as commenced (e.g. mA goes 
to state Stop) 
R.6 Mch may only unlock train route when: 
conditions 
For each train route (e.g., AX in Figure 32): define each condition (e.g., A 
goes to state Vacant) part of conditions that must be satisfied in order to 
unlock a locked train route. 
 
Instantiation Rule: An artefact Req (see Figure 33 and Figure 30) instantiates the Station Interlocking 
Requirements pattern if: 
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• Req is a set of requirements. 
• Req is the result of an analysis, e.g., by the use the problem frames analysis approach as 
outlined in Figure 33 and the guidance provided in Section “Problem Frame Analysis Solution”, 
of how a system Mch shall operate in order to assure safe train movements at a train station. In 
order to perform the analysis, the system Mch must be identified and described. Relevant 
problem domains that interact with Mch or in other ways are important for the interlocking 
scenario must be identified and their possible states must be defined. The objective of the 
analysis is to define the interlocking rules, in the form of requirements Req for Mch that assures 
the required functionality and safety.  
• Every requirement of Req is an instance of an abstract requirement. Abstract requirements are 
defined in column “Requirement” of Table 4. 
• An abstract requirement is instantiated by applying the guidance provided in the column “Note on 
instantiation” of Table 4. 
• Every requirement of Req is traceable to a unique abstract requirement. 
• Every requirement of Req describes a property, behaviour or a constraint of the system 
(identified by the instantiation of Mch). 
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A.2 LEVEL CROSSING INTERLOCKING REQUIREMENTS 
Name: Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements 
Pattern Signature: Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements is defined with the signature illustrated in 
Figure 34. 
In Figure 34, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the pattern: 
• Mch is short for Machine. 
• Req is short for Requirements. 
 
Figure 34 Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Support the elicitation of functional requirements Req for an interlocking system Mch that shall 
control the appliances of a level crossing. An example of a railway track with a level crossing is given in 
Figure 35. A level crossing is illustrated as a road lane crossing a single railway track. 
 
Figure 35 Example signal layout illustration 
Applicability: The Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements pattern is suitable to apply in the following 
situation: 
• To derive the functional requirements while building or upgrading an interlocking system that 
shall control the appliances of a level crossing. 
Problem: The main aspects relevant for establishing functional requirements for a level crossing 
interlocking system are: 
• Possible states of appliances: What are the possible states of the different appliances like level 
crossing signals, road signals and gates. 
• Possible System States: What are the possible system states. 
• Transitions: What are the expected transitions between system states. 
• Safety: Is there some system states or transitions that shall never be allowed and that may be 
hazardous. 
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• Dependencies: Is there any dependencies towards other interlocking equipment, e.g., the 
interlocking on a nearby station. 
Problem Frame Analysis Solution: Figure 36 illustrates the Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements 
problem frames diagram. 
 
Figure 36 Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements – Problem Frames Diagram 
The input parameter associated with the problem frame diagram shall be interpreted as: 
• Mch: represents the machine to be constructed or an existing system that is modernised, and 
that is responsible for controlling train movements in a safe manner. 
The expected output from instantiating the pattern is identified as: 
• Req: represents the set of requirements derived on the basis of instantiating the pattern 
according to the defined instantiation rule. 
The problem domains that are represented in the problem frame diagram shall be interpreted as: 
• Gates: represents the level crossing gates referred to in Figure 35.
• Coupling Points: represents the different couple and decouple points indicated in Figure 35. 
• Lights: represents the different road signals referred to in Figure 35. 
The Interlock Machine shall safely control the appliance for securing a level crossing and assure proper 
signalling to road users and trains. The Interlock Machine interacts with the appliances represented as 
problem domains in Figure 36 through the following interfaces in order to secure the level crossing: 
• A: represents the interaction between the Interlocking Machine and the Gates. The gates may be 
in two states, we name these states Closed and Elevated. 
• B: represents the interaction between the Interlock Machine and the Coupling Points. A coupling 
point may be in two states, we name these states True and False. 
• C: represents the interaction between the Interlock Machine and the Lights. The lights may be in 
the following states depending on type of signal: 
o A road signal may be in two states; we name these states Go and Stop. 
o A level crossing signal may be in two states; we name these states Passage of Crossing 
Allowed and Stop Before Crossing. 
o A level crossing distant signal may be in two states; we name these states Expect Passage 
of Crossing Allowed and Expect Stop Before Crossing. 
• D: represents the interaction between the Interlock Machine and Dependent Lights. The 
dependent lights can be light signals that are associated with the interlocking at a station. If the 
level crossing is placed in between light signals at a station (e.g., scenarios illustrated in Figure 
37), then the level crossing shall have a dependency towards relevant station signals. The two 
scenarios in Figure 37 depict different types of dependencies. In scenario A, the road crosses 
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the track between an incoming main signal and two outgoing main signals. In scenario B, the 
road is placed between a distant signal and a main signal. 
 
Figure 37 Scenarios for defining dependencies between interlocking and level crossing 
Requirements for the Interlock Machine can be elicited by the use of the abstract requirements and notes 
on instantiating the abstract requirements given in Table 5.  
Table 5 Level Crossing Interlocking Requirements – Abstract Requirements 
ID Requirement Note on instantiation 
R.1 Mch shall facilitate safe level crossings by controlling 
the level crossing appliances in the following system 
states: states 
Define each state associated with the level crossing system, 
e.g., open state, closed state. 
R.2 Mch shall by default control the level crossing 
appliances in state state  
Define any default state, e.g., open state. 
R.3 Mch shall set the level crossing system in state state 
when: conditions 
For each system state (e.g., closed): detail the conditions that 
must be satisfied in order to reach state (e.g., gates g1 and 
g2 indicated in Figure 35 are in the state Elevated) 
R.4 Mch shall when in system state state assure: 
appliance is in state state  
For each system state: detail the required state of each 
appliance (e.g., when in state open then gates g1 and g2 
indicated in Figure 35 are in the state Elevated) 
R.5 Mch shall when in state set the level crossing system 
to default state when: conditions 
For each system state: detail the conditions for transferring to 
a default state (if applicable) 
 
Instantiation Rule: An artefact Req (see Figure 36 and Figure 34) is the result of instantiating the Level 
Crossing Interlocking Requirements pattern if: 
• Req is a set of requirements. 
• Req is the result of an analysis, e.g., a result of the use the problem frames analysis approach as 
outlined in Figure 36 and the guidance provided in Section “Problem Frames Analysis Solution”, 
on how a system Mch shall operate in order to assure safe train movements at a level crossing. 
In order to perform the analysis, the system Mch must be identified and described. Relevant 
problem domains that interact with Mch or in other ways are important for the interlocking 
scenario must be identified and their possible states must be defined. The objective of the 
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analysis is to define the interlocking rules, in the form of requirements Req for Mch, that assures 
the required functionality and safety.  
• Every requirement of Req is an instance of an abstract requirement. Abstract requirements are 
defined in column “Requirement” of Table 5. An abstract requirement is instantiated by applying 
the guidance provided in the column “Note on instantiation” of Table 5. 
• Every requirement of Req is traceable to a unique abstract requirement. 
• Every requirement of Req describes a property, behaviour or a constraint of the system 
(identified by the instantiation of Mch). 
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A.3 DUAL MODULAR REDUNDANT 
Pattern Signature: The Dual Modular Redundantis defined with the signature illustrated in Figure 38. 
In Figure 38, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the pattern: 
• Cmd is short for Command. 
• C1 is short for Controller 1. 
• C2 is short for Controller 2. 
• V is short for Voter. 
• S is short for System. 
 
Figure 38 Dual Modular Redundant – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Describe the design of a system S that offers a simple and cost effective protection against 
random hardware failure by the use of two redundant controllers, C1 and C2 that operate in parallel. 
Command signals to the two controllers and status indications from these are handled by the component 
Cmd. Cmd also provides the interface between the components performing control operations and the 
overall system. A voter V is used to implement functionality for reacting upon discrepancies between the 
parallel operating controllers. 
Applicability:The Dual Modular Redundant pattern is intended for the following situations: 
• When the reliability of the individual controllers in the dual controller setup and supporting system 
parts is high enough, and there is satisfactory protection against random failure, to achieve 
adequate system reliability and safety. 
• When the safety management and quality management are performed to such an extent that 
ensures sufficient protection against systematic errors and furthermore that the dual modular 
redundant configuration to be sufficiently robust. 
Problem: The main aspects to be considered when providing protection against failure are: 
• Random hardware failure: hardware is susceptible to wear and tear and failure may manifest at 
random. Protection should be incorporated against random hardware failure. 
• Separation of functions: it must be ensured that the potential failures of non-critical functions do 
not negatively affect critical functions. Therefore, there should be a clear separation between 
functional parts of different safety integrity.  
• Reliability of components: it must be ensured that reliability of individual components is 
satisfactory in order to meet reliability targets. 
• Common cause failure: it must be ensured that the system is adequately protected against 
common cause failures. 
• Fail-safe behaviour: it should be ensured that any potential failure of the system should not 
negatively affect safety. 
Design Solution:Figure 39 illustrates the main structure of components and their interfaces of the Dual 
Modular Redundant design, specified using UML notation.
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Figure 39 Dual Modular Redundant Design 
The component Cmd is responsible for communicating with an overall system and the parts performing 
critical operations, C1 and C2. C1 and C2 are two identical parts/components that operate in parallel and 
perform critical operations (e.g., interlocking operations). A voter interacts with the plant or Equipment 
Under Control (EUC) and carry out the control operations from C1 and C2. The voter will implement 
mechanisms to provide 1-out-of-2 or 2-out-of-2 voting functionality. 
An important feature with respect to utilising the proposed design for safety critical systems is the 
physical and functional separation of non-critical functionality (resided in Cmd) from the critical 
functionality (resided in C1 and C2). The redundant controllers provide protection against random 
hardware failure that may affect control operations and the voter assures that no potential erroneous 
signalling is performed due to random hardware failure. Protection against systematic failure can be 
handled by following adequate activities during the development process (e.g., safety management 
activities and quality management activities); this is out of scope of the pattern. 
The roles and responsibilities represented in the pattern are:  
• S: System – represents the system defined by the Dual Modular Redundant. The system (e.g., a 
railway interlocking system) interacts with an overall system or human operator (e.g., a train 
leader through a Centralised Train Control (CTC) system) and the plant that is controlled (e.g., 
distant light signals, main light signals, and track switches). 
• C1: Controller – responsible for providing control signals (e.g., interlocking control signals) based 
on plant states and commands from the overall system or some operator. 
• C2: Controller – responsible for providing control signals (e.g., interlocking control signals) based 
on plant states and commands from the overall system or some operator.  
• Cmd: Command – responsible for the interaction with an overall system such that commands 
(e.g., from an operator) may be communicated to the control system. Cmd can also be 
responsible for secondary functions such as data logging.  
• V: Voter – responsible for activating plant control in accordance with the commands given by the 
dual controllers and take proper safe actions in the case of disagreement (that is an indication of 
a component failure) between the controllers. 
Instantiation Rule: An artefact S (see Figure 39 and Figure 38) instantiates the Dual Modular 
Redundantpattern if: 
• S is a specification of a control system with hardware and/or software parts/components. 
• S specifies a system containing at least two redundant controller parts that operate in parallel 
and that interface with a voting mechanism. 
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• S specifies a system that has a part that provides an interface with an overall system and the 
dual controllers such that orders may be given to, and indications obtained from, the controllers. 
• S specifies a system that has a part that is responsible for providing a voting mechanism such 
that protection against random failure is detected and may be mitigated.  
Related Patterns:The pattern relates to the other patterns in the following manner: 
• Any product requirement pattern that might be used to derive the functional requirements for the 
system. 
• Any process requirement pattern that might be used to assess and derive safety functional 
requirements for the system. 
• Any safety case pattern that might be used as a means to argue that the system is adequately 
safe for its purpose.  
Known Uses: In Norway, a commonly used interlocking system known as NSB-94 uses a dual modular 
redundant design similar to the one described here. Critical functions, such as the interlocking 
functionality, are implemented in terms of two identical PLCs (Programmable Logic Controllers) that 
operate in parallel. A voting mechanism ensures that no random hardware failure may lead to potentially 
harmful signalling, e.g., no train receives a go (green light signal) if there is any disagreement between 
the controllers (2-out-of-2 voting is required to give a go). In case of disagreement, e.g., one controller 
commands a stop signal (red light signal) and the other controller commands a go signal for a given light 
then stop is signalled (1-out-of-2 voting to give a stop). 
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A.4 HAZARD ANALYSIS 
Name: Hazard Analysis 
Pattern Signature: Hazard Analysis is defined with the signature illustrated in Figure 40. 
In Figure 40, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the pattern: 
• ToA is short for Target of Assessment. 
• Src is short for Source. 
• Haz is short for Hazards. 
• IdCsHz is short for Identified Causes of Hazards. 
• HzLg is short for Hazard Log. 
 
Figure 40 Hazard Analysis – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Support the assessment of a target system ToA by defining the process of deriving the potential 
causes of hazards Haz. The expected result of applying the pattern is a hazard log HzLg that documents 
the hazards Haz and the potential causes of hazards IdCsHz associated with a system ToA. The hazard 
log HzLg facilitates the evaluation of the potential of the system to negatively affect safety. The pattern 
describes: 1) the main characteristics of the process of hazard analysis, and 2) the main requirements for 
specifying the result of the process in a hazard log. 
Applicability: The Hazard Analysis pattern is suitable to apply in the following situations: 
• When the system under construction is intended to be used in a context where there exists 
safety concerns (e.g. potential threats to life or environment). 
• When hazards applicable to a system under construction are given and the potential causes of 
identified hazards are required to be identified.  
Problem: The main aspects to be considered when performing hazards analysis are: 
• Scope: To correctly delimit the scope of the analysis such that the cost of performing hazard 
analysis is minimised, but where the scope is sufficiently broad to capture all relevant safety 
concerns. 
• Hazards: To ensure that the sources providing data on hazards relevant for the system under 
construction provide valid information. 
• Sources: To ensure that the sources required for identifying potential causes of hazards are 
accounted for. Sources may represent experience data on incidents, accidents, and safety 
assessments. 
• Methods: To ensure that the methods applied in order to assess the potential causes of hazards 
are suitable and are able to provide the intended results. The intended result is to identify all 
relevant causes of hazards.  
• Causes: To ensure that the potential causes that can lead to hazards are identified. 
• Completeness: To ensure that all relevant hazards are assessed with respect to potential 
causes. 
Process Solution: Figure 41 illustrates the Hazard Analysis process annotated in a UML activity 
diagram. 
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Figure 41 Hazard Analysis – Activity Diagram 
The input parameters associated with the activity diagram may be interpreted as follows: 
• ToA (Target of Assessment): represents the entity that the hazard analysis concerns. 
• Haz (Hazards): represents information on identified hazards. 
• Src (Source): represents information on potential causes of hazards. 
• IdCsHz (Identified Causes of Hazards): represents the results from any method supporting the 
activity of identifying potential causes of hazards. 
The main activities intend to serve the following purpose: 
• Identify Scope of Analysis: the intent of the activity is to define the boundary of the investigation, 
its objectives, and a strategy for how to satisfy the objectives defined. The strategy should 
involve a plan for the study, set the responsibilities of those involved, describe how data shall be 
collected and detail a schedule. 
• Identify Relevant Data Sources on Hazards: the intent of the activity is to gather information on 
identified hazards applicable to the system under construction, here the target of assessment. 
• Derive Causes of Hazards: the intent of the activity is to assess a target in order to identify its 
potential contribution to events that may lead to hazards. The target should be assessed by 
examining relevant historic data and by the use of relevant assessment methods. One method or 
a set of complementary methods may be used as long as the total coverage is in accordance 
with the defined scope of analysis. 
• Document Hazards and Causes: the intent of the activity is to combine all relevant information 
with respect to the identification and analysis of hazards in a document form containing all 
identified hazards and their potential causes. 
Instantiation Rule: An artefact HzLg (see Figure 41 and Figure 40) is the result of the instantiation of 
the Hazard Analysis pattern if: 
• HzLg is a documentation of the results from applying the process described in Section “Process 
Solution”. 
• HzLg is a documentation of all relevant hazards associated with the use of a target system 
(identified by the instantiation of ToA) in a specific context. 
• Every hazard of HzLg is uniquely identified. 
Document Hazards and 
Causes
Identify Relevant Data 
Sources on Hazards
Identify Scope of Analysis
Derive Causes of Hazards 
scope
Hazards
Potential causes to hazards
ToA
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• Every hazard of HzLg describes a potential danger of the application of a target system in a 
specific context. 
• Every hazard of HzLg is traceable to its origin documentation, meaning the document where the 
hazard is identified (identified by the instantiation of Haz or Src). 
• Every hazard is associated with a description of potential causes. 
• Every potential cause associated with a hazard is traceable to its origin documentation, meaning 
the document (identified by the instantiation of IdCsHz) where the causal relationship may be 
identified. 
Related Patterns: The Hazard Analysis pattern is related to other process requirement patterns in the 
following manner: 
• May succeed Hazard Identification in terms of supplementing the hazard log provided as an 
output of Hazard Identification with information on potential causes of hazards. 
• May precede Risk Analysis by providing as a deliverable, a set of hazards and potential causes 
associated with the operation of a target system (ToA) such that risk may be determined. 
• May be used in order to address an abstract design defined in a design pattern or the 
instantiation of a design pattern with respect to its potential contribution to hazards. 
• May be used together with other method patterns that support assessment of the causes of 
hazards. 
Known Uses: The pattern describes a process of identifying the potential causes of hazards in 
accordance with the practice as described in several safety standards and guidelines, to notable 
standards are [IEC61508] and [EN50129]. 
[IEC61508] International Electrotechnical Commission, Functional safety of electrical/electronic/ 
programmble electronic safety-related systems, IEC 61508, Edition 2.0, 2010. 
[EN50129] European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization, Railway Applications – 
Communications, signalling and processing systems – Safety related electronic systems for signalling, 
EN 50129, 2003. 
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A.5  RISK ANALYSIS 
Name: Risk Analysis 
Pattern Signature: Risk Analysis is defined with the signature illustrated in Figure 42. 
In Figure 42, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the pattern: 
• ToA is short for Target of Assessment. 
• Haz is short for Hazards. 
• ClsSev is short for Classification of Severity. 
• ClsLi is short for Classification of Likelihood. 
• ClsCr is short for Classification of Criticality. 
• Risks is not abbreviated. 
 
Figure 42 Risk Analysis – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Support the assessment of a target system ToA with respect to risk. A process for risk 
assessment supports this where the result of an analysis of the likelihood of hazards as well as the result 
of an analysis of the severity of an accident associated with the occurrence of a hazard is combined into 
a notion of risk. The expected result Risks of applying the pattern represents a notion of the potential 
danger of applying the target system in a given context.  
Applicability: The Risk Analysis pattern may be suitable to apply in the following situation: 
• When the system under construction is already analysed with respect to its potential contribution 
to hazards in its intended context.  
Problem: The main aspects to be considered when performing risk analysis are: 
• Defined target: to clearly state what is the target of the assessment and correctly delimit the 
scope of the risk analysis. 
• Hazards: assessment of risk is performed on the basis of hazards and their potential causes 
associated with a target. It is expected that data on hazards and hazard causes will be provided. 
• Classification: in order to establish a notion of risk in a consistent manner such that risk 
associated with different systems or system entities can be easily compared. A categorisation 
scheme for discretising data on severity, likelihoods and risk is commonly applied. 
• Estimation: in order to provide a notion of risk, severity and likelihood estimates are required to 
be provided either quantitatively or qualitatively. 
• Mitigations: in order to sustain a certain risk level or reduce a risk to an acceptable level, 
mitigating means (or risk reduction means) are used. A part of risk analysis is to identify potential 
mitigations. 
Process Solution: Figure 43 illustrates the Risk Analysis process specified using a UML activity 
diagram. 
HWR-1037 rev 2 
- 54 - 
 
 
 
Figure 43 Risk Analysis – Activity Diagram 
The input parameters associated with activity diagram may be interpreted as follows: 
• ToA (Target of Assessment): represents the target of the assessment that is analysed with 
respect to risk. 
• Haz (Hazards): represents the hazards that are associated with the target. 
• ClsSev: represents the results from any method supporting the classification of the severity of 
hazards. 
• ClsLi: represents the result from any method supporting the classification of likelihood of 
hazards. 
• ClsCr: represents the results from any method supporting the classification of risk where risk is 
represented as a combined measure of the associated severity and the associated likelihood of 
hazards. 
The main activities intend to serve the following purpose: 
• Initiate Risk Analysis: the intent of the activity is to define the target of assessment, its intended 
context of operation, and identify hazards associated with the use of the target system in its 
context. It is expected that relevant information for risk analysis be provided as documentation of 
the target system. Relevant information include system hazards as well as the unwanted events 
associated with the operation of the target system that might lead to hazards. 
• Address Hazard Severity: the intent of the activity is to address the severity of the consequence 
of hazards. 
• Address Hazard Likelihood: the intent of the activity is to address the likelihood of occurrence of 
each hazard. 
• Establish Notion of Risk: the intent of the activity is to combine data on likelihood of a hazard 
occurring and data on severity of the consequence of a hazard into a notion of risk. 
• Identify Risk Mitigations: the intent of the activity is to identify risk reduction in the form of 
mitigations to reduce the likelihood of a hazard occurring and/or the severity of the consequence 
should a hazard occur. 
• Document Risk & Mitigations: the intent of the activity is to combine all relevant information with 
respect to the assessment of risk in a document form containing all relevant risks and associated 
mitigations. 
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Instantiation Rule: An artefact Risks (see Figure 43 and Figure 42) is the result of instantiating the Risk 
Analysis pattern if: 
• Risks is a documentation describing every relevant risk associated with the use of a target 
system (identified by the instantiation of ToA) in a specific context.  
• Every risk of Risks is uniquely identified. 
• Every risk of Risks is traceable to its origin documentation. By origin documentation, we mean: 
the document where the hazard relevant to risk is identified (identified by the instantiation of 
Haz), documentation on estimates on the severity of the consequence of hazards (identified by 
the instantiation of ClsSev), documentation on estimate of the likelihood of hazard (identified by 
the instantiation of ClsLi).  
• Every risk of Risks is associated with a description of mitigation. The description should describe 
any dependencies or possible mitigations for reducing risk to an acceptable level. 
• Every mitigation associated with a risk is stated such that its purpose and how it reduces risk can 
be clearly identified. 
Related Patterns: The Risk Analysis pattern is related to other patterns in the following manner: 
• May succeed Hazard Analysis in terms of supplementing the assessment of relevant hazards 
and their potential causes with information on the associated risk, e.g., by adding likelihood 
estimates and severity estimates associated with hazards. 
• May precede Establish System Safety Requirements by providing information on the risks 
associated with the operation of the system, and information on required mitigations and 
potential mitigations in order to reduce risk. This ensures that the specification of safety 
requirements is based on a risk assessment of a target system. 
• May be used in order to address the instantiation of a design pattern with respect to risk. 
• May be used with other method patterns that support assessment or categorisation of the 
severity of the consequence of hazards. 
• May be used with other method patterns that support the assessment or categorisation of the 
likelihood of the causes of hazards. 
• May be used with other method patterns that support the classification of risk. 
Known Uses: The pattern describes a process of assessing risk in accordance with the practice as 
described in several safety standards and guidelines, to notable standards are [IEC61508] and 
[EN50129]. 
[IEC61508] International Electrotechnical Commission, Functional safety of electrical/electronic/ 
programmble electronic safety-related systems, IEC 61508, Edition 2.0, 2010. 
[EN50129] European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization, Railway Applications – 
Communications, signalling and processing systems – Safety related electronic systems for signalling, 
EN 50129, 2003. 
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A.6 ESTABLISH SYSTEM SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
Name: Establish System Safety Requirements 
Pattern Signature: Establish System Safety Requirements is defined with the signature illustrated in 
Figure 44. 
In Figure 44, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the pattern: 
• ToA is short for Target of Assessment. 
• Reg is short for Regulations. 
• Risks is not abbreviated; represents the documentation of the risks associated with the 
application of ToA in its intended context. 
• Req is short for Requirements. 
 
Figure 44 Establish System Safety Requirements Pattern Signature 
Intent: Support the specification of system safety requirements Req on the basis of a risk-based 
approach. The safety requirements describe the required measures to be satisfied by the system ToA to 
assure the necessary safety integrity. The general approach for defining safety requirements is to define 
them on the basis of the result of a risk assessment Risks, especially the mitigations identified as means 
to reduce risk to an acceptable level. The pattern describes the general process of capturing the 
requirements that must be satisfied in order to assure safety. 
Applicability: The Establish System Safety Requirements pattern is intended for the following situations: 
• When the system under construction may negatively affect the overall system safety. 
• When there are identified measures that can mitigate identified risks and can be used as input to 
the specification of safety requirements. 
Problem: The main aspects relevant to address when establishing the safety requirements are: 
• Characteristics: To define the system characteristics to be satisfied such that the occurrence of 
unwanted events are minimised or avoided. 
• Functions: To define the safety functions that assures safe operations. 
• Constraints: To define the functional constrains that sufficiently delimit potentially hazardous 
operations. 
• Environment: To define the operational environment that ensures safe operations. 
• Compliance: To define the requirements that are required to be satisfied in order to comply with 
laws, regulation and standards, as a minimum the mandatory requirements related to assurance 
of safety. These requirements include requirements on applying some specific development 
process, perform certain activities, or make use of specific techniques. 
Process Solution: Figure 45 illustrates the Establish System Safety Requirements process specified 
using a UML activity diagram. 
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Figure 45 Establish System Safety Requirements – Process Flow 
The input parameters associated with the activity diagram may be interpreted as follows: 
• ToA (Target of Assessment): represents the target system for which safety requirements should 
be established. 
• Reg (Regulations): represents any source of information describing mandatory or recommended 
practices (e.g. as provided in laws, regulations or standards) valuable for identifying risk reducing 
measures. 
• Risks: represents risks associated with the target system. 
The main activities serve the following purpose: 
• Identify target: the intent of the activity is to identify ToA. The description of the target should as a 
minimum include a definition of the system and its boundaries, its operational profile, functional 
requirements, and safety integrity requirements. 
• Confer laws, regulations, and standards: the intent of the activity is to capture all relevant data 
(requirements for risk reducing measures) from relevant sources (normative references) in order 
to outline the set of risk reducing measures that shall be met by compliance. Each source is 
inspected in order to identify, as a minimum, the mandatory risk reducing measures that shall be 
met in order to be compliant. 
• Confer risk analysis: the intent of the activity is to capture all the relevant data on risk analysis of 
the system that is under construction in order to outline the system specific risk reducing 
measures that shall be met. 
• Establish safety requirements qualitatively: the intent of the activity is to define safety 
requirements on the basis of those identified risk reducing measures required applied, and which 
can be demonstrated fulfilled with qualitative reasoning. 
• Establish safety requirements quantitatively: the intent of the activity is to define safety 
requirements on the basis of those identified risk reducing measures required applied, and which 
can be demonstrated fulfilled with quantitative reasoning. 
• Document safety requirements: the intent of the activity is to detail all relevant information with 
respect to the requirements in a system safety requirements specification. For each requirement 
defined in the requirement specification, information detailing what influenced its definition 
should be provided, e.g., the associated risks, assumptions, calculations, and justifications.  
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Instantiation Rule: An artefact Req (see Figure 45 and Figure 44) is the result of a process that 
instantiates the Establish System Safety Requirements pattern if: 
• Req is a set of requirements. 
• Req is a result of applying a process illustrated in Figure 45 and described in Section “Process 
Solution”. The process is initiated by an activity on describing the target ToA. Once a description 
of the target system and its operational context is provided, the next activities shall identify the 
risk reducing measures to be applied to the target by conferring relevant laws, regulations and 
standards as well as the result of target specific risk analysis for guidance. Once all the relevant 
risk-reducing measures are identified, these shall be used as a basis to define the requirements 
to be met by the target system or by the process to be followed while developing the target. The 
requirements are defined quantitatively or qualitatively depending on the nature of the risk 
reducing measure that is addressed. The requirements are documented in a requirement 
specification Req.  
• Every requirement of Req is traceable to relevant risks (identified by the instantiation of Risks), 
and/or regulatory requirements (identified by the instantiation of Reg). 
• Every requirement of Req is justified such that any assumptions, calculations, and assessments 
that support the specification of the requirement as a safety requirement are provided. 
Related Patterns: The Establish System Safety Requirements pattern is related to other patterns in the 
following manner: 
• May succeed the Risk Analysis pattern that supports identifying risks. The Establish System 
Safety Requirements may be applied as support for defining the requirements to be fulfilled in 
order to reduce risk to an acceptable risk level. 
• May be used in order to detail requirements for the design that is a result of an instantiation of a 
design pattern. 
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A.7 FTA 
Name: FTA (Fault Tree Analysis) 
Pattern Signature: FTA is defined with the signature illustrated in Figure 46. 
In Figure 46, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the pattern: 
• ToA is short for Target of Assessment. 
• UE is short for Unwanted Event. 
• FT is short for Fault Tree 
 
Figure 46 Pattern Signature – FTA 
Intent: Support a systematic and deductive assessment of the potential causes of identified unwanted 
events UE of a target ToA. The pattern describes the fault tree analysis method and provides guidance 
on its application. A fault tree FT is expressed as a tree where the root of the tree denotes the unwanted 
event UE (e.g. representing a system hazard) that is analysed and leaf nodes denotes basic events (e.g. 
component failure modes) that may lead to the unwanted event. The primary goal is to identify minimal 
cut sets by the use of the tree structure. A cut set expresses a set of basic events such that if these 
occur at the same time, the unwanted event will occur. A minimal cut set expresses the minimal set of 
basic events that may lead to an unwanted event. 
Applicability: The FTA pattern is intended for the following situations: 
• As a means to deduce potential causes of unwanted events. 
• As a means to identify combinations of faults that may lead to unwanted events. 
• As a means to analyse system concepts, simple systems or complex systems. 
Problem: The main challenges associated with methods for assessment of the potential causes of an 
unwanted event are: 
• Efficiency: To support efficient application with minimal use of resources. 
• Logical: To support a logical specification of the dependencies between an unwanted event that 
is investigated and the potential causes that is identified through the assessment. 
• Communication: To support communication of results on a form that allows different actors to 
understand the findings with minimal effort. 
Method Solution: Figure 47 exemplifies a fault tree and outlines the relationships between a fault tree 
and the inputs and outputs of the FTA pattern.  
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Figure 47 FTA example diagram 
The following steps may apply the FTA method systematically: 
• Step 1 – Define the top event: The intent is to define the top event that represent the root of a 
fault tree and the event that is analysed (UE.Top in Figure 47). 
• Step 2 – Construct fault tree: The intent is to construct the fault tree by deductively constructing 
the tree in a top-down manner by the use of graphical elements symbolising events and gates. 
An unwanted event should state the fault/failure under consideration. Gates (e.g., the or gate in 
Figure 47) are used to define the combination of antecedents (e.g. basic event E.1, UE.Sub1, or 
UE.Sub2) that imply the consequent (e.g. UE.Top). Decomposition of an unwanted event (e.g., 
UE.Top) should not be described by connecting a series of gates down to basic events, instead 
intermediate unwanted events should be defined (e.g. UE.Sub1, and UE.Sub2). Basic events 
define how a system component or element can fail.  
• Step 3 – Find minimal cut sets: The intent is to deduce from the tree structure the combination of 
basic events that may lead to the top event and to arrange these in order. The set with lowest 
order (contains least number of basic events) is most significant. In Figure 47, the event UE.Top 
occurs if event E.1 occurs (minimal cut set of order 1). The top event also occurs if events E.2 
and E.3 occur or if events E.4 and E.5 occur (cut sets of order 2). There are cut sets of order 3, 
4, and 5 but these are less significant. 
• Step 4 – Qualitative Analysis: The intent is to analyse the fault tree qualitatively in order identify 
weak points of the system with respect to the top event. This may be performed on the basis of 
cut sets. If there exists cut-sets of order 1 then the system is vulnerable to single point of failure. 
If there exists no cut sets of order 1, but the events in the cut sets of order 2 have identical 
characteristics, then the system may be susceptible to common cause failures. 
• Step 5 – Quantitative Analysis: The intent is to calculate the probability of a top event by 
combining probabilities of basic events (given that probabilities of basic events are provided). 
The probability of UE.Top in Figure 47 may be calculated by a combination of the following 
general rules: 
o The probability of an event A ‘’and’’ an event B is expressed as: P(A*B) = P(A) * P(B) 
o The probability of an event A ‘’or’’ an event B is expressed as: P(A+B) = P(A) + P(B) – (P(A) 
* P(B)) 
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Instantiation Rule: A documentation artefact FT (see Figure 47 and Figure 46) instantiates the FTA 
pattern if: 
• FT is a set of fault trees. 
• Every fault tree of FT is instantiated by applying the guidance provided in Section “Method 
Solution” for all unwanted events (identified by the instantiation of UE). For a specific target ToA, 
this means that every unwanted event UE that represents a suitable top event in the analysis is 
systemically assessed according to the process outlined through Steps 1 to Step 5. 
• Every fault tree of FT is traceable to a unique unwanted event (identified by the instantiation of 
UE). 
• Every fault tree of FT describes the relation between an unwanted event, represented as a top 
node in the tree structure, and potential initiating events (e.g. HW/SW failures) associated with a 
target system (identified by the instantiation of ToA). 
Related Patterns: The FTA pattern is related to other patterns in the following manner: 
• May support Hazard Analysis pattern by providing a method for identification of potential causes 
of hazards. 
• May support Risk Analysis pattern by providing a method for performing qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of hazards.  
Known Uses: Fault tree analysis is a commonly applied method within safety critical domains and is 
described in several standards and guidelines, e.g. nuclear domain [NUREG–0492], aerospace 
[ARP4761], and the generic standard [IEC61025]. 
[NUREG–0492] NRC, Fault Tree Handbook, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1981) 
[ARP4761] SAE, Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil 
Airborne Systems and Equipment, Society of Automotive Engineers (1996) 
[IEC61025] IEC, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Edition 2.0, International Electrotechnical Commission 
(2006) 
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A.8 SIL CLASSIFICATION 
Name: SIL Classification 
Pattern Signature: SIL Classification pattern is defined with the signature illustrated in Figure 48. 
In Figure 48, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the pattern: 
• ToA is short for Target of Assessment. 
• Risks is not abbreviated. 
• THR is short for Tolerable Hazard Rate. 
• FncCat is short for Function Categorisation.  
 
Figure 48 SIL Classification – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Support the classification of railway system ToA with respect to its importance to safety. Railway 
systems may be classified according to a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) categorisation that defines five 
levels (SIL 4 to SIL 0, where SIL 4 categorises the most critical systems and SIL 0 categorises non-
safety related systems). A SIL for a specific system is determined on the basis of the safety functions it 
shall perform and represents a measure of the ability to perform the safety functions (the higher the SIL, 
the lower the likelihood of failing to perform the required safety functions). 
Applicability: The SIL Classification pattern is suitable to apply in the following situations: 
• When developing railway systems, as SIL classification is a mandatory activity. 
• When the classification of systems according to their importance to safety shall be performed 
according to [EN50128, EN50129]. 
Problem: The main challenges associated with categorisation of the functions of critical systems are: 
• Criticality: provide categorisation of systems based on an evaluation of the criticality of the 
functions it offers. 
• Conformity: provide categorisation of systems such that systems of same category may be 
associated with the same set of rules. 
Method Solution: Figure 49 illustrates the SIL Classification method pattern diagram. The following 
information should be provided in order to apply the method: 
• ToA (Target of Assessment): Specification of the target system and its function. 
• THR (Tolerable Hazard Rate): Description of the tolerable rates of occurrence of hazards. 
• Risks: Risks associated with ToA comprising a set of hazards associated with the operation of 
ToA such that for each hazard the potential severity and likelihood of occurrence is described. 
The safety integrity level of a system depends on the required level of protection against systematic and 
random failures. A high degree of safety integrity is achieved by:  
• Systematic failure integrity: represents the ability of a system not to contain hazardous 
systematic faults. The property is non-quantifiable and faults are caused by human errors in the 
various stages of the system/sub-system/equipment life cycle, e.g., specification error, design 
error, manufacturing error, installation error, operation error, and maintenance error. Systematic 
failure integrity is achieved by means of quality management and safety management. 
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• Random failure integrity: represents the ability of a system not to fail due to hazardous random 
failure events. Random failure is particularly associated with random hardware failure (e.g. 
material fatigue, short-circuit) and may be quantified based on reliability data of hardware 
components. 
 
Figure 49 SIL Classification - Method Pattern Diagram 
In order to establish a correct SIL of a ToA, the THR (Tolerable Hazard Rate) for each hazard associated 
with the operation of the ToA is defined first. Then, a SIL table is used to determine the SIL for functions 
from THR. A SIL is defined for each function. Thus, a SIL for an item (module, component, sub-system, 
or a system) is determined on the basis of the SIL associated with the functions performed by the item. If 
an item comprises several functions with different SIL, the highest SIL is selected as the SIL for the item. 
The steps that may be applied in order to determine SIL are: 
• Step 1 – If THR are not available, define the safety assumptions and the relevant hazards 
associated with the intended use of ToA. If THR is given, proceed to Step 2.   
• Step 2 – Describe the functions of the ToA, and for every function detail the relationship 
(available from risk analysis) to identified system hazards.  
• Step 3 – For every identified safety related function, allocate SIL to the function based on the 
relationship between the function and potential hazards by the use of the SIL table given in Table 
6 that defines the relationship between safety integrity levels and tolerable hazard rates per 
function.  
• Step 4 – Describe the fulfilment of functions with respect to the items (module/component/sub-
system/system) providing its HW or HW/SW implementation as given in the architecture 
specification of ToA. 
• Step 5 – Define SIL for HW or HW/SW items based on the safety functions they fulfil. 
ToA
FncCat
Design
Func. Descr. THR Risks Cat. Rationale
F.1 SIL 4
F.2 SIL 2
F.3 SIL 0
System: ToA
Risks
THR
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Table 6 SIL Table (made up from [EN50128] and [EN50129] SIL tables) 
THR (Tolerable 
Hazard Rate) per 
hour and per function 
Description of 
software safety 
integrity 
SIL (Safety 
Integrity Level) 
10-9 ≤ THR < 10-8 Very High 4 
10-8 ≤ THR < 10-7 High 3 
10-7 ≤ THR < 10-6 Medium 2 
10-6 ≤ THR < 10-5 Low 1 
 Non safety-related 0 
Instantiation Rule: An artefact FncCat (see Figure 49 and Figure 48) instantiates the SIL Classification 
pattern if: 
• FncCat is a documentation of the results from a classification of the functions of a target system 
(identified by the instantiation of ToA). 
• FncCat represents the results from applying the steps 1 to 5 described in Section “Method 
Solution” or represents the full results from applying steps 1 to 7 in Section “Method Solution”. 
• Every function described in FncCat is categorised as SIL4 to SIL0 according to categorisation 
given in [EN50128] and [EN50129]. 
Related Patterns: The SIL Classification pattern is related to other patterns in the following manner: 
• May support Risk Analysis pattern by providing a categorisation scheme for the categorisation of 
a system that is assessed with respect to risk. 
Known Uses: The pattern represents the method for categorising systems within a railway context which 
is similar to the categorisation defined in the standard [EN50128] and [EN50129]. 
[EN50128] Railway Applications – Communication, Signalling and Processing Systems – Software for 
Railway Control and Protection Systems (2011) 
[EN50129] Railway Applications – Communication, Signalling and Processing Systems – Safety Related 
Electronic Systems for Signalling (2003)  
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A.9 OVERALL SAFETY 
Name: Overall Safety 
Pattern Signature: Overall Safety is defined with the signature illustrated in Figure 50. 
In Figure 50, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the pattern: 
• ToD is short for Target of Demonstration. 
• QualMng is short for Quality Management. 
• SafMng is short for Safety Management. 
• TechSaf is short for Technical Safety. 
• Case is short for Safety Case. 
 
Figure 50 Overall Safety – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Provide a structure for the specification of an overall strategy (or plan) for the safety 
demonstration Case of a target system ToD. The overall strategy is a means to document the set of 
practices that jointly provide confidence in the system being sufficiently safe for its intended use. The 
pattern describes a top-down deductive strategy to build the safety demonstration with a focus on 
establishing the overall argument for adequate managerial and technical safety. The focus of the pattern 
is on how to combine strategies on different safety concerns into an overall strategy such that it may be 
claimed and proven with confidence that the system is sufficiently safe. 
Applicability: The Overall Safety pattern is intended for the following situations: 
• At the initial stages of development in order to outline the main set of demonstration strategies, 
and how these strategies may be combined to demonstrate system safety. 
• Prior to project initiation as a means for stakeholders (vendor, customer, safety authority) to 
reflect upon the main demonstration challenges and possible solutions. 
Problem: The main aspects to be considered when providing a solution for the demonstration of safety 
are: 
• Quality management: it is necessary to demonstrate that the quality of the system is controlled 
by an effective quality management system. Quality management is a means to minimise the 
occurrence of human errors at each stage of the development life cycle, and thus to reduce the 
risk of systematic faults in the system. 
• Safety management: it is necessary to demonstrate that safety management is controlled by 
effective means. Effective safety management facilitates to reduce the occurrence of safety-
related human errors throughout the life cycle and the risk of safety-related systematic faults. 
• Technical safety: it is necessary to demonstrate the safety of the technical design.  
• Strategy identification: in order to plan and effectively apply a suitable demonstration strategy for 
different systems, it is important to identify as early as possible the main lines of demonstration. 
This will reduce the cost related to performing safety assessment by avoiding those activities that 
does not support an effective safety demonstration. In addition, if the choice of demonstration 
strategies does not provide the necessary confidence, then there is a risk of not getting safety 
approval. The effect of not getting a safety approval may induce a great cost as additional work 
may be required in order to receive approval, or there will be a loss of returns if a project is 
discontinued.  
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• Effectiveness: it is important that the demonstration strategy is effective in providing the 
necessary safety demonstration. To develop safety related and safety critical systems is costly, 
mainly due to the activities required to assure and demonstrate that the system is sufficiently 
safe. It is important for a vendor to choose strategies that minimise cost but provide required 
results. 
• Confidence: it is important to choose a demonstration strategy that has the potential to convince 
some safety authority reviewing the evidences that sufficient safety is achieved. In a 
development project, the effectiveness of different demonstration strategies must be weighed 
against the estimated cost and the ability of building confidence. 
• Acceptance: it is important that the choice of demonstration strategies are acceptable for all 
involved parties such that they represent an effective means for demonstrating safety and may 
be applied in a manner that provides confidence that the system is safe. 
Argument Structure Solution: Figure 51 and Table 7 together present the demonstration solution, and 
therefore should be read together. Figure 51 illustrates the decomposition of the safety argument in a 
tree structure using GSN notation. Table 7 details the tree structure by defining the type and expected 
content of each node. 
Figure 51 Overall Safety – Argument Structure 
Associated with the contextual elements of the argument structure, the following is assumed: 
• ToD: identifies the target system under consideration; 
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Table 7 Overall Safety – Argument Structure Details 
Node Node Type Node Content Description 
Case Goal ToD is safe 
ToD Context Definition of parameter ToD (Target of Demonstration) 
AllConc Strategy ToD is demonstrated safe by demonstrating that QM (Quality 
Management), SM (Safety Management), and TS (Technical Safety) 
is sufficiently addressed 
SepConcern Justification Justification for the appropriateness of the separation of the 
demonstration concerning QM, SM, and TS 
QualMng Goal ToD is safe with respect to the QM (Quality Management) concern 
SafMng Goal ToD is safe with respect to the SM (Safety Management) concern 
TechSaf Goal ToD is safe with respect to the TS (Technical Safety) concern 
Instantiation Rule: An artefact Case (see Figure 51 and Figure 50) instantiates the Overall Safety 
pattern if: 
• Case represents the overall claim in a top-down decomposable safety argumentation on the 
safety of a target system (the target is identified by the instantiation of ToD). 
• Case represents the root node in a tree like presentation of the safety argument as indicated in 
Figure 51. 
• Every element of the decomposable safety argument where Case is the root node, is traceable 
to a safety case node as indicated in Figure 51. A safety case node is instantiated by adapting 
the descriptions in column “Node Content Description” in Table 7 to the context that is addressed 
in order to define a structure as given in Figure 51. 
• Case and the associated safety argumentation expresses the decomposition of a main claim, 
that a target system is sufficiently safe, for its intended purpose by a strategy of claiming 
sufficient quality management (the claim expressed in the node QualMng), safety management 
(the claim expressed in the node SafMng), and technical safety (the claim expressed in the node 
TechSaf). Note: No guidance is given in this pattern on how to decompose the safety argument 
parts represented by the claims QualMng, SafMng and TechSaf down to its supporting 
evidences, suitable patterns supporting such a decomposition should be conferred. 
Related Patterns: The Overall Safety pattern is related to other patterns in the following manner: 
• May be supported by other safety case patterns for detailing those parts that are not fully 
developed, e.g., the pattern Technical Safety may be used to as support on the issue of 
demonstrating that a system is technical safe and thereby detail the node TechSaf presented in 
Figure 51. 
• May be used as support for the safety demonstration of a design derived from a design pattern. 
  
HWR-1037 rev 2 
- 68 - 
 
A.10 TECHNICAL SAFETY 
Name: Technical Safety 
Pattern Signature: Technical Safety is defined with the signature illustrated in Figure 52. 
In Figure 52, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the pattern: 
• ToD is short for Target of Demonstration. 
• Case is short for Safety Case. 
• CoP is short for Code of Practice. 
• CrRef is short for Cross Reference. 
• ERE is short for Explicit Risk Estimation. 
 
Figure 52 Technical Safety – Pattern Signature 
Intent: Provide a structure for the specification of a safety demonstration Case showing that a system 
ToD is safe by arguing that it is developed according to an accepted code of practice, is similar to an 
already accepted system, or risk being explicitly addressed and sufficiently reduced. The intent is to 
provide an argument structure for demonstration on sufficient technical safety. The pattern facilitates 
early identification of the set of different overall demonstration strategies that may be applied in order to 
provide confidence that a system is sufficiently safe. 
Example: a system S is decomposed into the subsystems Sub 1 and Sub 2. Sub 1 is a system where 
showing compliance to a code of practice is a commonly accepted approach for safety demonstration. 
Sub 2 is a system includes novel technical solutions. Relying on a code of practice safety demonstration 
strategy of novel technical solutions may challenge our confidence as complying with a code is not 
necessarily sufficient. Therefore, for demonstration of Sub 2, a risk estimation strategy is chosen. The 
safety demonstration for system S consists of a combination of the safety demonstrations applied on the 
subsystems with the addition of the argumentation for this combination being sufficient. 
Applicability: The Technical Safety pattern is suitable to apply in the following situations: 
• At the initial stages of development in order to outline the main set of demonstration strategies to 
be applied for addressing technical safety concerns. 
• Prior to project initiation as a means for stakeholders (e.g, vendor, customer) to reflect upon 
main challenges associated with the demonstration of technical safety and possible solutions. 
Problem: The main aspects to be considered when providing a solution for the demonstration of 
technical safety are: 
• Implicit vs Explicit Safety Demonstration Strategy: the necessary confidence in a safety 
demonstration may be provided by an implicit demonstration strategy, e.g., referring to the 
application of a code of practice that is known to mitigate certain risks. Another strategy is to 
compare the target of demonstration to a similar system that already has received approval. If an 
implicit demonstration strategy is not sufficient, an explicit demonstration strategy must be 
performed that requires information on the risks associated with the target. 
• Effectiveness: it is important that the demonstration strategy is effective in providing the 
necessary safety demonstration. To develop safety related and safety critical systems is costly, 
mainly due to the activities required to assure and demonstrate that the system is sufficiently 
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safe. It is important for a vendor to choose strategies that minimise cost but provide required 
results. 
• Confidence: it is important to choose a demonstration strategy that has the potential to convince 
some safety authority reviewing the evidences that sufficient safety is achieved. In a 
development project, the effectiveness of different demonstration strategies must be weighed 
against the estimated cost and the ability of building confidence. 
• Acceptance: it is important that the choice of demonstration strategies are acceptable for all 
involved parties such that they represent an effective means for demonstrating safety and used 
in a manner that provide confidence that the system is safe. 
Argument Structure Solution: Figure 53 and Table 8 together present the demonstration solution, and 
therefore should be read together. Figure 53 illustrates the decomposition of the safety argument in a 
tree structure using the GSN notation. Table 8 details the tree structure by defining the type and 
expected content of each node.  
 
 
Figure 53 Technical Safety - Argument Structure 
 
Table 8 Technical Safety - Argument Structure 
Node Node Type Node Content Description 
Case Goal ToD is safe 
ToD Context Definition of parameter: ToD (Target of Demonstration) 
AllSubsysSafe Strategy ToD is demonstrated safe by demonstrating that all subsystems t of 
ToD is safe 
ValidDivision Justification Rationale for the division of ToD into subsystems is valid 
ValidStrategy Justification Rationale for the use of correct safety demonstration strategy on 
each subsystem of ToD as a means to demonstrate that ToD is safe 
CoP Goal Subsystem t of ToD is safe by means of Code of Practice 
CrRef Goal Subsystem t of ToD is safe by means of Cross Reference 
ERE Goal Subsystem t of ToD is safe by means of Explicit Risk Estimation 
Associated with the contextual elements of the argument structure, the following is assumed: 
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• ToD: identifies the target system under consideration; 
Instantiation Rule: An artefact Case (see Figure 53 and Figure 52) instantiates the Technical Safety 
pattern if: 
• Case is a safety demonstration of a target system (identified by the instantiation of ToD). 
• Every element of Case is traceable to a safety case node as indicated in Figure 53. A safety 
case node is instantiated by applying the descriptions in column “Node Content Description” in 
Table 8 to the context that is addressed in order to define a structure as given in Figure 53. 
• Case and the associated safety argumentation expresses the decomposition of a main claim, 
that a target system is technically safe for its purpose by a strategy of claiming that all 
subsystems are sufficiently safe. 
• Subsystems are claimed sufficiently safe by a strategy of reference to a code of practice, or 
cross-reference and comparison to a similar and proven system, or explicit risk estimation.  
Related Patterns: The Technical Safety pattern is related to other patterns in the following manner: 
• May be used for detailing the claims on technical safety in the Overall Safety pattern. 
• The Codes Of Practice pattern may be used to address the CoP node of this pattern by 
referencing common development practices. 
• The Cross Reference pattern may be used to address the CrRef node in this pattern by 
comparing a target to a similar reference system that is an assured system and thus provide an 
implicit safety demonstration. 
• The Explicit Risk Evaluation pattern may be used to address the ERE node in this pattern by 
explicitly addressing risk associated with a target. 
Known Uses: The pattern describes a structure for arguing safety with a focus on technical aspects that 
may be seen as a variant of Part 4 of the safety case required by the standard [EN 50129] on issues 
related to demonstration of technical safety 
[EN50129] European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization, Railway Applications – 
Communications, signalling and processing systems – Safety related electronic systems for signalling, 
EN 50129, 2003. 
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A.11 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS SATISFIED 
Name: Safety Requirements Satisfied 
Pattern Signature: Safety Requirements Satisfied is defined with the signature illustrated in Figure 54. 
In Figure 54, the following abbreviations are used for denoting the parameters of the pattern: 
• ToD is short for Target of Demonstration. 
• Req is short for Requirements. 
• ReqSat is short for Requirements Satisfied. 
• Case is short for Safety Case. 
 
Figure 54 Safety Requirements Satisfied - Pattern Signature 
Intent: Provide a structure for safety demonstration Case that a system ToD is safe, by arguing that all 
safety requirements Req are satisfied.  
Example: a system S shall satisfy the functional requirements R1 and R2, and safety requirements SR1 
and SR2. In order to demonstrate that S is sufficiently safe for its intended purpose it is enough to 
demonstrate that SR1 and SR2 are satisfied. In order for system S to provide the intended function then 
R1 and R2 must be satisfied, but as these requirements do no impact safety they are not addressed in 
the safety demonstration. 
Applicability: The Safety Requirements Satisfied pattern is intended for the following situation: 
• When it is required to provide an explicit demonstration of the ability of a system to uphold safety 
invariants that are expressed as safety requirements. 
Problem: The main aspects to be considered when providing a solution for the demonstration of safety 
are: 
• Completeness of specification: it is necessary to provide confidence that the set of safety 
requirements is complete, i.e. contain all relevant requirements. 
• Correct demonstration approach: it is necessary to provide confidence that for each requirement, 
the chosen approach for demonstrating that the requirement is satisfied is suitable. 
• Confirming evidences: it is necessary to provide confidence that for each chosen demonstration 
approach, confirming evidences is available or will be provided. 
Argument Structure Solution: Figure 55 and Table 9 together present the demonstration solution, and 
therefore should be read together. Figure 55 illustrates the decomposition of the safety argument in a 
tree structure using GSN notation. Table 9 details the tree structure by defining the type and expected 
content of each node. 
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Figure 55 Safety Requirements Satisfied – Argument Structure 
Associated with the contextual elements of the argument structure, the following is assumed: 
• ToD: identifies the target system under consideration. 
• Req: represents a set of safety requirements associated with the target system ToD. 
Table 9 Safety Requirements Satisfied - Argument Structure Details 
Node Node Type Node Content Description 
Case Goal ToD satisfies Req 
ToD Context Definition of ToD 
Req Context Definition or Req 
AllReq Strategy ToD is acceptably safe as all safety requirements are addressed 
and found satisfied 
ReqSetCom Justification Justification for the requirements set Req being complete or 
contain all safety requirements that are relevant for ToD 
ReqSetAdd Justification Justification for all elements of the set Req are accounted for. 
Elements may be addressed individually or in groups, any 
grouping of requirements needs to be justified. 
ReqSat Goal The requirement r, element of Req, is satisfied 
Instantiation Rule: A demonstration artefact Case (see Figure 55 and Figure 54) instantiates the Safety 
Requirements Satisfied pattern if: 
• Case is a safety demonstration of a target system ToD. 
• Every element of Case is traceable to a safety case node as indicated in Figure 55. A safety 
case node is instantiated by adapting the descriptions in column “Node Content Description” in 
Table 9 to the context that is addressed in order to define a structure as given in Figure 55. 
• Case and the associated safety argumentation expresses the decomposition of a main claim, 
that a target system ToD is safe, by a strategy of demonstrating that all safety requirements Req 
associated with the system ToD are satisfied. 
Related Patterns: The Safety Requirements Satisfied pattern is related to other patterns in the following 
manner: 
• May be used to detail the ERE node of Technical Safety concerned with demonstrating that risk 
is explicitly addressed by demonstrating that the safety requirements, defined on the basis of risk 
assessment, are satisfied. 
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• May be used together with the Establish System Safety Requirements. Establish System Safety 
Requirements can be applied in order to derive the safety requirements. Safety Requirements 
Satisfied is then used to develop a demonstration that argues that identified requirements are 
satisfied. 
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APPENDIX B DETAILS ON PATTERN INSTANTIATION 
B.1 RESULTS FROM INSTANTIATING FTA 
Table 10 represents a fault tree expressed in a tabular form. The table should be read from top to 
bottom. The fault tree represents an assessment of the hazards that are relevant with respect to the 
intended operation of the 2TLCI system. The fault tree analysis presented in the following tables 
represents the results of applying the FTA pattern (defined in Appendix A.7). The analysis is based on 
the fault tree analysis presented in [21]. 
Table 10 FTA of Hazards 
Hazards 
OR 
H1 – Derailment 
(See Table 11) 
H2 – Collision train-train H3 – Collision train-
object 
(See Table 28) 
H4 – Level crossing 
accidents 
(See Table 30) 
OR 
H2.1 – Collision train-
train at station 
(See Table 16) 
H2.2 – Collision train-train 
at line 
(See Table 22) 
Table 11 FTA of H1 – Derailment 
H1 - Derailment 
OR 
H1.1 – Train derail in point H1.2 – Train derail other place than at point 
See Table 12 E1 – Wrong speed, lack of track maintenance, rock 
fall, projecting error, etc. 
Table 12 FTA of H1.1 – Train derail in point 
H1.1 – Train derail in point 
AND 
E2 –Train occupies 
track section at 
point 
OR 
E3 – Point does 
not belong to train 
route 
AND 
E4 – Point belongs 
to train route 
OR 
E5 – Train does 
not have proceed 
aspect 
AND 
E6 – Train has 
proceed aspect 
H1.1.A – Derailing 
in a point belonging 
to a train route with 
proceed aspect 
See Table 13 
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Table 13 FTA of H1.1.A – Derailing in point belonging to train route with proceed aspect 
H1.1.A - Derailing in point belonging to train route with proceed aspect 
OR 
E7 – Point is not 
controlled in correct 
position 
Derailing in point that is controlled in correct position 
AND 
E8 – Point is 
controlled in correct 
position 
OR 
E9 – Point position 
altered 
AND 
E10 – Point 
position not altered 
H.1.1.B – Train passes point at too high 
speed 
See Table 14 
Table 14 FTA of H1.1.1.B – Train passes point at too high speed 
H1.1.B – Train passes point at too high speed 
AND 
E13 – Point is in a 
diverging position 
Train do not proceed slow (cautious) 
OR 
E14 – Main signal at 
beginning of train route 
signals "Proceed" 
AND 
E15 – Main signal does 
not signal "Proceed" 
H1.1.C – Train driver 
disregard restrictive 
signal or respond to late 
E16 – Derailment at 
point due to lack of 
braking 
See Table 15 
Table 15 FTA of H1.1.C – Train driver disregard restrictive signal or respond to late 
H1.1.C – Train driver disregard restrictive signal or respond to late 
OR 
E17 – Distant signal 
does not show 
restrictive enough 
signal 
AND 
E18 – Distant signal 
shows correct signal 
OR 
Human error Too short sighting 
distance to signal 
Too bad sighting 
conditions 
E19 – Human factors E20 – Projecting error E21 – Projecting error, 
vegetation, weather 
conditions, etc. 
Table 16 FTA of H2.1 – Collision train-train at station 
H2.1 – Collision train-train at station 
OR 
H2.1.1 – Collision incoming 
train against stationary train at 
station (See Table 17) 
H2.1.2 – Collision incoming 
train against incoming train 
at station (See Table 19) 
H2.1.3 - Collision incoming 
train against outgoing train 
at station (See Table 20) 
H2.1.4 – Collision outgoing train 
against outgoing train at station 
(See Table 21) 
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Table 17 FTA - H2.1.1 – Collision incoming train against stationary train at station 
H2.1.1 – Collision incoming train against stationary train at station 
OR 
Collision incoming train with proceed aspect against stationary train at station Collision 
incoming train 
without proceed 
aspect against 
stationary train at 
station 
OR E26 – Incoming 
train passes main 
signal in "Stop" Collision incoming train with proceed 
aspect against stationary train at 
incoming train route 
 
Collision incoming train with proceed aspect 
against stationary train at the safety zone of 
the incoming train route 
H2.1.1.A – 
Collision incoming 
train with proceed 
aspect against 
stationary train 
outside the 
incoming train 
route and its safety 
zone 
AND AND See Table 18 
E22 – Main signal 
(entry) signals proceed 
aspect 
E23 – Another 
train present in 
train route 
E24 – Main signal 
(entry) signals proceed 
aspect 
E25 – Another train 
present in safety 
zone 
 
Table 18 FTA of H2.2.1.A – Collision incoming train with proceed aspect against stationary train outside the incoming 
train route and its safety zone 
H2.2.1.A – Collision incoming train with proceed aspect against stationary train outside the incoming train route and its safety zone 
AND 
E27 – Main signal (entry) 
signals proceed aspect 
OR 
AND AND 
E28 – Point in incoming 
train route puts train 
onto another train route 
than the locked train 
routed 
E29 – Other train 
occupies other train 
route that is not 
extension of the 
incoming train route 
and its safety zone 
E30 – Incoming trains 
passes the incoming 
train route and its safety 
zone 
E31 – Other train 
occupies train route in 
extension of the 
incoming train route 
and its safety zone 
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Table 19 FTA of H2.1.2 – Collision incoming train against incoming train at station 
H2.1.2 – Collision incoming train against incoming train at station 
OR 
Collision incoming train against incoming train at station, both trains has proceed aspect Collision 
incoming train 
against incoming 
train at station, 
at least one train 
does not have 
proceed aspect 
OR E39 – Incoming 
trains passes 
main signal in 
"Stop" 
Collision 
incoming train 
against incoming 
train at same 
train route, both 
trains have 
proceed aspect 
Collision incoming train against incoming train with different train routes, both trains have 
proceed aspect 
E32 – Identical 
to: Collision 
incoming train 
against 
stationary train at 
station 
AND 
Both trains have 
proceed aspect 
OR 
E33 – Both train 
routes are 
locked 
Collision incoming train 
against incoming train in 
shared part of train route 
Collision incoming 
train against 
incoming train in 
the safety zone of 
one of the train 
routes 
Collision incoming 
train against 
incoming train in 
shared safety 
zone of the train 
routes 
OR E37 –Train route 
crosses safety 
zone of another 
locked train route 
E38 – Train route 
share safety zone 
with another 
locked train route 
E35 – Train 
route has 
shared part 
with another 
locked train 
route 
E36 – Train 
route has 
shared part 
with another 
locked train 
route that has 
been released 
too early 
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Table 20 FTA of H2.1.3 – Collision incoming train against outgoing train at station 
H2.1.3 – Collision incoming train against outgoing train at station 
OR 
Collision incoming train against outgoing train at station, both trains have received 
proceed aspect 
Collision incoming train against outgoing 
train at station, at least one train has not 
received proceed aspect 
AND OR 
Both trains have 
received proceed 
aspect 
OR E44 – Incoming 
train passes main 
signal in "Stop" 
E45 – Outgoing 
train passes main 
signal in "Stop" Collision incoming train against 
outgoing train in shared part of train 
route 
Collision incoming 
train against outgoing 
train in the safety 
zone of the incoming 
train route 
E40 – Both train 
routes are locked 
OR E43 – Train route 
crosses safety zone 
of another locked 
train route 
E41 – Train route 
has shared part 
with another locked 
train route 
E42 – Train route 
has shared part 
with another 
locked train route 
that has been 
released to early 
Table 21 FTA of H2.1.4 – Collision outgoing train against outgoing train at station 
H2.1.4 – Collision outgoing train against outgoing train at station 
OR 
Collision outgoing train 
against outgoing train 
at station, at least one 
train has not received 
proceed aspect 
Collision outgoing train against outgoing train at station, both trains has received proceed aspect 
E46 – At least one of 
the trains passes main 
signal in "Stop" 
AND 
Both trains have 
received proceed 
aspect 
Collision outgoing train against outgoing train in shared part of train route 
E47 – Both train routes 
are locked 
OR 
Collision outgoing train 
against outgoing train in 
different outgoing train 
routes 
Collision outgoing train against outgoing train in the 
same outgoing train route 
E48 – Train route has 
shared part with 
another locked train 
route 
E49 – Outgoing train route is released before first 
train has left the station 
Table 22 FTA of H2.2 - Collision train-train at line 
H2.2 - Collision train-train at line 
OR 
H2.2.1 – Train 1 at St. 1 
has proceed aspect 
towards St. 2, Train 2 
has left St. 2 but not 
arrived at St. 1. 
(See Table 23) 
H2.2.2 – Train 1 at St. 1 
has proceed aspect 
towards St. 2, Train 2 is 
at St. 2 with proceed 
aspect towards St. 1.  
(See Table 24) 
H2.2.3 – Train 1 at St. 1 
has proceed aspect 
towards St. 2, Train 2 is 
at St. 2 and receives 
proceed aspect towards 
St. 1. (See Table 25) 
H2.2.4 – Train 1 at St. 1 
receives proceed aspect 
towards St. 2, Train 2 at 
St. 2 receives proceed 
aspect towards St. 1. 
(See Table 26) 
H2.2.5 – Train 1 at St. 1 
has proceed aspect 
towards St. 2, Train 2 
has passed main signal 
(exit) at St. 2 and is 
enroute towards St. 1 
(See Table 27) 
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Table 23 FTA of H2.2.1 
H2.2.1 – Train 1 at St. 1 has proceed aspect towards St. 2, Train 2 has left St. 2 but not arrived at St. 1 
AND 
Train 2 is en route towards station 2 or returns to station 1 Train 1 is at station 1 with proceed aspect 
Conditions for receiving proceed aspect are satisfied 
AND AND 
E50 – Train 2 has proceed 
aspect 
E51– Train 2 occupies block 
line 
E52 – Signal received from 
station 2 that line is vacant 
E53 – The line is set in direction 
of station 2 
Table 24 FTA of H2.2.2 
H2.2.2 – Train 1 at St. 1 has proceed aspect towards St. 2, Train 2 is at St. 2 with proceed aspect towards St. 1 
AND 
Train 1 has proceed aspect Train 2 has proceed aspect 
Conditions for receiving proceed aspect are satisfied Conditions for receiving proceed aspect are satisfied 
AND AND 
E54 – Signal received from 
station 2 that line is vacant 
E55 – The line is set in 
direction of station 2 
E56 – Signal received from 
station 1 that line is vacant 
E57 – The line is set in direction 
of station 1 
Table 25 FTA of H2.2.3 
H2.2.3 - Train 1 at St. 1 has proceed aspect towards St. 2, Train 2 is at St. 2 and receives proceed aspect towards St. 1 
AND 
Train 1 has proceed aspect Train 2 receives proceed aspect 
E58 – Main signal (exit) signals proceed E59 – Line is set in direction of towards station 1 
Table 26 FTA of H2.2.4 
H2.2.4 – Train 1 at St. 1 receives proceed aspect towards St. 2, Train 2 at St. 2 receives proceed aspect towards St. 1 
AND 
Train 1 at station 1 satisfies conditions for receiving proceed 
aspect 
Train 2 at station 3 satisfies conditions for receiving proceed 
aspect 
AND AND 
E60 – Line is in direction of 
station 2 
E61 – The line is vacant E62 – Line is in direction of 
station 1 
E63 – The line is vacant 
Table 27 FTA of H2.2.5 
H2.2.5 – Train 1 at St. 1 has proceed aspect towards St. 2,  
Train 2 has passed main signal (exit) at St. 2 and is en route towards St. 1 
AND 
Train 2 had proceed aspect, the line was previously set in 
direction towards station 1 
Train 1 has proceed aspect 
AND E66 – Line is set in direction of station 2 
E64 – Train 2 has not arrived 
station 1 
E65 – Line is released 
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Table 28 FTA of H3 - Collision train-object 
H3 – Collision train-object 
OR 
Collision at level crossing with level crossing interlocking H3.1 – Collision 
related to work 
in/at track 
E71 – Other 
conditions that 
might be 
prevented by 
signalling "Stop" AND See Table 29 
E67 – Road traffic 
is not blocked 
Train arrive at level crossing 
OR 
E68 – Train do not 
pass main signal or 
distant signal that has 
dependency to level 
crossing interlocking 
Train passes main 
signal that has a 
dependency to level 
crossing interlocking 
Train passes distant 
signal that has a 
dependency to level 
crossing interlocking 
E69 – Main signal 
signals proceed 
aspect 
E70 – Distant signal 
signals proceed 
aspect 
Table 29 FTA of H3.1 – Collision related to work in/at track 
H3.1 – Collision related to work in/at track 
OR 
Collision related to work in/at track between two stations Collision related to work in/at track at station 
Proceed aspect for outgoing traffic is given from one of the stations Proceed aspect is given onto a track circuit that is 
under work 
Outgoing train route is locked E74 – Train route is locked that consists of a track 
section that is under work 
AND 
E72 – Line is set in an outgoing 
direction from a station 
E73 – Line is set in incoming 
direction to neighbouring station 
Table 30 FTA of H4 – Level Crossing Accident 
H6 – Level Crossing Accident 
OR 
Collision at level crossing with level crossing interlocking E79 – Other 
accidents 
AND 
Train arrive at level crossing Road traffic is not 
blocked 
OR E78 – Level crossing 
equipment (gates and 
signals) do not signal 
“Stop” 
E75 – Train do not pass main 
signal or distant signal that has a 
dependency to level crossing 
interlocking 
E76 – Train passes 
main signal that 
has a dependency 
to level crossing 
interlocking 
E77 – Train passes distant 
signal that has a 
dependency to level 
crossing interlocking 
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B.2 RESULTS FROM INSTANTIATING HAZARD ANALYSIS 
Table 31 represents the hazard log provided as a result of instantiating the Hazard Analysis pattern. The 
table provides traceability between hazards and their potential causes that are relevant with respect to 
the 2TLCI system (excluding potential causes of error associated with e.g. projecting error, human 
errors, etc. that are beyond the conceptualisation of the 2TLCI system).  
In the column “Potential Cause” of Table 31, potential causes of hazards are given by referencing the 
identifiers for events found in the fault trees (documented in Appendix B.1). The tables where identified 
events may be found are given in brackets. An “and” dependency between events in the fault tree are 
written by separating the identifiers for events with the sign “*”, and an “or” dependency in the fault trees 
are resolved by adding rows to Table 31. 
Table 31 Hazard Log 
Hazard: H1 - Derailment 
Cs. ID Potential Cause Problem description Mitigating Actions 
C1 E2*E3  
(Table 12) 
Train occupies a point that does not 
belong to its train route. 
Assure that a proceed aspect is not given unless all 
conditions for locking the train route are satisfied. 
Assure that a train route may not be locked if a track 
section with a point in the train route belongs to another 
train route. 
Assure that a train route may not be locked unless all 
track sections belonging to the train route are vacant. 
Assure that a train route may not be locked unless all 
points belonging to the train route are positioned 
correctly. 
 
C2 E2*E4*E5 
(Table 12) 
Point belongs to the train route but the 
train has no proceed aspect. 
No mitigation defined – the train has no proceed aspect. 
Automatic train control as mitigation is out of scope. 
C3 E2*E4*E6*E7  
(Table 12, Table 
13) 
Train has proceed aspect on a train 
route but the point is not in the correct 
position. 
Assure that a train route may not be locked unless points 
belonging to the train route are controlled in correct 
position. 
C4 E2*E4*E6*E8*E9  
(Table 12, Table 
13) 
Train has proceed on a train route 
where a point is initially in correct 
position but where the position is 
altered. 
Assure that the position of a point may only be altered if 
conditions for altering its position are satisfied. 
Assure that the position of a point may not be altered if it 
belongs to a locked train route. 
C5 E2*E4*E6*E8*E10
*E13*E14 (Table 
12, Table 13,Table 
14) 
Train has proceed aspect on a train 
route where a point is controlled 
correct in a diverging position but main 
signal does not signal proceed slow. 
Assure that a main signal for a train route that has a point 
positioned to a diverging track does not signal less 
restrictive signal than proceed slow. 
C6 E2*E4*E6*E8*E10
*E13*E15* *E16* 
E17  
(Table 12, Table 
13,Table 14,Table 
15) 
Train has proceed aspect on a train 
route where a point is controlled 
correct in a diverging position, main 
signal does not signal proceed but 
distant signal does not give correct 
restrictive signal. 
Assure that a distant signal shows at least as restrictive a 
signal aspect as its belonging main signal. 
Hazard: H2 – Collision train-train 
Cs. ID Potential Cause Problem description Mitigating Actions 
C7 E22*E23  
(Table 17) 
Collision when main (entry) signal 
signals proceed when another train is 
present in train route. 
Assure that a proceed aspect for a main signal belonging 
to a train route may only be given once the conditions for 
locking the train route are satisfied. 
Assure that a train route may not be locked unless all 
track sections in the train route are vacant. 
C8 E24*E25  
(Table 17) 
Collision as main (entry) signal signals 
proceed when another train present in 
safety zone. 
Assure that train route may not be locked unless its 
safety zone is vacant. 
C9 E26 (Table 17) Incoming train passes signal in ‘stop’. No mitigation defined – the train has no proceed aspect. 
Automatic train control as mitigation is out of scope. 
C10 E27*E28*E29  
(Table 18) 
Point is positioned onto wrong train 
route where there is a train. 
Assure that a train route may not be locked unless all 
points belonging to the train route is positioned correctly. 
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C11 E27*E30*E31  
(Table 18) 
Train has proceed aspect but passes 
its train route or safety zone where 
there is a train. 
No mitigation defined – the train should stop at end of 
train route. Automatic train control as mitigation is out of 
scope. 
C12 E33*E35  
(Table 19) 
Two train routes with shared pars are 
both locked. 
Assure that a proceed aspect for a main signal belonging 
to a train route may only be given once the conditions for 
locking the train route are satisfied. 
Assure that a train route may not be locked if it has a part 
that is shared with another locked train route. 
C13 E33*E36  
(Table 19) 
Two train routes with shared parts and 
proceed as one route is released too 
early. 
Assure that an incoming train route that is locked may not 
be released before the train has arrived the station. 
C14 E33*E37  
(Table 19) 
Two locked train routes where one 
train crosses safety zone of other train 
route. 
Assure that a train route may not be locked if there is 
another train route locked over its safety zone. 
C15 E37*E38 
(Table 19) 
Two locked train routes with same 
safety zone. 
Assure that a train route may not be locked if there is 
another train route locked over its safety zone. 
C16 E39 
(Table 19) 
Train passes signal in stop. Requires no mitigation – the train shall stop when signal 
is stop. Automatic train control as mitigation is out of 
scope. 
C17 E40*E41  
(Table 20) 
Two train routes are locked and has 
shared parts. 
Assure that a train route may not be locked if it has a part 
that is shared with another locked train route. 
C18 E40*E42  
(Table 20) 
Two train routes have shared parts 
and the second route gets locked as 
the first is released too early. 
Assure that an outgoing train route that is locked may not 
be released before the train has left the station 
C19 E40*E43  
(Table 20) 
Two locked train routes where one 
train crosses safety zone of other train 
route. 
Assure that a train route may not be locked if other train 
routes are locked over its safety zone. 
C20 E44 (Table 20) Train passes signal in ‘stop’. Requires no mitigation – the train has no proceed aspect. 
Automatic train control as mitigation is out of scope. 
C21 E45 (Table 20) Train passes signal in ‘stop’. Requires no mitigation – the train has no proceed aspect. 
Automatic train control as mitigation is out of scope. 
C22 E46 (Table 21) Collision at station as at least one train 
passes ‘stop’. 
Requires no mitigation – the train has no proceed aspect. 
Automatic train control as mitigation is out of scope. 
C23 E47*E48  
(Table 21) 
Collision at station as two train routes 
are locked where these have a shared 
part. 
Assure that a train route may not be locked if it has a part 
that is shared with another locked train route 
C24 E47*E49  
(Table 21) 
Collision at station as two train routes 
are locked due to one released before 
train has left the station. 
Assure that an outgoing train route that is locked may not 
be released before the train has left the station. 
C25 E50*E51*E52*E53  
(Table 23) 
Collision at line due to proceed is 
given although a train occupies line. 
Assure that a proceed aspect for a main signal, belonging 
to a train route, may only be given once the conditions for 
locking the train route are satisfied. 
Assure that a train route may not be locked unless all 
track sections in the train route are vacant. 
C26 E54*E55*E56*E57 
(Table 24) 
Collision at line due to proceed given 
to both stations. 
Assure that an outgoing train route may not be locked 
unless the line is vacant. 
Assure that an outgoing train route may not be locked 
unless the line is set in the direction from the starting 
point of the train route. 
 
C27 E58*E59 
(Table 25) 
Collision at line due to one train gets 
line set and receives proceed aspect 
in opposite direction as a train that 
already has proceed aspect. 
Assure that the line may only be set in the direction of an 
arrival station if the main signals (exit) of the arrival 
station shows ‘stop’. 
C28 E60*E61*E62*E63 
(Table 26) 
The line is vacant and two trains at 
different stations satisfy conditions for 
receiving proceed. 
Requires no mitigation – a line may only be set in one 
direction. 
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C29 E64*E65*E66 
(Table 27) 
Collision at line as the line is released 
although the first train has not arrived 
at its arrival station. 
Assure that an incoming train route that is locked may not 
be released before the train has arrived the station. 
Assure that an outgoing train route may not be locked 
unless the line is set in the direction from the train routes 
starting point. 
Assure that an outgoing train route may not be locked 
unless the line is vacant. 
Hazard: H3 – Collision train-object 
Cs. ID Potential Cause Problem description Mitigating Actions 
C30 E67*E68  
(Table 28) 
Road traffic is not blocked and train 
arrive at level crossing without passing 
main signal or distant signal with 
dependency to interlocking. 
Requires no mitigation – this may be a projecting error or 
the distance between level crossing and any distant 
signal or main signal makes it impractical to define 
dependency. 
C31 E67*E69  
(Table 28) 
Main signal with dependency to 
interlocking signals proceed and road 
traffic is not blocked. 
Assure that a proceed aspect for a main signal that has a 
dependency to a level crossing interlocking is only given 
if road traffic is blocked. 
C32 E67*E70  
(Table 28) 
Distant signal with dependency to 
interlocking signals proceed and road 
traffic is not blocked. 
Assure that a proceed aspect for a distant signal that has 
a dependency to a level crossing interlocking is only 
given if road traffic is blocked. 
C33 E71 
(Table 28) 
Event that might be prevented by 
signalling ‘stop’. 
Requires no mitigation – there is no other condition 
identified that requires ‘stop’. 
C34 E72*E73  
(Table 29) 
Collision related to work in/at line 
where the line is set outgoing from one 
station and incoming to neighbouring 
station. 
Assure that a train route may not be locked if a track 
section in the train route is blocked. 
Assure that no work is allowed on a track section unless 
it is blocked. 
C35 E74  
(Table 29) 
Collision related to work in/at track at 
station where a track route consisting 
of a track under work has been locked. 
Assure that no work is allowed on a track section unless 
it is blocked. 
Hazard: H4 – Level crossing accident 
Cs. ID Potential Cause Problem description Mitigating Actions 
C36 E75*E78  
(Table 30) 
Road traffic is not blocked and train do 
not pass main signal or distant signal 
with dependency to interlocking. 
Requires no mitigation – this may be a projecting error or 
the distance between level crossing and any distant 
signal or main signal makes it impractical to define 
dependency. 
C37 E76*E78  
(Table 30) 
Road traffic is not blocked and main 
signal with dependency to interlocking 
signals proceed. 
Assure that a proceed aspect for a main signal that has a 
dependency to a level crossing interlocking is not given 
unless road traffic is blocked. 
C38 E77*E78  
(Table 30) 
Road traffic is not blocked and distant 
signal with dependency to interlocking 
signals proceed. 
Assure that a proceed aspect for a distant signal that has 
a dependency to a level crossing interlocking is not given 
unless road traffic is blocked. 
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B.3 RESULTS FROM INSTANTIATING RISK ANALYSIS 
According to the SIL Classification pattern, the first step is to define tolerable hazard rates (THR) for 
system functions. The assumed THR for the hazards that are found relevant with respect to the operation 
of the 2TLCI system is defined in Table 32. We have assumed a THR of 10-9 per hour per function as 
each hazard may in a worst-case scenario lead to multiple fatalities. 
In Table 32, the first two columns identify hazards and THR (defined according to step 1 of SIL 
Classification). The column “Functions” list relevant system functions that are associated with the hazard.  
The “SIL” column lists the classification of the function into a SIL level based on the THR for the hazard 
and the potential contribution of the function (assumed “likely” here as we have not performed a 
quantitative estimation) to the occurrence of the hazard (defined according to step 3 of SIL Classification 
pattern). 
Table 32 Hazard Log Extension - Hazards, THR, Functions and SIL 
Hazard THR (Tolerable 
Hazard Rate) per 
hour per function 
Functions SIL 
Short description Ref. (Table 31) 
H1 – Derailment 10-9 F1 – Lock a train route C1, C3 SIL4 
F2 – Control point is free C1 SIL4 
F3 – Control point in correct position C1,C3 SIL4 
F4 – Set position of point C4 SIL4 
F5 – Signal proceed aspect C3, C5, C6 SIL4 
H2 – Collision train-train 10-9 F1 – Lock a train route C7, C12, C14, 
C15, C17, C19, 
C23, C26, C29 
SIL4 
F5 – Signal proceed aspect C7 SIL4 
F6 – Control track section is vacant C7, C8 SIL4 
F3 – Control point in correct position C10 SIL4 
F7 – Release a locked train route C13, C18, C24 SIL4 
F8 – Set direction of line C27 SIL4 
F9 – Release the line (set to neutral position) C29 SIL4 
H3 – Collision train-object 10-9 F1 – Lock a train route C31, C34, C35 SIL4 
F5 – Signal proceed aspect C31, C32 SIL4 
F10 – Block road traffic C31, C32 SIL4 
F11 – Block track section C34, C35 SIL4 
H6 – Level crossing 
accidents 
10-9 F10 – Block road traffic C37, C38 SIL4 
F5 – Signal proceed aspect C37, C38 SIL4 
Every hazard listed in Table 32 is given a THR that in the SIL table of the pattern SIL Classification maps 
to a SIL4 level for associated system functions. Instead of identifying and classifying every system 
function, Table 32 identifies the main functions and their SIL. We simplify the classification procedure 
and classify the system as a SIL4 system. A complete detailing of SIL for every function could be a 
benefit if it is possible to modularise the system such that there is a sufficient separation between 
functions with different SIL.  
The SIL4 classification implies that a compliance argument must be given that provides assurance that 
the system is developed according to appropriate practices. The appropriate practices associated with 
the development of SIL4 systems are stated in standards. In the context of the railway case the practices 
are defined by the requirements given in [13], [14], and [15] that applies to SIL4 systems.  
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B.4 RESULTS FROM INSTANTIATING ESTABLISH SYSTEM SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
The safety requirements defined in Table 33 were established on the basis of the proposed mitigations of 
hazards collected in the hazard log. The hazard log is presented in Table 31 in Appendix B.2. Potential 
mitigations for hazards are given in the column named “Mitigating Actions” in Table 31.  
The safety requirements in Table 33 have unique identifiers, which are given in column “ID”. Each safety 
requirement is traceable to the respective mitigated hazards by the references provided in the column 
“Mitigates”. 
Table 33 Safety Requirements 
ID Requirement Mitigates 
 (Ref. Table 31) 
SR.1 A proceed aspect for a main signal belonging to a train route may only be given once the conditions 
for locking the train route are satisfied 
C1, C7, C12, 
C25 
SR.2 A train route may not be locked unless all points belonging to the train route are positioned correctly C1, C10 
SR.3 A train route may not be locked if a track section in the train route belongs to another train route C1 
SR.4 A train route may not be locked unless points belonging to the train route are controlled in correct 
position 
C3 
SR.5 A points position may only be altered if conditions for altering its position are satisfied C4 
SR.6 A points position may not be altered if it belongs to a locked train route or if it belongs to a track 
section that is not vacant 
C4 
SR.7 A main signal for a train route that has a point positioned to a diverging track shall not signal less 
restrictive than proceed slow 
C5 
SR.8 A distant signal shall show at least as restrictive aspect as its belonging main signal C6 
SR.9 A train route may not be locked unless all track sections in the train route are vacant C7, C25 
SR.10 A train route may not be locked unless its safety zone is vacant C8 
SR.11 A train route may not be locked if it has a part that is shared with another locked train route C12, C17, C23 
SR.12 An incoming train route that is locked may not be released before the train has arrived the station C13, C29 
SR13 A train route may not be locked if there is another train route locked over its safety zone C14, C15,C19 
SR.14 An outgoing train route that is locked may not be released before the train has left the station C18, C24 
SR.15 An outgoing train route may not be locked unless the line is set in the direction from the train routes 
starting point 
C26, C29 
SR.16 An outgoing train route may not be locked unless the line is vacant C26, C29 
SR.17 The line may only be set in the direction of an arrival station if the main signals (exit) of the arrival 
station shows ‘Stop’ 
C27 
SR.18 In order to signal proceed aspect for a main signal that has a dependency to a level crossing 
interlocking, the road traffic must be blocked 
C31, C37 
SR.19 In order to signal proceed aspect for a distant signal that has a dependency to a level crossing 
interlocking, the road traffic must be blocked 
C32, C38 
SR.20 No work is allowed on a track section unless it is blocked C34, C35 
SR.21 A train route may not be locked if a track section in the train route is blocked C34 
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Abstract—In this paper, we present an analytic evaluation of the
Safe Control Systems (SaCS) pattern language for the develop-
ment of conceptual safety designs. By a conceptual safety design
we mean an early stage speciﬁcation of system requirements,
system design, and safety case for a safety critical system. The
SaCS pattern language may express basic patterns on different
aspects of relevance for conceptual safety designs. SaCS may
also be used to combine basic patterns into composite patterns.
A composite pattern may be instantiated into a conceptual safety
design. A framework for evaluating modelling languages is used
to conduct the evaluation. The quality of a language is within
the framework expressed by six appropriateness factors. A set
of requirements is associated with each appropriateness factor.
The extent to which these requirements are fulﬁlled are used to
judge the quality. We discuss the fulﬁlment of the requirements
formulated for the SaCS language on the basis of the theoretical,
technical, and practical considerations that were taken into
account and shaped the SaCS language.
Keywords–pattern language, analytic evaluation, design concep-
tualisation, safety.
I. INTRODUCTION
A pattern describes a particular recurring problem that
arises in a speciﬁc context and presents a well-proven generic
scheme for its solution [1]. A pattern language is a language for
specifying patterns making use of patterns from a vocabulary
of existing patterns and deﬁned rules for combining these
[2]. A safety critical system [3] is a system “whose failure
could result in loss of life, signiﬁcant property damage, or
damage to the environment”. With a conceptual safety design
we mean an early stage speciﬁcation of system requirements,
system design, and safety case for a safety critical system.
The Safe Control Systems (SaCS) pattern language has been
designed to facilitate the speciﬁcation of patterns to support the
development of conceptual safety designs. The intended users
of SaCS are system engineers, safety engineers, hardware and
software engineers.
This paper conducts an analytic evaluation of the suit-
ability of the SaCS pattern language for its intended task.
A framework for analysing languages known as the semiotic
quality framework (SEQUAL) [4] is used as a basis for the
evaluation. The appropriateness of a language for its intended
task is in the framework characterised by six appropriateness
factors [4]: domain, modeller, participant, comprehensibility,
tool, and organisational. A set of requirements is presented
for each appropriateness factor in order to characterise more
precisely what is expected from our language in order to be
appropriate. The requirements represent the criteria for judging
what is appropriate of a language for conceptual safety design,
independent of SaCS being appropriate or not. We motivate
our choices and discuss to what extent the requirements are
fulﬁlled.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows:
Section II provides a short introduction to the SaCS pattern
language. Section III discusses evaluation approaches and
motivates the selection of SEQUAL. Section IV motivates the
selection of requirements and conducts an evaluation of the
SaCS language with respect to these requirements for each
appropriateness factor. Section V presents related work on
pattern-based development. Section VI draws the conclusions.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE SACS PATTERN LANGUAGE
Fig. 1 deﬁnes a composite pattern according to the syntax
of SaCS [5]. The composite described in Fig. 1 is named Safety
Requirements and consists of the basic patterns Hazard Anal-
ysis, Risk Analysis, and Establish System Safety Requirements.
The basic patterns are speciﬁed separately in a structured
manner comparable to what can be found in the literature
[1][2][6][7][8][9][10][11] on patterns.
In Fig. 1, the horizontal line separates the declaration part
of the composite pattern from its content. The icon placed
below the identiﬁer Safety Requirements signals that this is
a composite pattern. Every pattern in SaCS is parametrised.
An input parameter represents the information expected to be
provided when applying a pattern in a context. An output
parameter represents the expected outcome of applying a
pattern in a given context. The inputs to Safety Requirements
are listed inside square brackets to the left of the icon, i.e., ToA
and Haz. The arrow pointing towards the brackets symbolises
input. The output of the pattern is also listed inside square
brackets, but on the right-hand side of the icon, i.e., Req. The
arrow pointing away from the brackets symbolises output. An
icon placed adjacent to a parameter identiﬁer denotes its type.
The parameters ToA, Haz, HzLg, and Risks in Fig. 1 are of type
documentation, while Req is of type requirement. The inputs
and outputs of a composite are always publicly accessible.
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Figure 1. A composite pattern named Safety Requirements
A particular instantiation of a parameter is documented
by a relation that connects a parameter with its associated
development artefact. In Fig. 1, a grey icon placed adjacent
to an identiﬁer of a development artefact classiﬁes what kind
of artefact that is referenced. A dotted drawn line connecting a
parameter with an artefact represents an instantiates relation.
Instantiations of parameters expressed in Fig. 1 are:
• the document artefact System and Context Description
instantiates ToA.
• the document artefact System Hazards Description
instantiates Haz.
• the requirement artefact Safety Requirements Speciﬁ-
cation instantiates Req.
• the document artefact Hazard Log instantiates HzLg.
• the document artefact Risk Assessment instantiates
Risks.
A one-to-many relationship exists between inputs in the
declaration part of a composite and similarly named inputs
with public accessibility (those pointed at by fat arrows) in
the content part. The relationship is such that when ToA
of Safety Requirements is instantiated (i.e., given its value
by the deﬁned relation to System and Context Description)
then every correspondingly named input parameter contained
in the composite is also similarly instantiated. A one-to-
one relationship exists between an output parameter in the
declaration part of a composite and a correspondingly named
output parameter with public accessibility (those followed by
a fat arrow) in the content part. The relationship is such that
when Req of Establish System Safety Requirements is produced
then Req of Safety Requirements is similarly produced.
The arrows (thin arrows) connecting basic patterns in the
content part of Safety Requirements represent two instances of
an operator known as the assigns relation. The assigns relations
within Safety Requirements express that:
• The output HzLg of the pattern Hazard Analysis is
assigned to the input Haz of the pattern Risk Analysis.
• The output Risks of the pattern Risk Analysis is
assigned to the input Risks of the pattern Establish
System Safety Requirements.
That the three basic patterns are process patterns follows
from the icon below their respective identiﬁers. There are six
different kinds of basic patterns in SaCS, each represented by
a speciﬁc icon.
III. EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
Mendling et al. [12] describe two dominant approaches
in the literature for evaluating the quality of modelling ap-
proaches: (1) top-down quality frameworks; (2) bottom-up
metrics that relate to quality aspects. The most prominent
top-down quality framework according to [12] is SEQUAL
[4][13][14]. The framework is based on semiotic theory (the
theory of signs) and is developed for evaluating the quality
of conceptual models and languages of all kinds. Moody et
al. [15] report on an empiric study involving 194 participants
on the use of SEQUAL and concludes that the study provides
strong support for the validity of the framework. Becker et
al. [16] present a guideline-based approach as an alternative
to SEQUAL. It addresses the six factors: correctness, clarity,
relevance, comparability, economic efﬁciency, and systematic
design. Mendling et al. [12] also discuss a number of bottom-
up metrics approaches. Several of these contributions are
theoretic without empirical validation according to the authors.
We have chosen to apply the SEQUAL framework for our
evaluation as it is a general framework applicable to different
kinds of languages [4] whose usefulness has been conﬁrmed in
experiments [15]. Furthermore, an analytic evaluation is pre-
ferred over a metric-based approach due to project limitations.
An analytic evaluation is also a suitable complement to the
experience-based evaluations of SaCS presented in [17][18].
The appropriateness of a modelling language for a speciﬁc
task is in SEQUAL related to the deﬁnition of the following
sets: the set of goals G for the modelling task; its domain D in
the form of the set of all statements that can be stated about the
situation at hand; the relevant knowledge of the modeller Km
and other participants Ks involved in the modelling task; what
persons involved interpret the models to say I; the language L
in the form of the set of all statements that can be expressed
in the language; relevant tool interpretation T of the models;
and what is expressed in the models M.
Fig. 2 is adopted from [13] and illustrates the relationships
between the different sets in SEQUAL. The quality of a
language L is expressed by six appropriateness factors. The
quality of a model M is expressed by nine quality aspects.
In the following, we will not address the different quality
aspects of a model M but rather address the quality of the
SaCS pattern language.
The appropriateness factors indicated in Fig. 2 are related
to different properties of the language under evaluation. The
appropriateness factors are [4]:
• Domain appropriateness: the language should be able
to represent all concepts in the domain.
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Figure 2. The quality framework (adopted from [19])
• Modeller appropriateness: there should be no state-
ments in the explicit knowledge of the modeller that
cannot be expressed in the language.
• Participant appropriateness: the conceptual basis
should correspond as much as possible to the way
individuals who partake in modelling perceive reality.
• Comprehensibility appropriateness: participants in the
modelling should be able to understand all the possible
statements of the language.
• Tool appropriateness: the language should have a
syntax and semantics that a computerised tool can
understand.
• Organisational appropriateness: the language should
be usable within the organisation it targets such that
it ﬁts with the work processes and the modelling
required to be performed.
A set of requirements is associated with each appropriate-
ness factor. The extent to which the requirements are fulﬁlled
are used to judge the quality of the SaCS pattern language for
its intended task. The requirements are deﬁned on the basis of
requirements found in the literature on SEQUAL [4].
IV. THE EVALUATION
A necessary step in the application of SEQUAL [4][13]
is to adapt the evaluation to account for the modelling needs.
This amounts to expressing what the different appropriateness
factors of the framework represent in the particular context of
the evaluation in question. In particular, the modelling needs
are detailed by the deﬁnition of a set of criteria for each of
the appropriateness factors.
Table I introduces the criteria for evaluating the suitability
of the SaCS pattern language for its intended task. In the
ﬁrst column of Table I, the two letters of each requirement
identiﬁer identify the appropriateness factor addressed by the
requirement, e.g., DA for Domain Appropriateness.
TABLE I. OVERVIEW OF EVALUATION CRITERIA
ID Requirement
DA.1 The language must include the concepts representing best practices within
conceptual safety design.
DA.2 The language must support the application of best practices within concep-
tual safety design.
MA.1 The language must facilitate tacit knowledge externalisation within concep-
tual safety design.
MA.2 The language must support the modelling needs within conceptual safety
design.
PA.1 The terms used for concepts in the language must be the same terms used
within safety engineering.
PA.2 The symbols used to illustrate the meaning of concepts in the language
must reﬂect these meanings.
PA.3 The language must be understandable for people familiar with safety
engineering without speciﬁc training.
CA.1 The concepts and symbols of the language should differ to the extent they
are different.
CA.2 It must be possible to group related statements in the language in a natural
manner.
CA.3 It must be possible to reduce model complexity with the language.
CA.4 The symbols of the language should be as simple as possible with
appropriate use of colour and emphasis.
TA.1 The language must have a precise syntax.
TA.2 The language must have a precise semantics.
OA.1 The language must be able to express the desired conceptual safety design
when applied in a safety context.
OA.2 The language must ease the comprehensibility of best practices within
conceptual safety design for relevant target groups like system engineers,
safety engineers, hardware and software engineers.
OA.3 The language must be usable without the need of costly tools.
The different appropriateness factors are addressed succes-
sively in Section IV-A to Section IV-F according to the order
in Table I. Each requirement from Table I is discussed. A
requirement identiﬁer is presented in a bold font when ﬁrst
introduced in the text followed by the associated requirement
and an evaluation of the extent to which the requirement is
fulﬁlled by SaCS.
A. Domain appropriateness
DA.1 The language must include the concepts representing
best practices within conceptual safety design.
In the SaCS language, there are currently 26 basic patterns
[17][18] on different concepts within conceptual safety design.
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Each pattern may be referenced by its unique name. Three of
the currently available basic patterns are referenced in Fig. 1
and are named Hazard Analysis, Risk Analysis and Establish
System Safety Requirements.
Fig. 3 presents the icons used for basic SaCS patterns and
indicates a categorisation. The three icons to the left are used
for categorising patterns providing development guidance with
a strong processual focus. The three icons to the right are used
for categorising patterns providing development guidance with
a strong product focus. Different kinds of patterns express dif-
ferent concepts and best practices within development of safety
critical systems. The combined use of patterns from different
categories facilitates development of conceptual safety designs.
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Figure 3. Icons for the different kinds of basic pattern references
Habli and Kelly [20] describe the two dominant approaches
in safety standards for providing assurance of safety objectives
being met. These are: (1) the process-based approach; (2) the
product-based approach. Within the process-based approach,
safety assurance is achieved on the basis of evidence from
the application of recommended or mandatory development
practices in the development life cycle. Within the product-
based approach, safety assurance is achieved on the basis
of product speciﬁc evidences that meet safety requirements
derived from hazard analysis. The practice within safety stan-
dards as described above motivate our categorisation into the
process assurance and the product assurance pattern groups.
The safety property of a system is addressed on the basis
of a demonstration of the fulﬁlment of safety objectives. Seven
nuclear regulators [21] deﬁne a safety demonstration as “a set
of arguments and evidence elements that support a selected
set of dependability claims - in particular the safety - of the
operation of a system important to safety used in a given plant
environment”. Although it is the end system that is put into
operation, evidences supporting safety claims are produced
throughout the system life cycle and need to be systematically
gathered from the very beginning of a development project
[21]. The safety case approach represents a means for explicitly
presenting the structure of claims, arguments, and evidences
in a manner that facilitates evaluation of the rationale and
basis for claiming that safety objectives are met. The safety
case approach is supported by several authors [10][20][21][22].
What is described above motivates the need for patterns
supporting safety case speciﬁcation in addition to patterns on
requirements elicitation and system design speciﬁcation.
As indicated above, in the design of the SaCS pattern
language we have as much as possible selected keywords and
icons in the spirit of leading literature within the area. This
indicates that we at least are able to represent a signiﬁcant
part of the concepts of relevance for conceptual safety design.
DA.2 The language must support the application of best
practices within conceptual safety design.
Safety standards [23] may demand a number of activities
to be performed in which certain activities must be applied in a
speciﬁc sequence. Safety standards [23] may also describe the
expected inputs and outputs of different activities and in this
sense state what is the expected content of deliverables that
allows a transition from one activity to the next. According
to Krogstie [4], the main phenomena in languages that ac-
commodate a behavioural modelling perspective are states and
transitions between states. In this sense, the language should
support the modelling of the application of best practices
according to a behavioural modelling perspective.
Fig. 4 presents the icons for the different kinds of pa-
rameters and artefact references in SaCS. The documentation
parameter and the documentation artefact reference types
(represented visually by the icons presented in Fig. 4) are
deﬁned in order to allow a generic classiﬁcation of parameters
and artefacts that may not be classiﬁed as requirement, design,
or safety case. An example may be the result of risk analysis
that is an intermediate result in conceptual safety design and an
input to an activity on the speciﬁcation of safety requirements
[23][24]. The process of deriving safety requirements on the
basis of an assessment of hazards is expressed by a chain of
patterns as presented in Fig. 1. The outcome of applying the
last pattern in the chain is a requirements speciﬁcation. The
last pattern cannot be applied before the required inputs are
produced.
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Figure 4. Icons for the different kinds of parameters and artefact references
Fig. 5 presents the symbolic representation of the different
relations in SaCS. Relations deﬁne transitions between patterns
or dependencies between elements within a composite pattern
deﬁnition. The reports [17][18] deﬁne the concepts behind the
different relations and exemplify the practical use of all the
concepts in different scenarios. Fig. 1 is explained in Section
II and exemplify a composite pattern containing ﬁve instances
of the instantiates relation and two instances of the assigns
relation.
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Figure 5. Symbols for the different kinds of relations
The need for the different relations presented in Fig. 5
is motivated by the practices described in different standards
and guidelines, e.g., IEC 61508 [23], where activities like
hazard identiﬁcation and hazard analysis are required to be
performed sequentially and where the output of one activity
is assigned as input to another activity. Thus, we need a
concept of assignment. In SaCS, this is deﬁned by an assigns
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relation between patterns. When performing an activity like
hazard analysis, the results from the application of a number
of methods may be combined and used as input. Two widely
known methods captured in two different basic SaCS patterns
are Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Fault
Tree Analysis (FTA). A concept for combining results is
needed in order to model that the results from applying
several patterns as FMEA and FTA are combined into a union
consisting of every individual result. In SaCS, this is deﬁned
by a combines relation between patterns. A details relation
is used to express that the result of applying one pattern
is further detailed by the application of a second pattern.
Functional safety is an important concept in IEC 61508 [23].
Functional safety is a part of the overall safety that depends
on a system or equipment operating correctly in response to
its inputs. Furthermore, functional safety is achieved when
every speciﬁed safety function is carried out and the level
of performance required of each safety function is met. A
satisﬁes relation between a pattern for requirements elicitation
and a pattern for system design expresses that the derived
system satisﬁes the derived requirements. Safety case patterns
supports documenting the safety argument. A demonstrates
relation between a safety case pattern and a design pattern
expresses that the derived safety argument represents a safety
demonstration for the derived system.
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 illustrate how the intended instantiation
order of patterns may be visualised. The direction of the arrow
indicates the pattern instantiation order; patterns (or more
precisely the patterns referred to graphically) placed closer to
the starting point of the arrow are instantiated prior to patterns
placed close to the tip of the arrow. Patterns may be instantiated
in parallel and thus have no speciﬁc order; this is visualised
by placing pattern references on separate arrows.
 
Figure 6. Serial instantiation


Figure 7. Parallel instantiation
As argued above, the SaCS language facilitates the ap-
plication of best practices within safety design and mirrors
leading international standards within the area; in particular
IEC 61508. We therefore think it is fair to say that the language
to a large extent fulﬁls DA.2.
B. Modeller appropriateness
MA.1 The language must facilitate tacit knowledge exter-
nalisation within conceptual safety design.
As already mentioned, the current version of the language
contains 26 basic patterns. The basic patterns are documented
in [17] and [18]. The patterns are deﬁned on the basis of
safety engineering best practices as deﬁned in international
standards and guidelines [21][23][24][25][26][27] and other
sources on safety engineering. The limited number of basic
patterns currently available delimit what can be modelled in a
composite pattern. Deﬁning more basic patterns will provide a
better coverage of the tacit knowledge that can be externalised.
A user may easily extend the language. A basic pattern, e.g.,
the pattern Hazard Analysis [17] referenced in Fig. 1, is deﬁned
in a simple structure of named sections containing text and
illustrations according to a common format. The format is
thoroughly detailed in [5].
Table II compares the overall format of basic SaCS patterns
to pattern formats in the literature. We have chosen a format
that resembles that of Alexander et al. [2] with the addition
of the sections “Pattern signature”, “Intent”, “Applicability”,
and “Instantiation rule”. The signature, intent, and applicability
sections of basic patterns are documented in such a manner
that the context section provided in [2] is not needed. The
format in [2] is a suitable basis as it is simple, well-known, and
generally applicable for specifying patterns of different kinds.
The format provided by Gamma et al. [8] is also simple and
well-known, but tailored speciﬁcally for capturing patterns for
software design.
All in all, we admit that there may be relevant tacit
knowledge that is not easily externalised as the SaCS language
is today. However, the opportunity of increasing the number
of basic patterns makes it possible to at least reduce the gap.
MA.2 The language must support the modelling needs
within conceptual safety design.
IEC 61508 [23] is deﬁned to be applicable across all in-
dustrial domains developing safety-related systems. As already
mentioned, a key concept within IEC 61508 is functional
safety. Functional safety is achieved according to [23] by
adopting a broad range of principles, techniques and measures.
A key concept within SaCS is that principles, techniques,
methods, activities, and technical solutions of different kinds
are deﬁned within the format of basic patterns. A limited
number of concerns are addressed by each basic pattern. A
TABLE II. PATTERN FORMATS IN THE LITERATURE
COMPARED TO BASIC SACS PATTERNS [5]
[6] [2] [8] [9] [10] [28] [29] [30] [5]
Name         
Also known as  
Pattern signature 
Intent   
Motivation  
Applicability   
Purpose 
Context    
Problem      
Forces  
Solution       
Structure  
Participants  
Collaborations  
Consequences  
Implementation  
Sample code 
Example 
Compare 
Instantiation rule 
Related patterns      
Known uses     
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speciﬁc combination of patterns is deﬁned within a compos-
ite pattern. A composite pattern is intended to address the
overall challenges that appear in a given development context.
Individual patterns within a composite only address a subset
of the challenges that need to be solved in the context. A
composite may be deﬁned prior to work initiation in order to
deﬁne a plan for the application of patterns. Another use may
be to reﬁne a composite throughout the work process. This is
exempliﬁed in [17] and [18]. A composite may also be deﬁned
once patterns have been applied in order to document the
work process. A composite representing a plan may be easily
reused for documentation purposes by adding information on
the instantiation of parameters.
C. Participants appropriateness
PA.1 The terms used for concepts in the language must be
the same terms used within safety engineering.
Activities such as hazard identiﬁcation and hazard analysis
[26], methods such as fault tree analysis [31] and failure
mode effects analysis [32], system design solutions including
redundant modules and voting mechanisms [33], and prac-
tices like arguing safety on the basis of arguing that safety
requirements are satisﬁed [21], are all well known safety
engineering practices that may be found in different standards
and guidelines [23][24][27]. The different concepts mentioned
above are all reﬂected in basic SaCS patterns. Moreover,
as already pointed out, keywords such as process assurance,
product assurance, requirement, solution, safety case, etc. have
all been selected based on leading terminology within safety
engineering.
PA.2 The symbols used to illustrate the meaning of con-
cepts in the language must reﬂect these meanings.
One commonly cited and inﬂuential article within psychol-
ogy is that of Miller [34], on the limit of human capacity to
process information. The limit, according to Miller, is seven
plus or minus two elements. When the number of elements
increases past seven, the mind may be confused in correctly
interpreting the information. Thus, the number of symbols
should be kept low in order to facilitate effective human
information processing.
Lidwell et al. [35] describe iconic representation as “the
use of pictorial images to make actions, objects, and concepts
in a display easier to ﬁnd, recognize, learn, and remember”.
The authors describe four forms for representation of informa-
tion with icons: similar, example, symbolic, and arbitrary. We
have primarily applied the symbolic form to identify a concept
at a higher level of abstraction than what may be achieved
with the similar and example forms. We have also tried to
avoid the arbitrary form where there is little or no relationship
between a concept and its associated icon. Fig. 3, Fig. 4, Fig.
5, and Fig. 6 present the main icons in SaCS. In order to
allow a ﬂexible use of icons and keep the number of icons
low, we have chosen to not deﬁne a dedicated icon for each
concept but rather deﬁne icons that categorises several related
concepts. A relatively small number of icons was designed in a
uniform manner in order to capture intuitive representations of
related concepts. As an example, the referenced basic patterns
in Fig. 1 have the same icons linking them by category, but
unique identiﬁers separating them by name.
PA.3 The language must be understandable for people
familiar with safety engineering without speciﬁc training.
The SaCS language is simple in the sense that a small set
of icons and symbols are used for modelling the application of
patterns, basically: pattern references as in Fig. 3, parameters
and artefact references as in Fig. 4, relations as in Fig. 5, and
instantiation order as in Fig. 6. Guidance to the understanding
of the language is provided in [5], where the syntax and the
semantics of SaCS patterns are described in detail. The SaCS
language comes with a structured semantics [5] that offers
a schematic mapping from syntactical elements into text in
English. Guidance to the application of SaCS is provided by
the examples detailed in [17][18]. Although we have not tested
SaCS on people unfamiliar with the language, we expect that
users familiar with safety engineering may comprehend the
concepts and the modelling on the basis of [5][17][18] within
2-3 working days.
D. Comprehensibility appropriateness
CA.1 The concepts and symbols of the language should
differ to the extent they are different.
The purpose of the graphical notation is to represent a
structure of patterns in a manner that is intuitive, compre-
hensible, and that allows efﬁcient visual perception. The key
activities performed by a reader in order to draw conclusion
from a diagram are according to Larkin and Simon [36]:
searching and recognising relevant information.
Lidwell et al. [35] present 125 patterns of good design
based on theory and empirical research on visualisation. The
patterns describe principles of designing visual information for
effective human perception. The patterns are deﬁned on the ba-
sis of extensive research on human cognitive processes. Some
of the patterns are commonly known as Gestalt principles of
perception. Ellis [37] provides an extensive overview of the
Gestalt principles of perception building upon classic work
from Wertheimer [38] and others. Gestalt principles capture
the tendency of the human mind to naturally perceive whole
objects on the basis of object groups and parts.
One of several Gestalt principles applied in the SaCS
language is the principle of similarity. According to Lidwell
et al. [35], the principle of similarity is such that similar
elements are perceived to be more related than elements that
are dissimilar.
The use of the similarity principle is illustrated by the
composite pattern in Fig. 1. Although each referenced pattern
has a unique name, their identical icons indicate relatedness.
Different kinds of patterns are symbolised by the icons in
Fig. 3. The icons are of the same size with some aspects of
similarity and some aspects of dissimilarity such that a degree
of relatedness may be perceived. An icon for pattern reference
is different in shape and shading compared to an icon used for
artefact reference (see Fig. 3 and Fig. 4). Thus, an artefact and
a pattern should be perceived as representing quite different
concepts.
CA.2 It must be possible to group related statements in the
language in a natural manner.
There are ﬁve ways to organise information according to
Lidwell et al. [35]: category, time, location, alphabet, and
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continuum. The category refers to the organisation of elements
by similarity and relatedness. An example of the application
of the principle of categorisation [35] in SaCS is seen in the
possibility to reduce the number of relations drawn between
patterns when these are similar. Patterns in SaCS may have
multiple inputs and multiple outputs as indicated in Fig. 1.
Relations between patterns operate on the parameters. The
brackets [ ] placed adjacent to a pattern reference denotes an
ordered list of parameters. In order to avoid drawing multiple
relations between two patterns, relations operate on the ordered
parameter lists of the patterns by list-matching of parameters.
Fig. 8 exempliﬁes two different ways for expressing vi-
sually the same relationships between the composite patterns
named A and B. The list-matching mechanism is used to reduce
the number of relation symbols drawn between patterns to
one, even though the phenomena modelled represents multiple
similar relations. This reduces the visual complexity and
preserves the semantics of the relationships modelled.
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Figure 8. Alternative ways for visualising multiple similar relations
CA.3 It must be possible to reduce model complexity with
the language.
Hierarchical organisation is the simplest structure for visu-
alising and understanding complexity according to Lidwell et
al. [35]. The SaCS language allows concepts to be organised
hierarchically by specifying that one pattern is detailed by
another or by deﬁning composite patterns that reference other
composite patterns in the content part.
Fig. 9 presents a composite pattern named Requirements
that reference other composites as part of its deﬁnition. The
contained pattern Safety Requirements is deﬁned in Fig. 1.
The contained pattern Functional Requirements is not deﬁned
and is referenced within Fig. 9 for illustration purposes.
Requirements may be easily extended by deﬁning composites
supporting the elicitation of, e.g., performance requirements
and security requirements, and later model the use of such
patterns in Fig. 9. In Fig. 9, the output of applying the
Requirements pattern is represented by the parameter ReqSpec.
The ReqSpec parameter represents the result of applying the
combines relation on the output Req of the composite Safety
Requirements and the output Req of the composite Functional
Requirements.
CA.4 The symbols of the language should be as simple as
possible with appropriate use of colour and emphasis.
A general principle within visualisation according to Lid-
well et al. [35] is to use colour with care as it may lead
to misconceptions if used inappropriately. The authors points
out that there is no universal symbolism for different colours.



 		
	
	
	









		
Figure 9. Composition of composites
As colour blindness is common the SaCS language applies
different shades of grey in visualisations.
Fig. 10 illustrates how the SaCS language makes use of
the three Gestalt principles of perception [35][39][38] known
as: Figure-Ground; Proximity; and Uniform Connectedness.
The Gestalt principles express mechanisms for efﬁcient human
perception from groups of visual objects.
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Figure 10. A fragment of Fig. 1 illustrating the use of Gestalt principles
E. Tool appropriateness
TA.1 The language must have a precise syntax.
The syntax of the SaCS language (see [5]) is deﬁned in
the EBNF [40] notation. EBNF is a meta-syntax that is widely
used for describing context-free grammars.
TA.2 The language must have a precise semantics.
A structured semantics for SaCS patterns is deﬁned in [5]
in the form of a schematic mapping from pattern deﬁnitions,
via its textual syntax in EBNF [40], to English. The non-
formal representation of the semantics supports human inter-
pretation rather than tools, although the translation procedure
as described in [5] may be automated. The presentation of the
semantics of patterns as a text in English was chosen in order
to aid communication between users, possibly with different
technical background, on how to interpret patterns.
F. Organisational appropriateness
OA.1 The language must be able to express the desired
conceptual safety design when applied in a safety context.
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The application of the SaCS pattern language produces
composite patterns that are instantiated into conceptual safety
designs. A composite pattern expresses a combination of basic
patterns. The basic patterns express safety engineering best
practices and concepts inspired by international safety stan-
dards and guidelines, e.g., [23][24][27]. International safety
standards and guidelines describe concepts and practices for
development of safety critical systems that may be perceived
as commonly accepted. The SaCS pattern language is tested
out in two cases. The ﬁrst concerned the conceptualisation of a
nuclear power plant control system, while the second addressed
the conceptualisation of a railway interlocking system, fully
detailed in [17] and [18], respectively. In both cases it was
possible to derive a conceptual safety design using the SaCS
language as support as well as model how patterns were
applied as support.
OA.2 The language must ease the comprehensibility of best
practices within conceptual safety design for relevant target
groups like system engineers, safety engineers, hardware and
software engineers.
We have already explained how basic patterns represent
concepts and best practices inspired by safety standards and
guidelines. Each basic pattern addresses a limited number of
phenomena. Basic patterns are combined into a composite
pattern where the composite addresses all relevant challenges
that occur in a speciﬁc context. A composite pattern as the
one presented in Fig. 1 ease the explanation of how several
concepts within conceptual safety design are combined and
applied.
Wong et al. [41] reviewed several large development
projects and software safety standards from different domains
with respect to cost effectiveness and concludes that although
standards provide useful and effective guidance, safety and
cost effectiveness objectives are successfully met by effective
planning and by applying safety engineering best practices ev-
idenced in company best practices throughout the development
life cycle. Compared to a standard or a guideline, a composite
pattern in the SaCS language may be used to capture such
a company speciﬁc best practice. In order to accommodate
different situations, different compositions of patterns may be
deﬁned.
OA.3 The language must be usable without the need of
costly tools.
Every pattern used in the cases described in [17][18] was
interpreted and applied in its context by a single researcher
with background from safety engineering. A conceptual safety
design was produced for each case. Every illustration in
[5][17][18] and in this paper is created with a standard drawing
tool.
V. RELATED WORK
In the literature, pattern approaches supporting develop-
ment of safety critical systems are poorly represented. In the
following we shortly discuss some different pattern approaches
and their relevancy to the development of conceptual safety
designs.
Jackson [42] presents the problem frames approach for
requirements analysis and elicitation. Although the problem
frames approach is useful for detailing and analysing a problem
and thereby detailing requirements, the problem classes pre-
sented in [42] are deﬁned on a very high level of abstraction.
The use of boilerplates [43][44] for requirement speciﬁca-
tion is a form of requirement templates but nonetheless touches
upon the concept of patterns. The boilerplate approach helps
the user phrase requirements in a uniform manner and to detail
these sufﬁciently. Although boilerplates may be useful for
requirement speciﬁcation, the focus in SaCS is more towards
supporting requirement elicitation and the understanding of the
challenges that appear in a speciﬁc context.
Withall [45] describes 37 requirements patterns for as-
sisting the speciﬁcation of different types of requirements.
The patterns are deﬁned at a low level; the level of a single
requirement. The patterns of Withall may be useful, but as
with the boilerplates approach, the patterns support more the
speciﬁcation of requirements rather than requirements elicita-
tion.
Patterns on design and architecture of software-based sys-
tems are presented in several pattern collections. One of the
well-known pattern collections is the one of Gamma et al.
[8] on recurring patterns in design of software based systems.
Without doubt, the different pattern collections and languages
on system design and architecture represent deep insight into
effective solutions. However, design choices should be founded
on requirements, and otherwise follow well established prin-
ciples of good design. The choice of applying one design
pattern over another should be based on a systematic process
of establishing the need in order to avoid design choices being
left unmotivated.
The motivations for a speciﬁc design choice are founded
on the knowledge gained during the development activities
applied prior to system design. Gnatz et al. [46] outline the
concept of process patterns as a means to address the recurring
problems and known solutions to challenges arising during
the development process. The patterns of Gnatz et al. are not
tailored for development of safety critical systems and thus do
not necessarily reﬂect relevant safety practices. Fowler presents
[7] a catalogue of 63 analysis patterns. The patterns do not
follow a strict format but represent a body of knowledge on
analysis described textually and by supplementary sketches.
While process patterns and analysis patterns may be rel-
evant for assuring that the development process applied is
suitable and leads to well informed design choices, Kelly
[10] deﬁnes patterns supporting safety demonstration in the
form of reusable safety case patterns. The patterns expressed
are representative for how we want to address the safety
demonstration concern.
A challenge is to effectively combine and apply the knowl-
edge on diverse topics captured in different pattern collections
and languages. Henninger and Correˆa [47] survey different
software pattern practices and states “software patterns and
collections tend to be written to solve speciﬁc problems with
little to no regard about how the pattern could or should be
used with other patterns”.
Zimmer [48] identiﬁes the need to deﬁne relationships
between system design patterns in order to efﬁciently combine
them. Noble [49] builds upon the ideas of Zimmer and deﬁnes
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a number of relationships such as uses, reﬁnes, used by,
combine, and sequence of as a means to deﬁne relationships
between system design patterns. A challenge with the relations
deﬁned by Noble is that they only specify relations on a very
high level. The relations do not have the expressiveness for
detailing what part of a pattern is used, reﬁned, or combined.
Thus, the approach does not facilitate a precise modelling of
relationships.
Bayley and Zhu [50] deﬁne a formal language for pattern
composition. The authors argue that design patterns are almost
always to be found composed with each other and that the
correct applications of patterns thus relies on precise deﬁnition
of the compositions. A set of six operators is deﬁned for
the purpose of deﬁning pattern compositions. The language is
exempliﬁed on the formalisation of the relationships expressed
between software design patterns described by Gamma et al.
[8]. As we want the patterns expressed in the SaCS language
to be understandable to a large community of potential users,
we ﬁnd this approach a bit too rigid.
Smith [51] presents a catalogue of elementary software
design patterns in the tradition of Gamma et al. [8] and
proposes the Pattern Instance Notation (PIN) for expressing
compositions of patterns graphically. The notation uses simple
rounded rectangles for abstractly representing a pattern and its
associated roles. Connectors deﬁne the relationships between
patterns. The connectors operate on the deﬁned roles of
patterns. The notation is comparable to the UML collaboration
notation [52].
UML collaborations [52] are not directly instantiable. In-
stances of the roles deﬁned in a collaboration that cooperates
as deﬁned creates the collaboration. The main purpose is to
express how a system of communicating entities collectively
accomplishes a task. The notation is particularly suitable for
expressing system design patterns.
Several notations [53][54][55] for expressing patterns
graphically use UML [52] as its basis. The notations are
simple, but target the speciﬁcation of software.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented an analytical evaluation of the SaCS
pattern language with respect to six different appropriateness
factors. We arrived at the following conclusions:
• Domain: In the design of the SaCS language we have
as much as possible selected keywords and icons
in the spirit of leading literature within the area.
This indicates that we at least are able to represent
a signiﬁcant part of the concepts of relevance for
conceptual safety design.
• Modeller: There may be relevant tacit knowledge that
is not easily externalised as the SaCS language is
today. However, the opportunity of increasing the
number of basic patterns makes it possible to at least
reduce the gap.
• Participants: The terms used for concepts have been
carefully selected based on leading terminology within
safety engineering. The SaCS language facilitates rep-
resenting the application of best practices within safety
design and mirror leading international standards; in
particular IEC 61508.
• Comprehensibility: The comprehension of individual
patterns and pattern compositions is supported by the
use of terms commonly applied within the relevant
industrial domains as well as by the application of
principles of good design in visualisations, such as
the Gestalt principles of perception [35][38].
• Tool: Tool support may be provided on the basis of
the syntax and semantics of the SaCS language [5].
• Organisational: Organisations developing safety crit-
ical systems are assumed to follow a development
process in accordance to what is required by standards.
Wong et al. [41] reviewed several large development
projects and software safety standards from differ-
ent domains with respect to cost effectiveness and
concludes that although standards provide useful and
effective guidance, safety and cost effectiveness objec-
tives are successfully met by effective planning and by
applying safety engineering best practices evidenced
in company best practices throughout the development
life cycle. SaCS patterns may be deﬁned, applied, and
combined in a ﬂexible manner to support company
best practices and domain speciﬁc best practices.
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